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ABSTRACT 
There are dozens of autonomous trade unions in Algeria, forming a heterogeneous 
political body within the dispersed opposition in the country. Autonomous trade 
unions are social movements that aim to defend workers’ rights through multiple 
organizational networks that consist of human rights groups, civil society 
associations and political parties. None of the single oppositional groups, whether 
autonomous trade unions, oppositional political parties or civil society actors, have 
succeeded in the formation of a credible, cohesive and unified alternative force to 
the state authorities in order to challenge the power elite in the country. 
In mapping and analyzing the trade union movement, its networks and 
development in Algeria as well as problematizing its functioning and contribution to 
social change through normatively expressed democracy building, this thesis 
concentrates on the most conspicuous oppositional unions and their created 
confederations over the last 30 years, since their official establishment amid 1989 
constitutional reform. Secondly, it contemplates how the state authorities manage 
peaceful societal protest and the challenge presented by these oppositional unions. 
Thirdly, it explores how the citizenship demanded by these autonomous union 
activists are negotiated through nonviolent acts of citizenship in the public space.  
The empirical material of this thesis comprises ethnographic fieldwork, 
participant observation, interviews and media analysis. Through partial knowledge, 
it is possible to understand social phenomena such as trade unionism and political 
activism. While autonomous trade unions are observed as social actors within the 
societal level, this study approaches individual activists through the theoretical 
framework of acts of citizenship. It enables us to understand citizenship as 
transformation through acts instead of perceiving citizenship as an institutional 
status. 
I analyze interviews and other existing research material, such as media articles 
and other available literature, through discourse analyses, concentrating on the 
historical and contemporary construction of antagonistic discourses. Various 
identities and hegemonic discourses are shaped within nodal points, forming 
understanding and representations of the world, as well as dislocated discourses 
within ruptures and the emergence of split subjects. 
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Political engagement involves activists around the country, from cities and 
villages. They depict and stress their political participation via social grievances 
especially related to work, working conditions and contracts of employment. 
Autonomous trade unions bring together members from varied backgrounds, 
breaking certain stereotypes related to religion, political ideology and gender 
associated with Muslim-majority countries.  
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Algeriassa toimii kymmeniä autonomisia ammattiyhdistyksiä. Niiden muodostama 
monitahoinen poliittinen ryhmä on osa maan hajanaista oppositioliikettä. 
Autonomiset ammattiyhdistykset ovat sosiaalisia joukkoliikkeitä, joiden 
tarkoituksena on puolustaa työläisten oikeuksia ihmisoikeusjärjestöjä, 
kansalaisyhteiskunnan yhdistyksiä sekä poliittisia puolueita järjestöverkostojen 
kautta. Yksikään oppositioryhmä, olivatpa kyseessä autonomiset ammattiyhdistykset, 
poliittiset puolueet tai muut kansalaisyhteiskunnan toimijat, ei ole onnistunut 
muodostamaan uskottavaa, yhtenäistä vastavoimaa valtaapitäville.  
Algerian ammattiyhdistysliikkeen kartoittamisen ja analysoinnin avulla 
hahmotetaan liikkeen verkostojen muotoutumista. Samalla sen yhteiskunnallisen 
muutoksen panosta problematisoidaan normatiivisen demokratian 
rakentamispuheen kautta. Tässä väitöskirjassa keskitytään viimeisten 30 vuoden 
aikana toimineisiin näkyvimpiin hallituksen vastaisiin ammattiyhdistysliikkeisiin, 
jotka perustettiin asteittain vuoden 1989 perustuslaillisen uudistuksen yhteydessä, 
sekä yksittäisten ammattiyhdistysten muodostamiin konfederaatioihin. Väitöskirja 
tarkastelee, kuinka maan viranomaiset hallinnoivat rauhanomaista sosiaalista 
protestia ja hallituksen vastaisten ammattiyhdistysten luomaa haastetta. Lisäksi 
pohditaan, kuinka autonomisten ammattiyhdistysliikkeiden aktivistien vaatimista 
kansalaisoikeuksista keskustellaan väkivallattomina kansalaisuustekoina (nonviolent 
acts of citizenship).  
Työn empiirinen materiaali koostuu etnografisesta kenttätyöstä, osallistuvasta 
havainnoinnista ja media-analyysistä. Osittaisen tiedon filosofian (partial knowledge) 
avulla on mahdollista ymmärtää sosiaalisia ilmiöitä kuten ammattiyhdistystoimintaa 
ja poliittista aktivismia. Samalla kun ammattiyhdistysliikkeitä tarkastellaan sosiaalisina 
toimijoina yhteiskunnallisella tasolla, tutkimus lähestyy yksittäisiä aktivisteja 
kansalaisuustekojen teoreettisesta viitekehyksestä. Se mahdollistaa 
kansalaisoikeuksien muotoutumisen ymmärtämisen tekemisen kautta sen sijaan, että 
kansalaisoikeudet hahmotetaan institutionaalisena statuksena. 
Analysoin haastatteluja ja tutkimusmateriaalia diskurssianalyysilla keskittyen 
vastakkaisten diskurssien rakentumiseen. Erilaiset ”solmukohdissa” (nodal points) 
muodostuvat identiteetit ja hegemoniset diskurssit – myös katvealueille jääneet 
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diskurssit ja hajaantuneet toimijuudet – ilmentävät ymmärrystä sekä representaatioita 
maailmasta. Etenkin työhön, työoloihin ja -sopimuksiin liittyvät sosiaaliset epäkohdat 
osallistavat eritaustaisia aktivisteja poliittiseen toimintaan ympäri maata rikkoen 
stereotypioita, joita liitetään uskontoon, poliittiseen ideologiaan ja sukupuoleen 
muslimienemmistöisissä maissa.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Beginnings 
Dozens of oppositional autonomous trade unions in Algeria operate within the civil 
society level, organizing nonviolent protests, rallies, sit-ins, demonstrations, hunger 
strikes, petitions and media coverage. Activists occupy public spaces for their 
political activities and demand their citizenship rights. Created officially one after 
another since the August 1990 and in the aftermath of October 1988 uprisings1, 
autonomous trade unions form a significant part of the dispersed opposition 
movement in the country. They challenge the state authorities on democratic 
practices in general and on issues related to work or working conditions in particular. 
Their existence and vigour emanate from the 1988-1992 period of democratization, 
or “opening” as they call it, and continue systematically to demand the actualization 
of democratic reforms guaranteed by the constitutional reform of 1989.  
Oppositional autonomous trade unions aim at democracy building through 
contestation by civil servants and claim equal rights for all workers, while protesting 
against any form of discrimination, inequality and exclusion. One of the main 
normative objectives of the autonomous trade union movement is to gather 
Algerians into organized unions, social movements, to struggle for better quality in 
public services to improve their working conditions by protecting their interests to 
gain better livelihoods. Promoting unity of collective action with other forces of 
social movements, the union is seen not only as an entity in itself, but also as a tool 
for workers.  
This thesis, anchored in peace research (PR), examines nonviolent acts of 
citizenship and the contribution of the independent trade union movement to social 
change in the post-conflict environment as their claimed objective of implementing 
normative characteristics of sustainable democracy building. This research focuses 
 
1   The October uprisings, also called the “October riots” or “bread riots”, erupted 4-10 October 1988, 
showing the depth of the discontent amongst the youth. The army fired on the demonstrators leading 
to the deaths of hundreds and imposed the state of emergency for the first time since the end of 
Algerian War of Independence (Volpi 2003, 38-45; Liverani 2008, 27, 71). I prefer to define the 
incidents of 1988 with the term October uprisings, which is, I believe, a more neutral concept regarding 
for the events. 
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on the oppositional social movements underlining the role of autonomous trade 
unions. I conducted the major part of my fieldwork by interacting and interviewing 
mostly the members of independent trade union SNAPAP2 and the General 
Autonomous Confederation for Algerian Workers (Confédération Générale Autonome des 
Travailleurs Algériens, CGATA3).  
While other independent trade unions, especially in the public sectors of 
education and healthcare are included in the analysis, I have concentrated mainly on 
SNAPAP, the most active and visible autonomous trade union since the 2000s. In 
addition, my interviews included members from CNES4, SATEF5, CNAPEST6 and 
human rights association LADDH7, all of which play an important role in the 
network of autonomous unions. SNAPAP functions in all public sector 
establishments and works in close cooperation with many salient movements, 
unions, associations, confederations and groups in the context of larger network of 
the oppositional social movement. My analysis starts from the 1988 October 
uprisings and ends in 2018, before the mass demonstrations of February 2019.   
SNAPAP was officially the first autonomous trade union since the enactment of 
laws 90-14 and 90-02 in 1990, though various autonomous unions existed already 
before constitutional change. The official creation of SNAPAP, in connection with 
the political pluralization and the birth of multipartyism, broke the monopoly of the 
long-standing General Union of Algerian Workers (Union Générale des Travailleurs 
Algériens UGTA), which had played important role in the liberation war (1954-1962) 
and served as the only representative of Algerian workers since independence in 
1962. Autonomous trade unions challenge the hegemonic position of UGTA, which 
is supported by the state authorities. According to the members of oppositional 
autonomous trade unions, the Algerian official authorities tolerate, but do not accept 
the pluralism of the trade unionism. UGTA and oppositional autonomous trade 
 
2 The National Autonomous Union of Public Administration Staff (Syndicat National Autonome des 
Personelles de l’Administration Publique). 
3   CGATA was established in 2013 and is affiliated by five autonomous trade unions: SNAPAP, SESS 
(Syndicat des enseignants du supérieur solidaire), SNATEG (Syndicat national des travailleurs de 
l’électricité et du gaz), SNAP (Syndicat national des postiers) and SAATT (Syndicat autonome algérien 
des travailleurs de transport). 
4   The National Council for Higher Education Professors (Conseil National des Professeurs du Supérieur). 
5   The Autonomous Union of Workers of Education and Training (Syndicat Autonome des Travailleurs de 
l’Éducation et de la Formation).  
6  The Autonomous National Council of Secondary and Technical Education Teachers (Conseil National 
Autonomes des Professeurs de l’enseignement Secondaire et Technique). 
7    The Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights (La Ligue algérienne pour la défense des droits de 
l’homme). 
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unions accuse each other of unpatriotic behaviour, political manipulation, and the 
destabilization of the country. Using discourse analysis, I contextualize and 
deconstruct these antagonistic polar discourses and locate them against the historical 
and contemporary social framework they are produced by.  
Due to the atrocities during the civil war in the 1990s, the reforms of the 
democratic period (1988-1992) were halted and the activities of the autonomous 
trade unions diminished, although some major demonstration and rallies, organized 
especially by the CNES, took place in the education and healthcare sectors. During 
the civil war and especially after the peace process, SNAPAP also started to be 
accommodate a more oppositional stance. The civil war and weakened security 
situation marginalized the independent unions and their achieved position 
guaranteed in the constitutional reforms in 1990. After the war gradually came to an 
end, after the 2000s, fierce struggles took place between the autonomous trade 
unions and state authorities. Trade union pluralism, according to oppositional 
autonomous trade union activists, was no longer self-evident. This phase can be 
considered the most ferocious period of contestation. It entailed a severe 
confrontation between SNAPAP, other autonomous trade unions, and the state 
authorities. The members of the independent unions argue that they were not able 
to function as traditional trade unions, which transformed the network of various 
associations, unions, political parties, and human rights groups into more of a 
political protest movement that started to demand the fulfillment of their political 
rights. Due to asymmetric power relations, this oppositional protest movement 
organized demonstrations in the public space to pressure the authorities to make 
political concessions and to gain popular support through the mobilization of the 
Algerian public for their objectives.   
During the 2000s, the peace process gave the hope of achieving a gradual 
sustainable democratic development. The attempts of the autonomous trade unions 
to challenge the state authorities lost endorsement due to the increasing socio-
economic improvements related to increased energy incomes. Political passivity, at 
least from the formal manifest perspective8, can be considered as a significant 
phenomenon. The autonomous trade unions struggled to achieve the status of trade 
union pluralism, while the authorities held the advantage due to higher energy prices, 
which meant more income and investments for socio-economic development. 
 
8    Ekman, Joakim & Amnå, Erik (2012, 295) Political Participation and Civic Engagement: Towards 
a New Typology. Human Affairs 22, pp. 283-300. Ekman and Amnå argue that there exist active forms 
of political disengagement that may depict well the context in Algeria. While youth and population in 
general demonstrated passive manifest political engagement, various forms of active political 
disengagement took place in Algeria within sport (football) and cultural (literature, arts, music) spheres. 
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Simultaneously, unions functioning within public sector suffered from the 
strengthening role of the private sector in the Algerian economy9. This structural 
environment, where dialogical process takes place, needs constant attention within 
this analysis.      
In 2011, long-term rulers stepped aside, one after another, in Tunisia and Egypt, 
due to pressure from millions of people who filled the symbolic public spaces in 
their respective countries. The non-state actors and civil society (trade unions and 
other social movements), often initially led by young activists, played a significant 
role in mobilizing the mass demonstrations. While the socio-economic factors — 
rapid population growth and the “youth bulge”, youth unemployment, 
marginalization and lack of prospects, oppression, corruption and rapid neoliberal 
economic programs —  have often been considered as the key factors regarding the 
dissatisfaction and challenges, they alone cannot fully explain the timing and the 
complex processes that were behind the mass gatherings.  
While I consider the autonomous trade unions as one actor among many in the 
larger picture of Algeria’s political environment, I argue that they do play an 
prominent role in the construction and formation of state-society and employee 
relations in contemporary Algeria. For example, SNAPAP, which has activities 
across the country, has claimed to comprise about 300 000-500 000 members, of 
which 40 000-50 000 are contributive members, while the membership of the 
confederation CGATA is claimed to be 268 00010. Its management insists on its 
independence from the Algerian government as well as from all political formations. 
On its website11 in 2012, SNAPAP defined its mission: To defend material and moral 
interests of the workers in the public functional sector; to defend syndicalist liberties; to promote 
action and syndicalist culture; and to sensitize the actors to defend the social gains. SNAPAP’s 
purported aim has been to offer the space for dialogue, exchange and solidarity, and 
it cooperates with other social movements in defending the trade union freedoms 
and rights, working for the construction of pluralistic and federalist trade unionism 
that accept diversity of opinion and struggles for broader social improvements. In 
addition, SNAPAP has also been behind the creation of numerous other social 
movements (See Chapter VII) around the country that challenge the authorities, on 
matters ranging from unemployed workers to opposing the drilling of the shale gas.  
 
9   The Report. Algeria 2017. Oxford Business Group. 
file:///C:/Users/km412377/AppData/Local/Temp/the-report-algeria-2017.pdf       
10    www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/15_01_22_list_affiliates_14th_gc-3.pdf 
11    http://www.maisondessyndicats-dz.com/historique.php (Retrieved in 7.2.2012, website does not 
function anymore). 
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In 2011, when the protests were depicted in the mainstream media as “the Arab 
Spring” began to spread, the autonomous trade unions in Algeria participated in 
creating the Coordination for Democratic Change (Coordination nationale pour le 
changement démocratique, CNDC) among opposition political parties, major 
political figures, youth and student groups, district committees, and human rights 
associations. SNAPAP and a few other autonomous trade unions comprised an 
important element inside the CNDC and called for reforms and peaceful democratic 
regime change. However, the Algerian protests were strictly controlled and never 
gained large participation, and CNDC soon split into two elements: political parties 
on one side, and civil society organizations, youth groups and autonomous trade 
unions on the other. The government responded by lowering the cost of cooking oil 
and sugar and by lifting the state of emergency that had come into effect in February 
1992 alongside the Islamist insurgency. For the CNDC, these announced reforms 
were not enough and they continued peaceful protests each Saturday until the 
movement gradually melted away. While these so-called “reforms” did not bring any 
real structural changes towards sustainable democratic development, it is similarly 
apparent that demonstrations never initiated large-scale support from the Algerian 
people.  
Since the 2011 uprisings, the autonomous trade union movement in Algeria has 
continued to challenge the authorities, although armed conflict and spirals of 
violence in the southern Mediterranean and in the Middle East have transformed the 
high hopes of achieving democracy and social justice into pessimism and despair. 
Today, the legacy of these popular demonstrations post-2011 seems modest after 
the power transitions turned into chaos and violence or into new forms of 
authoritarian rule within weakening socio-economic conditions. In Algeria too the 
attempts of the autonomous unions to mobilize Algerians gradually faded year by 
year and democratic social change seemed an ever more distant prospect. The 
dispersed oppositional trade union movement was not able to function efficiently or 
benefit from the growing discontent among the population related to the economic 
difficulties that the government was facing due to falling energy prices since 2015.    
1.2 International dimensions 
In this study, written at the Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) in Finland, I want 
to highlight the immediate proximity and economic importance of North Africa 
regarding the EU´s southern policies. Algeria has been an important energy supplier 
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for the EU, which is struggling to strengthen European energy security12. While 
many of the problems underlying the 2011 popular uprisings in the neighbouring 
countries were also present in Algeria, this role as a major energy supplier remained 
stable13, at least during the years of instability in the region. Attempts to mobilize the 
masses in the streets lacked popular support from among the majority of Algerians 
and the occasional protests that did occur did not result in crucial pressure for major 
changes of a social, economic or political nature. Many trade unionists were losing 
hope that social change would lead to sustainable democracy building, until the 
February 2019 uprisings, or the “Smiling Revolution” spurred massive mobilizations 
around the country that led to birth of the so-called “Hirak movement” and the 
resignation of the President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. The election of Abdelmadjid 
Tebboune as President in December 2019 on a relatively weak voter turnout did not 
halt the mobilizations, which took place on Mondays and Fridays.  
The context of trade unionism in different states of North Africa is varied and I 
would not suggest positing too many similarities among them. While it is probably 
too early to draw far-reaching conclusions on the role of the autonomous trade 
unions in instigating the February 2019 mobilizations in Algeria, some autonomous 
union activists believe that their contribution seemed to be quite limited. In Egypt 
and Tunisia, on the other hand, the impact of the trade unions can be considered 
crucial in ousting the governments of Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali 
in 2011. Trade union participation in the protests paralyzed societal functions, which 
further increased the pressure that led to the dismissals of the former Presidents. 
The 2011 uprisings prompted many scholars to pose questions concerning agency 
and change in relation to the definition of new social spaces to track emergent social 
and political settings14. Trade unions were a significant force, especially in Tunisia 
and Egypt.  They showed the capacity to mobilize broad participation of the workers 
during the uprisings that increased the societal pressure leading to the ousting of two 
longstanding presidents15. The uprisings and the socio-political upheaval that 
 
12   According to the Green paper: a strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy (2006, 3) half of the 
gas consumption in the EU comes from three countries (Russia, Norway and Algeria) and on current 
trends the imports will increase to 80% over the next 25 years. Currently Algeria is the third largest 
natural gas supplier and an important oil supplier of the EU (European Commission 2019). 
13  Silvia Colombo (The Southern Mediterranean: Between Changes and Challenges to its Sustainability, 
MEDPRO Technical Report no. 1, November 2010) separates sustainability from stability, arguing 
that the apparent stability internally and externally can take place without sustainable development 
covering development processes within institutions, norms and values. 
14    Bayat, Asef (2013, x) Life as politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East. Cairo: AUC Press. 
15   Bishara, Dina (2014) Labor Movements in Tunisia and Egypt: Drivers vs. Objects of Change in 
Transition from Authoritarian Rule. SWP Comments 1. January 2014; Yousfi, Héla (2015) L’UGTT, 
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followed in the southern Mediterranean continue to evoke a preoccupation with the 
conditions, organization, mobilization, and the structures of the social movements 
and especially trade union movement.  
There are many reasons for the resilient and ongoing functioning of the 
autonomous trade unions in Algeria. However, one seems to be the inefficiency of 
the UGTA to separate itself from the ruling authorities and identify itself as 
oppositional organization and to offer reliable protection for workers living in 
challenging social conditions and who perceive critical posture towards the so-called 
power elite or power (pouvoir)16. Low salaries and rising living costs prompt many 
Algerians to rely on interpersonal networks to cope with the conditions of daily life. 
During the civil war of 1992-2000, Algeria was exposed to structural adjustment 
programs through loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and neoliberal 
austerity politics that undermined the public sector17. These processes have naturally 
weakened trade unions operating within the public sector. For example, UGTA lost 
much popularity and credibility in the 1990s when it was powerless to prevent the 
weakening of the public sector in preference to international organizations that were 
able to interfere with Algerian societal structures.    
In 2013, SNAPAP and other autonomous trade unions formed a new 
confederation, CGATA, to challenge more widely the hegemonic confederal 
position of the UGTA. The new confederation is still waiting for official 
authorization to function legally. CGATA and many other oppositional autonomous 
trade unions were missing from the list, published in March 2018 by the Ministry of 
Employment, where 66 trade unions where officially (re)recognized. However, the 
affiliation of the CGATA to International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)18 as 
a second Algerian trade union confederation alongside with UGTA was considered 
an important victory for the autonomous trade unions and shows the 
internationalization of the struggle of autonomous unions. Gaining international 
recognition of their existence, while unauthorized in Algeria, sends an important 
message to the Algerian authorities while further accelerating the power struggle and 
 
Une passion Tunisienne: Enquête sur les syndicalistes en révolution 2011-2014. Tunis: Institut de 
recherche sur le Maghreb contemporaine (IRMC). 
16   The word power (pouvoir in French) is often used to depict the state authorities or “those who 
have power”. 
17   Liverani, Andrea (2008, 24) The Civil Society in Algeria: The political functions of associational 
life. Oxon: Routledge.  
18     ITUC is world's largest trade union federation, formed in 2006 and represents 175 million workers 
within 156 countries (www.ituc-csi.org). ITUC emerged from the assimilation of International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the World Confederation of Labour (WCL).  
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agency related to projection of nationalism, workers’ rights and democratic 
sustainability.  
Autonomous trade unions and various international non-governmental 
organizations reported regularly about the restrictions and even violent harassments 
related to the running of the autonomous trade unions in Algeria. They have argued, 
and continue to argue, that autonomous trade unions, including SNAPAP, are facing 
serious challenges vis-à-vis the Algerian authorities. According to ITUC’s Annual 
Survey of violations of trade union rights, Amnesty International, EuroMed Rights 
and the Solidarity Center, the activities of the autonomous trade unions are 
hampered and activists are persecuted, threatened and harassed. Additionally, these 
independent unions have experienced exclusion from the official collective 
bargaining and social dialogue in the context of annual tripartite meetings (labor 
unions-employers-government). Since the asymmetric power relations have 
prevented autonomous trade unions to achieve their objectives, they are increasingly 
have to ensure that they can function with the help of international organizations. 
Many consider these international responses as external meddling in Algerian 
internal affairs, while others are disappointed at the lack of stronger support from 
these international organizations. 
1.3  Nonviolence 
I relate the Algerian autonomous trade unions at the larger societal level to social 
movement theories (SMT). Autonomous trade unions stress their nonviolence and 
democratic objectives when highlighting their objectives in the context of normative 
sustainable democracy building. The nonviolence techniques practiced by 
autonomous trade union activists are pragmatic, normative, expressive, and 
communicative and it would be therefore reductive to deduce their content only in 
terms of the traditional rejection or opposition to violence and deprivation of human 
life. Within this more versatile tradition, communication in the public space and 
social movement are tools, whereas peaceful techniques are used to struggle for 
stated normative aims such as freedom, democracy and respect for human rights.  
Social change, independence and freedom struggles are often highlighted as part 
of violent combats, though social change can generate through nonviolent processes 
as well19. In Algeria, the armed struggle of Islamist groups have understandably 
 
19   Bartkowski, Maciej J. (Ed.) (2013, 4) Recovering Nonviolent History – Civil Resistance in 
Liberation Struggles. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers; Vinthagen, Stellan (2015a, 4) A 
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gained more visibility over recent years than the civil and nonviolent resistance of 
the autonomous trade unions, human rights associations and some political 
oppositional parties around them20. One of my goals in this thesis is to shed light on 
the apparent and natural heterogeneity of Algerian society instead of underlining 
dichotomies such as “Islamists and others”. Therefore, I stress that individual actors 
that operate within autonomous trade unions are young, old, female, male, leftist, 
communist, nationalist, of diverse ethnicities, rightwing, Islamist, secular and even 
anarchic, and so forth. I understand the concept of social change in this study 
extensively as being related to democracy building or processes of democratization 
in general that comprise social factors, the establishment of democratic institutions 
and other determinants of democratic sustainability (See Chapter II).    
Autonomous trade union members and activists use democracy-oriented rhetoric 
related to their activities and aim for social change to improve their personal position 
as a citizens, workers and family members. In numerous events they exercise their 
civic rights and participate in negotiations, debates and struggles about the meaning 
of citizenship. Therefore, it was natural to connect the theoretical framework of this 
thesis to citizenship studies. The demanded, defined and constructed understanding 
of citizenship articulates through acts in the public space and therefore citizenship is 
not understood here as simply status or practice. Engin F. Isin and Greg M. Nielsen 
argue that citizenship is shaped through motion or movement, an actor is formed 
through acts21. Mobilizing and organizing political nonviolent actions (sit-ins, strikes, 
rallies) as well as public events (meetings, demonstrations) around the country, can 
be considered as communicative performance taking place in the public space, to 
have an impact on Algerian popular public opinion through contingent articulation 
to win the support of citizens for their cause. These acts are approached via the 
theory of the acts of citizenship developed by Isin and Nielsen. When autonomous 
trade unions organize a demonstration in the public space to push the government 
to improve citizenship rights, they aim to communicate with the audience, the 
Algerian people, to mobilize them for their contestation. Simultaneously they 
transform themselves as citizens, or more accurately activist citizens, through acts.  
To achieve their goals, activists are obliged to perform within hegemonic 
asymmetric social structures. They use democracy-oriented rhetoric for change and 
 
Theory of Nonviolent Action: How Civil Resistance Works. London: Zed Books. Benamrouche, 
Amar (2000, 11) Grèves et conflits politiques en Algérie. France: Éditions Karthala. 
20      Benamrouche, Amar (2000, 11) Grèves et conflits politiques en Algérie. France: Éditions Karthala. 
21    Isin, Engin F. & Nielsen, Greg M. (Eds.) (2008) Acts of Citizenship. London & New York: Zed 
Books. 
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use nonviolent practices, because that seems to be the only option available within 
the asymmetric power relations, where authorities have a monopoly on violence 
through the management of the police and armed forces. This does not imply that 
asymmetric power relations are the only reason exclusively why these activists use 
democracy-oriented rhetoric or that they would not genuinely aspire for sustainable 
democratic social change and citizenship rights. There are various other peaceful 
repertoires at their disposal, such as nonviolent protests, non-cooperation, 
interventions, civil disobedience and negotiation.  
There exist many examples of negotiations between autonomous trade unions 
and the government. During the 1990s and 2000s especially, multiple acts of dialogue 
took place. In recent years the Ministry of Education negotiated with several 
autonomous trade unions to halt protests that affected the continuity of studies and 
the possibility to receive education without strikes and other forms of action that 
disrupted the school year whether in the levels of elementary or higher education. 
While the outcome was often estimated as modest, they show the weight these 
unions can generate to achieve minimum dialogue with the authorities. 
Simultaneously, most vocal oppositional unions were excluded from the latest 
negotiations. 
In my interviews (see Chapter III) I have been interested in why Algerian activists 
joined autonomous trade unions and how they understand the concept of 
citizenship. I have also sought to outline the larger experience of the interviewees 
regarding their background, political views, future prospects and construction of 
historical perspective to understand more profoundly the motives behind their 
activism. I am therefore interested in those Algerians who participate in social 
movements, aim at social change, and are ready to act to fulfill their objectives. 
However, it would be incorrect to claim that these individuals represent the majority 
of Algerians. Being an activist in Algeria has been a marginal phenomena and many 
surveys, as I will later show, confirmed that evident political disengagement was 
relatively widespread in the country before the 2019 uprisings. This does not mean 
that political passivity as such is considered as a marginal phenomenon or that 
Algerians are not interested in politics. 
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1.4 Outline of the study 
This thesis is divided into theoretical (Chapter II), methodological (Chapter III) and 
analytical sections (Chapters V, VI and VII) to separate the more profound 
discussions from each other. This does not mean that they are not interrelated; 
however, I wanted to treat certain detailed thematics separately, such as the 
genealogies of the concepts, development of theories and decisions on which 
methodological tools were adapted, to concentrate on each topic in a respective 
chapter with as few interruptions as possible during the analysis of autonomous trade 
unions. The research questions are presented in the final section of this introduction.  
In the second chapter, I introduce the theoretical framework of this study. My 
objective is to increase knowledge about the autonomous trade union movement, its 
networks and development in Algeria. I use social movement theory (SMT) at the societal 
level when approaching the unions as actors, while the theory of Acts of citizenship 
introduced by Engin F. Isin22 and Greg M. Neilsen, is used when reflecting agencies 
of individual activists. The act of a trade union activist ruptures the given moment 
breaking their habitus forming the actor. Actors actualize acts and themselves 
through action. Simultaneously, acts and action are separated categories, while 
concurrently related classes of phenomena, because as Isin and Nielsen stress, acts 
can have a virtual existence while action is always actual, as I will discuss in more 
depth later on23.    
I then turn to the methodological discussion, where I introduce major tools of 
this thesis, fieldwork and discourse analysis, and conclude the theoretical discussion. 
I mainly use the discourse theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe24 when I 
problematize the discourses from the interviews with the union activists as well as 
of other material, such as the media, governmental reports and existing public 
responses. They shape historical and contemporary antagonistic nodal points that are 
formed through various identities within hegemonic discourses, social antagonism, 
dislocated discourses within ruptures, and the emergence of split subjects25.  
 
22    Isin, Engin F. & Nielsen, Greg M. (Ed.) (2008) Acts of Citizenship. London & New York: Zed 
Books. 
23    Isin (2008, 36). 
24   Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal (2001, xiii) [1985] Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics. London and New York: Verso.  
25  Torfing, Jacob (2005, 14-17) Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments, and Challenges, in 
David Howarth and Jacob Torfing (Eds.), Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and 
Governance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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I narrate the background of the development of trade unionism through existing 
literature as well as its implications for Algerian worker’s movement in particular in 
Chapter IV. This part can be considered as the historical framework where I develop 
my understanding of the birth of the contemporary autonomous trade union 
movement. My intention is not to write historiography about trade unionism in 
Algeria. I rather stress the examples of historical discussions, with an eye to the 
relevant features to contextualize this thesis within broader phenomena and to 
understand contemporary trade unionism in Algeria in relation to wider debates 
related to the capitalist economic order, political practices, balance of power relations 
and functioning of social movements.    
The three analytic chapters deal with the contemporary autonomous trade union 
movement. In Chapter V, I approach the emergence of these unions starting from 
the 1988 October uprisings that led to constitutional reform, which enabled political 
pluralism. I analyze the development of the autonomous trade union movement 
during the civil war, which halted the democratic period 1988-1992. In the chapter 
VI, I elaborate the position of these unions during the peace process and its 
aftermath, which I consider as the fiercest period within the contestation. In the 
post-conflict societal environment the autonomous trade union movement struggled 
forcibly to maintain political rights guaranteed within constitutional reform before 
the civil war. Finally, in the chapter VII, I problematize the positive connotations 
that were often connected to 2011 uprisings reflecting the regional upheaval in the 
Algerian context. I end my analysis at 2018, which marked despair and frustration 
among oppositional trade union movement about achieving social change, 
sustainable democracy building, and citizenship rights. Finally, I conclude with my 
findings of this thesis.  
 
1.5 Research objectives 
In this thesis, my aim is to analyze the Algerian autonomous trade union movement, 
to define accurate concepts to understand and explain this phenomena, and to 
respond to the following research questions:  
What are the nonviolent acts of citizenship of the autonomous trade unions 
in Algeria? 
This question yields three secondary research questions: 
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- What are the contributions of the independent trade unions to social change 
in Algeria and how do they implement the democracy building? 
- How the Algerian ruling authorities manage the nonviolent acts of 
citizenship conducted by the autonomous trade unions? 
- How the citizenship demanded by independent trade union activists is 
negotiated through nonviolent acts of citizenship in the public space? 
Each of the three secondary questions will be approached separately within the 
analytical chapters five, six and seven. However, after the question is presented it is 
carried along within other sections, due to the relational and interconnected 
character of the social world.  
Civil society in Algeria can be described as versatile and manifold. It includes a 
diverse range of voluntary associations and grassroots groupings. Following the 
official figures for the numbers of associations, Algeria represented in the past one 
of the most rich and “association dense” states in the eastern and western 
Mediterranean26. The emergence of associational life that coincided with the failed 
liberalization process of 1988-2000 have led to the success of numerous association 
to represent a mechanism  to expand political freedoms in the forms of collective 
empowerment and political participation, while the regime has been averse in 
tolerating oppositional autonomous groups whether traditional, religious or 
professional27.  
Various movements (women’s organizations, trade unions, environmental 
groups, solidarity organizations, and peace movements) use nonviolent tactics to 
advance their interests, world views and ideas to achieve social change that promote 
their aspired objectives. The main goal of autonomous trade unions in general has 
been to develop their independence from the state-led UGTA, the only such partner 
for the Algerian state, to enter the tripartite negotiations (labor unions-employers-
government). Members of these unions argue that UGTA serves as a strategic 
partner for the state authorities in exercising governmental sovereign power in the 
organization of the labor market and state affairs in the wider scope of economic 
policies, both in the domestic and foreign domains. The concept of ‘autonomous’28 
 
26   Liverani, Andrea (2008, 1) The Civil Society in Algeria: The political functions of associational life. 
Oxon: Routledge 
27   Liverani (2008, 5). 
28   In this thesis I understand the words “autonomous” and “independent” as synonyms. During the 
interviews the word autonomous was referred to being independent from the state, UGTA and the 
power (pouvoir). I was not able to trace any direct links between the Algerian autonomous trade union 
movement and the so-called movement of “autonomism”, which was heterogenous international 
 26 
refers mainly to actions beyond the UGTA, meaning the independence from the 
official authorities.   
 
 
 
movement influenced by ideas of Italian Autonomists related to Italian workers struggles during 
1960s-1970s. However, this does not mean that the Algerian autonomous trade unions are without 
influence like, for example, the French autonomous movements (mouvance autonome en France), 
consisted of communists, anarchists and Situationists since the 1960s, whether related to ideas or 
operations. 
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2 ACTS OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE PUBLIC SPACE 
The activists of the autonomous trade unions in Algeria explain their unionizing 
within normative arguments of democracy, freedom and equality, or citizenship 
rights, in the context of work and society at large. Their explicitly expressed aim is 
to achieve social change, or re-launch the process of democratization, which was 
according to their narrative halted due to 1990s civil war (See Chapter V). Social 
change can generate through violent or nonviolent processes. Algeria captures 
decades long tradition within non-violent resistance during the colonial period. 
While violent independence and freedom struggles receive often more attention, 
such as the Independence war of Algeria (1954-1962) or armed struggle of Islamist 
groups (1992-2000), the nonviolent civic resistance of the autonomous trade unions, 
human rights associations and some political oppositional parties around them 
should not be neglected.  
Social movement operating in the wider societal context forms through 
participant members and activists, thus individuals. Their motives, aspirations and 
desire to engage into movement are interlinked to their interpretation of experienced 
social and political environment. I use Social Movements Theory (SMT) in my 
approach on dozens of autonomous trade unions functioning in contemporary 
Algeria. These movements challenge the Algerian government and the largest trade 
union confederation, the close partner of the governmental authorities, General Union 
of Algerian Workers (Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens, UGTA)29. In general, 
the stated objective in addition with politicizing the workers’ rights in various sectors 
of the autonomous trade unions, has been developing their independence from 
UGTA, the only accepted partner of the state in tripartite arrangements (unions-
employers-government). The concept autonomous refers to these oppositional 
movements mainly labor actions outside the activities conducted by the UGTA and 
the government, as I will later explain more in details.  
The objective of this research is firstly to map and analyze the trade union 
movement, its networks and development in Algeria. Secondly, to problematize its 
functioning and contribution to social change through normatively expressed 
 
29   Founded in 1956 by activists situated in Algeria and France during the Algerian Independence war 
(Bourouiba 1998, 203-258), as explained in the previous chapter.          
 28 
democracy building. Thirdly, to look at how the state authorities manage peaceful 
development in Algeria and respond to the challenge of these oppositional 
autonomous unions. Fourthly, to explore how the citizenship demanded by these 
autonomous unions is negotiated through nonviolent acts of citizenship in the public 
space?  
While I consider the social movements as actors in the societal structures, at the 
individual level, dealing with agency of individuals, I operate within the theory of 
Acts of citizenship introduced by Engin F. Isin30 and Greg M. Neilsen. Their theory 
enables us to theorize the acts conducted by individual trade union activists, because 
they do not conceptualize citizenship as a general legal category or practice, but 
consider it as a phenomenon that comes into existence through motion and 
experience. The action performed by the movements are shaped from the singular, 
or individual, acts that are motivated in certain specific moments by longer-term 
historical conduct of social reality — the habitus. Therefore, the acts that creatively 
temporarily break the habitus and flourish in a specific moment in particular social 
circumstances form the aspired citizenship that represents the desired positionality 
in the society.  
Acting subjects actualize acts and themselves through action. Simultaneously, acts 
and action are distinct and separate (but related) classes of phenomena. In some 
occasions, they carry similar meanings. It is important to stress the importance of 
rupture: acts rupture or break the given orders, practices and habitus. Various 
creative ruptures and breaks, such as disagreements, take different forms that cannot 
be reduced or simplified. What actualizes an act cannot be decided in advance. 
However, actualization of acts provokes both responsibility and answerability, 
because acts always concern others and the Other. As I will show later on, it is the 
tension between responsibility and answerability that produces acts as ruptures in 
the given orders. Regarding ethics and politics, it is necessary to separate ethics and 
the ethical, politics and the political, though they are related but reducible aspects of 
acts.  
Based on mobilization, contestation, collective action and negotiation, members 
of the autonomous trade unions claim to represent justified political struggle to 
achieve social change. Activists or members, the actors, aim to gain more visibility 
for their cause by communicating in the public space  to encourage Algerian fellow 
citizens to join organized union and engage for nonviolent peaceful social change. 
Contributive members bring in financial resources needed to continue the action 
 
30   Isin, Engin F. & Nielsen, Greg M. (Ed.) (2008) Acts of Citizenship. London & New York: Zed Books. 
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because most of the oppositional autonomous unions do not enjoy any financial 
state support.   
To implement the theoretical approach more concretely, it is necessary to reflect 
the definition of principal concepts presented above. I am not aiming to make all-
inclusive universal definitions or fundamental and pervasive explanation regarding 
vast and context-related phenomena such as social change, social movement, 
citizenship, civil society and public space. Each concept will be articulated within 
their contexts and in relation with other social characteristics.  
This chapter starts by introducing the relevant literature on trade unionism in 
Algeria and situating this thesis in the context of transdisciplinary peace research. I 
consider the performances of autonomous trade union movement as nonviolent in 
the post-conflictual societal space. I will then elaborate various interpretations on 
social change and stress the normative characteristics of sustainable democracy 
building. I go to some lengths to discuss the theory of acts of citizenship, which I 
consider as the main theoretical framework for this thesis. Finally, the relevancy of 
public space as a site for mobilization and actualization of citizenship rights are 
approached from socio-economic perspectives as part of social theory.   
This theoretical background of this thesis concludes in Chapter III, after the 
methodological discussion. It is necessary to reflect the discourse analysis and its 
interplay with the theoretical framework to have a full picture how the social world, 
its functioning and experience of its interpretation is perceived. While some might 
call my approach as poststructuralist, hermeneutic or constructivist, I retreat from 
any such kind of labeling, maintaining the potentiality to operate within different 
tendencies and streams when necessary and fruitful. I understand social theory as an 
ever changing and transforming field that springs from multiple historical, 
recognized or non-recognized, traditions.  
2.1 Situating the thesis into transdisciplinary peace research 
 
There is a shortage of scholarship regarding the trade unionism in the Southern 
Mediterranean and a significant amount of it contains conceptualization and 
approaches that can be considered as Eurocentric or more broadly the so-called 
Western31. There is also a lack of academic articles or research conducted related to 
 
31   Beinin, Joel and Vairel, Frédéric (2011, 20) Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle 
East and North Africa. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
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the contemporary trade union movement in Algeria. There is even a broad vacuum 
concerning the history of the labor movement in the country. The works written by 
famous trade union activists Boualem Bourouiba32, Lakhdar Kaïdi (interview)33, 
Abdelmadjid Azzi34 and two books about Aïssat Idir written by Mohamed Fares and 
Hassan Aïssat (brother of Aïssat Idir) have tried to fill the gap. Also René Gallissot35 
and Charles-Robert-Ageron36 have written great analyses about the emergence of the 
Algerian trade union movement. In addition, there are a few other more historic 
perspectives on Algerian participation on French confederations CGT and CFTC 
and workers in general37, more related to the period of workers' self-management 
committees (1963-65) 38 and about the student union movements39.    
These major contributions, however, disclose little about the actual contemporary 
trade union movement in Algeria, especially the autonomous trade union movement. 
They are mostly descriptive, historically oriented works. In general, only a few works 
exist that deal with contemporary trade union pluralism in Algeria; a few of them are 
interview-based body of literature and some of them research articles40. I would like 
 
32   Bourouiba, Boualem (1998) Les syndicalistes algériens. Leur Combat. De l'éveil à la libération. 
Paris: L'Harmattan and Bourouiba, Boualem (2012) L'UGTA dans les premières années de 
l'indépendance (1962-1965): Un témoignage post mortem. Alger: Alger-Livres Éditions. 
33   Djabi, Nasser (2005) Kaidi Lakhdar, Une histoire du syndicalisme algérien: entretiens. Alger: 
Chihab Editions. 
34   Azzi, Abdelmadjid (2012) Le Mouvement Syndical Algérien à l'Épreuve de l'Indépendance. Alger: 
Alger-Livres Éditions. 
35  Gallissot, René (1969) Syndicalisme et nationalisme: La Fondation de l’Union Générale des 
Travailleurs Algériens, ou du syndicalisme C.G.T. au syndicalisme algérien (1954-1956-1958). Le 
Mouvement social No. 66 Jan.-Mar., 1969, pp. 7-55. 
36  Ageron, Charles-Robert (1989) Vers un syndicalisme national en Algérie (1946-1956). Revue 
d’Histoire Moderne & Contemporaine, Année 1989 36-3, pp. 450-463. 
37  Bentabet, Fathi (2016) Salaries, Patronat, Cgt Et Cftc En Algérie (Oranie) Du Front Populaire Au 
Gouvernement de Vichy (1936-1941). Creatspace Independent Publishing Platform; Bourdieu, Pierre; 
Darbel, Alain; Rivet, Jean-Paul and Sebel, Claude (1963) Travail et travailleurs en Algérie. Paris: Mouton. 
38  Clegg, Ian (1971) Workers’ Self-Management in Algeria. New York- London: Modern Reader; and more 
sources from the following link: https://autogestion.asso.fr/2238/ 
39  Clement, Moore Henry (2010) UGEMA: Union générale des étudiants musulmans algériens. Alger: Casbah 
éditions; Mahi, Ahmed (2014) De l’UGEMA à l’UNEA : Témoignage sur le mouvement étudiante (1959-
1965). INAS Éditions: Alger; Wallon, Dominique (2015) Combats étudiants pour l’indépendance de l’Algérie : 
UNEF-UGEMA (1955-1962). Alger: Casbah Editions. 
40  Chikhi, Said and El Kenz, Ali (1991) Workers’ Perceptions and Practices in Algeria: The Cases of 
the El Hadjar Iron and Steel Works and Rouiba Industrial Motor Car Plant, in Inga Brandell (Ed.) 
Workers in Third-World Industrialization. London: Macmillan, pp. 31-48; Chikhi, Said (1993) Question 
ouvrière et rapports sociaux en Algérie. NAQD no 6, septembre 1993 – mars 1994, pp. 3-19; 
Benamrouche, Amar (2000) Grèves et conflits politiques en Algérie. France: Éditions Karthala; Djabi, 
Abdennacer (2000) L’Algérie, du mouvement ouvrier syndical aux mouvement sociaux. Alger: Institut national 
du Travail (In Arabic); Chouicha, Kaddour (2008) Évolution du pluralisme syndical, in Mohammed 
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to highlight the importance for my study of the works of Amar Benamrouche, Inga 
Brandell, Said Chikhi, Kaddour Chouicha, Nacer Djabi, Larbi Graïne and Ali El 
Kenz. They have been a great help for me in trying to increase my understanding 
about complex organizational networks, histories and trade union practices in 
Algeria.  
There are a few academic studies available, though they concentrate on the 
opposition movement41 or civil society42 in general. I was also able to benefit from 
a few wide-ranging works in the context of employee relations in Algeria that set the 
structures for work related issues and employment policies43 as well as few studies 
that concentrate on female labor in the country44. Some of these contributions offer 
good descriptive documents, insightful interviews and deep philosophical and 
historical processing about trade unions and the major figures of the autonomous 
trade union movement in contemporary Algeria. Furthermore, current data in terms 
of contemporary collective actions of autonomous trade unions in Algeria relies 
 
Chentouf (Ed.) l’Algérie face á la mondialisation. Éditions Dakar: Codesria, pp. 277-300; Graïne, Larbi 
(2010) Algérie: Naufrage de la fonction publique et défi syndical – entretiens. Paris: L’Harmattan; Badoui, 
Mohamed Sofiane and Alimazighi, Kamel (2013) Le mouvement syndical algérien: origins, réalites et volonté 
d’autonomie. www.sciencelib.fr; Djabi, Nacer (Ed.) (2016) La cartographie syndicale algérienne… Aprés un 
quart de siècle de pluralisme. Editions Les Amis de Abdelhamid Benzine: Alger.  
41  Redjala, Ramdane (1988) L’Opposition en Algérie depuis 1962: tome 1 : le PRS-CNDR et le FFS. Paris: 
l’Harmattan; Islam Derradji (2012) La coordination nationale pour le changement et la démocratie algérienne et la 
réveil arabe: griefs, ressources et opportunité. (McGill University Thesis); Baamara, Layla (2017) La contestation 
institutionnalisée. Sociologie d’un parti d’opposition en contexte autoritaire : Le cas du Front des forces socialistes 
algérien. Thèse de doctorat en Science politique, Aix-Marseille Université. 
42  Liverani, Andrea (2008) The Civil Society in Algeria: The political functions of associational life. Oxon: 
Routledge; Addi, Lahouari (2011) Les obstacles à la formation de la société civile en Algérie, in Anna 
Bozzo and Pierre-Jean Luizard (Eds.) Les sociétés civiles dans le monde musulman. Paris: La Découverte; 
Galleze, Ouiza (2011) Evaluation du system associatif en Algérie : L’Importance de la formation sur le développement 
des acteurs associatifs. Algérie: Editions Dar Khettab; Salhi, Mohamed Brahim (2013) Reconstruire et produire 
du lien social dans la société civile algérienne du 21ème siècle : engagement citoyen et modes de mobilisation des jeunes 
dans les organisations de la société civile. Réghaïa – Algérie: ENAG; and Taib, Essaid (2014) Associations et 
société civile en Algérie. Alger: Office des publications universitaires. 
43  Musette, Mohammed Saib and Hammouda, Nacer Eddine (Eds.) (2006) La question de l’emploi au 
Maghreb central. Alger: CREAD; Branine, Mohamed; Fekkar, Ahmed Foudil; Fekkar, Otmane and 
Mellahi, Kamel (2008) Employee Relations in Algeria: A Historical Appraisal. Employee Relations. Vol. 30 
No. 4. pp. 404-421; Lassassi, Moundir and Muller, Christophe (2013) Reseaux sociaux et insertion sur le 
marche du travail en Algerie. Working Paper No. 756. The Economic Research Forum (ERF): Egypt; 
Benghabrit-Remaoun, Nouria (Ed.) (2012) Quelles formations pour quelles emplois en Algérie? Oran – Algérie: 
Éditions CRASC; and Musette, Saïb Mohamed (2014) Employment Policies and Active Labour Market 
Programmes in Algeria. European Trading Foundation (ETF). 
44  Rebzani, Mohammed (1997) La vie familiale des femmes algériennes salariées. Paris – Montréal: 
L’Harmattan; Moghadam, Valentine M. (1998) Women, Work, and Economic Reform in the Middle East and 
North Africa. Boulder – London: Lynne Rienner Publishers; and Moghadam, Valentine M. (2013) 
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largely on reports elaborated by international organizations and NGOs, such as 
Human Rights Watch, EuroMed Rights, and Amnesty International. It has been 
challenging to find any official data on Algerian trade unionism, amount of strikes 
and so forth. 
This work is situated in multi or transdisciplinary peace research45. While it would 
seem relatively easy to contextualize nonviolent autonomous trade unions, operating 
in a post-conflict society, within the body of peace research literature, there are many 
aspects, choices and practices that I want to stress more concretely. From the larger 
standpoint, my aim is to depict how the Algerian authorities manage oppositional 
movements, such as autonomous trade unions, to sustain peaceful development in 
the country, and how these nonviolent movements act. Being a fragmented field of 
study, Peace research has a close relation to neighboring disciplines in social 
sciences46. In this study, the theoretical and methodological framework shifts within 
other disciplines, such as anthropology, sociology, economic studies and 
international relations. I want to stress that from the ontological and epistemological 
perspectives, social phenomena can be approached from the scopes of multiple 
social science traditions and their methodologies and theoretical frameworks do not 
exclude each other. 
Peace research has been transformed over the decades. It started as a movement 
criticizing longer established fields of studies, such as the realist tradition of 
international relations (IR) and strategic studies47. In general, peace research 
concentrates on multiple forms of experienced political violence, peace building and 
mediation, and observes the construction of everyday peace from various aspects. 
However, political violence, or war and peace, tends to bring up new dimensions 
within different timeframes and power relations, which direct and bring new 
elements on peace research related to security and violence, war and peace. It is 
especially relevant to reflect what we mean when discussing about peace: peace for 
whom? And what does acting for peace mean? It is also immensely important to 
question who has the power to speak on behalf of peace: what are the power 
relations and contexts in which peace is defined?  
 
45  Galtung, Johan (1964, 4) An editorial. Journal of Peace Research, 1(1), pp. 1-4; Alger, Chadwick F. 
(2000) Peace Studies as Transdisciplinary project, in Charles Webel and Johan Galtung (Eds.) Handbook 
of Peace and Conflict Studies. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 299-318. 
46   Jutila, Matti; Pehkonen, Samu & Väyrynen, Tarja (2008, 624) Resuscitating a Discipline: An Agenda 
for Critical Peace Research. Millenium: Journal of International Studies 36(3) pp. 623-640. 
47   Jutila et al. (2008, 626). 
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Ranabir Samaddar48 argues that when we deal with the theory of “democratic 
peace”, we automatically direct our views as if “western democracies” are inherently 
genuine peacemakers worldwide aiming at spreading the peace and prosperity. Of 
course, one can argue that the so-called western democracies put efforts in peace 
building and mediation through international and non-governmental organizations, 
however, some of the colonial wars and military interventions, more recently in the 
form of humanitarian interventions and democratic exportations, have also been 
conducted in the name of peace. Samaddar has stated that perhaps we should 
acknowledge “the duality of their peace studies/our peace studies” to restore the 
fundamental values of peace studies, such as justice, dignity, equality, reconciliation 
and democracy49.  
The aforementioned “us and them” reflections are becoming increasingly 
common, mostly due to inherent Eurocentric or Western-centric dimensions in t 
contemporary social sciences50. Today, many prominent scholars speak about the 
US and, on a smaller scale, European dominance in literature on political studies or 
international relations51. One could add that social sciences in general are suffering 
from Eurocentric premises due to substantial contributions that have been made in 
the universities in Europe and North America over past centuries. According to 
Amitav Acharya52, this tendency cannot continue in the future. Alongside the 
transition of power and new international order, what some call multiplex53 or pluri-
 
48   Samaddar, Ranadir (Ed.) (2004, 12) Peace Studies: An Introduction to the Concept, Scope, and Themes. New 
Delhi – Thousand Oaks – London: Sage Publications. 
49   Samaddar (2004, 12). 
50  Said, Edward (2003) [1978] Orientalism. London: Penguin Books; Abdel-Malek, Anouar (1981) 
Civilizations and Social Theory. Volume 1 of Social Dialectics. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan; Said, 
Edward (1993) Culture and Imperialism. New York: Vintage Books; Gran, Peter (1996) Beyond 
Eurocentrism: A New View of Modern World History. New York: Syracuse University Press; Hall, Stuart 
(1999) Identiteetti. Tampere: Vastapaino; Chakrabarty, Dipesh (2000) Provincializing Europe. Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University Press; Hobson, John (2004) The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Corm, Georges (2009) L’Europe et le mythe de l’Occident: La 
construction d’une histoire. Paris: Éditions La Découverte; Mignolo, Walter D. (2000) Local Histories/Global 
Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University 
Press; Goody, Jack (2010) The Eurasian Miracle. UK and USA: Polity Press; Hobson, John (2012) The 
Eurocentric Conception of World Politics. Western International Theory, 1760-2010. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; Cupples, Julie and Grosfoguel, Ramón (2018) Unsettling Eurocentrism in the Westernized 
University. London and New York: Routledge. 
51   Acharya, Amitav and Buzan, Barry (2010) Non-Western International Theory: Perspectives Beyond Asia. 
London and New York: Routledge; Acharya, Amitav (2014) The End of American Order. UK: Polity; 
Acharya, Amitav (2016) Regionalism Beyond EU-Centrism, in T.A. Börzel ja T. Risse (Eds.) The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Regionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 109-130. 
52   Interview of Amitav Acharya on 12.9.2018 in Tampere.  
53   Acharya (2014). 
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verse54, experiences and “realities” of the so-called non-Western world are becoming 
increasingly relevant. Acharya speaks today about Global International Relations, 
where concepts and theories are reflected from more global perspectives and do not 
only reflect images of the Euro-American imagined communities55, constructed 
identity politics of “the West”. This is also the direction where I have sought to 
orient this thesis.  
In general, I will avoid large and inaccurate cultural generalizations such as 
“West”, “Africa” and “Islamic World” as much as I can, even though they can be 
useful in some instances where the connotation is rather to describe wider 
assumptions and stereotypes or officially approved geographical locations and states. 
Algerians share at least African, Arab, Mediterranean and Maghrebin identities. Their 
history is connected with ancient civilizations, Sahelian kingdoms, Arab and Turkish 
conquests, and European imperialism. Therefore, my intention is also to present a 
more pluralist view of Algerian society, which is along with other Muslim-majority 
countries often represented as predominantly “Islamic”. Religious emphasis, and 
especially Islam, is regularly presented in the media, movies and even academic 
literature as “anti-Western”, whether from historical, political or cultural premises56. 
By showing the heterogeneity of autonomous trade union -membership and 
presenting their objectives (freedom, democracy, human rights, women’s 
emancipation etc.), will hopefully rupture certain Islamic centered narrations that 
were common especially during the 1990s civil war, where armed conflict was 
depicted via confrontation between government and Islamist armed resistance.   
I share in many ways the basic arguments presented in postcolonial and subaltern 
studies, especially related to social and political power relationships and anti-
essentialism that are produced through cultural narrations57. Nevertheless, I would 
like to stress that even though colonial structures, and especially more recent 
neocolonial constructs, still widely affect colonized populations and their respective 
societies, there are decades of independence and internal processes in previously 
colonized countries, and therefore it would be too reductive to emphasise their 
contemporary performances exclusively through colonial heritage. I also take a very 
 
54     Mouffe, Chantal (2013, 22) Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically. London and New York: Verso. 
55   Benedict Anderson (2006) [1983] Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso. 
56    Said, Edward (1997) Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the 
World. New York: Vintage Books; Männistö, Anssi (1999) Islam länsimaisessa hegemonisessa diskurssissa: 
Myyttis-ideologinen ja kuva-analyyttinen näkökulma sivilisaatioiden kohtaamiseen. Tampere: Rauhan- ja 
konfliktintutkimuskeskus TAPRI. 
57   Hall (1999); Chakrabarty (2000).  
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critical view of the concept of the West, which is repeatedly operationalized in 
postcolonial studies among other fields of studies in social sciences at large. I 
understand the concept of the West as an imagined community58 that emerges as a 
political actor, historical narrative, geographical location and assumed value-based 
construction. I believe that such generalizing and rigid cultural concepts reproduce 
Eurocentric connotations and are inaccurate to describe social phenomena whether 
in the micro or macro levels.  
Unfortunately, peace research is not immune to these ingredients either. For 
example, the concept of popular peace developed by David Roberts integrates self-
evident ontological assumptions of normative understanding of peace in the frames 
of liberal institution-building59. Democratic principles are taken for granted and 
international institutions such as the World Bank are seen as their promoter. The 
same goes for Adaptive Peace Building, connected to the United Nations’ nurtured 
Sustaining Peace, which integrates institutions such as World Bank as central 
actors60. In Algeria, the Bretton woods system was seen as foreign intervention that 
privatized the public sector, demanding more private investments deteriorating 
workers’ social conditions and was fiercely opposed by the very civil society actors 
that should be strengthened according to normative aims within both Popular and 
Sustaining Peace. However, their understanding of complexity in the social world 
and highlighted importance of the civil society actors and everyday peace practices 
are useful for this work. 
Philippa Williams has rightly argued that while peace is often the main focus in 
studies, little effort has been given to the actual concept, as if peace is a “trouble free 
product” worthy of mention61. Similarly, she considers the concept of Liberal Peace 
in general as a “Western vision for what peace should look like and how it should be 
done”62. In the 1950s Quincy Wright started a tradition of a negative definition of 
peace, containing the idea of the absence of violence, while later on Johan Galtung 
framed the concept Positive Peace, which referred to the absence of structural violence 
 
58  Anderson, Benedict (2006) [1983] Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso. 
59  Roberts, David (2011) Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Liberal Irrelevance and the Locus of 
Legitimacy. International Peacebuilding, 18:4, pp. 410-424. 
60   De Coning, Cedric (2018) Adaptive Peacebuilding. International Affairs 94:2, pp. 301-317. 
61     Williams, Philippa (2015, 4-5) Everyday Peace? Politics, Citizenship and Muslim Lives in India. Chichester 
– West Sussex – UK – Malden – MA – USA: Wiley Blackwell. 
62   Williams (2015, 5). 
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at large63. Williams stresses that peace should be grounded in a place; peace is 
political, peace is a process and peace should be approached from the ground within 
anthropologic fieldwork64. According Kanti Bajpai, peace is hegemonic of deterrent 
(more than just absence of war), transactional (functional and economic interaction) 
and integrative or perpetual (social condition)65. Therefore, it is also relevant from 
which direction peace is approached and different fields of studies enable multiple 
perspectives and tools to study peace from manifold perspectives. 
The work of Chantal Mouffe related to agonism has led many peace researchers 
to conceptualize Agonistic Peace. For Mouffe, liberal democratic politics need 
discussion and struggle with adversaries (agonism), not struggle between enemies 
(antagonism)66. The distinction of political and politics (see more at the end of this 
chapter) helps in integrating antagonism as a constitutive part of social life in the 
context of post-structuralism resting on the relational comprehension that identities 
are contingent over different spaces of disagreement. Therefore, conflicts, if they are 
managed in a correct and respectful way, can be considered positive elements that 
merely develop society within peaceful progress67. Or, they can be seen as vital in 
the development of sustainable democracy that integrates various perspectives and 
discourses.  
According to Malika Rahal68, features of nonviolent resistance in Algeria be can 
traced to the popular resistance of the French colonial period (1830-1954). These 
forms varied within multiple contexts of domination. In the beginning, the Algerians 
emigrated in the 1830s to Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, Palestine or Egypt to avoid the 
imposition of non-Muslim authority69. Later, other forms of nonviolent action 
contained rejection and boycotts, withdrawal (behavior, clothing and family roles), 
and political nonviolent resistance within Sufi brotherhoods, nationalist political 
 
63   Jutila et al (2008, 627); Galtung, Johan (1969, 183) Violence, Peace and Peace Research. Journal of 
Peace Research, 6, pp. 167-191. 
64   Williams (2015, 5-6). 
65   Bajpai, Kanti (2004, 38) A Peace Audit on South Asia, in Samaddar, Ranadir (Eds.) Peace Studies: 
An Introduction to the Concept, Scope, and Themes. New Delhi – Thousand Oaks – London: Sage 
Publications. 
66   Mouffe, Chantal (2013, 7) Agonistics. Thinking the World Politically. London – New York. Verso. 
67 Aggestam, Karen, Cristiano, Fabio and Stömbom, Lisa (2015, 1738) Towards agonistic 
peacebuilding? Exploring the antagonism-agonism nexus in the Middle East Peace Process. Third 
World Quarterly, 36:9, pp. 1736-1753. 
68   Rahal, Malika (2013) Algeria: Nonviolent Resistance Against French Colonialism, 1830-1950s, in 
Maciej J. Bartkowski (Ed.) Recovering Nonviolent History. Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles. Boulder and 
London: Lynne Rienner Publisher. pp. 107-124. 
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parties and Islamic Reformism70. However, it is beyond the scope of this study to 
connect such forms of nonviolent activities to today’s Algerian autonomous trade 
union movement. 
Nonviolence, in the context of contemporary autonomous trade unions and the 
acts of citizenship, can be understood as a pragmatic tradition that includes nonviolent 
action as a collection of techniques that are considered as important and effective71. 
It captures elements such as communication and social movements as tools where 
peaceful techniques are used to fight for normative objectives, such as freedom, 
democracy, and respect for human rights72. This pragmatic way of understanding 
nonviolent action in contemporary social sciences is in many ways a consequence of 
important work conducted in the early 1970s by Gene Sharp73, who was highly 
influenced by the work of Mohandas K. Gandhi.  
Stellan Vinthagen74 introduces an altered view of nonviolent action, while 
recognizing the importance of Sharp’s work. He criticizes Sharp’s overemphasis on 
pragmatism, because “it reduces nonviolent action to a matter of power struggle, and 
power is conceptualized pre-Foucault” and in addition, Vinthagen argues that 
nonviolent action should be approached from a multidimensional perspective, where 
pragmatism is only one aspect75. Vintahgen is after a complex, flexible and forceful 
understanding of nonviolent action, which enables to adapt it within acts of 
citizenship –theory, used in this study after theorizing acts vis-à-vis action. During 
the field work in general and in the interviews, nonviolent actions was not elicited as 
moral philosophical ideology. Whether or not nonviolence conducted by union 
activists is part of larger political philosophy or pragmatic tactic, is not in the main 
issue of this study, though questions related to nonviolence sometimes capture 
questions related to underlying motives: is it a lifestyle or tactic, pragmatic or 
principled action76. The idea is to understand nonviolent acts of citizenship of 
autonomous unions as the collective birth of citizenship rights of those involved in 
 
70   Rahal (2013, 111-119). 
71   Johansen, Jørgen (2007, 145-146 and 148) Nonviolence: More than the absence of violence, in 
Charles Webel and Johan Galtung (Eds.) Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies. London and New York: 
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73   Sharp, Gene (1973) Politics of Nonviolent Action. Boston: Porter Sargent. 
74   Vinthagen, Stellan (2015b) The 4 Dimensions of Nonviolent Action: A Sociological Perspective, 
in Kurt Schock (Ed.) Civil Resistance: Comparative Perspectives on Nonviolent Struggle. The University of 
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75   Vinthagen, Stellan (2015a, 41-44) A Theory of Nonviolent Action: How Civil Resistance Works. London: 
Zed Books; Vinthagen (2015b, 259-260). 
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particular, and its social impact, instead of seeing it only as an organized or individual 
process as such. Questions related to ideology, psychology, tactics and pragmatism 
are of only secondary importance. As Vinthagen stresses: 
Nonviolence is commonly motivated by externally imposed philosophical moral 
systems. However, I use morality in another sense, one that affects social norms, 
sanctioned contexts and legitimate rules of action, as it refers to the development of 
moral representation among concrete, collective communities77.  
Vinthagen stresses the role of various social theories, such as the Theory of 
Communicative Action developed by Jürgen Habermas or other late “modern” social 
theories developed by Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault and Anthony Giddens 
among others, connecting them more fixedly to nonviolence studies and allowing 
more relational, constructivist and pragmatic excerpts78. By combining these 
elements within Habermas’s social theory, Vinthagen introduces four nonviolent 
rationalities. These are goal rationality (how well material objectives are achieved 
within strategic planning); normative rationality (how normative actions are regulated 
by the norms, institutions and morals); expressive rationality (self-expressive action 
articulating aesthetic views on how subjects feel and experience); and communicative 
rationality (how language is used in social relations and the coordination of social 
action)79. Nonviolence as a concept has two dimensions: without violence + against 
violence80. 
As Vinthagen81 stresses, it is not relevant here whether we agree or not on 
Habermas’s social theory completely. Likewise, I use the theory of public sphere 
theorized by Habermas, but only partially, adding elements from the Nancy Fraser’s 
transnational public sphere and from others, as I will show later. What is central is that 
we can apply various social theories when analyzing nonviolent action. In addition, 
Vinthagen points out “the weak utilization of studies of social movements and 
revolution, despite their relevance for those who seek to understand how 
(nonviolent) movements bring about (nonviolent) revolutions”82. In this study, I 
apply the social movement theory to connect the nonviolent action of autonomous 
trade unions into larger social units within the level of analysis. However, as I will 
 
77   Vinthagen (2015a, 10).  
78   Vinthagen (2015b, 260). 
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81   Vinthagen (2015b, 265). 
82   Vinthagen (2015b, 262). 
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show later, I draw a distinction between “the act” and “the action” in the context of 
acts of citizenship theory, which enables the main theoretical framework for this 
thesis. 
2.2 Conceptual frameworks 
2.2.1 Aiming at social change and sustainable democracy  
Social change is a diverse and versatile concept that contains historical connotations. 
Our lives are surrounded by changes; change is everywhere. Social change 
encapsulates the notion of change in the larger social context but includes also effects 
related to individual life-worlds and memories. Social change therefore means 
everything between phenomena, such as the births and deaths, marriages and 
divorces as well as deterritorialization and globalization, localization and 
urbanization.  
Aspects of and interest in understanding social change can be tracked already 
from the works of the Ancient Greece philosophers and from India for example in 
the Arthashastra of Kautilya (circa 4th century BCE)83. According to Nessim Joseph 
Dawood84, The Muqaddimah (prolegomena or introduction) of Ibn Khaldun (1332-
1406) in 1370 may have been the first attempt by any historian to elucidate “the 
pattern in the changes that occur in man’s political and social organization”.  Ibn 
Khaldun’s view about the social change was cyclical85, while some social scientists 
have perceived social change as linear process86. There are also many ways to 
characterize the social change: community change, universal phenomenon, essential 
law, continuous change, speed of change within various time factors, chain-reaction 
sequence and so forth87.  
 
83   Kautilya (1992): Arthashastra. India: Penguin Books. 
84   Dawood, Nessim Joseph (2005) [1967] Introduction, in Ibn Khaldun (translated by Franz Rosenthal 
and Bruce B. Lawrence) The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History. [1370]. New Jersey, United States: 
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85   Oswald Spengler and Arnold J. Toynbee also had cyclical understanding of social change. 
86   See Auguste de Compte, Emile Durkheim, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Karl Marx and Max 
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87   Maheswhari, M.A (2016) The Concept of Social Change. 
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However, while writing about change has been common in the past, 
understanding the logic, forms and timing has proved to be more challenging. In his 
famous work The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time 
(1944) Karl Polanyi writes:  
Nowhere has liberal philosophy failed so conspicuously as in its understanding of the 
problem of change. Fired by an emotional faith in spontaneity, the common-sense 
attitude toward change was discarded in favor of a mystical readiness to accept social 
consequences of economic improvement, whatever they might be88.  
In the 1970s, Don Martindale89 and Günter Wiswede & Thomas Kutsch90 argued 
that one of the oldest divisions in sociological scholarship can be tracked to the 
separation of social structure and social change, and held that the weakest branch in 
sociological study relates to its theory of social change. 
Today the contemporary theories of social change aim at a more generalized, 
evolutionary and far-reaching analysis of change. Hans Haferkamp and Neil J. 
Smelser91 stress the structural determinants of social change (e.g. population growth, 
the dislocations as a result of warfare), processes and mechanisms of social change 
(e.g. precipitating or accelerating mechanisms, social movements, political conflict 
and accommodation, and entrepreneurial activity) and directions of social change 
(e.g. structural changes, effects and consequences). However, social change should 
not be understood as only taking place via structural transformations. It is also a 
positive trend that climate change and its impacts in the societies are becoming 
increasingly popular in the studies of social sciences.  
According to the Valentine M. Moghadam92, research related to social change 
repeatedly highlights selected societal institutions and structures. While social change 
and social development are seen as realized through technological advancements, 
class conflict and political action, she stresses that these processes are often 
gendered. The change strengthening, for example, women’s position “has come 
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about through a combination of long-term macro level processes – notably 
industrialization, urbanization, proletarianization, the demographic transition, 
globalization – and forms of collective action that include national liberation 
movements, revolutions, and social movements”93.    
Trevor Noble94 has highlighted six key elements for theories of change that show 
various dimensions of change. First, he describes the characteristics of change (1) 
endogenous – exogenous, whether the change is related to the social system itself or not; 
(2) inevitable – contingent, where the patterns (cyclical-linear) or questions related to 
progress come out. Then he introduces the notion of social and reflect (3) sociological 
realism (structure) – methodological individualism (agency) aspects as well as dichotomy 
between (4) materialism and idealism. The last phase discloses the character of 
explanation, where (5) possible objectivity (science) meets with inescapable commitment 
(ideology), positioning the debate towards epistemological questions about the theory 
of knowledge and to discussion about satisfactory explanation (6) rationalism – 
empiricism.  
In this study, I stress the concept of social change extensively within democracy 
building or processes of democratization, whether in the structural or ideational 
levels, that comprise social factors, the establishment of democratic institutions and 
other determinants of the state’s democratic sustainability. Therefore, social change 
can take place in the mindset of the individuals as well as in the structural level 
attached to the social. The espirit de corps, or Asabiyyah95 as depicted by Ibn Khaldun96, 
is sacralized to the point where it becomes the basic institution of the community 
and the guiding principle of its very existence97. This community attached individual 
is socialized within social institutions, such as the family, education, religion and that 
market that can also be understood as solid components of the state98. At this stage, 
it is enough to recognize the poststructuralist or constructivist premises, where both 
levels, individual and societal, are connected through constant but contingent 
interaction, without stressing either’s decisive position to determine the other. The 
social subjects are able to change the structures while the structures effect on the 
social subjects.  
 
93  Moghadam (2013, 1). 
94  Noble, Trevor (2000, 5) Social Theory and Social Change. New York: St Martin’s Press. 
95  Asabiyyah or “group feeling” is understood here as social solidarity, unity and social cohesion. It is 
needed for community as the bond of cohesion. 
96  Ibn Khaldun (2005 [1370], 47, 97-109 and 16). 
97  Boutefnouchet, Mostefa (2004, 23) La Société Algérienne en Transition. Alger: Office des Publication 
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98  Boutefnouchet (2004, 22). 
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The activists of the autonomous trade unions in Algeria argue that they gather 
into unions to precipitate the processes of democratization to advance working 
conditions in the structures of the state aiming to increase personal freedom and 
political space. Meanwhile, they can suffer or benefit from larger social processes 
such as the economic situation that is effected by external factors: international 
energy prices, national or international military conflicts or challenges, and 
opportunities brought about by social factors, such as the rapid population growth, 
bureaucratic elements, family relations, and so forth.  
Social change can be generated through violent or nonviolent processes. 
Independence and freedom struggles are often highlighted as part of violent 
combats99. Independence in 1962, October uprisings in 1988 and civil war (1992-
2000), were the results of various parallel socio-economic processes, violent and 
nonviolent, in connection with internal and external developments. Individuals 
mobilized, some in the name of thawra (revolution), some in the name of jihad (holy 
war), to achieve better material or idealistic living conditions through social change. 
Both structure and agency matter, as well as their interaction.  
The starting point is the need of the autonomous trade unions, consisting of 
individual activists, who choose to struggle through nonviolent means to change the 
asymmetric hegemonic power structures into a more pluralist field, and for a more 
inclusive social space where they can act and conduct chosen syndicalist 
performances. To achieve their goals they use democracy-oriented rhetoric for 
change, because in the asymmetric power relations that seems to be the only viable 
option. This does not denote that asymmetric power relations would be the only 
reason why these activists use democracy-oriented rhetoric and aim at sustainable 
social change, as if the activists or members of these unions would not aspire for 
genuine democracy building as such.   
It is common to depict the Algerian political system within the stability-instability 
nexus. Stability, as a discourse, is also a central concept and a part of the discourse 
analysis (See Chapter V) in this study. Therefore, I use the distinction between 
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sustainable democratic development100 and stability, proposed by Silvia Colombo101. 
She argues that it is possible to have “apparent stability internally and externally 
without sustainable development”. While the state, as in the case of Algeria, can 
present itself as stable and ensure the continuation of the sovereignty and use of 
power, it is possible to present political and socio-economic aspects that show 
simultaneously the lack of sustainable democratic development, which can lead into 
turmoil in the longer run in the processes of development. In the chapter IV, I 
discuss more profoundly how the political change evolved in Algeria during the 
colonial period and after the independence in 1962. 
Today many nations organize presidential and parliamentary elections to build up 
an image of democratic practices. Nevertheless, does organizing elections mean that 
the nations are democratic? What are the conditions for a democratic state? 
Colombo argues that the stable state is, in general, governed by “the regime” while 
the sustainable nation state is organized around democratic structures by “the state”. 
She stresses that the state involves the society more extensively in the state’s affairs, 
while the regime is concentrated to secure its own interests. Colombo strengthens 
her argument by asking the question “sustainability for whom?”   
Accredited, but contested due to its political motivation, the Democracy Index 
elaborated by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), based in London, classifies 
Algeria as an authoritarian state102. Of 167 countries, Algeria is ranked 126th behind 
Tunisia (69th, flawed democracy), Morocco (105th, hybrid regime), Mauritania (117th, 
authoritarian) exceeding only war-torn Libya (155th, authoritarian) in the Maghrebin 
context. What do such reports really tell us about democracy, whether in the United 
States, EU-countries or particularly in Algeria? The Arab Human Development Report, 
published regularly since 2002 by UNDP, has depicted and explored the democratic 
deficit, alongside knowledge, gender equality, and youth integration deficits that exist 
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).  
Moghadam103 highlights the problematic approaches related to the body of 
political science literature that endorses a “Middle Eastern or Muslim 
 
100   The roots of the sustainable development can be derived from the Brundtland report (Our 
Common Future, Chapter II: http://www.un-documents.net/ocf-02.htm) in 1987 drawn by 
commission that was appointed by former United Nations Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar 
in 1983. This organizing principal aiming to correspond with human development goals are also 
playing important role in the agenda of United Nations (Our Common Future, Chapter II: 
http://www.un-documents.net/ocf-02.htm).  
101   Colombo, Silvia (2010, 2) The Southern Mediterranean: Between Changes and Challenges to its Sustainability.  
MEDPRO Technical Report No. 1/November 2010. 
102   Democracy index (EIU): http://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index  
103   Moghadam (2013, 5). 
 44 
exceptionalism” that concludes that the problem is either oil, or sharia law or gender 
inequality. She argues that researchers who conduct such reports and studies often 
lack a wider understanding of the peoples of the region, its culture and traditions. 
While she recognizes some basis for these claims she refers to studies104 that show a 
high endeavor for democratic practices in the region, recalling events such as June 
2009 Green Protests in Iran, and the 2011 uprisings and democratic elections in 
Tunisia. What do the 1988 October uprisings in Algeria and democratic elections tell 
about the preference of democratic practices among Algerians? 
How well did the normative ideal democratization of the Middle East and North 
Africa through military invasion turned out in Iraq, for example? Why are democratic 
principles stressed on some occasions (Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria) but less so in the 
others (Saudi-Arabia, Morocco, Jordan)? The diversity that exists in the region 
ranging from Morocco to Iran is so extensive that is it even meaningful to approach 
the so-called MENA as one singular object of analysis? Democracy is nowadays a 
highly politicized and contradictory concept, but it does not mean that this prevents 
us from exploring its meaning and forms of actualization.   
While it is hard to predict when social change or change in general takes place, it 
is possible to evaluate and propose a measurement for sustainable development. 
Drawing on Bruce Gilley’s work on the determinants of the state legitimacy105, 
Colombo has introduced a categorization for such performance and stresses the 
concentration on ideational assets as well as governance structures that spring from 
the actors and action, defining how and what kind of governance structures are 
requisite and available106. She classifies the major determinants of sustainability into 
four categories: social factors, economic factors, political factors and contextual 
factors. These normative adjustments are worth introducing to illustrate further the 
aspect of democracy building linked to social change and to understand more 
generally the endeavors of the normative democratic rhetoric used by autonomous 
trade union activists, although not directly connected or cited by the autonomous 
union activists in Algeria.     
Firstly, Colombo107 stresses three social elements. Starting from equality 
(incorporating gender equality as well), assets that aim to reduce inequalities (income, 
gender) should be developed. In addition, there should be a governance structure 
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created to strengthen the juridical system that guarantees the equal treatment of the 
people. In order to develop social capital (networks and relationships), a term coined 
by Pierre Bourdieu, the levels of human resources should be evolved, transparency 
should be increased to tackle corruption and guarantee access to basic 
infrastructures. Of major importance for the autonomous trade unions is the 
revision of the multiparty system and creation of new autonomous spaces. Civic 
interest and engagement with politics can be improved via the opening of new channels to 
engage in politics, which require the transparency of political processes, 
strengthening accountability and openness of the political environment in general.  
Secondly, Colombo108 divides economic factors into three groups. Strengthening 
the welfare level means ensuring the necessary basic services to the population in health 
and education. The access to infrastructures should be facilitated, while formal 
employment, youth education and the power of trade unions should be developed. 
Poverty reduction has an impact on individual and societal levels, while the economic 
governance and stability (GDP, inflation, level of foreign direct investment, private 
property, debt rates, public deficit and macroeconomic stability) should be liable. 
However, I believe that some of the so-called “structural build up” 
recommendations that include liberalization and privatization measures are closer to 
the ideals of the Bretton Woods system than to the goals of the autonomous trade 
unions in Algeria.  
Thirdly, the political factors that Colombo109 discloses, relates to political stability, 
which requires elite accountability, quality of leadership, political dissent, the 
question of succession and space for political opposition. In the framework of general 
political governance, the role of bureaucracy, “state class” and emergence of intellectual 
elite offer major assets, while on the structural levels of governance transparency, 
control of corruption, promotion of the rule of law, independent judiciary and neo-
patrimonialism are major questions to be developed. Democratic rights and civil liberties 
are crucial ideational and structural components for sustainable democracy.  
Finally, Colombo110 divides the contextual factors in four categories. The capacity 
to receive and distribute external aid and trade relations are crucial. Colombo stresses 
market-friendly reforms, competition, the role of foreign direct investment, 
association agreements (e.g. Algeria-EU association agreements) and so forth. The 
Rhetoric of democracy means conceptualizing the democracy, securitization of foreign 
policy and sufficient migration policies. Military support and rhetoric of conflict 
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encompasses military expenditures and training offering flexibility in the ever-
changing international political context. 
These aforementioned multidimensional determinants that can be used to 
describe state legitimacy and sustainable development cover “objective” and 
subjective socio-economic proportions where it is possible to contextualize the 
demands of the autonomous trade unions. They are normative aspects that depict 
the legitimacy and sustainability of the states’ conduct of governance, while being 
debatable in contemporary international politics. Democracy is argued to be the 
most developed system of governance because it mobilizes the majority to defend 
its legitimacy. It is also debatable how well Algeria complies with these determinants 
and what is the objective state of democracy in the country. It is also open to 
discussion, how widely these normative democratic premises are endeavored in 
Algeria and how much the oppositional forces would be committed to their 
realization if they were in power. What is more, one can also debate how well the 
democratic ideals are present in practice within the oppositional movements 
themselves. 
2.2.2 Nonviolent acts of citizenship 
As I will later show in the analytic chapters, autonomous trade union activists use 
democracy-oriented rhetoric through declarations, interviews and media statements 
related to their action and aim social change to improve their position as a citizens, 
workers and family members. In recurrent occurrences they call for civic rights and 
participate in negotiations, debates and struggles about the meaning of citizenship. 
Their demanded, defined and constructed understanding of citizenship articulates 
through acts in the public space. Mobilizing and organizing political nonviolent 
actions (sit-ins, strikes, hunger strikes, rallies) as well as public events (meetings, 
demonstrations) around the country can be defined as the acts of citizenship. These 
collective political participatory actions at the individual level are reported mostly in 
the alternative and oppositional media111, whether newspapers, internet publications 
or webpages, bringing public attention to their activities both inside Algeria and 
abroad especially through international and national labor movements and civil 
society organizations.  
 
111   Algérie Focus, El Watan, Journalistes Citoyens d’Algérie, La Tribune, Le Matin, Le Soir d’Algérie, 
Le Quotidienne d’Oran, Liberté and Tout sûr l’Algérie (TSA).  
 47 
The concept of the citizenship within contemporary Algeria remains ambiguous. 
It is articulated through hegemonic processes112 intrinsically linked to social 
antagonism between different actors (e.g. oppositional movements and state 
authorities). Mustapha Medjahdi113 has studied the educational aspect of the 
citizenship in the Algerian media in the context of agenda-setting theory. He stresses 
that citizenship constitutes a two-pronged meaning. The pro-government 
newspapers stress the responsibility aspect of the citizens towards the state, while 
the critical oppositional media highlight the rights and responsibility of the state 
towards the citizens. It is obvious, that autonomous trade union members and 
activists share the opposite, or at least different, view on actualization of citizenship 
vis-à-vis governmental authorities and especially related to their argument about the 
performances of nonviolent acts of citizenship.   
The concept of citizenship has been ambiguous in the past too. Therefore, it is 
necessary to have a more past-oriented approach to the development of the concept 
of citizenship and its genealogy in Algeria. Historically, the concept of citizenship, 
according to dominant “western” centric literature, dates back to Athenian (polites) 
and Roman (res publica) roots as an active participation in collective self-rule and legal 
status of freedom as a part of territorial jurisdiction.114 Aristotle's definition of the 
concept can be viewed as an important starting point for scholars115. According to 
Aristotle, the phenomenon was known already in the trading cities such as Carthage 
and therefore has its roots most likely somewhere in the Mediterranean116, while we 
do not know accurately whether there were such connotations during the periods of 
early civilizations in Mesopotamia, ancient Egypt or elsewhere Asian continent and 
the Mesoamerica.  
Since the emergence of the territorial sovereignty in the 17th century and the 
nation state in the 18th century, the meaning of the citizenship became in many ways 
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synonymous with nationality, as the “fact”, which was criticized by Giorgio 
Agamben117 in the 1990s, leaning on the earlier work of Hannah Arendt118. 
According to Arendt: “This was the unfortunate result of the transformation of the 
citoyen of the French Revolution into the bourgeois of the nineteenth century on one 
hand, and of the antagonism between state and society on the other”119. After the 
Age of Enlightenment, interpretations of citizenship transformed, along with 
revolutions, into so-called modern sovereign representative democracy that is 
constitutionally constrained by the rule of law. It included values or ideals such as 
state of nature, natural law, religious tolerance, social contract, human and 
citizenship rights, equality among men, freedom, civil society, sovereignty, 
democracy, secularization and laïcization. However, against this so called 
Eurocentric narrative, John G.A. Pocock (1992), Gianluca P. Parolin (2010) and 
Hassan Remaoun (2012), among others, emphasize that neither the so-called 
”classical” ideal citizenship exists nor does the solid tradition that has led to a 
unilateral understanding of its meaning. French colonial rule in Algeria gives a 
perspective on the debate, often an idealistic and romanticized picture, systematically 
linked to the Age of Enlightenment and its achievements.  
The concept of citizenship, within this genealogy, and its development in Algeria 
can be traced back at least to the colonial period. Today, the French legacy still plays 
a significant and complex role in Algeria around various social, political and 
economic dimensions, linking citizenship to the construction of discourses, 
especially antagonistic ones, within various frameworks. According to Remaoun, 
Algerians became familiar with the French concept of citizenship since the French 
occupation of 1830120, even though they did not have access to it. The Algerian natives 
(the indigènes) were recognized as French but were rejected as citizens since 
nationality and citizenship were legally separated121. They were governed under the 
Muslim Status enacted by the sénatus-consulte of 14th of July 1865, which established the 
Muslims of Algeria as French. Algerians could request full rights as French citizens, 
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but only if they were willing to abandon their personal status (statut personnel) as 
Muslims and accept French law in matters such as marriage and inheritance122. 
Similarly, as Marnia Lazreg points out, citizenship and the position of women are 
often covered under the religious paradigm that provides explanatory power in 
describing the development of the citizenship in general in Algeria123. 
The 1860s is an interesting period, being an example of varieties during the 
repressive colonial period. It is characterized as the epoch of the Arab Kingdom 
(Royame Arabe), where the ruler of the Second French Empire Napoleon III and 
his counselor Ismaël Urbain conducted more sympathetic policies towards Algerians 
at the expense of settlers, integrating Algerians in the construction of a common 
society that aimed at smoother coexistence. Algeria would be transformed into an 
Arab kingdom rather than staying a colony, where the practices and religion of the 
Algerians were respected while, on the other hand, any inherent suggestion of 
cultural autonomy was opposed124. Nonetheless, while the policies of Napoleon III 
where targeted at improving the lives of the Algerian population, they ultimately 
turned out to be more harmful than beneficial. 
Gradually, since the 1840s, Algeria had started to assimilate into France. The 
collapse of the Second Empire, as a result of the loss of the war with Prussia (1870-
71), was rejoiced by the French settlers in Algeria125 but it also boosted the revolt126 
of the Kabyles of the Biban Mountains. In 1881, the Indigenous Code or Native Penal 
Code (code de l'indigénat) created 110 offences, providing for special penalties of 
imprisonment, probation, collective fines, and individual or collective confiscations 
that further divided Algerians as second-class citizens from the European settlers127. 
On the 4 February 1919, the Jonnart Law (Loi Jonnart), controversial and unpopular 
in France128, offered some scope for Algerians, on the enhancement of political 
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rights, to acquire positions in the army and to work in the civil service. However, 
this required the abandonment of Muslim status129.  
The national movement and the visible figures such as the leader of the 
Association of Algerian Muslim Ulemas Abdelhamid Ben Badis and Ferhat Abbas, 
the leader of Federation of Elected Natives, tried during 1930s to find a way for the 
national movement to achieve harmony regarding basic citizenship rights, stressing 
that the settlement should include democracy, citizenship, social justice and respect 
for Islamic identity. After the Second World War, equality of rights and duties were 
proclaimed by the Ordonnance of 7 March 1944 and later confirmed by the Lamine 
Guèye Law in 7th of May 1946. It granted French citizenship to all subjects around 
French territories and departments overseas. However, it was the Law of 20 
September 1946 that granted French citizenship to all Algerians, and this time they 
were not required to renounce their Muslim personal status. This equality did not 
extend to electoral legislation, which provided for the continuation of the separate 
and unequal system of representation in the Algerian Assembly and the French 
Parliament. In summary, Algerians were first considered as indigénes, then subjects 
and finally French Muslims130.  
Gradually the national movement became radicalized and led to a formation of 
the National Liberation Movement (FLN) that proclaimed the start of the 
revolutionary struggle and claimed for “liquidation of the colonial system”, “the 
abandonment of all relics of reformism” and “national independence through the 
restoration of the Algerian state”131. These formulations concentrated on the 
liberation of the country and political rights, such as the position of women, were 
not a priority132. Lazreg, who separates citizenship as “status” and citizenship as 
“practice”, criticizes the process, in which individuals were considered 
unproblematically as citizens after independence, though nationality law privileged 
men while discriminating against women133. The year after independence, an 
Algerian Nationality Code, subject to Islamic law, was passed, on 27 March 1963, 
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which imposed Algerian nationality in article no. 6 by filiation of an Algerian father, 
who had to have at least two ascendants in the paternal line born in Algeria. As a 
result, all Pieds-noirs (French and other European ancestry or Jews who lived in 
French North Africa) were deprived of Algerian nationality. In 1970, the Code was 
repealed but maintained the pre-eminence of (paternal) jus sanguinis134, the 
requirement of strong assimilation for naturalization and strict control to avoid cases 
of dual nationality. It was not until 2005 that the Code was amended by the Order 
1/2005 to allow the attribution of Algerian nationality by maternal jus sanguinis and 
the acquisition of Algerian nationality by marriage135. Despite this, the revision did 
not bring about social change regarding the deficits of citizenship and gender 
rights136. 
According to Lazreg, “formal citizenship precludes the emergence of substantive 
citizenship, which includes the protection of civil and social rights”137. She argues, in 
highlighting the situation of women, that autonomy and agency play central role 
within the realization of substantive citizenship138. Similarly, the members and 
activists of the autonomous trade unions insist that citizenship rights are not 
implemented concretely, because contemporary Algeria lacks democratic practices, 
such as freedom of speech and actualization of individual rights, that prevents the 
exercise of substantive citizenship. In their view, natural resources are confiscated 
by the oppressive elite and Algeria is ruled by an oppressive oligarchy that practices 
nepotism and corruption. They claim that natural resources belong to the people and 
that profits should be distributed on a more equal basis. Activists believe that their 
dignity is on the line and they do not have anything to lose. They are motivated to 
act within unions to defend workers’ rights and fulfillment of the citizenship. 
Sometimes gender questions are also raised, but mostly union activists concentrate 
on working conditions in general and undemocratic practices in particular. 
However, do they exercise responsibility towards Algerian state? If so, how? This 
argument is occasionally raised by the state authorities in response to the demands 
of these various oppositional groups. Union activists claim that their action as such 
contains the fulfillment of their responsibility towards all the Algerian citizens and 
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to Algeria in general. SNAPAP is portrayed by the governmental forces as the group 
of “Trotskyists” or “Islamists”, whose aim is to destabilize Algeria in the favor of 
hostile foreign countries that want to take control of Algerian natural resources. On 
the other hand, autonomous trade union activists describe authorities as “Harkis” or 
“hizb fransa” (the Party of France) and blame them for working as puppets of France 
and other hostile foreign governments while viewing their own actions as the 
continuation of Algerian liberation struggle. By using the symbols of and references 
to the Algerian liberation war (1954-1962) they challenge the monopoly of state 
authorities to benefit from the sacrifices of the “moudjahidines”, veterans of the 
liberation war. Both sides argue that they represent the real nationalist Algerian image 
and accuse the other of unpatriotic performances while stressing the sacrifices of the 
“moudjahidines” for their own cause. The concept of citizenship emerged many 
times when interviewees spoke about their individual motivation for their activism.   
When autonomous trade unions organize demonstrations, sit-ins and rallies in 
the public space to push the government to improve and strengthen citizenship 
rights, they aim to communicate with the audience, the people in Algeria and those 
outside part of the international human rights networks. I approach this 
communicative performance in the public space within the theory of Acts of citizenship 
of Engin F. Isin139 and Greg M. Neilsen. They describe citizenship as a phenomenon, 
which is neither status nor practice. By this, they mean that citizenship is not a static 
status or state, but something that exist and shape through motion and experience.  
Isin and Neilsen stress the concrete acts of citizenship of the different actors 
amongst various social groups: 
We propose to shift focus from the institution of citizenship and the citizen as 
individual agent to acts of citizenship – that is, collective or individual deeds that 
rupture social-historical patterns. Acts are not passively given, nor do they emerge 
from a natural order; as such, they can be opposed to the naïvely formulated definition 
in which to be a citizen simply means to exercise rights or fulfil obligations, as if these 
neutral forms of individual choice could be sanctioned outside multiple networks of 
authority. Whereas citizenship practices like voting, paying taxes or learning languages 
appear passive and one-sided in mass democracies, acts of citizenship break with 
repetition of the same and so anticipate rejoinders from imaginary but not fictional 
adversaries140. 
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The effect of this turn or shift from the passive institutional understanding of 
citizenship to practices has been production of studies related to routines, rituals141, 
customs, norms and habits of everyday life through which subject transform into 
citizens. Studies on citizenship in general have focused on three modes: jus sanguinis 
(a child inherits citizenship via parent), jus soli (a child inherits citizenship via birth) 
and jus domicile (a person acquires citizenship by naturalization)142.  
Isin stresses that citizenship cannot be seen reductively as a legal status, in the 
case of Algeria possessing an Algerian passport and embracing rights as citizen of a 
given country, but as a notion that further involves social, political, cultural and 
symbolic practices that can constitute citizenship as a legal status.  
[…] formal citizenship is differentiated from substantive citizenship and the latter is 
seen as the condition of the possibility of the former. Yet, whether the focus is on 
status or practice, it remains on the doer rather than the deed. To investigate 
citizenship in a way that is irreducible to either status or practice, while still valuing 
this distinction, requires a focus on those acts when, regardless of status and 
substance, subjects constitute themselves as citizens or, better still, as those to whom 
the right to have rights is due. But the focus shifts from subjects as such to acts (or 
deeds) that produce such subjects.143 
It is the acts that create the actor, not vice versa. Isin prefers to investigate citizenship 
as a negotiated and contested field of contingent possibilities and impossibilities 
rather than only focusing on content, the form and extent of rights and obligations 
or on apparent exclusions and inclusions144.  
Isin is interested in the process how a subject transforms into citizen that acts for 
his/her rights and the places where the process actualizes: “how the emergence of 
this figure is implicated in the emergence of new sites145, scales146 and acts through 
which actors claim to transform themselves (and others) from subjects into citizens 
as claimants of rights”147. The main idea is to increase knowledge how the acts, sites 
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and scales (that are overlapping) generate new political subjectivities and “transform 
themselves and others into citizens by articulating ever-changing and expanding 
rights”148. 
Citizenship is, therefore, understood as a complex web of rights and 
responsibilities that materialize contingently as every state, and according to Isin: 
“exists in social, political or economic integration and is implicated in varying degrees 
of influence and autonomy”149. The acts of citizenship are an attempt to theorize the 
claim for citizenship rights through concrete acts that are “those constitutive and 
disruptive moments when rights are claimed, responsibilities asserted and obligations 
imposed”150. This could be then connected to Vinthagen’s understanding of 
nonviolence, which “entails a moment of disobedience or a breach with the 
requirement of submission”151. 
We can therefore view citizenship as a discourse. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe, whose discourse theory is used in this thesis and will be further examined 
in the Chapter III, argue that social actors possess “differential positions within the 
discourses that constitute the social fabric”152. Therefore, citizenship is comprised 
here as a discourse, which is constitutive of our world through signs, or elements as 
Laclau and Mouffe153 call them in their discourse theory.  These elements, which 
have multiple potential meanings, are transformed in discourse into moments, never 
entirely, to reduce their polysemic character to a fully fixed temporal meaning154. 
This happens through articulation of those acts of citizenship and construction of 
identities that are affected by political dimensions. It is useful to notice that Laclau 
and Mouffe do not put so much weight, as for example Norman Fairclough does155, 
on the idea of the actions and reflexivity that human agents reproduce in 
transforming the social world.  
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What is of major importance here and ought to be underlined is the difference 
between the act and action that is highlighted in the theorizing of acts of citizenship. This 
distinction is also important to transform Vinthagen’s nonviolent action into nonviolent 
acts of citizenship. As Isin argues, it is rare to find previous scholars that have paid 
attention to the difference between act and action156. He describes some inputs of 
Robert Ware, Jacques Lacan and Mikhail Bakhtin, but is not fully satisfied with their 
outcomes. The same critiques can be made of Vinthagen, who does not seem to 
differentiate between act and action but uses both terms interchangeably when 
depicting social action157. What is then the difference? 
Following Adolf Reinach’s158 work The A priori of Foundations of Civil Law, Isin159 
separates ontologically the concepts of action and act. The concept of act can be 
understood as a verb (to put in motion, move to action, impel, actuate, influence, 
animate, to bring into action, bring about and so forth) or as noun (actuality of a 
condition, state, quality, the process of doing, action or operation). Isin argues that 
the word act, both as verb and noun, “implies and evokes an impressive range of 
conduct and outcomes that are related to but irreducible to action”160. An act is 
similar but something more than an action because an act has also some kind of 
virtual existence: an act of forgiveness, for example, which can happen before the 
actual performance itself.   
Finally, Isin161 concludes six differences between acts and action:  
1) Acts and action are distinct and separate (but related) classes of phenomena. 
While acts have a virtual existence, action is always actual. 
2) Acts rupture or break the given orders, practices and habitus162. Creative ruptures 
and breaks take different forms that are irreducible. They can, for example, take 
forms of resistance or subservience. What actualizes an act is not determinable 
in advance. 
3) Acts produce actors and actors do not produce acts; actors actualize acts and 
themselves through action. 
 
156  Isin (2008, 23).   
157  Vinthagen (2015b, 263). 
158  Reinach, Adolf (1983) [1913] The Apriori Foundations of Civil Law. Aletheia, 3, 1-142. 
159  Isin (2008, 21-22). 
160  Isin (2008, 22). 
161  Isin (2008, 36-37). 
162  I will further reflect the concept of habitus in the pages 43-44. 
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4) Actualization of acts provokes both responsibility163 and answerability164. Acts 
always concern others and the Other. The tension between responsibility and 
answerability produces acts as ruptures in the given. 
5) Responsibility and answerability are distinct and separate (but related) classes of 
phenomena. While responsibility invokes the given, immediate and calculable, 
answerability orients acts towards the Other. 
6) Ethics and the ethical, politics and the political are distinct and irreducible (but 
related) aspects of acts that one must investigate separately while keeping them 
together. 
In short, Isin separates routinized social actions, such as voting, taxpaying and 
enlisting, from acts, because acts break routines and on the contrary make difference 
underlining the difference165. This difference takes place when acts are actualized 
with actions: “[m]aking difference introduces a break, a rupture”166. Therefore, acts 
and action, acts and habitus should be separated and perceived as isolated acts that 
create a scene by incorporating those actors that continue to stay in the scene167. 
When Isin uses the term theorizing acts, he means “[A]n assemblage of acts, actions 
and actors in a historically and geographically concrete situation, creating a scene or 
state of affairs”168. Like the concept of political or the concept of power, an act is 
actualized by certain articulated action. Due to their transcendent qualities (e.g. act 
of forgiveness) they do not necessarily need concrete deed or action.  By theorizing 
acts one must “focus the rupture that enables the actor (that the act creates) to 
remain at the scene rather than fleeing it […]”. Isin also differentiates activist citizens 
and active citizens169. For him “activist citizens engage in writing scripts and creating 
the scene” while “active citizens follow scripts and participate in scenes that are 
already created”. To act is to engage on creation of a scene through creation of 
oneself. The observation and exploring of the citizenship should take place in acts, 
not practices or institutions. 
In the Algerian autonomous trade union context, this can be interpreted in the 
way that union activists are not satisfied by settling only for state led political 
processes (voting and participating elections, paying taxes, developing society as 
 
163  Responsibility is ontic (physical, real or factual existence) and action-oriented (Isin 2008, 28). 
164  Answerability is ontological and acts-oriented (Isin 2008, 28). 
165  Isin (2009, 379). 
166  Isin (2009, 379). 
167  Isin (2008, 27). 
168  Isin (2008, 24). 
169  Isin (2008, 38). 
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civilian family members). They want more. They want to organize themselves as 
responsible agents and act through rupture from their own individual premises to 
have an impact on the national conduct of policies. They are ready to act within the 
moments of uncertainty even though it can mean for them drifting into 
confrontation with the state authorities. To act means setting the unexpected and 
unpredictable170. Autonomous union activists use nonviolent protests, non-
cooperation, nonviolent interventions and civil disobedience171 as tools to pressure 
the government to reach their set demands without knowing the outcome. They are 
ready to change the conditions. They do not want to vote or pay taxes under certain 
conditions. Through these acts, they fulfill their experienced social responsibilities 
and transform into activist citizens. However, acts of citizenship also integrate the 
virtual desires that drive the activists to risk their social positions. Why some 
Algerians activate around the autonomous trade unions while others do not?  
Isin172 claims that “[a]cts cannot happen without motives, purposes, or reasons, 
but those cannot be the only grounds of interpreting acts of citizenship”. While acts 
of citizenship include decisions, they should not be reduced to calculability, 
intentionality or responsibility. Therefore, Isin173 stresses that: 
- The first principle of investigating acts of citizenship is to interpret them 
through their grounds and consequences, which includes subjects 
becoming activist citizens through scenes created.  
- The Second principle of theorizing acts of citizenship recognizes that acts 
produce actors that become answerable174 to justice against injustice.  
- The third principle of theorizing acts is to recognize that acts of 
citizenship do not need to be founded in law or enacted in the name of 
law. 
There has been much attention given to the status and habitus of citizenship, which 
Isin175 sees as ways of thought and conduct internalized over long period of time; 
acts of citizenship should be understood as related but distinct from them. They see 
a distinction related with the everyday creative momentous acts as breaks regarding 
 
170  Isin (2009, 380). 
171  Johansen (2007, 149-151). 
172  Isin (2008, 38). 
173  Isin (2008, 38-39). 
174  By the answerable act, Isin (2008, 30) means: the ‘actualization of a decision – inescapably, 
irremediably, and irrevocably’. 
175  Isin (2008, 15).  
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structural and even determinist concepts of habitus and practice176.What about those 
acts that may not be considered, in some contexts, as political or related with 
citizenship rights?  
Thomas H. Marshall classic formulation divides citizenship into civil, political and 
social categories177. However, Isin and Neilsen stress the requirement to focus on 
the exact moments, regardless of status and substance, when subjects constitute 
themselves as citizens. There are no fixed identities nor solid habitus or practice but 
more various fluid subject positions. When autonomous trade unions organize 
nonviolent sit-ins, or demonstrations, they become actors through acts they commit, 
perceived as the acts of citizenship. As Laclau and Mouffe write in the context of 
their discourse theory: “where every element has been reduced to a moment of that 
totality – all identity is relational and all relations have a necessary character”178.   
This leads us to recall that Laclau and Mouffe have received criticism regarding 
their conception of subjectivity and political agency179. While Laclau and Mouffe 
have tried to find a middle path between structuralism and post-structuralism 
regarding the understanding of political agency, they have been accused of reducing 
the subject from the political agency and substance, where subject is only approached 
by already existing discursive structures180 or reduced to an ensemble of subject 
positions marked upon a subject in discursive structures181.  This is a very 
Foucauldian way to see that subjects are created in discourses182. However, the 
critical discourse theory gives more liberty in this sense related to the understanding 
of the social nature of individual creativity as Norman Fairclough pronounce:  
[T]he creativity of the subject is socially determined, in the sense that creativity 
flourishes in particular social circumstances, when social struggles are constantly de-
structuring orders of discourse; and the creativity of the subject is socially constitutive, 
in the sense that individual creative acts cumulatively establish restructured orders of 
discourse183.  
 
176  Isin (2008, 18). 
177  Marshall, Thomas H. (1950) Citizenship and Social Class. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
178  Laclau and Mouffe (2001, 106). 
179  Howarth, David (2000, 121). Discourse. Buckingham UK: Open University Press. 
180  Ibid. 
181  Torfing (2005, 16). 
182  Howarth, David and Stravrakakis, Yannis (2000, 13) Introducing discourse theory and political 
analysis, in David Howarth and Yannis Stravrakakis (Eds.) Discourse theory and political analysis. Identities, 
hegemonies and social change. Manchester: Manchester University Press. pp. 1-23. 
183  Fairclough, Norman (1989, 142-143) Language and Power. Routledge: London and New York. 
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Laclau and Mouffe aim to give more space within the conception of split subject, where 
the subject is seen as internal to the structure but without complete structural 
identity, meaning that the structure of identity is ontologically open. In this 
dislocation, the subject appears as a split subject, which means that the subject may 
carry numerous identities at a time184. Still Marianne Jorgensen and Louise Phillips185 
argue that even in these postures where subject’s agency and role in social change 
are highlighted, they are surrounded by the discourses limiting the latitude of the 
subject to generate action.  
So it is fruitful to remind how Pierre Bourdieu strived to surpass the complex 
ontological structure-agency layout. Bourdieu tried to show the complementary role 
of relationship between structure and agency through the concept of habitus186. He 
defined habitus as something that is “the product of history, [and] produces 
individual and collective practices, and hence history, in accordance with schemes 
engendered by history”187. Habitus, “which restores to the agent a generating, 
unifying, constructing, classifying power188” as a conduct of social reality, while itself 
socially constructed. “[T]his capacity to construct social reality […] is not that of a 
transcendental subject but of a socialized body, investing in its practice socially 
constructed organizing principles that are acquired in the course of a situated and 
dated social experience189”. As Brian C. J. Singer190 explains in the context of acts of 
citizenship theoretical framework: “It does not mediate between position (structure) 
and position-taking (agency), but precedes both position and position-taking, status 
and practices”.  
Related to act and creativity, Melanie White191 poses a question: “[c]an an act of 
citizenship be creative?” She refers to works by Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze 
to show how creativity expresses itself as duration and cutting itself from obligation 
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191  White, Melanie (2008, 44) Can an act of citizenship be creative?, in Engin F. Isin & Greg M. Nielsen 
(Eds.) Acts of Citizenship. London & New York: Zed Books. pp. 44-56. 
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that in turn gain its strength from habit that keeps the so-called “closed society192” 
together and reinforce the already existing societal structures. She argues that when 
citizenship is understood as organized exclusively by habits, our aptitude to consider 
the creativity of citizenship is obstructed by limitations to challenge, debate, critique 
and reflect our recurrent action and such engagement to our habits, or stagnation, 
generate miscalculation regarding our ways of envisage futures from antecedent 
action. A creative act of citizenship requires openings “where citizens break or 
destabilize the bonds of habitual activity”193. That can take place through encounters, 
the meetings and confrontation between other human beings, where habitual activity 
is interfered. White concludes, by saying that: “in the encounter one exercises a 
degree of choice over whether to act one way and not the other – and it is in this 
context, I want to suggest, that a creative act is born”194.  
When activists and members of autonomous trade unions possessed with habitus 
constructed over long period of time make a decision to become a claimant of their 
citizenship rights and in a way break temporarily out with habitus in a specific 
momentum, they show creativity in imagining the possible social transformation. 
Therefore, Isin argues that the “difference between habitus and acts is not merely 
one of temporality but is also a qualitative difference that breaks habitus 
creatively”195. He is also interested in what conditions subjects act as citizens, how 
they transform into actors, how they become claimants of rights, entitlements and 
responsibilities, how should we name those acts and how to investigate them and 
their transformation into citizens?196  
Finally, in my interviews I have been interested to find out why Algerian activists 
joined autonomous trade unions, and how they understand the concept of 
citizenship. I have also aimed to outline the larger experience of the interviewees 
regarding their background, political views, how did they find their way into union, 
future prospects and construction of historical perspective. Being an activist in 
Algeria, whether a female or male, young or old, can be considered as marginal 
phenomena. Many surveys197 show that manifest political disengagement is 
 
192  By ”closed society” White means the state of society that preserve its own existence through 
obligation and habit. Obligation, habit and pressure work in conjunction to stabilize the social. (White 
2008, 48). 
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197  Moulai-Hadj, Mourad (2011) Espace public et participation politique en Afrique: le cas de l’Algérie. 
Afrique et développement, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, 2011, pp. 63-73; Robbins, Michael (2014) Skipping the Arab 
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widespread in Algeria, though I admit that these kind of studies contain manifold 
challenges. What then transforms some individuals, an assumed minority, to act and 
in what context? I define the acts of citizenship following the definition of Isin198 as:    
[T]hose acts that transform forms (orientations, strategies, technologies) and modes 
(citizens, strangers, outsiders, aliens) of being political by bringing into being new 
actors as activist citizens (claimants of rights and responsibilities) through creating 
new sites and scale of struggle. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Picture 1. Theoretical framework 
 
Spring? The Arab Barometer surveys a Changing Algeria. April 2014; SAHWA National Case Study (Algeria) 
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Algeria; Thomas, Kathrin (2018) Civic Engagement in the Middle East and North Africa. Arab 
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The theory of acts of citizenship is applied in this study at the individual level when 
approaching single activists. These individuals form larger units when they organize 
into autonomous trade unions and hence within this level of analysis these actors 
function in the larger societal structures. Next, I will expand my theoretical 
contemplation and reflect how the social movement theory is applied in the context 
of Algerian autonomous trade unions. 
2.2.3 The Relevancy of Public Space in the Mobilization 
Based on the mobilization, contestation, collective action, negotiation and 
communicative performances, autonomous trade unions claim to represent 
normative virtues and work against all forms of discrimination and exclusion of civil 
servants and workers. At the same time, they encourage Algerian citizens to join 
organized union to form united collective action in the struggle for better quality in 
the different fields of public services in particular working conditions. The goal is to 
return to the process of democratization that started in 1988 and to demand the 
redemption of the promises promulgated in the constitution. They want to break 
from the generally accepted repertoire of collective actions and signal to other 
Algerians that they should not be afraid to express their potential discontent, and 
even encourage their fellow citizens to unionize to all-inclusive struggle for the 
protection of workers’ and citizenship rights. 
The stated general objective of the autonomous trade unions is nonviolent 
democratic transformation and social change. Therefore, I define the action of 
autonomous trade unions, consisting of set of individual citizenship acts, as 
nonviolent movement due to their activities, methods and elements, such as 
communication and social movement as a tool where peaceful techniques are used 
to fight for normative objectives such as freedom, democracy and respect for human 
rights199. I connect the Algerian autonomous trade unions in larger societal level to 
social movement theories (SMT). In order to bring more diversity to the SMT 
framework, developed mainly in the European and North-American contexts 
considered by some as Western societies, I may contextualize and locate its 
theoretical background more widely regarding the Algerian cultural and socio-
economic specificities  to pay attention not overemphasize them, when required. 
While I consider autonomous trade unions as one actor among many in the larger 
picture of the Algerian political environment, they play an active and visible role 
 
199  Johansen (2007, 148). 
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within Algerian oppositional movement and contribute to the construction and 
formation of state-society relations.  
When social movements come to exist, the most frequently asked questions have 
been why or how did they emerge and who joins them. SMT has developed and 
transformed during the past years as any other field of research connected to the 
social, political and economic world. The so-called collective behavior theories, 
before the 1960s, tended to assume or consider the political engagement or activism 
as an unconventional or irrational type of behavior, meanwhile “Mass society” 
theorists insisted that social movements took place due to the failure of society to 
sustain “intermediary” organizations that kept individuals socially detached200. Many 
studies that stressed personality traits, marginality and alienation or grievances and 
ideology were conducted and the general outcome or conclusion was that the social 
movements emerged due to dissatisfaction201.  
Since the early 1960s, an important body of literature related to SMT began by a 
collective attempt of William Gamson, Charles Tilly and Mayer Zald. Converting the 
previous focuses on collective behavior, they formulated explicit organizational and 
political arguments linked to social unrest. They stressed the phenomena such as 
collective action, social movements and social movement organizations (SMOs)202. 
Therefore, the main body of work on social movements has gone from collective 
behavior theory to resource mobilization theory (RMT)203 while new social 
movements (NSM) interpretations such as action-identity figurations have become 
more common during recent years.  
As a reaction to collective behavior theories, which focused too heavily on what 
attracted people to participate in social movements, RMT opened another 
perspective that stressed more structural factors: availability of resources to gain 
membership in a community and position of individuals in various social 
 
200  Goodwin, Jeff and Jasper, James M. (Eds.) (2003, 11) The Social Movement Reader. Cases and Concepts. 
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201  Klandermans, Bert (1984) Mobilization and Participation: Social-Psychological Expansions of 
Resource Mobilization Theory. American Sociological Review, Vol 49, No. 5, pp. 583-600. 
202  Davis, Gerald F., McAdam, Doug, Scott, W. Richard & Zald, Mayer N. (2005, 4-40) Social Movements 
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the variety of resources that must be mobilized, the linkages among the groups, the dependence of 
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and Zald 2003, 169; Pakulski 1991, 12-14). 
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networks204. Unlike the collective behavior theories, RMT stressed movement action 
as “rational, normal behavior, subject to the decision-making constraints of all 
behavior”205. As the founders of RMT, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, 
argued already in 1977, there are always potential participants in reserve, but the 
resources that are available explain more how the movements emerge206. McCarthy 
and Zald moved away from questioning “why” collective action takes place to “how” 
the processes take place207.  
According to McCarthy and Zald, the RMT relied more on political sociological 
and economic theories than on the social psychology and collective behavior208. Bert 
Klandermans argued in the mid-80s that RMT was able to gain a dominant approach 
in the field while criticized it for drifting too far from social-psychological analysis209. 
He argued that social psychology could contribute in a consequential way to reveal 
processes of participation on the individual level, for example giving attention to the 
interaction among the individuals generating mobilization210. I will not draw on 
social psychological theories such as expectancy-value theory but I am interested in 
how the members of autonomous trade unionists construct discourses related to 
their society and political development, which impacts to their participation and 
agency.  
A perennial question in SMT relates to the interest to understand when, why and 
how social movements emerge211. In this regard, large body of social movement 
theory corresponds well to my research problem to process autonomous trade 
unions in Algeria. Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper212 describe social movement 
studies as a window into a number of aspects of social life and movements as the 
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main source of political conflict and social change. They define social movement as 
“a collective, organized, sustained, and non-institutional challenge to authorities, 
power holders, or cultural beliefs and practices”. Thus, through this definition I also 
approach Algeria’s autonomous trade unions in general, various human rights 
organizations and other civil society organizations around them. 
McCarthy and Zald213 defined social movement as “a set of opinions and beliefs 
in a population, which represent for changing some elements of the social structure 
and/or reward distribution of a society”. Social movement does not automatically 
promote social change. They can support or oppose social change as well.  Charles 
Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, on their behalf, define social movement as “sustained 
campaign of claim making, using repeated performance that advertise the claim, 
based on organizations, networks, traditions, and solidarities that sustain these 
activities”214. 
I consider SNAPAP and other autonomous trade unions as a social movement 
because they are:  
Collective, organized, sustained, and non-institutional independent trade unions that 
spring from a set of opinions and beliefs of Algerian workers and challenges the 
Algerian authorities to achieve the sustainable democratic social change through 
protecting workers’ rights via networks, traditions and solidarities.  
According to resource mobilization theory, it is relevant to discuss how SNAPAP 
accumulates the variety of resources such as time, money, organizational skills and 
certain social and political opportunities that permit the movement to conduct its 
function  achieve its long-term objectives, sustainable democratic social change that 
allows protection of workers’ rights. McCarthy and Zald215 stress the study of the 
aggregation of resources to be able to reflect social movement activities and 
resources available for their use, engagement and social change. Resource 
aggregation requires organization as well as individual participation, which is crucial 
regarding the success or failure of the social movement within societal structures. 
The action conducted by the authorities influences the outcome as well. Therefore, 
the attempts of the Algerian authorities in controlling the autonomous trade unions 
as well as societal structures in the cultural context that enable contingent interaction 
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certainly has a significant impact on social movements such as SNAPAP and its 
members from the individual point of view.   
While RMT offers one possible aspect to approach the resources available in the 
processes of mobilization, the criticism introduced by David A. Snow, Louis A. 
Zurcher and Sheldon Ekland-Olson216 argue that it focuses too much on formal 
organizational networks and ignores the importance of contingent social settings that 
are relatively free from state control217. Nevertheless, I believe that RMT can be also 
useful aspect regarding the understanding of the structure of SNAPAP. Despite that, 
I recognize the criticisms by Daniel M. Cress and David A. Snow218 that RMT is 
insufficient if it is understood as a catalogue of the resources used by social 
movements: 
The problem with this strategy is that it seldom goes beyond identifying the general 
categories of money, legitimacy, people, and occasionally expertise. As a consequence, 
it is usually unclear whether the listed resources include all resources mobilized or 
only those deemed critical by the researcher. Thus, the resource concept remains 
nearly as ambiguous as it did when it was introduced more than 20 years ago.219 
Keeping this aspect in mind, I will introduce the organizational structure of 
SNAPAP220 to give an idea about one autonomous trade union from the reductive 
structural point of view. SNAPAP activists often pointed out how the union’s 
structure can be described from horizontal and vertical perspectives, from the base 
to all sectors within the public sector. The information that was distributed on 
SNAPAP’s webpages in 2012 gives a formal and normative picture about the 
movement while I am critical regarding the continuous functioning of its organs. 
Firstly, I am not aware of whether all the organs are functioning and with what 
intensity. Secondly, from the individual activist viewpoint, being a human means that 
individuals have multiple life spheres and periods of life, which prevents the 
possibility of constant activity, as Florence Passy and Marco Giugni has argued in 
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combining structural and cultural factors221. Sometimes activists are active, 
sometimes not due to their personal life courses.  
The horizontal structure of SNAPAP can be approached from four levels: the 
national level222, the regional level223, the provincial (Wilaya)224 level and the base 
level225. The National Congress is the supreme organ of SNAPAP and it assemble 
in every five years in the capital Algiers. National Guidance Council is also the 
supreme organ, which meet in every two years in between the assemblies of the 
National Congresses. The National Executive Council is the supreme executive 
body, which meets regularly once a year, while the National Office is the executing 
body that congregates regularly every month. Regular meetings can increase 
commitment, which according to Passy and Giugni strengthen the sustained 
participation of the members226. All the organs can assemble in an emergency 
situation. The National Councils Sectors are members of each federation sector 
nationally. McCarthy and Zald point out that when social movement wants to 
achieve its goals in larger environment, like in this case SNAPAP in Algeria, it may 
establish federative associations:  
A SMO [social movement organization] which desires to pursue its goals in more 
than a local environment may attempt to mobilize resources directly from adherents 
or to develop federated chapters in different local areas. Federation serves to organize 
constituents into small local units227.  
At regional level, SNAPAP is divided into two components: the Regional Council 
(C.R), which is the supreme organ of the regional groups of three to five different 
provinces (wilayas)228, depending on the size of the region, and the sessions are held 
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in every six months; and the executive organ of the Regional Council (RC), which is 
elected by the latter within it.  
The provincial level is divided into four elements: the Congress of Wilaya (C.W), 
the Executive Council of Wilaya (C.E.W), the Office of Wilaya (B.W) and the 
Councils Wilayas Sector (C.W.S). The Congress of the Wilaya is the supreme body 
across the provinces that meets every five years, while The Executive Council of the 
Wilaya is the supreme organ of the Wilaya level between Congresses. The Office of 
Wilaya is the executive organ of the Executive Council of Wilaya, which is elected 
by the latter within it. Councils Wilayas Sector is a federation of bodies in each sector 
across the wilayas. Finally, there is the Base level, The Union Section (S.S), which is 
divided into three structures: The General Assembly of Members (A.G), The Trade 
Union Council Section (C.S.S) and The Executive Board of the Section (B.E.S). 
The Union Section is the base Structure of the Union composed of all members 
at the place of work (Institution and Public Administration "IPA", Common, 
Educational Institutions, Offices and Administrative Institutions with characters). 
The General Assembly of Members, is composed of members from the same 
workplace, whereas The Trade Union Council Section is the organ of the Union 
Base, elected by the General Assembly. The Executive Board of the Section is the 
executive organ of the Trade Union Section, elected by the General Assembly for a 
term of four years. In addition, SNAPAP is organized from the vertical structure 
aspect into different bodies of federations called the National Council Areas229.This 
introduction of SNAPAP’s structure is just one example of how the autonomous 
trade unions can be structured within wider societal components.  
In general, the collective action conducted by the non-state actors in North Africa 
and the Middle East have been studied both as a part of the civil society and, more 
recently, in the context of SMT. While social movement studies mostly concern 
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North American traditions, and emphasize especially RMT, it seems that less data 
has been gathered on the Middle East and North Africa. Joel Beinin and Frédéric 
Vairel230 have stressed that instead of generalizing social movements in the Eastern 
and Western Mediterranean in the unbalanced category of hostile “anti-Western” 
terrorist movements, the geographically defined location can offer a “fascinating 
laboratory”  to test the SMT’s feasibility and to increase the theoretical knowledge 
of social movements in general. They believe that “the disinterest of the dominant 
currents in comparative politics or sociology in collective action and social 
movements in the Middle East and North Africa is striking”231.  
Autonomous trade unions operating in the civil society claim to mobilize around 
social grievances and injustices in the context of work and campaign for a better 
treatment of workers at workplaces as well as the public space at large. In general, 
civil society can be approached from various perspectives. In general, it can be 
considered as third sector or associative sphere that is independent from the state. 
Its normative functioning and linked “romanticization” owes in many ways to Alexis 
de Tocqueville’s (1805-1859) depiction of associative structures in 19th century 
United States. He manifested free institutions and political rights in democratic 
America against aristocratic Europe. He described public associations and civil life 
in America: 
Only those associations that are formed in civil life without reference to political 
objects are here referred to. The political association that exist in the United States 
are only a single feature in the midst of the immense assemblage of associations in 
that country. Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form 
associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which 
all take part, but associations of thousand other kinds, religious, moral, serious, futile, 
general or restricted, enormous or diminutive. The Americans make associations to 
give entertainments, to found seminaries, to build inns, to construct churches, to 
diffuse books, to send missionaries to the antipodes; in this matter they found 
hospitals, prisons, and schools232. 
Tocqueville233 highlighted the connection between the public associations and 
newspapers. He stressed the stabilizing political role of civil associations and their 
facilitating role regarding political associations: “In civil life every man may, strictly 
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speaking, fancy that he can provide for his own wants; in politics he can fancy no 
such thing”234. 
Meanwhile, it is often neglected that Tocqueville was openly advocate for French 
colonial rule in Algeria (1830-1962) though tried to adapt majority of the values he 
presented in his famous work Democracy in America. Tocqueville’s writings on Algeria 
such as Deuxième letter sur Algérie235 (1837), Travail sur l’Algérie236 (1841) or Premier 
rapport sur l’Algérie237 (1847) disclose the development of his view on the colonization 
of Algeria within ten year timeframe. According to John W.P. Veugelers238, 
Tocqueville maintained his position regarding the support of French colonization in 
Algeria due to international and strategic reasons, but gradually lost his belief in the 
possibilities of integrating French population with Algerians. While it would be an 
exaggeration to argue that Tocqueville supported an apartheid kind of societal 
division in Algeria, he explicitly brings out the superiority of European civilization 
in comparison with the “Arabs”:  
One can easily imagine that a nation as powerful and civilized as ours exercises by its 
superiority of enlightenment almost invincible influence on small, nearly barbaric 
tribes; and to annex them requires that established power creates lasting relations with 
them. 
The Frenchmen and the Arabs inhabit the same areas, and thus it would be logical to 
apply for both people such a legislation they can understand and they have learned to 
respect. The political leader would be the same for both races, but for a long time 
everything else would stay different; fusion would became later by its own force.239.  
Ten years later, Tocqueville was more explicit regarding his position on French 
occupation. Simultaneously, he praised the French army and conduct in Algeria. 
Tocqueville was worried that French settlers were not taken care of in the colony, 
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which might result as similar uprising that took place in America. He stressed 
international power politics and the French position in the international world order: 
Without a doubt, it’s advisable to employ natives as agents of government, but they 
must behave like civilized men, and with French maximes. This hasn’t been the case 
always and everywhere, and we could have been accused of having less civilized native 
administration; we have only lent European structures and intelligence to its 
barbarism. 
Sometimes the actions have combined with the theories. In various writings, one has 
promoted this doctrine that the native population, who have reached the last stage of 
depravity and vices, is forever incapable of any change and progress; thus we 
shouldn’t enlighten them, but rather deprive them the lights they possess. Far from 
just sitting on our ground, we should push them little by little away from their territory 
and take their place; expecting nothing else from them than submission, and there’s 
only one way to obtain that: submit them by force240. 
Still, it is important to contextualize the positions, whether of practicing statesman 
or citizen, that Tocqueville represented when writing his works241.  Meanwhile, the 
abrupt contradiction that lies between his studies in the United States and Algeria 
particularly related to the timeframe should not be ignored either: he was already 
writing Democracy in America when he published his work about Algeria242. In general, 
normative values and ideals materialize differently when brought into practice. As 
Dipesh Chakrabarty explains in the context of British colonial India: “The European 
colonizer of the nineteenth century both preached this Enlightenment humanism at 
the colonized and at the same time denied it in practice”243. As if one says: we are 
superior to you due to our universal liberal values, democracy and freedom, but you 
must wait until you have achieved our stage of development before they are applied 
to you.  
The civil society and its institutional core are understood here as non-
governmental and non-economic connections and voluntary associations that 
according to Jürgen Habermas244 “anchor communication structures of the public 
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sphere in the society component of the lifeworld245”. Civil society can bring up socio-
economic problems and challenges from the so-called grass-root level to the political 
decision making processes and inform authorities or decision makers about them to 
develop the society. According to Habermas, civil society is “composed of those 
more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organizations, and movements 
that, attuned to how social problems resonate in the private life spheres, distill and 
transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public sphere”246. He continues: 
“The core of civil society comprises a network of associations that institutionalize 
problem-solving discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of 
organized public spheres247”. Because the political system or authorities (political 
parties) are sensitive to public opinion due to the electoral processes, they need to 
listen what comes up from the civil societal level. 
Hassan Hanafi248 argues that the civil society is considered as a “Western” 
concept. According to this historical narrative, it was coined by the famous English 
philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) who saw the civil society as an alternative 
to kingdom and church where the “human being was neither a subject of the king 
nor a believer in church” but “a citizen of a state”249. Many well-known historical 
political philosophers have processed the concept from European premises250. For 
Hegel, civil society meant a widely described type of mediation between private and 
public life (churches, synagogues, labor unions and political parties, while Locke 
emphasized constitutional democracy and therefore institutions that helped 
maintaining balance of power251. However, I support the idea proposed by Hanafi 
that citizenship is not alien to Islamic countries or other non-European locations in 
general such as Algeria, dominated by Muslims (99%).  
Regarding the existence of civil society in Muslim dominated countries, Hanafi 
splits the understanding of the civil society from its Islamic basis into three 
categories. Firstly, there are those who reject the very idea of civil society connected 
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to Islam. Secondly, some affirm the universality of the concept, approaching it as a 
global idea, irrespective of its so-called Western origins.  Finally, it is possible to 
develop the idea of civil society from classical Islam or historical perspective to 
reflect the concept in contemporary social needs. I embrace the third approach. It is 
not only useful, but it would be unconvincing to argue that the civil society would 
be alien to Algerian social life especially recalling the versatile history of the country 
as an inseparable part of Mediterranean historical development whether Numidian, 
Phoenician, Roman, Byzantine, Islamic, Ottoman, French or independent state.  
The 132-year French occupation built its structures on previous social 
constructions, which created a distinctive spatial body that separates Algeria from 
some other Muslim majority countries. Omar Carlier252 argues that since the 
enactment of the Law on Freedom of Association (Loi Waldeck-Rousseau) in 1901 
offered a more liberal environment and autonomous social space that encouraged 
group solidarity. It paved the way for more common ground for elites (khassa) and 
mass (’amma) through associative sociability even though the presence of Algerians 
in the associations established by the European settlers was in fact rare253. However, 
Algerians founded their own clubs (nadi) and constituted substantial public spaces 
around the cafés (See Chapter IV). It was especially in these cafés, situated in the 
cities, where workers and traders met up, met newcomers and offered working 
possibilities. These spaces can be most likely described as hyper-masculine, where 
gender restrictions probably prevailed reflecting the gender positions of the society 
more generally. I have not found literature related to women’s presence in these 
spaces. Newspapers were an integral part in generating public and political 
discussions. Therefore, it was also in these public spaces where Algerian nationalism 
was able to develop and generate until the stage of Independence war in 1954.  
If the public enables to reflect moral dimensions of democratic policies such as 
public interest, public goods or public policies, its counterpart, the private, denotes 
individual freedoms and possible participation in the public sphere254. I am interested 
in the actual social space and the forms of collective action generated by the trade 
union activists. This is due to the notion that the civil society does not represent an 
automatically solid stage on the sustainable path towards democracy in many Eastern 
and Western Mediterranean countries, or elsewhere in the world.  
 
252  Carlier, Omar (1995,151) Entre nation et jihad. Histoire sociale des radicalismes Algériens. Paris: PFSP. 
253  Carlier (1995, 152) and Liverani, Andrea (2008, 14-15) The Civil Society in Algeria: The political functions 
of associational life. Oxon: Routledge. 
254  Nash, Kate (2014, 1) Transnationalizing the Public Sphere. UK: Polity. 
 74 
While I recognize the concept of public sphere255 developed by Jürgen Habermas, 
I would replenish it with Nancy Fraser’s256 concept transnational public sphere, which 
contains a focal criticism of the public sphere theory of Habermas. However, I will 
not use the concept transnational public sphere either, but public space, an expression 
employed neither by Habermas nor Fraser. The public space is, what Antonio 
Gramsci257 would call, the sort of intermediate state between the civil society and 
political society, or the state. Still, the social theory of Habermas and its key 
components are applicable and utilized per se though added with complementary 
modifications, especially from Fraser. Therefore, it is relevant to illustrate some of 
the elements of his social theory.                
To start with, my interest to public space started by the contentious action 
generated by the autonomous trade unions in the public political space. Frédéric 
Vairel defined contentious space as: “a part of the social world built at the same time 
against and in reference to the political field and its formal institutions” 258. 
According to Vairel, social actors struggled in the contentious space by believing 
possibilities to change political climate via mobilization and political activism such 
as writing statements, organizing sit-ins and gathering people around various issues. 
Activists share friendship and political comradery and exchange ideas. However, 
contentious space as such is not sufficient to elaborate social space as a spatial 
location, whether virtual or non-virtual, or to explain thoroughly who are the actors, 
what are the actions or acts taking place and for what aims. There are many other 
points to be linked to social space that is considered here as being more than just a 
space for contentious politics. It comprises meeting, experiencing, eating, running, 
driving, and other everyday activities. It covers inanimate spatial places, such as 
parks, buildings, nature and yards. And what is more, it is especially and most 
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interestingly a space for representation, as depicted by Don Mitchell in his book The 
Right to the city: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space 259.       
To start with Habermas260, he separates the public sphere as “a communication 
structure rooted in the lifeworld261 through the associational network of civil society” 
and the political public sphere as “a sounding board of problems that must be processed 
by the political system because they cannot be solved elsewhere”. Habermas sees the 
public sphere as a “warning system with sensors” that is sensitive regarding the social 
problems within the society. In the context of nation state262 democratic theory, 
Habermas stresses that the public sphere should “detect and identify problems” and 
“convincingly” and “influentially” thematize them while trying to seek possible 
solutions as well as to take them to the political decision-making because “the 
capacity of the public sphere to solve problems on its own is limited”. However, he 
believes that this potential should be exercised to exceed the challenges within the 
political system.   
What is the relation between civil society and public space? Habermas uses the 
concept of civil society to outline some barriers and power structures inside the 
public sphere, as he operationalizes the concept and argues that in critical situations 
the barriers can be surpassed with “escalating movements”. He defines public sphere 
as a “social phenomenon” that is “just as elementary as action, actor, association, or 
collectivity”, but which “eludes the conventional sociological concepts of social 
‘order’”. Habermas distinguishes an institution, an organization or a framework of 
norms (competences, roles, membership regulations) from it. The public sphere is 
best described by Habermas as “a network for communicating information and 
points of view” and is “reproduced through communicative action”, which he 
disconnects from everyday communicative practices and refers rather to the social 
space that is “generated in communicative action”.  
Communicative action is symbolically mediated interaction where things are 
performed via linguistic expressions especially in intersubjective way263. As lifeworld, 
public sphere is reproduced through communicative action, which results in the 
processes of communication filtered and synthesized to fuse into clusters of 
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“topically specified public opinions”. In the Algerian context, Mourad Moulai-
Hadj264 argues that we cannot imagine public space without its contribution to the 
formation of public opinion, which is considered side by side with other institutions 
such as schools, factories, universities and mass media, as well as other institutions 
of socialization or re-socialization in different social categories. Therefore, public 
space is understood here as a form of development of civil society that can be 
envisaged as a theatre of confrontation of the ideas, discussions and negotiations 
among various social strata.   
Nevertheless, Habermas265 stresses that while public sphere expands to the 
politically relevant questions, it leaves their resolving to the political system itself: the 
public sphere “refers neither to the functions nor the contents of everyday 
communication but to social space generated in communicative action”. People meet 
each other in simple or episodic situations where they shape together negotiated 
interpretations of gestures and language and form spatial structure that transforms 
into larger public assemblies, performances and presentations. The physically 
gathered audience in local places offer a more clear understanding of shared public 
sphere and detached public’s physical presence transforming the experience into 
virtual presence (readers, listeners, viewers).  
Next I present a supplementary review of literature to complement and update 
the concept of public sphere theorized by Habermas. John Hartley266 has criticized 
the demand of physically gathered audience by reminding of the current media 
landscape (television, popular newspapers, magazines, photography and internet) in 
the public sphere. Likewise, Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge have decentralized 
and multiplied the public sphere to enable the critique towards understanding of 
public sphere of Habermas as exclusively bourgeois in its nature by constructing 
aonther conceptualization of space that allows for the proletarian counter-public 
sphere that permits concurrently room for new political tools within political debate 
culture, extremely essential regarding this thesis267. Often when Habermas has been 
contradicted and criticized, it has happened within the framework of public sphere 
theory itself268. This is also the case with Negt and Kluge. They utilize critically the 
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framework of disintegration theory developed by Habermas, but continue 
developing it even further. This is also my intention. Negt and Kluge show that the 
concept of proletarian public sphere is no less ambiguous than bourgeois269. They 
argue that the concept of bourgeois “does refer to a strategic position that is 
substantively enmeshed within the history of the emancipation of the working 
class”270. This example is especially relevant in the context of autonomous trade 
unions. However, there are many other elements as well: gender, historical 
narrations, culture, normativity and so forth. 
Joan B. Landes271 has asked in relation to the public sphere theory of Habermas: 
“One public or many? Where are the women?” What about other spheres such as 
global public sphere and Islamic public sphere? My main frame in developing the 
understanding of public space comes from Nancy Fraser272 and her aforementioned 
concept of transnational public sphere. She has introduced remarks that challenge the 
application of the public sphere theory of Habermas in globalized, multicultural and 
the so-called post-western world views. She has presented critiques of at least six 
major presuppositions included in the public sphere theory of Habermas regarding 
the formation of public opinion that are connected to the “blind spot” of the 
Westphalian democratization of the “modern territorial nation state”273. Fraser is 
mostly keen to question the normative legitimacy and political efficacy of the 
constructed public opinion and especially inclusivity of its formation. The major 
challenge of Habermas’s concept of public space is connected to its pursuit of 
universalizing the discourse in exclusive male, bourgeois and white spaces274. These 
reductive and exclusive constructions do not fit into Algerian autonomous trade 
union context. 
First, the assumption of the Westphalian nation state bounded on territory and 
ruled by the undivided sovereign is doubtful in the light of international institutions, 
intergovernmental networks, transnational and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO’s) operating within the structures of contemporary states275. Second, the 
assumption that the ‘public’ encapsulates national citizens excludes immigrants, 
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paperless, diasporas and dual or triple-citizenship holders and their capabilities to 
participate the formation of public opinion as equal, efficient and legitimate 
members276. Third, the formation of the major topics in the shaping of public 
opinion within political communities in the larger picture of the structural 
transformations (organization of the labor relations or environmental laws) in 
competition with global neoliberal 24/7 electronic financial markets and their 
supported institutions277. Fourth, the supposed role of the national media in 
generating public opinion in the era of social media seems absurd, but actually its 
reduced capacities were challenged even before the internet due to international 
private TV and radio channels that opened possibilities for international public 
opinion development278. Fifth, a single national language has probably never been 
option in the Mediterranean countries such as Algeria even though hardly elsewhere 
either279. Finally, the national literature that contributes to the creation of national 
imaginary is also at the odds with multiculturalism and cultural hybridity280. 
Therefore, Fraser depicts the formation of the public opinion as transnationalizing 
the public sphere. She does not introduce a brand new theory, but operates within the 
foundations created by Habermas and stresses the role of the participants of the 
formation of the public opinion, which she considers as significant political force281.  
In her previous studies, she has highlighted the role of social movements as “the 
only way to reduce disparities in political voice”282. Still, even if everyone can 
participate from equal premises to the formation of solid public opinion, does it 
emerge from rational inference, as Habermas believes regarding his deliberative 
speech?  
In this regard, Jacques Rancière283 presents a counter-model to Habermas 
claiming instead that disagreement of rational deliberative speech act, sets the 
democratic foundations:  
We should take disagreement to mean a determined kind of speech situation: one in 
which one of the interlocutors at once understands and does not understand what the 
other is saying. The disagreement is not the conflict between one who says white and 
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another one who says black. It is the conflict between one who says white and another 
who also says white but does not understand the same thing in the name of 
whiteness”284.  
However, disagreement does not mean misconstruction, nor does it stem from 
indefinite words or different languages, because in numerous speech situations 
disagreement does not have anything to do with misconstruction or 
misunderstanding285. According to Rancière, disagreement has more to do with the 
power and politics, while Habermas stresses mainly ideal speech situation free from 
power captives. Disagreement can be understood as a rupture in a given situation as 
an act that breaks habitus. Rancière does not look after rationality or consensual 
politics, but views politics as channel to make people heard and visible286, while 
political parties as a part of political system and political processes disappear. 
Similarly, Mouffe stresses agonism, the need for debate and struggle in liberal 
democratic politics instead of th totalitarian condition of full agreement and 
unanimity287.  
The understanding of politics by Rancière288 seems to fit with the aspectual view of 
politics. He criticizes the understanding of politics as action that is only taking place 
at the institutional level or by demonstrators in the public space. Laclau and Mouffe 
stresses the political processes and political articulation that they insist, determine 
“how we act and think and thereby how we create society289. Therefore, it is 
necessary to define what is the political. Mouffe290 divides between the political, 
ontological dimension of antagonism, and politics, ensemble of practices and 
institutions that aim to organize human coexistence. I approach the construction of 
discourses from the aforementioned aspectual view of politics291. Aspect politics draws 
on a broader understanding of politics than the so-called sectoral view, where politics 
is understood as a field or sector (formal institutions such as parliament, government 
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or municipal council), where political action is conducted by those who in general 
consider themselves as politicians.   
In the aspectual view of politics, the world is seen in a similar configuration as 
Michel Foucault depicts power: power is not in one place intrinsically, where some 
can use it over the others, but it actualizes in specific contingent events and produces 
the social292. All aspects and phenomena of social life potentially has a political 
aspect, which can actualize in certain particular contexts. Social life is conflictual, the 
political potentiality of a phenomenon can actualize through conflicts and therefore 
enable spaces for political action. The same phenomena can seal in non-political and 
political aspects through interpretation and articulation, which actualize in the 
process of politicization. As Foucault depicts the existence of power, the political 
operates in a similar pattern: it is potentially everywhere, but it is actualized only 
through articulation and interpretation. This supports also how Laclau and Mouffe 
view the political related to their discourse theory stressing that politics should not 
be understood narrowly, as for example party politics, but as we constantly constitute 
and reproduce the social293. As Rancière stresses: “Politics is not made up of power 
relationships; it is made up of relationships between worlds”294. William Gamson295 
has introduced three interconnected sequences in the processes of politicization. 
First people cogitate a moral indignation in front of an experience they consider as 
inequitable. Next, they construct collective cognition regarding the iniquitous 
problem. Eventually, they obtain interest to act solving it. Therefore, Gamson 
applies three frames: injustice frame, identity frame and agency frame. 
Finally, I see public space and public sphere, as action and act, intertwined and 
overlapping, but different. I prefer to operate in this thesis through the concept of 
public space, because it enables to show that public opinion can also be formed in 
the de-spatialized spaces and non-physical environments, such as internet and social 
media. Rancière does not seem to pay attention to the difference of space and sphere 
and often uses both terms, when he displays the examples of the disagreement 
effected by power and politics. I argue that the usage of public space also helps to 
withdraw from the Habermasian discourse of deliberative speech act and gives more 
room to describe citizenship acts that aim rather to provoke contradictive attention 
in the form of space of representation than strive to political consensus. As Mitchell 
describes the attempts of marginalized groups to be heard: 
 
292 Jorgensen and Phillips (2002, 37). 
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Without occupation of the space, without taking it … the kinds of protests that came 
to a climax in Tiananmen, Leipzig, Seattle or People’s Park would have remained 
invisible. The occupation of space is a necessary ingredient of protest [… ]296. 
One of the aims of SNAPAP and other autonomous trade unions is to gain visibility 
through organizing performances in the public space to impact on public opinion 
that would increase the political engagement of Algerian citizens leading to an 
increase in future mobilizations. In the Maghrebin context, Mohamed Nachi297 
argues that the concept of public space enables the realization of the various 
components of the civil society at large, such as associations, organizations, political 
groups and social movements, and reflects them intelligibly within the processes of 
formation and engagement. It is a concept that integrates participative elements that 
are not so much involved in the concept of public sphere that had connotations of 
managing general phenomenon around social life. However, at the same time I 
recognize the fluidity of the differences between the concepts and admit that neither 
should be overtaxed.  
While civil society can be considered as rich and versatile in Algeria, according to 
Arab Izerrouken298, only 5 000 out of 81 000 registered associations in Algeria were 
functional in 2004. He believes that despite the initial enthusiasm, many projects 
were left unfinished due to the lack of funds and maturation as well as due to the 
difficult security situation during the 1990s. Andrea Liverani299 has similarly stressed 
identical concerns in his work on Algerian civil society and emphasizes that the 
reported official number of functioning associations on the paper is distorted and 
not in concord with the realities in the field. Liverani also argues that against the 
general belief, associative sector seal in mistrust among Algerians, meaning that it is 
not automatically considered as genuine political participation that instigates its roots 
within authentic aspiration of the population300. This is one of the greatest challenges 
regarding SNAPAP’s attempts to mobilize Algerians for social change. 
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3 ENGAGING WITH TRADE UNION ACTIVISTS IN 
URBAN AREAS 
This chapter discusses methodological choices, challenges and their improvisation. 
Fieldwork and the ethnographic oriented method that played an important role 
regarding the collection of research material in this work is depicted as a process that 
integrates various measures and arrangements other than conducting interviews, 
field notes and participant observation itself. Regarding ontological and 
epistemological questions, I stress situated and partial knowledge, while highlighting 
the importance of hermeneutic process of analyzing the phenomena.  
As Allaine Cerwonka writes, ethnographic research requires “improvised 
strategies and ethical judgements”301. After I have introduced the research material 
and conduct of the interviews, I describe fieldwork and the unexpected situations 
that emerge during research from ethical perspectives. I raise ethical challenges in 
the processes of fieldwork and ethnography, because the researcher is intrinsically 
part of the research and therefore it is necessary to ponder my positionality regarding 
the research topic, interpretation and outcome. My main motives in this research are 
to increase the knowledge of Algerian society, to have better possibilities to connect 
myself to Algerian civil society, and to show the heterogeneity of Algerian social life 
at large.  
My intention is to interpret the acts of citizenship of the autonomous trade unions 
from the interviews with union activists as well as through participant observation, 
media analysis, governmental reports and existing public discussions. I will also 
introduce more deeply how I apply the discourse theory formed by Ernesto Laclau 
and Chantal Mouffe302  to track discourses from the interviews of the members of 
SNAPAP (and other autonomous trade unions) and pro-governmental actors. I am 
after how historical and contemporary antagonistic nodal points form through various 
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identities within hegemonic discourses, social antagonism, dislocated discourses and 
the emergence of split subjects303.  
I use stability, political and patriotism as nodal points (or master signifiers) in the 
following analytical chapters. Stability reflects the socio-economic transformation 
and aimed social change. The concept of the political plays important role in the 
discourses of autonomous trade union activists and state authorities when justifying 
their acts. Finally, patriotism emerges as an aim for action by political agents. I end 
this chapter by presenting some background for the media landscape in Algeria 
reflecting how media analysis is practiced in this study. Press articles play important 
role in this thesis to reflect 30 years long journey of the Algerian official autonomous 
trade union movement.  
3.1 Collection of research material 
3.1.1 Ethnographic challenges 
This is a qualitative research study and the primary research material consists of 
ethnographic oriented fieldwork, during 2013-2015, including participant 
observation and personal interviews as well as media analysis. I wrote field notes 
during the field trips. I have collected articles from various media304 (newspapers, 
internet articles, videos) concerning the autonomous trade unions (between 1993-
2018) to support the analysis of the development of the independent labor 
movement that consist also dozens of interviews from the activists and researchers. 
In 2008, I attended the Euromed Civil Forum in Marseille as part of group 
constituted by various Finnish non-governmental organization (NGO) 
representatives. Participants came from the European Union (EU), eastern and 
western Mediterranean countries. While the forum mainly accentuated immigration 
related issues, many activists and scholars represented multiple non-governmental 
organizations without special programs in that regard. During the forum I met with 
the President of the National Autonomous Union of Public Administration Staff 
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(Syndicat National Autonome des Personelles de l’Administration Publique, 
SNAPAP), Rachid Malaoui. I remember parts of our exchange of ideas about the 
political situation in Algeria and information I received about the contestation of the 
trade union movements aiming at syndicalist pluralism and rights pledged in the 
constitution. However, I could not foresee that a few years later the popular protests 
and demonstrations would erupt in North Africa and I would start preparing my 
doctoral thesis about the autonomous trade unions in Algeria.   
Everything has its beginnings. However, I do not know whether my interest to 
start research on autonomous trade unions in Algeria is a consequence of 
aforementioned meeting in Marseille, or how much this path relates to my Finnish-
Algerian roots. The cultures of North Africa and especially Algeria have played an 
important role throughout my life from various perspectives through growing up in 
Finland. Entering into worlds of trade unionism opened intriguing access to explore 
the civil society and social movements through manifold encounters and 
experiences. Participant observation enabled views and perspectives, power 
positions and narrations that might have stayed uncovered without conducting 
fieldwork on the topic.  
As mentioned above, I started the fieldwork in 2013 and stayed at first one month 
in Algeria. I met Algerian scholars in Algiers and Oran and held discussions how the 
subject of Algerian autonomous trade unions could be studied. I also met some 
activists, such as Rachid Malaoui and Kaddour Chouicha, in a café and travelled with 
group of activists to the border of Tunisia, where the continuation of the trip towards 
World Social Forum organized in Tunis (2013) was prevented by the authorities at 
border stations near Tebessa and El Kala. The following year I returned for two and 
half months (2014-2015) and conducted my fieldwork mainly in Oran while regularly 
conducting interviews and participating in meetings in the capital Algiers. I was 
simultaneously a visiting researcher at the National Center of Research in Social and 
Cultural Anthropology (Le Centre national de recherche en anthropologie sociale et 
culturelle, CRASC), in Oran, which gave me a substantial possibility to interact with 
Algerian researchers. Many important personalities to whom I had connection 
related to SNAPAP and LADDH were resided in Oran as well. Due to these 
synenergies, Oran was natural choice for me to conduct the fieldwork. In addition, 
I participated in the World Social Forum organized again in Tunis in 2015, where I 
was able to continue my study among Algerian activists participating to the forum. I 
travelled since few times to Algeria, but I do not consider them as strictly part of the 
field research and directly related to this thesis.    
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Clifford Geertz305 argues that ethnography can be understood as a process rather 
than a methodological doctrine306. I see the “field” as the space, floating in time, that 
incorporates the system of social positions formed by social practices in relation of 
inclusion and exclusion rather than just a set location307. Afterwards, I could say that 
fieldwork always started already from the airport, or from the local train that carried 
me to airport, because leaving home and family behind and heading off to encounter 
trade union activists encapsulated emotions, thoughts and assumptions that were 
more connected to field research than my private personal being. Participating in 
meetings, conducting interviews and writing notes are only one element in the larger 
processes of fieldwork. On top of that, as it is seems to often be case, the most 
fruitful conversations and discussions took place in unexpected situations without 
the recorder while many notable moments and occurrences were occasionally set out 
in a non-explicit way308. Therefore, I wrote notes after meetings and interviews and 
drew pictures of some of those that I met to remember better the various encounters. 
While I want to separate as much as possible my personal life and work-related 
research, I cannot but agree with those who argue that the researcher cannot escape 
his or her personal impact on the research topic, research process and analysis309. 
The subjectivity of the researcher is “always” out there. Donna Haraway310 has 
depicted the assumption of objective claims related to information produced in 
scientific research in social sciences as “situated knowledges”. We carry out our 
social position and habitus throughout meetings and interaction with people we meet 
and similarly all knowledge we produce project particular social conditions. In order 
to understand a specific culture or phenomena, one benefits a lot from personal 
experiences and encounters. I believe that I would have missed many context related 
details and versatile viewpoints related to Algerian autonomous trade unions, if I had 
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only worked through secondary sources, media articles, policy papers and official 
documents. Sufficient sensibility or disposition requires a genuine plunge towards 
the phenomena, object of research.  
According to John Van Maanen311, “ethnography is a storytelling institution. It is 
one that carries a good deal of cultural legitimacy because its stories are 
commissioned and approved by the leading scientific and educational organizations 
of the day”. There are many important questions raised on ethnography related to 
power and the politics of representation, who has the right to represent whom and 
for what intention?312 Eric Luke Lassiter asks an important question: “[c]an the 
disparity between the academy and the communities in which we work be narrowed 
further through ethnographic practice and writing?”313 I should stress that the 
outcome of this thesis springs from my subjective and selective understanding that 
originates from my socio-economic background and experience. I am convinced that 
I am only able to bring one perspective to the subject. Therefore, I emphasize that 
my conclusion in this thesis represent partial knowledge and is free from demands 
of a positivist insistence on objective knowledge, though I do not in principle oppose 
ideals related to objectivity as such314. I adopt a critical stance toward the possibilities 
of arguing that one’s work represents the objective truth within the premises of social 
sciences at large.  
When studying a social movement, it is hard to choose who should be 
interviewed. As Matti Hyvärinen315 argues, there does not exist the unanimous 
understanding of a central core of a movement, or understanding of it, which would 
be shared unanimously by all the researchers to get an “objective” sample of it 
through interviews. On the contrary, the vagueness of boundaries and the 
controversy are already linked to the concept of social movement itself. It was also 
often out of my hands to pick the interviewees and was not always easy to set 
meetings for interviews with autonomous trade union activists. 
I faced many challenges during my fieldwork journey. Some interesting activists 
that I would have wanted to interview were not keen. The representatives of 
UGTA316 were reluctant to give recorded interviews. In general, they were the most 
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reluctant to interact when I informed them that I was preparing research on 
autonomous trade unions in particular. In the end, my contacts with them remained 
rather distant, though I wanted to interact with them to have various approaches on 
autonomous trade unions. While I was not able to record our discussions, I can use 
the field notes written up after the meetings. In general, they had a very antagonistic 
relation vis-à-vis autonomous trade unions and these prejudices were taking place 
actually in both directions: autonomous trade union activists were often extremely 
suspicious of trade union activists working in UGTA as well. Meanwhile I met some 
members who were critical towards their membership in UGTA and had a lot of 
sympathy towards autonomous trade unions.   
In addition, it was sometimes challenging to conduct formal interviews with 
female autonomous trade union activists. This work would have benefitted greatly if 
I had been more successful in this sense and able to conduct more interviews with 
female activists to reflect more deeply gender related questions and female 
perspectives. Christine L. Williams and E. Joel Heikes317 have underlined the 
importance of the interviewer’s gender, because interviews as well as any social 
interaction occur in a “gendered context”, and therefore interviewees behave 
differently vis-à-vis the interviewer’s gender. In general, I mostly had chance to 
dialogue with males, older and younger. This does not mean that female activists 
were not present, or that I did not want to interact with them, but rather that I got 
more change to conduct recorded interviews with males. I cannot ascertain whether 
the reluctance of the women to give recorded interviews resembles Willy Jansen’s318 
experiences in the late 1980s, when she felt that during her fieldwork related to her 
study of Algerian women, that Algerians in general were suspicious of social 
research? However, I was able to speak and discuss with many female activists in 
various situations, so I have research material in my fieldwork notes even though 
our discussions were not recorded.  
3.1.2 Interviews and the photo elicitation   
I recorded 20 interviews with members of various trade unions in Oran, Algiers and 
various other places during our trip from Algiers to Tunis. I mostly interviewed those 
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related to SNAPAP319, however I also interviewed members of CNES320, SATEF321, 
CNAPEST322 and LADDH323 . I also conducted interviews, for example with 
members of UGTA in Oran that I was not permitted to record. In addition, I have 
20 interviews that I have collected from various newspapers and websites. I was 
mostly interested in the members of SNAPAP due to its visible role in the public 
sector and important role in the civil society as a part of the larger oppositional 
movement. Many were now functioning under new confederation the General 
Autonomous Confederation for Algerian Workers (Confédération Générale Autonome des 
Travailleurs Algériens, CGATA324). Some of the interviewees had dual memberships 
in the aforementioned organizations, meaning that they were active in both 
SNAPAP and LADDH.  
Before conducting the interview, I explained to the interviewees about my 
research and my personal background. In general, I felt that autonomous trade union 
activists were most usually pleased about my interest regarding their activities and 
for their cause. I also told them that I have been active in the Finnish Peace 
Committee (Suomen Rauhanpuolustajat), a leftwing peace movement, since the 
beginning of 2000s and that I believe that my activist background offered many 
positive experiences related to my possibilities to understand certain processes 
regarding their activism in general and also related to their attitudes towards my 
questions and interests.  
Ten of the recorded interviews were conducted using visual methods. I had seven 
different photographs, equipped occasionally with dates or small descriptive 
sentences that directed the interview. I chose the photographs according to 
discourses that came up during the previous rounds of interviews. Instead of asking 
direct questions, I aimed to give more space for the interviewee to narrate more 
specifically and openly certain events and political figures in the context of their own 
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chosen timeframe. As Douglas Harper has suggested, photo elicitation can “be 
regarded as a postmodern dialogue based on the authority of the subject rather than 
the researcher”325.  
My aim during the process of conducting interviews was to give more room to 
identify and understand how to approach more objectively the interviewer’s 
subjective construction of “discursive reality”326. Direct questions may already orient 
the answers towards the interviewer’s own aims. While the use of the photographs 
encapsulates similar challenges, these semi-directive interviews nevertheless leave 
more space for the interviewee to navigate the discussions and bring up elements 
that might be delimited within the contexts of direct questions. That worked well 
especially when the photos already directed the discussion to more specific cases, 
but simultaneously enabled space around them, while direct questions, which were 
additional in some cases during the interview, may have directed the discussion too 
much. 
According to Harper327, a photo elicitation328 interview that contains text and 
images differs from interviews that uses only words, being a process that generates 
even different kinds of information, notably more symbolic representation. He 
argues that: “images evoke deeper elements of human consciousness that do words; 
exchanges based on words alone utilize less of the brain’s capacity than do exchanges 
in which the brain is processing images as well as words”329. While photos were a 
part of ethnography since the early years of anthropological research330, I 
encountered this method by accident in the doctoral dissertation of Bruno Lefort,331 
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who used photo elicitation in his interviews with Lebanese student partisan groups. 
The empirical and descriptive approach stresses the multivocality of the photographs 
and subjective experience of everyday life in general and permits the observation of 
systems of representation and the construction of discourses from both cognitive 
and sociological perspectives332.  
When the interviews started, I explained to the interviewee that I am about to put 
seven pictures on a table and that the interviewee is expected to take one picture at 
a time and start discussing his experiences related to his activities around trade 
unionism. I feel that I was able to construct trust at least at some level with the 
interviewees in the sense that they were very open and vocal in their speech and 
critics. In general, the interviewees spoke freely about their activism and 
backgrounds. While I already had an idea of what elements I was searching for 
through the interviews, the photo elicitation fitted well, naturally broadening the 
discussion around the connotations I had in mind. The interviewees did not have 
any specific form or pattern in narrating the photos and when answering my 
questions. On some occasions their thinking and formation of opinions contained 
identical argumentation and incorporated some repetition. 
These seven pictures encompass, presented in fluid chronological order. A photo 
of the flag of Algeria, which generated discussion related to national devotion and 
nationalism in general, patriotism, trust, history and the Independence war (1954-
62). A photo of former President Chadli Bendjedid (1979-92) aimed to evoke 
reflection or memories regarding the October uprising of 1988 and the constitutional 
reform that enabled the creation of autonomous trade union movement. A photo of 
two leaders of the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, FIS) Abassi 
Madani and Ali Belhadj symbolize in this photo elicitation Islam and religion in 
general, but also the democratic process that was intercepted and the civil war (1992-
2000) that followed. The fourth photo, of former Major-General of Algerian army 
Khaled Nezzar, was intended to spark reflection regarding the civil war and 
especially the role of the army in the country.  
 
 
332 Cognitive stresses the subjectivity of the interviewee and sociological the socio-economic 
background (Lefort 2013, 52). 
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Picture 1. Photos used in the semi-directive interviews.  
The last three photos concentrated on more recent events and phenomena. One of 
those presented  election posters of the President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in 2009 when 
he was elected for his third term after the constitution was changed to allow the 
president to maintain the position for more than two terms. This photo sought 
discussion on the development of the democracy in the country as well as on the 
reliance on Algerian authorities to maintain the order. A photo of the Secretary 
General of UGTA, Abdelmadjid Sidi-Saïd, stressed the role and the relations of the 
UGTA and the autonomous trade unions. The last photo showed trade union and 
other activists waving their passports as a protest in the border of Tunisia in 2013 
when they were prevented to participate to World Social Forum in Tunisia. Here the 
idea was to direct the interview towards questions of citizenship and citizen rights.   
I chose these pictures when I was searching visual representations for 
aforementioned themes. I found most of these photos from internet. The photo that 
depicts activists waving their passports was taken by myself. Afterwards when the 
fieldwork was already finished, I understood that I could have tried to choose 
 92 
pictures with gender objectives. Now all the photos present male figures, which of 
course relates also to masculinity related to the main political figures and politics in 
Algeria in general. I understood this deficit after the fieldwork was conducted.  
As previously mentioned, I have collected about 2 700 press articles that consist 
of publications that I have collected myself during the process dissertation as well 
those given to me and collected by the SNAPAP activists themselves from their 
press book since 1993. I organized those articles, as a part of my analysis, in the 
chronological time order. Then I went them through searching for concepts, 
historical and contemporary discourses, visions, official statements, non-violent 
citizenship acts in the public space, links to globalization, employment policies, 
gender, class, various social dimensions from food prices to representations of 
power and conditions of the youth that formed categorizations and research material 
for my analysis. I categorized each article according to aforementioned group in the 
chronological time order, which helped me to search out different discourses later 
on in the research and writing process.  
It was possible to make comparisons regarding oppositional or governmental 
oriented newspapers about the same events and their various differential ways of 
narrating them. While I navigated the articles and organized them into categories 
(concepts, historical and contemporary discourses, visions and so forth), I searched 
certain discursive master signifiers (stability, politics and patriotism) to contextualize 
and analyze the articulations of these discourses. Before I start discussing about 
discourse analysis any further, I want to write few words about ethics related to this 
study.  
3.1.3 Ethical and moral responsibilities 
Ethical questions are intrinsically part of the qualitative and ethnographic research. 
As Elizabeth Murphy and Robert Dingwall333 argue, it is challenging to dismantle 
the nodes of the interlinkage of ethics and politics. This means that ethics are related 
to individual ethnographer’s way of perceiving the nature of reality, conduction of 
research and other philosophy-methodological orientations that effect on research 
outcome. Therefore, due to the lack of consensus related to the ontological and 
 
333 Murphy, Elisabeth and Dingwall, Robert (2001, 339) The Ethics of Ethnography, in Paul Atkinson, 
Amanda Coffey, Sara Delamont, John Lofland and Lyn Lofland (Eds.) Handbook of Ethnography. Sage 
Publications, pp. 339-351. 
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epistemological questions, it is also debatable to argue how the research effects on 
social world in connection to research results.  
My main ethical principle related to this thesis is reliable scientific conduct. I 
follow the Finnish Advisory Board on Research Integrity that has produced the guidelines 
for the responsible conduct of research (RCR guidelines)334. They provide an 
exemplar for the responsible conduct of research, which is however unfortunately 
grounded on a voluntary commitment of the research community to pursue them335 
while the justifications for universal and commonly agreed ethical standards continue 
to be the object of debate336. Following official guidelines of scientific conduct does 
not make research automatically ethical. The social world is versatile and complex, 
leaving space for various interpretations. 
According to Marilys Guillemin and Lynn Gillam337 research ethics can be 
divided into procedural ethics and ethics in practice. With procedural ethics, they 
mean applying permission from relevant ethics committee for conducting the 
research in sensitive situations that involve human beings. The most intractable 
question related with ethics may nevertheless sprout from more immediate everyday 
situations and encounters. As Murphy and Dingwall write: 
Most controversy about the ethics of ethnography has, however, arisen at the level of 
practice, rather than principle. Professional ethical codes have been developed in an 
attempt to give effect to the abstract propositions of ethical theory. There has been 
wide criticism of the mechanical application to ethnographic research of codes and 
regulatory systems, including human subjects review, devised for biomedical and/or 
quantitative research338. 
Murphy and Dingwall argue that the process induces at least two problems:  
First, ethical codes that are not method-sensitive may constrain research unnecessarily 
and inappropriately. Secondly, and just as importantly, the ritualistic observation of 
these codes may not give real protection to research participants but actually increase 
the risk of harm by blunting ethnographers’ sensitivities to the method-specific issues 
which do arise. This is not to suggest that different ethical standards should be applied 
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335 Responsible conduct of research and procedures for handling allegations of misconduct in Finland (2012, 28). 
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to different kinds of research so much as to recognize that common principles may 
need to be operationalized in different ways339.  
Hence, it is much on the responsibility of the researcher’s willingness and 
responsibility to be aware of and recognize the specific moments where ethical 
dimensions of research practice arise and to take them seriously by responding them 
appropriately340.  
Fieldwork that contains paradoxes, ambiguities and dilemmas differs from 
positivist and impersonal quantitative research inquiry, because in the field the 
researcher is in direct contact with the interviewees and form relationships that 
require confidence and respect341. Having had possibility to interact with many 
autonomous trade union activists, who have lived and experienced many significant 
phases alongside the development of the autonomous trade union movement, I want 
to express my appreciation regarding their efforts. I am in a great debt to those who 
shared their experiences with me.  
The researcher may possess some expert knowledge that is lacking among 
interviewees, while these relationships also incorporate power and personal relations 
that relates to world views and identities. In my case, that was occasionally the case 
regarding the theoretical understanding of the social world in social sciences and 
methodological disposition. However, many of the activists were so much more 
experienced and theoretically advanced that those aforementioned positions were 
rather the opposite.  
Qualitative research, in particularly fieldwork, suffers from a variety of technical 
and methodological dilemmas, especially when it concentrates on sensitive social 
phenomena in sensitive locations342. According to John D. Brewer343, five different 
types of challenges appeared when he was studying the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
(RUC) in East Belfast, Northern Ireland: technique, methodology, ethics, social 
context, and personal security. In his research, problematics regarding the integrality 
of the context and security were linked due to the personal security challenges that 
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were a direct result of the spatial, geographical and socio-economic context. 
However, Brewer emphasizes that personal security risks may be existent without 
any serious contextual problem.  
While conducting research in a complex, conflicting and contradictory 
environment, I have reflected my own position and activities as a researcher during 
the fieldwork. I have avoided any direct political participation while attending various 
events related with trade union activism. My research results also discuss the wider 
implication of researcher’s positionality and implication, while it is hard to avoid that 
processed research-material could not be used for unilateral and political purposes. 
However, my main concern has been to emphasize and prevent any risks of 
generating harm, whether physic or material on the part of the interviewees and 
reflect seriously on their safety in terms of my work344. Responsibility does not end 
when the researcher quits the field. Protecting collected research material during and 
after the analyzing process is always in the responsibility of the researcher.  
Due to the perilous nature of the activism and political environment of 
participants in autonomous trade unions in Algeria, I will not disclose all of the 
personal details of the interviewees. I will guarantee the anonymity and privacy of 
those connected to my research to avoid any harm to them or their families. While 
the interviewees gave me vocal permission to narrate them with their own names, I 
will use pseudonyms to ensure the anonymity of those who I felt should not be 
directly involved due to their age or minor visible position in the movement. 
Situations change over time but written text as such, not interpretations, stay 
unchanged. On some occasions, interviewees were young adults and their political 
orientation may be in process. I consider it important to guarantee the anonymity, 
privacy and confidentiality of those interviewed as part of my own professional 
conduct of fieldwork.  
Nonetheless, Marlene de Laine345 points out that it is too generalized and narrow 
to consider research ethics in its entirety within the priorities of ethic committees or 
by potentially harmful interaction between researcher and researched. She stresses 
the ethical problems and dilemmas that arise from “unanticipated consequences, not 
outcomes from a researcher intent to deceive and betray the trust of others”346. As 
Murphy and Dingwall argued, de Laine also emphasises that ethical codes and 
guidelines are merely generalizations that cannot present detailed case studies that 
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emerge in the practices of actual fieldwork. It is the moral duty of the researcher to 
take proper action and act according the ethical principles. In some occasions, the 
researcher has to make quick decisions while in some occurrences researcher 
understands only afterwards that different mode of operation would have been 
recommendable. These require, according to de Laine, “One’s obligation to a 
discipline” that “need[s] to be balanced with one’s moral and professional standards, 
feeling and intuitions347. 
I also faced some ethical challenges during my fieldwork. Friendship in the 
research field opens up possibilities to receive connections and information348. Some 
of the relations that I constructed through meetings, interviews and interaction 
transformed into personal relationships. I had occasionally possibilities to meet their 
families and I was accustomed to some of their everyday social challenges, even 
though limitedly. As a researcher, I was not ready to mix research objectives with 
personal dimensions especially when analyzing the research material. In some cases, 
I was invited and offered dinner and we spent evenings together in their homes or 
in relation to assemblies. While in ethnographic research interaction and friendship 
is common and sometimes even recommended349, it is also challenging for the 
researcher to take distance from personal affective feelings and concentrate on 
research.  
I did not conduct covert research in any forms. On some occasions I wondered 
about how to deal with incidents where a third party got involved in my research. 
There were situations, where I was spending time in a café or elsewhere with an 
activist or activists who were aware of my research, while their friend or friends 
joined us for a while or longer period and I did not have always possibility to inform 
them about the research. In general, I was strictly informing about my work and I 
explained more thoroughly the content, methods and aims of my study when 
necessary. However, sometimes I got interesting information from situations where 
I was not able to inform all the participants and it is ethically questionable whether 
such material can be used because people who were present were not aware of my 
motivation, or at least not as far as I know.  
Sometimes I heard complaints or information related to their internal debate or 
personal conflicts, which I consider too personal to integrate into my study even 
though it might have some content relevance. It is clear that when actors work 
 
347 De Laine (2000, 29). 
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together they are not all the time agreeing and have their own power related, personal 
or other conflicts. There are strict and clear cases when ethics can be taken into 
consideration within clear contexts, but there are also more fluid, personal or 
emotional contexts, where those dimensions are more flyaway.  
Ilkka Pietilä stresses the role of the researcher and interaction between the 
interviewer and the interviewed in the process of analyzing the process of producing 
knowledge350. While my goal has been to produce knowledge about the autonomous 
trade unions in Algeria, I simultaneously felt that different parties wanted to see my 
research as some kind of support for their opinions, narratives and struggle. How to 
process understanding of the role of autonomous trade unions in Algeria and not to 
violate or offend either counterpart but still keep academic ambitions as a principal 
objective? As de Laine states, the disclosure of the research may generate moral 
pressure for the researcher to fulfill alleged “expectations when one party demands 
loyalty and allegiance and conflicts with another”351. 
Language posed particular challenges especially related to transcription and 
translation, but also occasionally regarding participant observation. Most of the 
interviews were conducted in French and some in Arabic with additional help. Being 
born in Finland and living most of my life in the country of my birth, Finnish is my 
native language. However, this dissertation is written in English. That of course 
creates challenges regarding capturing the essence and nuances of the interviewees 
and complicate my interpretation, coding, classification and analysis especially 
regarding discourses and narrative.  
Simultaneously, French does not play the role of the native language for some of 
the interviewees, especially the younger generation, and therefore the interviewees 
were not always capable of expressing them as accurately as they wanted. My 
knowledge of Arabic was helpful but I mostly relied on help of a third party when 
interaction was held in Arabic. In consequence, my role as an interpreter emphasizes 
the capture of the small nuances that interviewees aimed to transmit. Additionally, 
while observing non-verbal communication such as facial expressions and gestures 
it is worthwhile to note their significance also have an effect to my interpretation, 
even though I find challenging to show them in textual form.  
 
350  Pietilä, Ilkka (2010, 414) “Vieraskielisten haastattelujen analysointi ja raportointi”, in Johanna 
Ruusuvuori, Pirjo Nikander and Matti Hyvärinen (Eds.) Haastattelun analyysi. Tampere: Vastapaino. 
351 De Laine (2000, 30). 
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3.2 Discourse analysis and antagonistic configurations 
In this work, as already mentioned, my intention is to interpret the acts of citizenship 
of the autonomous trade unions through construction of discourses from the 
interviews of the SNAPAP activists as well as through participant observation, other 
press material, governmental reports and existing public responses. The research 
material in its entirety is therefore complex and manifold. The discourses from the 
interviews (conducted by myself or from other literature) of the members of 
SNAPAP (and other autonomous trade unions) and pro-governmental actors shape 
historical and contemporary antagonistic nodal points, theorized by Ernesto Laclau 
and Chantal Mouffe352, that form through various identities within hegemonic 
discourses, social antagonism, dislocated discourses and the emergence of split 
subjects353.  
I use stability, political and patriotism as a nodal points (or master signifiers) in the 
analytic chapters five, six and seven. Stability reflects the socio-economic 
transformation and aimed social change. The concept of political plays important 
role in the discourses of autonomous trade union activists and state authorities when 
justifying their acts. Patriotism emerges as an aim for action for political agents. I am 
interested in how these discourses are constructed among both competing and 
antagonistic actors. Therefore, I use conducted interviews, statements and press 
articles as primary research material to trace various and constantly transforming 
discourses. I am interested in how these discourses are shaped through articulation 
within hegemonic struggles of meaning to justify the acts and action among both of 
these competing and antagonistic actors that differentiate each other from another.  
My approach can be considered as a two-step process. Interviews and the 
collection of research material are conducted within ethnographic oriented method, 
but part of the research material was found from existing literature (media, books, 
reports). Of course, fieldwork and ethnographic oriented methods had an impact on 
the collection of research material but implementing discourse analysis within the 
aforementioned theoretical framework took place in the second stage, when all the 
research material was examined. Two-step process allowed flexibility in 
implementing discourse analysis, instead of conducting, say, the narrative analysis, 
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and probably more often used within ethnographic approach. Before I continue 
further with this problematic, a few words about what discourse is, how it is 
constructed, and what its connection is to the social world.      
There are various possibilities to define the discourse. Probably the most usual 
and general way is to understand discourse as a text or a way of speech related with 
the specific situation or context where the knowledge is circulated354. Discourses in 
general, are practices that allow interpretation of the constructed “reality”, 
normatively speaking, from various hegemonic and non-hegemonic aspects whether 
cultural, social or political, and also reproduce power relations355. As Stuart Hall 
argues, discourse means producing knowledge through language while being itself 
simultaneously product of these certain practices that produce meaning356. Marianne 
Jorgensen and Louise J. Phillips357 define “[d]iscourse as a particular way of talking 
about and understanding the world (or an aspect of world)”. 
Within poststructuralist theory, Laclau and Mouffe argue, that discourse 
constructs the social world in meaning, which can never be definitively set due to 
“fundamental instability of language” and therefore discourse shapes constantly in 
contact with other discourses358. The discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe 
concentrates on “how the structure, in the form of discourses, is constituted and 
changed”359. They call the discourse as “[t]he structured totality resulting from the 
articulatory practice”360. There are various possibilities to articulate the surrounding 
social world. Laclau and Mouffe define articulation as “any practice establishing a 
relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the 
articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, 
we will call discourse”361.  
Laclau and Mouffe challenge the idea of Ferdinand de Saussure362 and 
structuralism in general regarding the so-called “closure” of the linguistic model in 
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the sense that they depress all elements to the internal moments of a particular system363. 
They see that discourse closes the meaning of the discourse, but only temporarily: 
“The differential positions, insofar as they appear articulated within a discourse, we 
will call moments. By contrast, we will call element any difference that is not 
discursively articulated”364. Laclau and Mouffe intercept, or in a way snatch, 
discourse from the environment in which it is developed or articulated, and call the 
rest, or the remaining reservoir, as the general field of discursivity365.  
Outside any discursive structure, it is obviously not possible to speak of 
fragmentation, nor even to specify elements. Yet, a discursive structure is not merely 
“cognitive” or “contemplative” entity; it is an articulatory practice which constitutes 
and organizes social relations. We can thus talk of a growing complexity and 
fragmentation of advanced industrial societies – not in the sense that, sub specie 
aeternitatis [under the aspect of eternity], they are more complex than earlier societies: 
but in the sense that they are constituted around a fundamental asymmetry. This 
asymmetry existing between a growing proliferation of differences – a surplus of 
meaning of “the social” – and the difficulties encountered by any discourse 
attempting to fix those differences as moments of a stable articulatory structure366. 
As mentioned earlier, in the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe discourse is 
shaped as partial fixation of meaning around various nodal points: “[a]ny discourse is 
constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of 
differences, to construct a centre. We will call these privileged discursive points of 
this partial fixation, nodal points”367. This privileged sign, nodal point, gathers other 
signs around it in certain order through hegemonic processes in the social structures. 
The meanings of these other signs are fixed according to nodal point368. Jorgensen 
and Phillips further describe the importance of the nodal points regarding discourse 
theory of Laclau and Mouffe, which also explains why I chose to integrate it to my 
thesis: 
What discourse or discourses does a specific articulation draw on, what 
discourses does it reproduce? Or, alternatively, does it challenge and transform an 
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existing discourse by redefining some of its moments? As a starting point for answers 
to these questions, the nodal points of the specific discourses can be identified: what 
signs have a privileged status, and how are they defined in relation to other signs in 
the discourse? When we have identified the signs that are nodal points, we can then 
investigate how other discourses define the same signs (floating signifiers) in 
alternative ways. And by examining the competing ascriptions of content to the 
floating signifiers, we can gradually map the partial structuring by the discourses of 
specific domains369. 
In the chapters below I will further develop the nodal points (stability, politics, 
patriotism) that I have chosen  to explain the antagonistic discourses that belong to 
fields of discursivity, constructed by activists of the autonomous trade unions and 
official authorities  to depict the diverse “realities” experienced. I argue that they 
experience their action and existence from antagonistic perspectives. The objective 
of the discourse analysis of the Laclau and Mouffe is to plot those processes where 
the struggle of the meaning of sign is set and endeavored to become naturalized. In 
order to justify their accounts, autonomous trade union activists and governmental 
representatives struggle to produce meanings of social and political processes and 
the ways of understanding the social world more largely. As Jorgensen and Phillips 
argue, the social world changes through transformations of discourses370: “Struggles 
at the discursive level take part in changing, as well as in reproducing, the social 
reality”371.   
Therefore, I am not aiming to claim nor engage with the question of whose 
understanding and experience of the world is more real, true or correct372. However, 
this does not mean erasing subjects’ names, biographies or histories. For Michel 
Foucault373 the truth does is not created through the confluence of language and 
reality but is a discursive construction related to power. From the “archaeological” 
perspective, Foucault is interested in what defines why some arguments are 
considered more reliable than others in specific historical era: 
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[…] We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same 
discursive formation; it does not form a rhetorical or formal unity, endlessly 
repeatable, whose appearance or use in history might be indicated (and, if necessary, 
explained); it made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of 
conditions of existence can be defined. Discourse in this sense is not ideal, timeless 
form that also possesses a history; the problem is not therefore to ask one-self how 
and why it was able to emerge and become embodied in this point in time; it is, from 
beginning to end, historical -  a fragment of history, a unity and discontinuity in history 
itself, posing the problem of its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the 
specific modes of its temporality rather than its sudden irruption in the midst of the 
complicities in time374.    
Thus, Foucault distinguishes discursive practice from the expressive operations such as 
an idea, a desire or an image or planned rational activity and competence. “[I]t is 
body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in the time and space that 
have defined a given period, and for a given social, economic, geographical, or 
linguistic area, the conditions of operation of the enunciative function375”. Power is 
always present in our way of approaching things, an integral element that is 
propagated through all social practices. While Foucault argues that “[w]e must 
conceive discourse as a violence that we do to things, or, at all events, as a practice 
we impose upon them376”, he does not, however, generalize power exclusively as 
agonizing but also as productive, something that induces “pleasure, forms 
knowledge, produces discourse”.  Discourse “is in this practice that the events of 
discourse find the principle of their regularity”377. Nevertheless, my use of discourse 
analysis is closer to Laclau’s and Mouffe’s discourse theory, though there are many 
overlaps with Foucault. 
I take Foucault’s warning related to “discourse as violence” seriously. When 
operating with discourse analysis, I am aware that my connotations drifts meanings 
and experiences away from my interviewees. However, similar problematics are 
contained also for example in narrative analysis, and as stated already before, in 
principal, I renounce from normative endeavor to positivist objectivity stressing 
researchers’ subjective effect within the research process. Related to applying of 
discourse analysis, mostly influenced by Laclau and Mouffe, I have to be extremely 
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careful not to subsume “particular events and their variable initial conditions, under 
causal laws […]“, as David Howarth cautions378.  
I am after discursive formations through recorded semi-directive photo 
elicitation interviews, more general question-answer interviews, fieldwork 
observations as well as various statistics and other research produced from the 
societal structures in Algeria. They provide important primary data regarding 
individual contribution of the members of autonomous trade unions and official 
authorities to deconstruct their “discursive experiences” and to understand the 
relation of these texts within larger societal surroundings through observation.  
This work is ethnographic oriented research, because important body of research 
material is not conducted through purely ethnographic method, let’s say participant 
observation, relatively unstructured interviews, self-reflection and writing of the field 
notes. In general, I understand ethnographic research more widely and 
heterogeneously than the aforementioned description. Discourse analysis is applied 
to my fieldwork and ethnographic oriented research material as well as to other 
media and literature containing interviews and statistics. Even though some 
commentators may argue that ethnography and discourse analysis could not be 
combined, I think it depends on how these two approaches are defined. Despite 
some challenges exists within application of discourse analysis and ethnography, it is 
possible to emphasize convergence as well, as Maria Tamboukou and Stephen J. 
Ball379 and Graham Smart380, for example, do. According to Clifford Geertz381, who 
explored a specific social group’s discourse practices, the aim of interpretive 
ethnography is “to aid us in gaining access to the conceptual world in which subjects 
live”.  
Regarding the application of the discourse analysis of Laclau and Mouffe, it is 
extremely important to remember what Ernesto Laclau wrote in 1991 related to 
myth of methodology: 
There is a widespread opinion that there is a spread of orderly procedures to be 
followed in carrying out any particular research. Nothing could be more erroneous. 
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[…] [T]he important point is that these are tools that the researcher can decide ad hoc 
to use in each case for pragmatic reasons, and that they are not unified in an 
established and orderly system of procedures called “methodology”. A lot of time will 
be saved if the researcher knows from the beginning that nothing can substitute 
his/her personal intuition.382  
To understand any kind of social order, it is fundamentally important to recognize 
the role of “hegemonic nature” and “hegemonic practices” which through 
articulation in given order create or fix meaning in social institutions383. Power 
enables the condition of contingent possibilities for the social that produces the 
subjects through discourses. Laclau and Mouffe adhere to Foucault’s understanding 
of power and the way it engages the formation of discourse and discursive space, or 
the social as a discursive construction384. Power is not in one place, where some can 
use it over the others, but it actualizes in specific contingent events producing the 
social385. In every situation, the order is temporal and complex articulation of 
contingent proceeding, which includes and excludes accepted configurations 
through hegemonic power struggles that can be politicized.  
Processes of articulation need to be approached through the Gramscian theory 
of hegemony386, which offers great inspiration to Laclau and Mouffe.  The question 
is about the struggle of the meanings in the context of antagonistic conflicts that are 
affected by power relations. According to Jorgensen and Phillips, “A social 
antagonism occurs when different identities mutually exclude each other”387. Every 
subject, of course, carries various identities and that does not automatically mean 
that these diverse identities should exclude each other. Exclusion and antagonism 
can nevertheless take place when competing discourses conflict. The hegemonic 
power has superiority to win those battles by defining what is right and wrong, true 
or false, beneficial or harmful, democratic or authoritarian or objective and political.  
Michelle Barrett defines the concept of hegemony as: “the organization of consent – 
the processes through which subordinated forms of consciousness are constructed 
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without recourse to violence or coercion”388. Through the production of meaning 
hegemony can mask political aspirations or interests and stress for example the 
topics, content and perspectives related to social consciousness to sustain, develop 
or increase power relations: who has the hegemony to decide about what we discuss? 
Laclau and Mouffe stress the political processes and political articulation that they 
insist, determine “how we act and think and thereby how we create society389.  
3.3 Using media as a source of information 
Regarding the research material that I have accumulated related to press articles, this 
information stands as a vital source of information, because there does not exist 
deeper historical or contemporary analysis about the formation, beginning and 
development of autonomous trade unions in Algeria. In many cases, I must rely on 
past press articles that contain specific information that is challenging to audit, but 
indispensable to construct narrative understanding related to their functioning.  
However, I mainly use them as secondary sources or as material for discourse 
analysis, while in certain cases I was able to conduct media analysis when possessing 
several articles from different newspapers about one specific event. I use media 
coverage, mostly newspaper articles, to describe how certain events and occurrences 
were represented in various media outlets. In those cases, I employ critical discourse 
analysis as a tool to approach what kind of world views articles represent, what social 
identities, relationships and systems of knowledge and meanings they set up390. I also 
reflect them against the reminiscences of the past that came to prominence in the 
interviews, especially among senior members of the trade union movement.  
When I approach the newspaper articles and interviews, I apply both the 
discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe and the critical discourse theory of Norman 
Fairclough. Fairclough’s critical discourse theory operates discourses referring to 
discourse as language use as social practice, as the kind of language used within 
specific field and as a way of speaking which gives meaning to experiences from a 
particular perspective391. The communicative event and the order of discourse are 
playing the key roles while language use can be considered as communicative event, 
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as a text, as a discursive practice and as a social practice from the wider perspective392. 
In Fairclough’s393 three-dimensional conception of discourse, all the elements are 
interconnected in every level of analysis and in relation to the order of discourse (the 
configuration of all the discourse types used in within a social institution or a field)394.  
Today, the new forms of media are gaining increasingly more ground. Many 
interesting elements regarding information of social movements occur in the digital 
world and in social media in general. For example, SNAPAP mostly informs about 
its actions on the website Journalistes Citoyens d’Algérie395 or on their Facebook pages. 
Individual activists also use their private Facebook accounts for activism. In the 
uprisings of 2011 in Tunisia and Egypt, the social media was playing important role 
in the mobilization of the various social movements by offering new kind of online 
virtual spaces396. In Algeria, the use of social media has been more modest compared 
to Tunisia and Morocco while in general the youth in eastern and western 
Mediterranean countries gets their daily news more often from Facebook than TV 
news channels, online sources, or print397.  
When dealing with the articles, I approached what is written and by whom 
critically and reflect the implications of the larger media struggle in Algeria, because 
it is important to analyze and recognize each journal or media in general context 
where the article is published398. The Algerian official media plays important role in 
distributing the news, but independent newspapers, online channels and TV 
channels are emerging increasingly that contain a critical approach to state 
authorities. The advent of satellite television 30 years ago was important regarding 
the media coverage of Algeria because it enabled Algerians to understand and 
interpret the world more significantly. Until the mid-1980s, only the national 
broadcaster ENTC was available399.   
The French language newspapers in Algeria have a long history, which dates back 
to 1830, when France occupied Algiers. The French soldiers brought to Sidi Ferruch 
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L’Estafette d’Alger400. During the period of colonialism, many French newspapers 
appeared in Algeria. The first Algerian newspaper Al-Mubashir (direct) was 
established in 1847401. The newspaper El Moudjahid (the freedom fighter), was 
established by Algerian independence movement FLN in 1956. Today it is still the 
mouthpiece of the biggest political party FLN and therefore governmental 
officials402. In Arabic there was a newspaper called Ech-Chaab (the people) available 
and the French weekly Algérie Actualite (Algeria News)403.  
In April 1990, the new press law followed by the political pressure that emerged 
after October uprisings in 1988 and started the period of liberalization of the press. 
It permitted establishment of number of new newspapers such as: L’Hebdo libéré 
(1990), El-Watan (1990), Le soir d’Algérie (1990), Le Matin (1990), Liberté (1992), La 
Tribune (1994), L’authentique (1994), L’indépendant (1995), Le quotidian d’Oran (1995) 
among others404. However, during the civil war in the 1990s the press faced many 
restrictions while authorities established “reading committees” observing mediation 
of the conflict405. 
El Watan, La Liberté and Le Soir have been considered as one of the most influent 
oppositional, or critical newspapers regarding the authorities, though, some older 
autonomous activists told me that even La Liberté was gradually losing its 
oppositional status. All of them follow and mediatize regularly the events related to 
the civil society and autonomous trade unions. The main pro-governmental 
newspaper is El Moudjahid. Some governmental representatives have told me that 
even though El Moudjahid is explicitly pro-governmental, it contains numerical facts 
that makes it significant source within media landscape. Other such a kind are 
L’Expression and L’Horizon. In 2014, 43 newspapers (20 in Arabic, 23 in French) 
existed in Algeria406. According to my personal experience, Algerian media coverage 
is in many ways versatile and comprehensive. Occasionally, I have been surprised 
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how much political critic is presented through various daily newspapers, television 
channels and web publications.     
Regarding the newspapers in Arabic, El khabar and Echorouk are widely read 
especially among the younger generation. There are many so-called liberal media as 
well and it is not possible to label these simply into one category. However, as 
Fairclough’s critical discourse theory suggests, the text should never be analyzed in 
isolation from its social background407. The relation of communicative speech 
(article, film, video or interview) and order of discourse (the configuration of all the 
discourse types) should be understood as dialectical, meaning that communicative 
events do not just reproduce orders of discourse, but can change them as well 
through creative and innovative use of language408.  
There are also different websites that are getting more and more popular in 
parallel with the use of social media (Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, short messaging 
services SMS, blogs and Dailymotion) via internet such as Tout sur Algérie (TSA), 
Algérie 1, DZ Activiste, Algérie-Focus to mention only a few. Many of them offer 
significant resources for the mobilization that can be approached via resource 
mobilization theory (RMT), because they offer interesting less-confined political 
spaces in addition to more traditional or conventional political spaces.  
The newspaper articles contain many interesting question-answer interviews and 
other quotations that I subjected to discourse analysis. When citing409 interviews (and 
articles in general) conducted by journalists and reporters I can never be fully assured 
about the exact content of the interviews, because they tend to be stylized and 
refined and therefore may lose essential nuances focal to this thesis. In addition, I 
found many content errors regarding dates, names and abbreviations while going 
through the newspapers articles and especially when comparing them to one another. 
Nevertheless, the media language analysis is important to analyze the processes of 
social and cultural change410 and ask how the world is represented, what identities 
are set up for those involved and what kind of relationships exist between them411.   
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4 BACKGROUND OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR 
MOVEMENT AND ALGERIA 
Work as a social phenomenon has multiple of dimensions. I examine work from 
individual and social perspectives. Therefore, work is a multidimensional concept 
and touches many different fields of social life. My aim is not to examine work too 
meticulously, but it is necessary to recognize its importance and wide-ranging socio-
economic effects on daily basis of human life. Unionizing, seen as a social 
phenomenon, is based on those daily experiences and expectations for improving 
individual and communal conditions.   
In general, work should guarantee our basic income to sustain a meaningful life 
and to fulfill our everyday basic needs. Work should be motivating and considered 
as congenial to our beliefs and values. Work should not damage our health and our 
working conditions must satisfy basic security requirements. Work has important 
impact on how we reflect our position in a society. It reflects educational background 
and networking capabilities. Implying how valuable our contribution to the society 
may be and how precious our time is regarding the amount of money we are worth. 
So work depicts our social status more largely and influences our potentiality to 
achieve our various individual objectives. All these characterizations are of course 
relative and related to our locations, time and space.  
To begin with, work as a part of the spectrum of human life, can be approached 
at least from four elements or clusters: economics, politics, psychology and 
sociology. While these four elements are separable from each other, they should not 
be dealt entirely separately. They closely affect each other from various perspectives 
in the larger societal structures. Flora Gill412 argues that economics and socio-
economic features should be examined more cohesively and the social field or 
creative endeavor should be integral part of Economics. This requires, of course, a 
multidisciplinary approach and combination of social psychology, sociology and 
political theory413. This study focuses on autonomous trade unions from larger social 
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actor perspectives and does not incorporate psychological tools in the analysis. 
Nevertheless, individual output is integrated and psychological aspects are a 
significant part of one’s social orientation, which this study recognizes.   
4.1 Politicization of the work: background of the international 
labor movement 
Trade unions are the tools that workers use to organize themselves to improve their 
working conditions, salaries and social position. According to Sidney and Beatrice 
Webb, trade unions can be defined as “a continuous association of wage-earners for 
the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their working lives”414. 
The first trade unions, as we define them in contemporary research literature, 
possibly appeared in 18th century in Britain alongside with the process of 
industrialization415. According to Karl Kautsky (1854-1938)416, trade unions embody 
elements that spring from guilds where old-time journeymen organized in medieval 
Europe. This does not mean that before industrial revolution there were not action 
related working and worker-employer relationships. As Webbs write:  
Strikes are as old as history itself. The ingenious seeker of historical parallels might, 
for instance, find in the revolt, 1490 B.C., of the Hebrew brickmakers in Egypt against 
being required to make bricks without straw, a curious precedent for the strike of the 
Stalybridge cotton-spinners, A.D. 1892, against the supply of bad material for their 
work. But we cannot seriously regard, as in any ways analogous to the Trade Union 
Movement of to-day, the innumerable rebellions of subject races, the slave 
insurrections, and the semi-servile peasants revolts of which the annals of history are 
full417.  
Alain Touraine, Michel Wieviorka and Françoise Dubet also argue that these earlier 
forms of work related to resistance should neither be confused with actual worker’s 
movement418. While I partly agree with previous arguments, it is nonetheless also 
challenging to find an analogy with the British trade union movement and 
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contemporary labor struggles from a global perspective either. History seals in 
various struggles, assemblies and prototype kind of associations that have gathered 
workers to protect their rights. From the global perspective, colonial struggles and 
slavery, for example, integrate various forms of work-related resistance as well and 
their connection to liberation movements and nationalism, as was the case in Algeria 
in the beginning of 20th century. The context of colonization in the development of 
trade union movement in decolonization processes may offer a more relevant basis 
for their observation than the interaction and influence of European trade unions 
and their emergence in Britain.   
According to the dominant narrative, Britain is often used as an example 
regarding the formation of labor movement. Since 1350, the state in England 
regulated apprenticeship, wages, and hours419. Yet, within decreasing wages in 
structures of nascent capitalism, a new class of wageworkers challenged this trend. 
However, managers that surrounded the government with petitions managed to 
effect on parliament that passed Combination Acts of 1799-1800420. Labor was 
subjected to exploitation by industrial capital that left little choice, breaking the law 
or submit to a slave421.  Luddite textile workers’ uprisings (1811-1816) and the 
aftermath of Napoleonic wars (1803-1815) that followed thousands of returned 
soldiers and various other struggles challenged the position of the ruling elite in 
Britain. The period prior to 1824, encapsulates the incipient trade union movement 
that according to the Webbs represented the starting point of the contemporary 
trade union movement422.  
The Combination Acts repealed in 1824 legalized trade unions and gave right for 
workers to organize and associate even though the following acts enabled the 
continuation of prosecutions and persecution of the unionist423. Strikes and 
associations that were not directly linked with wages and working hours were 
considered as illegal424. The July 1830 revolution in France, two months after the 
French soldiers arrived to Algeria and begun colonization process that lasted 132 
years, led according to Rudolf Rocker425 to a recovery of the English reform 
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movement and was followed by the Reform Bill of 1832 that eventually left the 
workers, again, betrayed and without further achievements.  
Being integral part of many ancient civilizations426 alongside the Mediterranean, 
Algeria and its inhabitants are influenced by various historical, cultural, political and 
economic tendencies. Today Algeria is often seen unilaterally as an Islamic country, 
especially because officially 99 percent of its population adhere to Islam. Algeria 
experienced gradual Islamization since the 7th century and have also been inspired 
by the so-called medieval Islamic political thought and its various Islamic trends ever 
since427. Therefore, the Islamic political tradition has also significant implication on 
Algerian political philosophy. While it may be challenging to track the overall impact 
of Islamic political thought in contemporary Algeria, a number of well-known 
political theorists428 have certainly left traces on its contemporary political and 
cultural tradition. Ibn Khaldun started the writing of his famous Muqaddimah in 
Algeria near Frenda (currently Wilaya de Tiaret) during 1375-1379429.  
The Algerian system of industrial relations can be considered as an outcome of 
various historical interactions and intersections between variable circumstances, 
institutional arrangements and configurations that are linked to the state’s effort to 
maintain its power and control on trade unions430. Before the French colonial 
occupation, Algeria was loosely a part of the Ottoman Empire (1518-1830) under 
the regency that had Algiers as its capital. Charles André Julien431 describes the role 
of Algeria as exploited colony ruled by Turk minority and local notables. Algeria was 
at the time a traditional tribal rural society animated by a cultural network of village 
assemblies (jama'ât) as well as religious lodges (Zaouïas) and brotherhoods (turuq) that 
linked the country to other regions in North Africa and the Muslim world in general.  
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Ottoman Turks brought the idea of borders and territorial sovereignty that 
transformed the approximate shape of the area into contemporary Algeria432. From 
the 19th century onwards, the Grand Vizier of Ottoman Empire appointed the deys 
that ruled as monarchs with the help of diwan (council) consisted of five Turkish 
officials and the regency was split into dar al-sultan (the region of Algiers) and three 
beyliks (principalities): Constantine in the East, Oran in the West and Titteri in the 
center433. Constantine was, according to Mahfoud Kaddache, the most important 
due to amount of its population and riches434. This mode of governance worked 
mainly in the areas directly connected to deys and the Ottoman power was mainly 
present in the cities nearby435. The Turks “established the clear modes of production 
and employee relations according to different types of land ownership”, which was 
“divided into private land (melk), communal land (arch), religious land (habous) and 
the public land (baylek)” 436.  
Éric Gobe437 argues that trade unions in the Southern Mediterranean are distant 
inheritors from the Ottoman Empire's professional unions, carrying the name in 
Arabic niqaba mihniyya. These unions gathered participants and formed sections 
according to various professions. Before the French arrival, Algeria was already 
facing regression and 90 percent of its 3 million of population were rural, while the 
numbers of inhabitants in the cities such as Algiers (30 000), Constantine (25 000), 
Tlemcen (7000) or Oran (5000) were declining438. The French largely destroyed 
during the occupation (1830) the collective forms of ownership of the land and 
profited from cheap indigenous workforce  to accumulate capital within “form of 
centralized and exploitative production system, for colonial purposes, which shaped 
the structure and functions of management and employee relations during most of 
the colonial period”439.    
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4.2 Formation of the working class movement in the 19th century 
In order to understand the development of trade unionist practices in Algeria and its 
French influences necessitate analyzing the transformation of the concept in 19th 
century Europe. It is also possible to track similar developments that took place at 
that time in Europe from independent Algeria: the political orientation of trade 
unions and their relation to political parties. Therefore, I raise questions about the 
historical development of the labor force and labor unions that are also actual in 
employment relations in contemporary Algeria, and elsewhere in the world.  
A major attempt to analyze the politics of labor came from the text, written by 
Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) in 1845. In his famous book, The Condition of the Working 
Class in England, Engels concentrated on industrial workers and stated in economic 
terms that the value of trade union action was highly limited440: 
The History of these Unions is long series of defeats of the working-men, interrupted 
by a few isolated victories. All these efforts naturally cannot alter the economic law 
according to which wages are determined by the relation between supply and demand 
in the labor market. Hence the Unions remain powerless against all great forces which 
influence this relation. […] If the employer had no concentrated, collective opposition 
to expect, he would in his own interest gradually reduce wages to a lower and lower 
point; indeed the battle of competition which he has to wage against his fellow-
manufacturers would force him to do so, and wages would soon reach the 
minimum441. 
Engels was able to capture the very essence of trade union struggle in the industrial 
capitalist framework that is still relevant in contemporary economics. He continued 
his work famously with Karl Marx (1818-1883). In their joint works Marx and Engels 
argued that ruling class was also able to dominate ideational field and should be 
considered as hegemonic intellectual force, because those who lacked the means of 
mental production were subjected to the ideas of the ruling class442.     
In general terms, Marxist ideology stresses the mode of production where conflict 
oriented dialectic al class struggle persists through the division of labor and integrates 
also the division of mental and material labor443. In this context, it is also interesting 
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to return to the 14th century to reflect what Medieval North African thinker Ibn 
Khaldun had to say about the labor and capital especially with its connection to 
Algeria, North Africa and Mediterranean in general: 
[…] labour is the real basis of profit. When labour is not appreciated and is done for 
nothing, the hope for profit vanishes, and no (productive) work is done444. 
Everything comes from God. But human labour is necessary for every profit and 
capital accumulation. When (the source of profit) is work as such, as, for instance (the 
exercise of) a craft, this is obvious. When the source of gain is animals, plants, or 
minerals, human labour is still necessary. Without it, no gain will be obtained, and 
there will be no useful (result)445. 
For Marx, the level of wages “only settled by the continuous struggle between capital 
and labor, the capitalist constantly tending to reduce wages to their physical 
minimum, and to extend the working day to its physical maximum, while the working 
man constantly presses in the opposite direction”446. Without trade union 
organization the capitalist would cut wages, increase working hours and benefit from 
the worker’s contribution as much as possible. Marx and Engels saw the role of the 
unions as substantial barrier to halt the greediness of the ruling class and their target 
was the very fundamentals of the capitalism and its political economy447. As Engels 
wrote in the Conditions of the Working Class in England: 
[W]hat gives these Unions and the strikes arising from them their real importance is 
this, that they are the first attempt of the workers to abolish competition. They imply 
the recognition of the fact that the supremacy of the bourgeoisie is based wholly upon 
the competition of the workers among themselves; […] And precisely because the 
Unions direct themselves against the vital nerve of the present social order, however 
one-sidedly, in however narrow a way, are they so dangerous to this social order. The 
working- men cannot attack the bourgeoisie, and with it the whole existing order of 
society, at any sorer point than this. […] Wages depend upon the relation of demand 
to supply, upon the accidental state of the labour market, simply because the workers 
have hitherto been content to be treated as chattels, to be bought and sold.448. 
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According to the Richard Hyman449, the interpretation of the trade union action of 
Marx and Engels can be considered as optimistic. By this, he means that Marx and 
Engels believed that workers’ organization strikes at the very core of the capitalist 
system and is significant step towards the revolution within collecting the masses to 
struggle against the ruling class, as written in the Communist Manifesto450. Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe take a critical view regarding the lack of explanation how 
this transformation of workers’ consciousness spring451? What if workers do not 
recognize their real position in the capitalist societies? According to Sidney Tarrow, 
neither Marx nor Engels never really asked, how individuals make a choice to engage 
in collective action and argued that Marx and Engels underestimated the resources 
needed to engage, its cultural factors and the political environment452.  
Therefore, Marx and Engels can be depicted as traditional structuralists, who 
stressed the capitalist structures and “false consciousness” within ”objective 
conditions” instead of reflecting individual interpretation in dialogue with 
surroundings453. Hyman simplifies the Marxist approach regarding collective action 
into deterministic process, where the development of industrial capitalism is 
considered as a precondition for the collective organization of the workers that form 
a unity through class consciousness, which is transformed into a method of struggle 
that creates a threat to the stability of capitalism and challenges “directly the whole 
structure of class domination”454. 
During their lifetimes, Engels and Marx were possibly disappointed at the failure 
of “People’s Spring” revolutions in Europe in 1848, which gave them more space 
for detailed attention beyond Europe455. There are interesting connections and less 
Eurocentric connotations, especially related to the explicit writings of Engels on 
Algeria456. In 1848, Engels rejoiced the French conquest and capture of Emir 
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Abdelkader457 as “an important and fortunate fact for the progress of civilization”, 
but nine years later in 1857, he had ended up in opposite view and praised Algerian 
resistance against French colonial rule458. While Marx never wrote directly about 
Algeria, he visited the country to gain strength shortly in 1882, a year before his 
death459.  
The Saint-Simonians, dismissed by Marx and Engels as “utopian socialists”460, 
believed that growth in industrialization and scientific research would develop 
civilizations. They were mainly the only ones who theorized the French colonization 
of Algeria while rejecting liberalism endorsed by Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), 
who also promoted French colonial objectives461. Abdallah Zouache argues that in 
contrast with Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), who rejected colonization in 
principal, the Saint-Simonian movement with its heterogeneity established the 
relationship of domination between the French and the Algerians believing in 
hierarchical difference whether individual or “racial”462. Patricia M. E. Lorcin depicts 
Saint-Simonian vision463 in Algeria as: “doctrine of the achievement of well-being 
through economic endeavor under the paternalistic guidance of a natural elite”464.  
In 1864, a significant number of socialist and anarchist activists organized a 
meeting in London. According to Gary K. Busch465, they had all suffered a surge of 
repressive actions by the authorities since the 1848 uprisings (the Spring of 
Nations/People’s Spring). They founded the International Workingmen’s 
Association (IWA) that was later named as the First International or the Black 
International. It was led by two visible figures, Marx and Mikhail Bakunin (1814-
1876), and consisted mostly of British liberal unionists (mostly hostile to socialism, 
anarchism and revolution), the French republican democrats, Italian revolutionary 
followers hostile to Marxism of Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872), Proudhonist 
 
457 Emir Abdelkader (1808-1883) led the resistance against French conquest during 1832-1847. 
458 Nimtz (2002, 68). 
459 Galissot and Badia (1976, 289-373). 
460 Ryan, Alan (2012, 879) On Politics. The History of Political Thought from Herodotus to the Present. New 
York and London: W.W. Norton and Company. 
461 Zouache, Abdallah (2009, 433) Socialism, Liberalism and Inequality: The Colonial Economics of 
the Saint-Simonians in the 19th-Century Algeria. Review of Social Economy, 67:4, pp. 431-456. 
462 Zouache (2009, 453). 
463 It is also vital to take into account the content variation and heterogeneity between significant Saint-
Simonian writers such as Prosper Enfantin, Ismaël Urbain, Ernest Carette and many others. 
464 Lorcin, Patricia M. E. (1999, 50) Imperial Identities. Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in Colonial Algeria. 
London – New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers. 
465 Busch, Gary K. (1983, 6) The Political Role of International Trade Unions. London and Basingstoke: The 
Macmillan Press ltd. 
 118 
anarchists and other exiled revolutionaries and activists around the Europe466. While 
the accomplishments of the First International can be considered as modest, the 
main characterization could be the internationalization of the developing worker’s 
movement.  
The First International decomposed in its fifth congress in Hague in 1872, when 
anarchists left the International. Bakunin and James Guillaume (1844-1916) were 
dismissed from the IWA467. Bakunin had accused Marx of authoritarianism and the 
First International was not even able to find common view regarding the Paris 
Commune a year earlier468. Marx probably feared the anarchist seizure of the IWA 
and its headquarters was moved to New York where it persisted until 1879. The 
dissolution of the First International did not mean an end to the worker’s 
movements, nor to the functioning and the development of the trade unions. 
Actually, the loosely organized and spontaneous “labor movement” reached its peak 
around Europe and North America469 during the 1880s470.  
Another interpretation regarding the start of the contemporary labor movement 
is introduced by Gerald Friedman471, who argues that the modern labor movement 
was born in 1889, exactly one hundred years after the French Revolution of 1789. 
In Paris, 391 delegates from twenty countries, met to form the Second Socialist 
International, or the Socialist International in the “spirit” of the French Revolution. 
The leading theoretician behind the Second International was Kautsky, who stressed 
the democratic connotations instead of socialism and highlighted the interaction 
between socialism, labor and “bourgeois democracy”472. European socialist and 
social democratic parties were emerging and were able to achieve legitimized societal 
positions and power, while simultaneously dominant in their national trade union 
movements, expect in Britain473. According to Busch, in Austria and Germany the 
socialists were able to construct their unattached parallel societies that included book 
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and hiking clubs, singing societies, socialist housing co-operatives and cultural 
societies, newspapers, socialist drama societies and even schools474.  
Workers, worried about their economic management, began to distinguish the 
interests of activity in trade unions from interests of the political parties and started 
to establish separate national centers to emphasize distinct identities of their 
contribution475. In 1886, about eight months after the Haymarket affair476, craft 
unions established American Federation of Labour (ALF), in France General 
Confederation of Labour (Confédération générale du travail, CGT) was created in 1895, 
The Belgian Labour party formed its national center in 1898 and the social 
democratic unions established the general commission in Germany in 1890477. In 
Britain, the Trade Union Congress (TUC), founded already in 1868, was kept 
separated from the political parties. The Second international aimed to form the 
unity among these various political parties and unions. According to Friedman, only 
from the 1880s the loose protests, contentious events and strikes transformed into 
a well-orchestrated, organized and bureaucratized “labor movement”478. British, 
Austrian and German parties were the dominant due to their large membership479.  
4.3 Trade unions, colonies and bureaucratic challenges 
To understand the development of trade unionism in Algeria, it is necessary to sift 
through the history of the development of associational life and especially its gradual 
emergence. It is also worthwhile stressing that the official policy in Algeria vis-à-vis 
autonomous associations has changed and transformed in the past. While 
associational life in its contemporary form can be seen as originating from the French 
occupation since the 1830 and, more formally, from the enactment of the 1901 Law 
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of Association, diverse forms of associations, such as Freemasonry480, and collective 
action took place before the French conquest. In other words, associational life has 
deep roots in the history of Algeria481.  
According to Andrea Liverani, even though associational life flourished under 
French colonial rule (1830-1962), the participation of Algerians in the settlers' 
associations was generally rare, if not exceptional482. The colonial structures 
prevented Algerian workers from setting up trade unions. However, this did not 
prevent Algerians from establishing their own associations. Arab Izerrouken483 
asserts that since the 1901 Law of Association there were three different types of 
ethnically composed associations. Firstly, there were mixed associations that were 
cohabited by Algerians and European settlers such as schools, trade unions and to a 
lesser extent colonial army. Secondly, associations composed exclusively of colonial 
European settlers and thirdly those that were composed of colonized Algerians. 
Ironically, the first trade unions that were established by Algerian workers 
themselves were not formed in Algeria, but by Algerian immigrants in France where 
Algerian workers were connected to trade unionism through French trade unions484. 
It is assumed that the first trade unions were established in Algeria between 1880-
1890 in the city of Constantine by the French settlers working in the printing 
business and spread gradually to other cities as well tough limiting always to the same 
economic sector485. The first strike organized by typographers took place in Algiers 
in 1888, which lasted 14 days and led to increase of their salaries by six francs in the 
nine hours of working day486. These unions functioned under the aegis of the French 
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CGT487. Unions were organized in three departments: Algiers, Oran and Constantine 
and were all led from Paris488. In the beginning of 20th century CGT was consisted 
of 1043 unions and 100 000 members in 1902, 2399 unions and 300 000 members 
in 1906 and 2837 unions and 600 000 members in 1912, according to its own 
congress reports489.  
The relations of the state and trade unions and their development in various 
societal contexts has raised many important questions regarding the functioning of 
social movements and trade unions in general. The problematic trade union-state-
political party relation, which plays important role in this thesis as well in connection 
to contemporary Algeria, severed alongside with the institutionalization process. As 
the political situation in Europe started to get closer to total warfare in 1914, it also 
reflected the disparities within the labor movement490. National obligations 
surpassed socialist internationalism, which infuriated the radicals within the 
movement. The anarchists did not participate anymore in the Second International. 
In 1913, the famous anarchist Emma Goldman wrote that the fundamental 
difference between the trade unionism and the old organizations was that the latter 
function invariably inside capitalistic pay system and recognize the necessity of it491. 
Established labor leaders, such as Samuel Gompers (ALF), Léon Jouhaux (CGT), 
Carl Legien (the German labor federation) and Walter Citrine (TUC) believed in their 
capacity to dissolve impulses within democratic system through collective bargaining 
and their control over rank-and-file assured mature action instead of strikes492. 
Strikes were considered as an early “militant stage” form of action that would erupt 
only within undeveloped unions, not in mature ones493.  
The Russian communist revolutionary Vladimir Lenin (1870-1924), who argued 
that the labor movement institutions should be centrally controlled, represent 
according to Hyman a pessimistic interpretation regarding the functioning of the 
trade unions494. Lenin stressed that normal activities of the trade unions such as 
strikes and demonstrations to fight for the wages and working hours were not 
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enough, posing no threat to the capitalist order, and therefore he emphasized the 
sectional nature of the trade union struggle495. Lenin stressed the leadership and 
organization: organization would solve the challenge of collective action, because 
without it workers would be left on the mercy of trade unions496. The relation 
between the political party and trade union is currently extremely relevant in the 
context of Algerian contemporary trade union movement. According to Lenin, 
Marxists needed to establish a political party, which required the development of 
Social-Democratic consciousness and recognition that there would not be possibility 
to find middle-way between bourgeois ideology and Social-Democratic 
consciousness (with Social-Democratic consciousness Lenin meant revolutionary 
socialist consciousness)497. The labor movement, without political party, was only 
able to develop trade union consciousness, which was not leading to disposal of 
bourgeois order. Lenin’s view, especially that presented in the influential What is to 
be Done in 1902, on trade union politics differs from that of Marx and Engels498. 
While Lenin agrees that trade unions are capable of achieving victories within the 
economic framework of capitalism, they however endogenously preserve orientation 
that leads to the integration of them within the system.  
The pessimist interpretation, according to Hyman, also integrates the 
understanding of Robert Michels (1876-1936) that coincided with Lenin’s concern 
about the trade union’s tendency of adapting too readily within ruling order499. In 
his book, Political Parties500, Michels approach trade unions and other social 
institutions from psychological perspectives. He argued that “in the trade-union 
movement, the authoritative character of the leaders and their tendency to rule 
democratic organizations on oligarchic lines, are even more pronounced than in the 
political organizations”501. He also added that “[i]n the trade union, it is even easier 
than in the political labor organization, for the officials to initiate and to pursue the 
course of action disapproved by the majority of the workers they are supposed to 
represent”502. Michels believed that direct democracy in the unions was impossible, 
negotiations and strikes needed an organization orchestrated by official with special 
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experience and that the larger the union was, more it demanded bureaucratic 
leadership503.   
For Michels it was obvious that even though union leaders had to cope with 
regular elections to keep their position, they became step by step bound to their spot 
for economic and professional reasons504. The special expertise that leaders acquire 
make them irreplaceable while workers start to believe that they owe for the leaders 
their “sacred duty”505. Gradually union leaders start to impose their own policies and 
claim they know better the situation of the workers than the workers themselves506. 
This oligarchic control is consolidated by mass apathy that results when the workers 
begin to alienate from the organization, while leaders forget their original class where 
they originated from, and loose the sense of solidarity towards the union leaders, and 
other way around, that have transformed into “petty bourgeois”507.  
According to Rosa Luxemburg (1870-1919), the working class could only 
overturn capitalism if it preserved its commitment to a revolution508. It was the 
ultimate socialist vision as a goal that kept alive the political struggle within trade 
unions and parliamentary work509. Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) argued that 
vanguard forms of organization, supported by Lenin, would not be enough to 
instigate revolution510 and stated his concern regarding the bureaucratization of the 
trade union movements:  
The workers feel that the complex of ‘their’ organization, the trade union, has become 
such an enormous apparatus that it now obeys laws internal to its structure and its 
complicated functions, but foreign to the masses who have acquired a consciousness 
of their historical mission as a revolutionary class. They feel that their will for power 
is not adequately expressed, in a clear and precise sense, in the present institutional 
hierarchy. […] These de facto conditions irritate the workers, but as individuals they 
are powerless to change them: the worlds and desires of each single man are too small 
in comparison to the iron laws inherent in the bureaucratic structure of the trade-
union apparatus511. 
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Gramsci stressed that the development of workers’ own consciousness and their 
movement, collective intellectual, should create working-class culture512. Bourgeoisie 
hegemony should be replaced with constitutive of the subjectivity513, or 
countercultural consensus of the workers514.  
The Marxist revolutionary Lev Trotsky (1879-1940) also suggested that only 
through fundamental transformation of society could workers’ economic needs be 
fulfilled515. He did not see future prospects for the trade unions within the 
framework of capitalist society in Great Britain and criticized corrupt union leaders 
who were affected by bourgeois ideology: 
It would be radically wrong to think, to imagine, that bureaucratism rises exclusively 
from the fact of the conquest of power by the proletariat. No, that is not the case. In 
the capitalist states, the most monstrous forms of bureaucratism are to be observed 
precisely in the trade unions. It is enough to look at America, England and Germany. 
[…] The bureaucracy of the trade unions is the backbone of British imperialism. It is 
by means of this bureaucracy that the bourgeoisie exists, not only in the metropolis, 
but in India, in Egypt, and in the other colonies516. 
The chaos of the First World War was continuing when the revolution in Russia of 
1917 took place. Around Europe, the socialist and the social democratic parties that 
had worked alongside before the war were now holding antagonistic position against 
each other. What separated them deeply was how to operate with their respected 
governments517. In 1919, the Bolsheviks created the Third International, or better 
known as the Communist International or Comintern, that declared the proletarian 
dictatorship and demanded the proletariat to struggle against European socialist 
parties518. According to Busch, Comintern had a clear policy to aim to fulfill the 
interests of the Russian Communist party and the demands of Russia first519.  
In Algeria, the year 1920 witnessed number of strikes and upheavals due to the 
end of the First World War. The Third International created by the Bolsheviks split 
the French labor movement into revolutionaries and reformists. Those who wanted 
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to join to Leninist Third International created the United General Confederation of 
Labour (Confédération générale du travail unitaire, CGTU), while CGT gathered most of 
the unions in France. Three departments in Algeria (Algiers, Oran and Constantine) 
chose CGTU and resumed therefore more revolutionary orientation520. Algeria was 
an integral part of France and the colonial structures in the country were even deeper 
than in other colonialized Northern African states, as Joel Beinin states: 
The dominant position of foreign or resident European capital and the national/racial 
component of relations between labor and capital were central features of colonial 
capitalism and the formation of working classes in both Tunisia and Egypt. But there 
were also significant differences. Egypt was nominally independent, a far richer prize, 
and strategically located at the crossroads of the British Empire. Tunisia was a settler 
colony, albeit on a much smaller scale than neighboring Algeria521.  
Charles-Robert Ageron522 argues that the history of the development of Algerian 
trade union movement is often written about with an over emphasis on French 
perspectives and impacts. Without rejecting or neglecting the importance of French 
influence, Ageron underlines that it is necessary to contextualize the Algerian trade 
union model also closely within the Maghrebin environment related with trade union 
movements in Tunisia and Morocco. The trade union movement did not only 
develop in Maghreb within socialist and communist inspiration, but was also 
exceedingly influenced by anti-colonial struggle and nationalism. Like Destour523 in 
Tunisia and Istiqlal524 in Morocco, Algerian labor movement also politicized and 
evolved in conjunction with nationalist political movements. 
Since the 1920s, in particular, Algeria experienced a multiplication of associations 
called nadi (Arabic word for circle, society or club) in connection with the political 
group the Young Algerians525, who endorsed the idea that Algerian society should 
integrate into French colonial structures and claim similar citizenship rights to both 
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Algerian and French settlers. Young Algerians consisted of a liberal well-educated 
elite that sought to acquire approval of being treated equally as French and Algerians. 
In general, Algerians were living under French occupation and lacked the citizenship 
rights526 that were guaranteed for the European colonial settlers. Main reason for 
their marginalization was due repressive Indigenous Code527 (Code de L’indigénat) that 
was enacted in 1881 and gave the French authorities the power to fine or imprison 
the Algerians individually or collectively without trial and set up a number of 
humiliating regulations.  
In France, a Communist party organization of North African workers, initiated 
with the concept of syndicalism, formed a party called Star of the North Africa (Étoile 
nord-africaine) in 1926, though Ageron suggests that origins of the organization are 
contested and not well known528. However, it is affirmed that the movement was in 
connection with French Communist party and CGTU529, while Jacques Berque has 
noted that Algerian workers suffered from the rift between CGT and CGTU530. The 
period 1920-1936 involved strikes and protests organized by unions within sharpen 
political context, while according to Berque all of them did not target the colonial 
system531, and finally gave approval for Algerians to join unions as well532. Gradually 
CGT and CGTU united alongside other left-wing parties to counteract the rise of 
far-right movement only to be dissolved by Vichy government few years later. 
Around the time of Algerian Muslim Congress (CMA) 533 in 1936, the popularity of 
nadi was also at its highest. Nadis were formed around sporting, philanthropic and 
cultural circles and were consisted of emergent new Algerian elite such as liberal 
professions, teachers, intellectuals, public servants and Muslim clergy534. The more 
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popular equivalent for nadi was called café535, which was more meaningful for 
gathering masses (the city workers and traders met in the café and welcomed new 
people in town). Both nadi and café offered new spaces alongside with the mosque, 
market and hammam that formed the modern foundation for new social and political 
movements in Algeria536.  
The well-known Algerian communist trade union activist Lakhdar Kaïdi537 
elucidates the significance of the café at the beginning of his political activism in the 
city of Mila in the Northeast of Algeria in the late 1930s: 
At one time, I even worked as a coffee boy at the café at ”river gauche”. There I 
learned much frequently and more closely with the Europeans who came to the café, 
and also with Muslim population who, by their professions, visited the café and played 
belote etc. 
[…] I’ve mentioned that we went to café at ”rive gauche”, it was called that even if it 
wasn’t called that at all in that era, and we played belote there. The café was owned 
by an European, a French socialist who was an influential member of ”France 
Combattant”.  The French and the Algerians met each other there, and played belote. 
Sometimes we teamed up, Europeans against Algerians, the some took coffee, and 
others took a beer, and it didn’t bother anyone. And there was also Boussouf, one of 
them because the Boussoufs is a whole tribe. He was one ot those who promoted the 
idea of Etoile Nord Africaine. 
Nadi and the café resulted from urbanization but, despite their geographic location 
in the cities, they were socially rather exclusive and supposedly male-dominated 
spaces of congregation538.  
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a rare and expensive product. Carlier, Omar (2012) Le café maure, lieu de sociabilité et instance politique. (Ed.) 
Bouchène, Abderrahmane, Peyroulou, Jean-Pierre, Tengour, Ouanassa Siari, Thénault, Sylvie [2012] 
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Omar Carlier539 describes the Algerian public space of the 1930s as a meeting 
point formed and re-invented by the encounters, not solely through institutions of 
the national state of the colonial power France. Carlier emphasizes that in Muslim 
Algeria politics encompassed an autonomous public space by building a new 
relationship between speech and writing and was reinvented by the meeting of voice, 
gestures and oral culture (téléphone arabe or le passe-parole), not only by forming 
institutions, scriptural culture and texts, as the dialogue between famous Algerian 
unionist Lakhdar Kaïdi and Nasser Jabi affirms540:  
Kaïdi L.: At that time there were few radio sets. Even in 1939-1940 the radio wasn’t 
very developed. To listen to the radio you had to go the only café that had a radio to 
listen some music […] 
Djabi N: So, to a young person like you the only contact one could have at that time 
was a direct one, humane. It is to say that when you got an idea, it came when you 
spoke and discussed directly with people or through the bus that came by, from where 
they distributed newspapers, and through trips? 
Kaïdi L.: Yes, absolutely! And when the bus broke down, there was practically no 
contacts. […]  
It is also striking that the café was a substantial meeting point between Algerians and 
French settlers. Carlier541 stresses that within the French colonial rule the idea of 
nationalism was build up into modern collective expression and mirrored French 
associational culture. Similar projection can be viewed regarding the trade union 
movement as well.      
Related to the workforce in colonized Algeria, factories and workshops 
employed, according to Charles-Robert Ageron542, 110 000 workers in 1924 and 
264 000 in 1954. The non-agricultural sector encompassed circa 120 000 
independent Muslim workers and 463 187 wage-earners. As Ageron writes: 
The former were craftsmen or small tradesmen with fewer than 30,000 employees; 
the net earnings of some 100,000 Muslim businesses came to no more than 33 billion 
frs., compared to the 375 billion frs. of some 65,000 European enterprises. As for the 
wage-earners in industry, commerce and public employment, there were 131,110 out 
of work, 172,000 unskilled labourers of whom 84,000 were partially unemployed, and 
75,000 skilled workers; 68,000 were professionals, minor civil servants or other 
employees, while there were 12,000 in managerial or technical positions. Muslims thus 
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constituted 95 per cent of the unskilled labour force and 68 per cent of the skilled, 
but only 17,6 per cent of those in technical grades and 7,2 per cent of executives543.  
Ageron544 states that due to unreliable and contradictory statistics it is more difficult 
to analyze rural Algerian society. However, he is surprised how little the wage labor 
grew compared to vast population growth and even more astonished related to those 
out of work and unemployed (400 000 in 1954). Regarding the 4 609 177 women, 
according to a colonial administrative statistic of December 1954, only 45 000 had 
jobs, which was most usually household keeping, cleaning or in the rural areas 
agricultural worker or craftswomen545.  
It is interesting to see how another famous trade union activist, from the ranks 
of nationalist PPA/MTDL546 and later one of the founders of Union Générale des 
Travailleurs Algériens (UGTA) in 1956, Boualem Bourouiba547 divides the 
development of Algerian labor movement into four stages in his comprehensive 
work Les syndicalistes algériens: Leur combat de l’éveil à la liberation (Algerian trade 
unionists: Their Struggle from Awakening to Liberation). First, starting in the 
beginning of the 20th century when the first trade unions were established until 1936 
when the constitution of the Popular Front was drawn up and Algerians could join 
to unions. Algerian workers, excluded from CGT and CGTU, where actually the 
most vulnerable to suffer from the sanctions imposed on workers during the Great 
Depression since 1929548. Algerian workers faced problems in organizing themselves 
in unions due to lack of resources, illiteracy and lack of awareness regarding 
employment rights that belonged to them549. However, from 1936 on the CGT, 
dominated by the socialists and anarchists, started to recruit Algerian workers 
influenced by the French Communist Party (PCF)550.   
 
543 Ageron (1991, 89). 
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546 Political party, transformed from the Northern African Star of Messali Hadj.     
547 Bourouiba (1998, 37-39). 
548 Bourouiba (1998, 45). 
549 Branine; Fekkar; Fekkar and Mellahi (2008, 406).   
550 Parti communiste français (PCF) was founded in 1920 by a split from the French socialist political party 
Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO) by the members that supported the Lenin's Communist 
International (Komitern). Parti Communiste Algérien (PCA), called as Region Algérienne du PCF, 
emerged in Algeria in 1920 within the Congress of Tours as an extension of PCF and was officially 
established as separate entity in 1936 (Melasuo 1999, 273). However, communists in Algeria were at 
odds with Third International and PCF, because they refused to support decolonization of Algeria 
(Melasuo 1999, 276). 
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The Second period (1936-1945) witnessed the end of the Second World War and 
many trade union activists where liberated by the allied forces from prisons and 
camps where they were imprisoned by the Vichy regime. Women were also 
integrated to the nationalist movement. Three associations of women emerged 
between 1934-1947 under the umbrella of political parties: the women’s section of 
the Algerian People’s Party (PPA551), the Union of Algerian Women, and the 
Association of Muslim Women of Algeria552. These associations, or their programs, 
dealt more with labor issues or anti-colonial struggles than questions related to 
emancipation of women553. However, the second period saw the massacres in Sétif 
and Guelma in 1945 that were followed by vast demonstrations organized by 
Messalist movement and Algerian trade unionists calling for the liberation of their 
country and led to the radicalization of the worker’s movement at large. The 
massacres killed between 20 000 and 30 000 Algerians554, while the French 
authorities recognized the deaths of a few thousand in contrast to the nationalists’ 
claims of 45 000 fatalities (some even speak of up to 80 000 dead)555. A year before, 
Algerians had obtained the right to associate and even manage their own unions556. 
The French authorities used the Sétif protests as an excuse for tightening their grip 
on political activities in Algeria banning the Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty (Amis 
du Manifeste et de la Liberté, AML)557, latest major attempt to form political unity 
among Algerian nationalist movements gathering more than 300 000 members558. 
During the third period (1946-1953) the Democratic Union of the Algerian 
Manifesto (UDMA)559 of Ferhat Abbas and the Algerian People’s Party/the 
Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (PPA/MTDL)560 of Messali 
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Hadj gained popularity and succeeded to have presentation in the French National 
Assembly and Municipal Councils. Simultaneously the first congress of the MTDL 
gave birth to the Central Commission of the Social and Trade Unionist Affairs led 
by Aïssat Idir, major figure in the creation of the UGTA in 1956. The Cold War 
broke the French CGT again, as Communists were removed from the French 
government and Léon Jouhaux established the Workers’ Force (Force ouvrière, FO) 
with the assumed help of American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)561. In 1947 a 
general strike in France influenced in Algeria as well impacting on various sectors 
such as the ports, mines, transportation, railways, banks, construction and 
agriculture562. Nevertheless, in 1952 the participation of Algerian workers to trade 
unions was weak, roughly estimated as 43 000, while 35,750 majority (83 percent), 
were affiliated to CGT563.  
Finally, the fourth period (1954-1962) during the Algerian War of Independence 
encapsulates the creations of three major Algerian trade unions that also reflect the 
wider political struggle and the competition among national movements. Ageron564 
explains the slower development of trade union movement in Algeria, compared to 
Tunisia and Morocco, by repression committed by French authorities. For example, 
Messalist PPA/MTDL had been forced to cooperate within French CGT, 
meanwhile algerianization of CGT and the Algerian Communist Party (PCA) was in 
a good tune, but since 1952 started to challenge it more openly565. CGT did not 
enable itself as a platform to raise certain themes into discussion, especially related 
to independence struggle, but the pressure of the growing nationalism was felt. This 
led to the establishment of the General Union of Algerian Trade Unions (Union 
générale des syndicats algériens, UGSA) in June 1954, which is often described as UGSA 
(CGT) due to its close ties within French union566. Most of those Algerian trade 
unionists who switched to UGSA (CGT) were simultaneously members of PCA, 
though many party members of the MTDL also joined to its ranks567.  
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Members of the MTDL wanted to create their own union, but the creation of 
National Liberation Front (Front de libération nationale, FLN) in October 1954 and its 
declaration of the war of independence on 1 November retarded the process568. The 
independence war that started on 1 November followed arrests of Algerian trade 
unionists569. Finally, on 11 February 1956, the new Messalist politico-military 
organization Le movement nationale algérien (MNA), that had replaced former MTDL, 
established Union of Algerian Workers (Union syndicale des travailleurs algériens, USTA). 
The creation of USTA broke the unanimity of Algerian trade union movement and 
was followed by the third union: Union générale des travailleurs algériens (UGTA). It was 
established 24 February by famous trade unionist figures, such as Aïssat Idir, Attalah 
Ben Aïssa, Boualem Bourouiba, Ali Yahya Madjid and Rabah Djermane. UGTA 
refused to cooperate with UGSA (CGT) and USTA570 and it was UGTA that was 
able to lead the combat for the workers’ rights in the severe conditions during the 
independence war. Its members were arrested and most of them sent to camps such 
as Berrouaghia, Bossuet, Serkadji and Birtraria571. Aïssat Idir was one of those who 
died in detention.  
After the independence of Algeria in 1962 led to gradual transformation of 
UGTA as the unique representative of trade unionism in Algeria as part of the one-
party rule societal order. Kaddour Chouicha572 accuses the Algerian official historical 
narrative of highlighting the creation of UGTA in the frames of FLN while 
simultaneously excluding the formations of UGSA and USTA. Likewise, René 
Gallissot573 argues that according to reports between UGTA and FLN, one can 
discover an autonomous position of the trade union vis-à-vis the liberation 
movement.  
Nowadays, autonomous trade union activists argue that the field of trade 
unionism in Algeria was plural since the beginning574. The eclectic creation and the 
gradual monopolization of trade unionism of the UGTA in Algeria, is explained 
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further in detail by Boualem Bourouiba575, Lakhdar Kaïdi576, Abdelmadjid Azzi577, 
René Gallissot578 and Charles-Robert Ageron579 in their comprehensive 
contributions regarding the historical development of Algerian trade union 
movement. This study concentrates on the development of the autonomous trade 
union scene. 
4.4 Rise and decline of trade unions in the 20th century 
By the mid-twentieth century, labor movements built up providing enormous power 
and gathered millions of workers in their ranks. Employers mostly shared the 
consensus that everyone is better off when workers are organized and social unrest 
is controlled through negotiations between union leaders, employers and state 
officials. Over the century since 1880, unions grew at a rate of about two percent per 
year580. Union leaders tend to return from palaces of power after successful collective 
bargaining.  
In the 1980s, Gary K. Busch581 argued that international trade unions are the 
most important of the international non-governmental voluntary organizations. He 
also projected various levels of abstraction whereby trade unions function. First, the 
organizational level that look after the fulfillment of working practices and 
compensation schemes. Second, the national organizational level, where trade 
unions form mutual representation and collective bargaining (autoworkers, 
engineers, farmworkers). Third, the national centers that are considered as political 
organizations of the sectoral unions that foster regular contacts with responsible 
governments and political parties. In centralized economies, such as in Eastern 
Europe or many Third World countries (according to Busch), there often exists only 
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one national center. In most developed industrial countries there tends to be a variety 
of trade union centers.  
In general, the role of trade unions is often underscored when political parties 
and especially oppositional parties are weak, lacking funding, manpower and 
organizational skills and settings. Due to their central position, influence and 
strategic roles within the industrial relations of the singular nation states, trade unions 
often instigate external interest from abroad. Thus, Busch argued that: “There is 
probably no area of concern, outside of military intelligence, which is more vital to 
the security of a nation than activities within and through the international trades 
(sic) union movements”582. It is also quite rare that external states attempt to interfere 
the state policies via trade unions, even though international union assistance and 
various civil society actors work closely with trade unions.  Nevertheless, since the 
1980s the growth of the trade unions have declined. As Friedman583 argues, to grow 
labor unions and other radical political movements must successfully mobilize 
workers and activists for collective action. In addition, unions must convince 
employers that it is in their interest to accept the demands of the workers unions. It 
is of course in the interest of the employers as well as state authorities to prevent 
unrest and maintain tranquility.  
The labor movement with its multiple organizations challenge the authorities and 
employers using the principles of democracy and justice. Within the political 
democratic system, unions cooperate with political parties and other civil society 
actors. In the end, labor unions stand against the wealth, authority and the prestige 
of the established order, if hostile for their endeavors, and the arguments unions 
have, are normative appeals related to dignity, respect and human rights584. Activists 
play vital interest for union leaders in mobilizing the collective action, because as 
Sidney Tarrow explains, they “resolve the social transaction costs of collective action; 
creating focal points for people who have no sources of compulsory 
coordination”585. Activists invest a major amount of resources and time sitting in 
popular cafés, distributing literature, conducting debates and organizing events that 
work for the benefice of the unions586. However, what happens if union leaders 
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integrate too closely to perceive world views and arguments of the employers and 
state officials and drift away from the premises of workers’ conditions? 
Associational life was gradually renewed in Algeria after the war with the 
promulgation of the Law of Association in 1962587. Several associations were 
brought under the direct control of the FLN’s one-party system. One of the most 
important events was the take-over of the government regarding workers' self-
management committees during the years of the post-independence588. The 
government introduced the “March Decrees” in March 1963 and a special 
governmental commission was appointed to prepare an official program over the 
self-management committees that resulted to taking control of the election 
process589. According to Branine et al. “the party-appointed leadership of the UGTA 
was detached from the militant local trade unions and the workers they represent” 
while “often the local unions organized strikes that the UGTA leadership officially 
disapproved”590.  
Newly independent Algeria faced many challenges: the uprisings by the Socialist 
Forces Front (Front des Forces Socialistes, FFS) guerrillas591 in October was followed 
by Moroccan intervention a few days later592. While formally independent, the 
Algerian economy was still highly dependent on France593. Meanwhile, Algeria 
attracted sympathizers and leftist militants from France who wanted to participate 
in its reconstruction and development594. According to another well-known trade 
unionist, Tahar Gaïd595, Algerian socialism can be considered very specific, because 
Algeria did not have typical working class, capitalism and bourgeoisie. The colonial 
France did not implant industries in Algeria and the colonized Algeria was merely 
reserve of discharge already for finalized products that were installed from the 
“metropolis”. According to Gaïd, Algerian economic structures could be described 
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as more colonial than capitalist. It is also important to note that French colonialism 
had destroyed the traditional system of hierarchies in Algeria and the new elite class 
and the class system in general was only about to emerge and transform after the 
independence. Finally, Gaïd argues that Algerian socialism did not embrace the same 
characteristics as in industrialized European countries.  
Inga Brandell596 has pointed out that the classical vision that was mainly 
constructed on European and North American experience of proletarianization and 
industrialization was challenged by the research conducted in Third-World countries. 
The forms of trade unions and their patterns diverge regarding the economic and 
political impacts. Trade unions were attached tightly to the state after the 
independence while access to certain basic human rights that were explicitly 
demanded during the colonial struggles within independent movements were not 
guaranteed. Brandell597 recalls that “elements of classical theories have been 
questioned also from within the highly industrialized societies”.   
By the end of 1965, when Houari Boumedienne seized power from Ahmed Ben 
Bella in a bloodless coup598, the majority of the UGTA's top militants were in jail or 
in exile599. Meanwhile the government prepared new legislation to minimize the role 
of UGTA and to replacing the self-management committees by tripartite elements 
(the state, the party and workers representatives in each individual enterprise)600. In 
1968, trade unions were formally under the control of the state and next year UGTA 
became attached to the organs of the party FLN601. According to Farid Cherbal602, 
the independent trade unionists suffered from repressive actions during 1965, 1968 
and 1971. Members of UGTA had to be members of the FLN, which helped to 
minimize the members of Socialist Vanguard Party (Parti de l’avant-garde socialiste, 
PAGS) and other carrying similar ideologies603. Every category, whether youth 
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(UNEA604 or UNJA605), trade union (UGTA), politics (FLN), or women (UNFA606), 
had their own representation that was controlled by the state. Still, the state was not 
able to efface the autonomous trade union movement completely.  
Nevertheless, the worker’s movement was weak and Said Chikhi even stress the 
difficulty of applying the term “working class” in Algeria in the first place for 
describing actions taking place merely as contestation organized by groups of 
workers: dockworkers, railway workers, steelmakers and metallurgists organized 
strikes categorically separately607. Chikhi and Ali El Kenz608 argue that:  
[I]t does not seem as if the history of Algerian society and industry has led to the 
formation of a working class with an organic character. The strong presence of an 
unstable population, who are workers yet refuse to belong totally to the factory and 
to identify themselves with the values strictly linked to the industrial world, seems in 
fact to be a symptom of heterogeneity and absence of collective identity.  
Branine et al.609 argue that the state’s and party’s control over the UGTA took its 
final phase when “large state-owned companies managed by the state-appointed 
directors and the introduction of state-imposed system of worker’ participation –
Socialist Management of Enterprises (Gestion Socialiste des Entreprises, GSE)” were set. 
While most of the local trade unionists opposed the prescription, it was introduced 
on 16 November 1971 as the official charter of the GSE, brought about as a result 
of massive nationalization processes. UGTA’s role was to integrate its local and 
enterprise unions in the execution of the GSE. As a result: 
[A]fter the introduction of the GSE, trade union membership increased from 62 
percent of the working population in 1973 to 85 per cent in 1980, putting the socialist 
enterprises at the heads of the unionized sectors. […] However, this level of 
membership reflected the role of nationalized trade unions as state agents in a state 
capitalist system. Having a membership card is a key to social and material privileges, 
not a sign of workers unity and solidarity610. 
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As a result, workers’ action remained low-key from 1967-1974. After 1976 strikes 
were prohibited, except in the private sector, which however did not mean the 
ending of the strikes and political protests that were usual especially at the end of the 
decade in 1977 and 1979611. In 1977 Boumedienne promised democratization of the 
trade union movements, which resulted in calm during 1978612.  
Many remember the reign of Boumedienne in a positive light, because Algeria 
had the highest growth rate (8,5 percent) in 1970s compared to other oil exporters, 
and embarked broad reconstruction, education and development programs613. In the 
years when Boumedienne was in power, Algeria witnessed significant economic 
development in various specific sectors such as heavy industries, construction, 
mining and hydrocarbons614. Algeria had adopted a form of socialism and was 
playing visible role in the international politics and the non-aligned movement. In 
1971, Boumedienne nationalized the oil industry, which severed the complex 
relations between Algeria and France. He introduced various socialist reforms and 
integrated former members of the PAGS into the government. Nationalization 
proceeded together with stateization. 
The 58 years old autonomous trade union and human rights activist Mohamed 
Haimouni remembers the period during 1970s under the presidency of 
Boumedienne. The reminiscence of the Haimouni, currently working in the Algerian 
League for the Defense of Human Rights (La Ligue algérienne pour la défense des droits 
de l'homme, LADDH), regarding the beginning of his activism during the 1970s in 
the cinema club depicts how the leftist youth looked after the social space  to express 
themselves and their political aspiration:   
Starting from 1973-74, there was a single party rule. There was only the cultural action 
where we could function. It was the dictatorship. There was only the FLN and the 
mass-movements of the FLN such as the women’s union movement, peasant 
movement and so forth. Every socio-professional category had its own movement. 
The youth had UNJA. So all the people who wanted to conduct activism had to do it 
through mass movements of the FLN. In 1971 during the nationalization of the land 
and oil, Boumedienne started to conduct state socialist politics. In order to be 
successful he needed the youth and the left, because the left believed in 
nationalization of the land and oil. Simultaneously Boumedienne left a little bit space 
for the left to express itself. There were of course various tendencies of the left at the 
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times. We were Maoists, Trotskists or one could say extreme left. We invested into 
cinema club. Through cinema we could pass our message. I functioned in the cinema 
during 1973-74 until 1990. We were a bit divided: Maoists and Trotskists. Sometimes 
we worked together615. 
Chikhi616 depicts more profoundly the condition of the worker’s movement in the 
Algerian social context during 1970s in his article Question ouvrière et rapports sociaux en 
Algérie (Labor Question and Social Relations in Algeria). He argues, that the so-called 
Social Pact that embodies social relations during the reign of Boumedienne contain a 
combination of and close relation between social democracy and political 
despotism617. This meant that the public space was emptied from any open 
confrontation while individuals renounced from the charges of sovereignty to have 
an access to distribution of the state’s resources: the state enabled satisfaction on 
social demands and in exchange prohibited public freedoms618. Whilst successful 
industrialization and development during the period of Boumedienne meant larger 
social justice and paved the path to improve social position for many, it meant also 
collective atomization of social movements and weak identity and consciousness for 
the worker’s movement more widely619.  
The associational field and the attitude towards independent associations changed 
after the death of President Boumedienne in 1978620. Bendjedid Chadli became the 
President and questioned with renewed entourage previous conduct of policies and 
some of the popular achievements621. Chadli’s presidency also witnessed major 
global changes622 in the international economic structures while Chikhi and El Kenz 
623stress the unique situation for the working force in Algeria, when its numbers 
increased from 240 000 almost to 1 100 000 during 1970-1983. This meant the 
increase of 21 percent in 1967, 33 percent in 1978 and 37 percent in 1983624. 
Meanwhile women's employment remained modest reaching to 15 percent among 
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25-29 years old in 1985 and until 1995 women aged between 15-65 represented only 
8 percent of the labor force625.  
The increasing numbers related to industrialization focused mainly on heavy 
industry. From a broader perspective, economic and social changes in Algeria such 
as urbanization and rural exodus, the generalization of schooling, the growth of wage 
labor, the emigration and the patterns of consumption of the elites “provoked an 
inexorable loss of symbolic values of the traditional universe and doomed local 
patterns and the ‘village’ hierarchy to gradual extension”626. According to Chikhi, 
these societal transformations during the mid-1970s to early 1980s led to 
destabilization of the Algerian working class627. 
In 1980, the so-called Berber Spring broke out in Kabylia and Algiers, claiming 
recognition for Amazigh identity, but more importantly in the context of this study 
it embodied local strike movements628. The Berber associative movement was not 
meant to pose a veritable challenge to the Algerian authorities, but it gathered 
internationally recognized intellectuals to its ranks, such as Pierre Bourdieu629. On 
the contrary, the Chadli government was able to profit from it because it divided the 
political left630. Meanwhile another upheaval took place at the Rouiba industrial 
motor car plant631. According to Chikhi and El Kenz the workers in Rouiba could 
not voice their demands through union and it was obvious that the “distance 
between workers and the trade union” was remote because “[t]he union has 
proceeded to patron-client practices”632. This recalls of course about the larger 
debate on the integration of the trade unions in general as part of the societal 
structures and governance concentrating more on methods of collective bargaining 
while alienating the leadership from the occasional challenges of the workers 
affiliating them to other responsibilities.  
Otherwise, the years 1981-1987 were relatively calmer despite a few larger popular 
uprisings in Oran (1982) as well as in Constantine and Sétif (1986) and the amount 
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of strikes decreased633. Worker’s resistance was considered as destabilizing factor 
that ought to be suppressed634. Among others, the former activists of the UNEA, 
which was dissolved in 1970635, managed to transform the independent unionism 
into autonomous student committees in the university campuses during 1976-
1989636. Strikes that were 922 record high still in 1980 decreased to 648 in 1987637. 
While governmental political forces were able to dominate the social environments 
and collective action, it meant that the political contestation moved from the 
factories to the streets,638 though Amar Benamrouche argues that some of the larger 
protests in the public spaces in the 1980s were connected on some occasions to the 
strikes that started in the factories too639. When the October  1988 uprisings spread 
from the Rouiba protests, they ended up bringing extensive social instabilities that 
eventually led to the collapse of the dominant political system and finally to civil war.  
However, this also instigated the process of democratization that opened the 
door for autonomous trade unions and pluralistic understanding of unionizing 
regarding both political parties and associations. As a consequence, some of the 
autonomous trade unions are today challenging the unique position of UGTA, which 
they continue to blame being too close to the power elites or even being solid part 
of the power apparatus. Concerning the larger picture that relates to the certain 
pattern of how trade unions develop from radical basis and end up integrating or 
being part of the institutional machinery working for the government and employers, 
can be considered I believe, too deterministic. Therefore, I suggest that each 
nationally or geographically located case should be approached distinctly in special 
socio-economic environment within specific timeframe to be further analyzed from 
unique premises.   
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5 REMEMBERING SOCIAL CHANGE: PATH TO 
DARK DECADE 
The October uprisings of 1988 brought to the surface the social discontent that had 
been gradually developing in Algerian society under one-party rule since 
independence. There were various socio-political factors behind the 1988 uprisings 
but one major element was the combination of socio-economic challenges to social 
change and restricted social space that prevented social contestation and therefore 
gradual improvement. The youth revolts instigated the process that triggered the 
beginning of the ongoing democratic transition in the contemporary Algeria. 
Constitutional change in 1989 legalized the official creation and functioning of the 
autonomous trade unions.  
In this chapter, I will reflect on this constitutional change and the emergence of 
autonomous trade union movement and ask: What are the contributions of 
independent trade unionism to social change in Algeria and how do they reflect 
democracy building in the country? While I concentrate on this question in this 
chapter, it will be carried on within two previous chapters as well to provide a more 
profound analysis at the end of this thesis. As I explained in the second chapter, the 
concept of social change is understood as sustainable democracy building or as 
processes of democratization comprising social factors and establishment of 
democratic institutions. It can take place on the mental level of the individuals 
involved as well as at an institutional level, connected through contingent interaction 
without any determinist dominance relationship, as part of the social. The 
autonomous trade unions, associations and the multi-party system emerged 
simultaneously within the democratic state building, which contained ideas and 
demands that were formulated already in the past within various platforms and 
movements. The 1988 uprisings enabled possibility to common promotion of 
heterogeneous claims that conjoined as major demand for reform for political 
liberties.  
Therefore, the 1988 October uprisings started a democratization process, which 
was nonetheless halted after the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won in September the 
1990 municipal elections and would have probably won the general elections in 
January 1992, if the process would not have been suspended. After interruption of 
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the democratization process Algeria drifted into bloody civil war, which also 
sustained the process of the development of autonomous trade union movement. I 
will describe how those unions struggled to maintain their action during the décennie 
noir (black decade) during 1990s within destabilizing societal structures through 
promoting democracy building within the context of work. 
To describe the background for the emergence of autonomous trade union 
movement I use the interviews I conducted and relevant literature in the context of 
collective memory. I am interested in how the 1988 uprisings and the 
democratization process were politicized by various actors, including autonomous 
trade unions. I analyze the interviews via discourse analysis illustrating antagonistic 
relations around the reference points, or nodal points, to reflect how the discourses 
around the stability, the political and the patriotism are formed, how do they reflect 
the construction of “reality” and justify the acts and action conducted by the 
autonomous trade union activists and the state authorities.  
In addition, I will show how the autonomous trade unions use and define the 
contested public space, the space of representation, where they organize activities 
sensitizing citizens to increase their mobilization in the future actions. These acts of 
citizenship, which turns actors into citizens in the contentious space, integrate 
assumption that they have power to change the politics through mobilizations 
creating pressure towards official state authorities and other decision makers in the 
policy making. There are diverse ways to interpret the social and public space while 
some activists that I interviewed argued that free public space does not exist in 
Algeria due to control of state authorities.  
Finally, I will discuss the various backgrounds of the membership of these unions. 
I am interested in how ordinary citizens transform into political actors by joining 
autonomous trade unions. I will also reflect on the versatile background of the 
membership and generational experiences through interviews. Regarding their 
agency, I define the acts conducted by the activists as manifest political participation. 
While activists typically give individual reminiscence related to their engagement, I 
will stress the importance of their interplay with societal structures and trajectories.  
This chapter describes the early development of the autonomous trade union 
movement until the end of 1990s, when gradual launch of the peace process took 
place. The period of civil war strained the development of the autonomous trade 
union movement. The peace process and the gradual termination of the violence 
between Islamist groups and the government resulted into new situation where 
autonomous trade unions were again demanding citizenship rights and liberties they 
felt were lost during the civil war.  
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5.1 Towards a reform of political liberties 
As in 2011 uprisings in the North Africa and the Middle East, glossed in the global 
media as “the Arab Spring” or “Arab Awakening”640, the 1988 October uprisings641 
in Algeria raised hope and expectations for achieving sustainable democratic state 
building and strengthened pluralistic official forms of political representation. The 
destabilization that followed the uprisings in 2011 have been ever since stronger 
argument by the state authorities and some of the citizens in the area to denounce 
the agency of the oppositional social movements that denounce the conduction of 
state affairs in their respected countries. In Algeria, the democratic reforms that were 
launched after October uprisings also led to destabilization and civil war though 
some major democratic development within political system was achieved. 
In the 1980s, during the presidency of Colonel Benjedid Chadli (1979-1992), the 
economy of Algeria was subjected to profound liberalization programs642 due to 
fears of fiscal crisis643 amid the strengthening international liberal economic 
paradigm. The factors behind the October uprisings originate mainly from the 
combination of socio-economic and demographic development in Algeria644: 
liberalization of the economy during the Presidency of Chadli accelerated youth 
unemployment, lack of housing and corruption645 on the one hand, enrichment of 
the others on the other. Laurie Brand646 stresses also the aftermath of the death of 
President Houari Boumedienne and the power struggle between two “diametrically 
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opposed tendencies” that effected on the role of private sector in the coming years: 
those who preferred rigid political control and those who supported discontinuation 
of socialist policies. The first group were roughly defined the officers, UGTA, the 
leftist student groups, section of the arabisants, members of the Socialist Vanguard 
Party (Le Parti d’avant garde socialiste, PAGS)647 and sections of the press, while the 
latter were formed by administrative and technocratic elites, the private sector and 
liberals648.  
Gradual “de-boumedienation” made President Chadli, who supported 
strengthening the role of the private sector, gather gain support from arabisants close 
to strengthening Islamist movement, which meant for example courting 
conservative Islamists in the context of promulgation of the Family Code in 1984649. 
Meanwhile, state revenues suffered from low oil prices due to the 1986 collapse of 
the world oil market when the oil prices fell from $US30 (1983) to $US15 in 1986650 
and in the summer 1988, the price of food increased radically651. State export 
revenues were down by 40 percent and harmed the country, which was strongly 
subsidized, while economic growth was -3,6 per cent652. Governmental assistance 
for basic goods ceased while black market flourished and housing shortage deepened 
in a country, where 60 per cent of its nearly 30 million population were under the 
age of 20653.  
During the period of President Chadli the military nationalists, the left and the 
communists were politically marginalized, while the worker’s movement was 
considered as a destabilizing factor that was suppressed under political observation 
and restriction by the police forces654. According to Said Chikhi, trade unions were 
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under the influence of the urban petit bourgeois, worker elites and employers close 
to state’s one party-system meanwhile the social actors in general were weakly 
represented with few more visible exceptions such as cultural Amazigh movement, 
the Women’s movement and small groups of human rights defenders655. The strikes 
had gradually decreased simultaneously with the increase of the youth 
unemployment656. Chikhi argues that the passivity of the trade union movement 
among others led to absence of social movements and contestation in the public 
space. This development transformed political frustration and action into more 
dispersed agencies within the youth in the football stadiums, mosques and the streets 
where they expressed their dissatisfaction to various grievances such as the lack of 
water and sanities, electricity, housing and jobs657. I consider the restriction of social 
space, weakening social structures and new liberal economic policy-making as the 
main factors for October uprisings. 
Social and political contestation and destabilization of political structures existed 
already before 1988. Two years earlier, In November 1986, important manifestation 
took place in various cities in the Eastern Algeria, especially in Constantine and 
Sétif658. The number of strikes hit a record high in 1988 until in September a major 
strike took place in the state-owned motor-industry complex of Rouiba, near the 
capital Algiers659. As mentioned in the chapter IV, the workers in Rouiba had lost 
their capacity to voice their demands through unions due to patron-client practices, 
which resulted to mobilization and manifestation660. Violent riots led to violent 
clashes between workers and the police force661. PAGS was active organizing the 
demonstrations662. The unrest spread rapidly to urbanized areas. A steep rise in the 
price of school materials at the beginning of the school year led to clashes between 
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the police and youth, especially high-school students and unemployed young males 
aged between 12 to 20 years old, leading to strikes in the schools and universities663.  
On the 4 October, the youth led manifestations erupted in the popular quarter of 
Bab El Oued, a suburb of Algiers, and quickly spread around the city664. Students 
and unemployed youth raved the elitist commercial and cultural center Ryad-el-Feth 
while during the clashes with the police led to deaths of several children and 
instigated rumors of police brutality quickly spread665. Next day schoolchildren, 
students and unemployed youth organized a protest march around several suburbs 
of capital Algiers (e.g. Harrach, Belcourt, Kouba, Ben Aknoun), which rapidly shifted 
into riots and violation of public facilities, state-owned supermarkets and FLN 
offices666. Demonstrating youth blamed President Chadli for impaired social 
conditions, who in turn blamed the financial speculators667. The youth claimed they 
wanted to mobilize public opinion668. The violence targeted especially the 
governmental facilities because the youth considered the state authorities responsible 
for their problems and difficulties in life and injustice (hogra)669. 
On Thursday the 6th, just before the Friday prayers, the government imposed the 
state of emergency in the Algiers region while all the civilian authorities were 
positioned under the military control for the first time since the independence670. 
Some elements of the Islamist movement used the situation for their own benefice 
to increase their visibility enforcing the mobilization671. They had not been present 
during the first days of manifestations, but started to be more involved after the 
Friday prayers on the 7th. More the protests grew, more these Islamists became 
visible wanting to show that they were in charge672.  
The new contemporary Islamist movement had at least since the 1970s been 
active political actor in Algerian society mobilizing against certain configurations of 
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social secularism aiming for the implementation of Sharia law673. While Islamist 
movement during the 1980s is often depicted by their gains regarding the 1984 
Family Code or The Algerian Islamic Armed Movement led by Mustapha Bouyali 
during 1982-1987, Said Chikhi674 recalls how the Islamist movement managed to 
cover various empty social spaces with satellite organizations and cells675. Besides, 
the Islamist movement was able to evoke response by offering simple answers to 
complex questions related to life in general, they were also present in various 
initiatives in community support work helping the sick people in hospitals, needy in 
villages and victims of natural disasters676. During the 1980s, they had been able to 
strengthen their position functioning as an asset for Chadli to consolidate his 
power677. Simultaneously it is important to stress, as Myriam Aït-Aoudia recalls that 
the Islamist movement, like other agents (authorities, students, doctors, journalists, 
trade unionists, human rights activists, intellectuals and so forth), should be rather 
seen as heterogeneous movement than one single compact body of organization678. 
On Friday 7 October 1988, the manifestations spread to Oran, Tizi-Ouzou and 
various other districts and outside from Algiers the security forces were unprepared 
to face such extensive protests, which led to bloody confrontation with the 
demonstrators679. Order was attained on 10 October after violent clashes and 
casualties680. The government was concerned due to heavy force used and invited 
number of major Islamist leaders, some of whom were organizing the 
manifestations: Ahmed Sahnoun, Mahfoud Nahnah, Abassi Madani and Ali 
BelHadj681. As a conclusion, it seems that the state was in impasse. 
Then President Chadli went on television to announce that government would 
immediately decrease the prices and increase subsidized goods682. What was even 
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more significant in his speech was that he raised the political challenges the country 
was facing and promised reforms: 
BC: In my opinion, it is the time to introduce the necessary reforms, even in the 
political field, and review certain structures and constitutional bases to adapt them 
towards a new course. […] As citizens, you have to react to those political reforms 
that will be submitted to you. Those reforms must take place in a calm and serene 
atmosphere, so that we can overcome the familiar economic and political difficulties. 
That is the only way to resolve our problems. Any other way would be undoubtedly 
rejected by sincere citizens. […] In front of our nation, I am committed to respect 
the voice of the people with regard to the broad political reforms. I personally believe 
that the proposed reforms allow us to resolve many of our political and economic 
problems, and open the way towards real national competences, without excluding 
anyone. Thus, we will eliminate the monopoly of responsibility and allow the official 
institutions of the state, be it the parliament or any other institution, to play their role 
in the control and monitoring683. 
The main importance of the speech was to calm down massive demonstrations to 
establish peace and secure the stability of the country. It also showed patriotic 
sacrificing for the sake of national interest through sectorial political reforms, 
improvement of structures and constitutional foundations. It also incorporated 
connotations of genuine dialogue with those sincere citizens, who would aspire the 
best for the country and construct Algeria within peaceful environment.  
President Chadli therefore announced his intention to hold a nationwide 
referendum on the 1976 constitution to allow wider freedoms and to democratize 
political institutions, which included the formation of political opposition groups684. 
It is possible to reflect this change also within the wider international context of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, and thus Algeria was a little bit ahead with its form of 
“glasnost” policies simultaneously spreading around the Eastern Europe685. The 
marginalized youth were successful where institutionalized social elites such as trade 
unions and other social movements had failed: instigating democratization 
process686. The new amendments, enacted 23 February 1989, to the Algerian 
Constitution, opened the window for new political parties, strongly opposed by 
many members of the FLN687.   
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The beginning of the democratization process was launched in an atmosphere of 
enthusiasm and mobilization. Autonomous trade unions were inherited from laws 
90-14 and 90-02 of February 1989 in an entirely new ratification of constitution, 
where the right to found associations of a political nature was recognized and 
inaugurated into formal political pluralism. The scattered working class and civil 
society found many obstacles in the way in front of dominant state apparatus and it 
was difficult to form a counterbalance among precariat workers, poor, unemployed 
and excluded who were more in numbers than those in work688. The state controlled 
trade union UGTA was considered by many as corrupt, too close to those in power, 
and this meant the emerge of the independent labor movement: the average amount 
of strikes during 1983-1987 had been less than 800, in 1989 the Ministry of 
Employment registered 3389 strikes689.  
Trade union activists had already been active in the student movements, especially 
inspired by the former members of the National Union of Algerian Students (Union 
nationale des étudiants algériens, UNEA), that were behind heavy strikes before and 
during the October uprisings. Aït-Aoudia690 has shown how multiple anti-
governmental groups (including some groups of imams, lawyers, teachers, students, 
doctors, journalists and other human rights activists) denounced the violence used 
by state authorities during the October uprisings and meantime politicized the youth 
protests according to their own political narratives. She argues that these former 
groups and movements transformed the acts conducted by the youth according to 
their aims turning the youth as their spokesmen through politicization of the 
demonstrations. In addition, she also argues that the 1988 uprisings have been 
politicized by researchers themselves too through construction of various narrations 
related to these events attaching political dimensions that may not have been present. 
She believes that there does not exist much concrete evidence to show that 
spontaneous and unorganized youth demonstrations had either similar objectives 
that are often connected to these narratives, or that these uprisings were simply 
caused by frustrated youth due to weaken socio-economic structures691. In addition, 
referring to Abed Charef’s research, she believes that the youth did not maintain any 
liaison to youth, Islamist, FLN or leftist movements692. 
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5.2 Emergence of the autonomous trade unions 
When dealing with the worker’s movement in Algeria, and particularly autonomous 
trade unions, it is important to locate them within the wider context of Algerian 
society to reflect their capacity to conduct collective action, to estimate the degree 
of their independence regarding the state and to reflect their political significance693. 
They can also be analyzed according to their reach and range whether they function 
in the level of enterprise, local wilaya level or national territory at large694. Some of 
these unions are working closely attached with political parties, some in the 
specialized field of sector or profession695. 
Through the democratization process, President Chadli's government sought to 
reconstruct the state's relationship with civil society actors on various levels and 
pardoned those arrested during the uprisings and condemned by military tribunals696. 
FLN lost its state-party status and cut its special relationship with the military in 
March. It also lost the ideational monopoly to define the national identity, which had 
significant consequences regarding its image as patriotic political representation697. 
The Islamists, on the other hand, formed the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique 
du Salut, FIS)698 challenging FLN’s religious representation. Similarly, about 50 new 
political parties appeared in the speed like mushrooms after the rain699. From the 
February 1989 to June 1990 14 new political parties were officially registered, while 
between June 1990 and December 1991 36 new parties came into existence700.   
On 12 June 1990, the first multiparty elections, in local level, were held and newly 
formed newspapers mediatized the process within crisp political environment701. 
Algerian electorate was divided into local and provincial levels that consist of 48 
wilayas, which have representative assemblies (Assamblées Populaires de Wilaya, APW), 
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and 1539 municipal councils (Assamblées Populaires Communals, APC)702. FIS won 
the elections receiving 4.3 million votes (54 per cent of the vote nationwide from the 
65 per cent voter turnout)703 compared to 2.25 million votes of the FLN704. FIS was 
the most popular in the urban areas in the north, not in the Amazigh areas (such as 
Kabylia) and Saharan regions, and won in 32 wilayas705. The electoral victory of the 
FIS increased their confidence, which was reflected by their toughened rhetoric. For 
example, young and charismatic leader Ali Belhadj hinted in his speeches of 
establishment of a Caliphate and started to criticize the entire democratic process as 
redundant: why majority would decide while all the necessary societal answers can 
be sprang from the sacred book Coran?706   
After the elections, the UGTA held its 8th Congress on 27 June 1990. Due to its 
reputation being solid part of power apparatus UGTA decided to cut all its formal 
ties to political party FLN, which started new independent, at least formally, period 
in its relatively long history. In the late 1980s, UGTA gathered only few industrial 
worker707. Abdelhak Benhamouda was chosen as the new Secretary-General. 
According to Chikhi, UGTA condemned opening of the syndicalist pluralism to 
maintain its monopoly708, but Benhamouda stated his more detailed opinion few 
weeks after his election:  
AB: […] I am not against pluralism, but I must point out that I don’t agree with those 
who think that political pluralism should automatically lead to several trade union 
organizations. However, I prefer to look at this through the present situation and the 
interests of workers. What advantage several trade union organizations would give? 
At best, one majority trade union organization would be vis-á-vis the other social 
actors, be whatever their number. So, trade union pluralism, but only one organization 
to negotiate with leaders and bosses. Worse option would be many small trade unions 
fighting for the status of unique or privileged negotiator with the government or other 
social partners. This battle would endanger not only the demands of the workers but 
also the trade unions because the ambition to represent all the workers is likely to 
result in the opposite: the vast majority of workers would remain outside trade unions 
that couldn’t defend them. The new laws are clear. To enter negotiations, the 
representation must be over 20 % of the collectives. It’s possible that no one reaches 
this threshold […]709.  
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This statement by Benhamouda shows the antagonistic relations between UGTA 
and autonomous trade unions from the beginning. His statement integrates various 
subjectivities into common project and politicize major element in the context of 
trade unionism: who defends the workers. He argued that only UGTA was big 
enough to protect the interests of the workers while autonomous trade unions were 
too small and scattered. From his position, being the head of the largest trade union 
in a country, it is normal to stress the unity of the workers, who should gather into 
one representative body instead of creating numerous weak unions that are easy to 
deal with separately by those in power. Simultaneously, Benhamouda’s statement 
depicts frighteningly well the current trade unionism platform in Algeria, where 
dozens of unions function without massive representation and coordinated action 
due to governmental divide-and-rule tactics as well as due to their internal 
discrepancies.  
According to official documents about those autonomous trade unions that are 
still operating today (2019) show that 13 union were established in 1990710, 16 in 
1991711, five in 1992712 and six in 1993713. Until the beginning of the 1991, the 
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number of trade unions (UGTA including) in Algeria was multiplied to 28714. I do 
not have information about all of the autonomous trade unions that were established 
since the enactment of the laws 90-14 and 90-02 and my intention is not to list all of 
them. However, a few of them, those most central to this thesis, require a little more 
introduction. The National Autonomous Union of Public Administration Staff 
(Syndicat National Autonome des Personelles de l’Administration Publique, SNAPAP) was 
the first autonomous trade union that came into existence during the process in 
September 1990. The current President of SNAPAP, Rachid Malaoui, recalled the 
birth of the first autonomous trade union in Algeria's modern history:  
RM: When SNAPAP was founded in 1990, I wasn’t involved there yet. It was the 
first accepted trade union after the one-party system was abolished. It was registered 
as number 1. SNAPAP was founded by officials of the interior of the country who 
form the majority of public officials. Previously, the civil servants from different 
wilayas haven’t been able to organize. Thus, even UGTA has been absent in this 
sector. Now the civil servants at the level of the local branches of the state could set 
up an union that would represent the whole of the public service715.  
The creation of autonomous trade unions did not only meant competition and 
occupying positions of the UGTA, but also establishing unions to the sectors where 
UGTA had been absent. SNAPAP was officially the first autonomous trade union 
that was established and it has been one of the most visible oppositional union in 
the country during the last two decades. However, at this stage, it gets a little 
confusing, because some of the activists that are currently operating in SNAPAP 
argue that in the beginning SNAPAP was merely just one autonomous trade union 
that had close links with state authorities denying its oppositional nature. Long-term 
SNAPAP trade union activist Salim Mecheri716 even argued that SNAPAP was 
created by the power (pouvoir). He stated that it was in 1995 that more oppositional 
elements started to conduct activism within its ranks and the leadership transformed 
more into oppositional character after Malaoui was elected as Secretary General in 
1999.    
Meanwhile these new autonomous trade unions were supposedly independent, at 
least from the single-party system, and organized by actors who used their new rights 
to organize themselves and create new independent movements? All these 
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definitions, “what is independent and what is not”, or, “who is the real defender of 
the workers”, mainly remind me about the power politics and politicization of the 
work at large. It also suggests that power structures can change in the autonomous 
trade unions. According to those that are active today in SNAPAP argue that only 
after Malaoui and other unionists around him became in charge in the movement in 
the turn of 2000s, it transformed into “real defender of the workers’ rights”. 
It is also necessary to stress that the autonomous trade union movement was not 
born from the post-October uprising processes, as Secretary General of the 
Autonomous Trade Union of the Workers of Education and formation (Syndicat Autonome 
des Travailleurs de l’Éducation et de la Formation, SATEF), Mohamed Salem Sadali¸ 
argued: 
MSS: To claim that the idea of autonomous syndicalism came from nowhere, that it 
suddenly emerged in Algeria after October 1988, would be an insult to those brave 
trade unionists who at the first congress of UGTA in January 1963 were beaten when 
they tried to free UGTA from the omnipotent FLN. It would also ignore the student 
unionism of the 70s and 80s (recall the assassination in 1982 of the student Kamel 
Amzal at Ben Aknoun when he was attaching a poster calling for the democratic 
election of the university committee). There was a model of structure that would bring 
about activists who were behind the creation of autonomous unions and even political 
parties after October 1988. Let us also recall the major role played by autonomous 
collectives of workers of the ENIEM and COTITEX at Tizi Ouzou in the Berber 
Spring in 1980. Let's not forget also that the events of October 88 were preceded by 
a strike at the SONACOME in Rouiba717. 
The aforementioned SATEF was not the first autonomous union that was 
authorized, but it was one of those unions that gathered activists that had a longer 
background in trade unionism and was created already in 1989, authorized in 1990 
and conducted several important strives on the ground in the field of national 
education and professional formation718. SATEF was also significant because of its 
cultural homogeneity locating in the center of the Northern Algeria among Amazigh 
population while its leadership functioned closely with the political party FFS led by 
Hocine Aït Ahmed719.  
The National Council for Higher Education Professors (Conseil National des Professeurs 
du Supérieur, CNES) was also created already in 1989 but was not authorized until 
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January 1992. It was consisted, according to Larbi Graïne720, of leftist elements such 
as members of PAGS, who had been active in autonomous student committees 
already during 1970s and 1980s. In addition, it incorporated activists from The 
National Union of Algerian Students (l'Union nationale des étudiants algériens, UNEA), 
Berber Cultural Movement (Mouvement Culturel Berbère, MCB) and The National Union 
of Algerian Youth (Union Nationale de la Jeunesse Algérienne, UNJA). CNES was one 
of the most, if not the most, active autonomous trade unions that functioned in 
Algeria during the civil war in 1990s and well-known trade union figures such as 
Farid Cherbal, Kaddour Chouicha and Nacer Djabi, only few to mention, were active 
in its ranks.   
In October 1989 in the Eastern Algeria the National Union of the Educational and 
Training Staff (Union Nationale des Personnels de l’Éducation et de la Formation, 
UNPEF) was established in Annaba by the teacher group based in Constantine 
integrating all the levels in the sector of education721. UNPEF was authorized in June 
1990 and is closely linked to the Islamist political party Movement of Society for Peace 
(Mouvement de la société pour la paix, MSP722) ex-Hamas723. In the educational 
sector emerged in 1991 emerged also the National Federation of Education Workers 
(Fédération Nationale des Travailleurs de l’Éducation, FNTE). It was created in the 
summer 1991 and was affiliated with UGTA, because it became apparent that the 
autonomous trade unions gained followers in the educational sector724. FNTE was 
serving according to critical observers as an instrument to intermediate in the sector 
for the benefit of the UGTA725.  
The autonomous trade unions emerged also separately in the sector of health 
care. In 1991 the National Trade Union of the Practitioners in the Public Health Care 
(Syndicat National des Praticiens de la Santé Publique, SNPSP) was stablished to 
function in national level gathering doctors and specialized doctors, surgeons, 
dentists and pharmacists in the CHU’s (Centre Hospitalier Universitaire), or teaching 
hospitals726. The health care sector is important arena for the trade unions because 
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its pressure and strikes are immediately felt widely in society. However, due to 
internal disagreements related to diverse demands regarding the salaries between 
majority general doctors and minority of those specialized, led in 1992 to the 
establishment of the National Trade Union of the Specialist Practitioners in the Public Health 
Care (Syndicat National des Praticiens Spécialistes de la Santé Publique, SNPSSP)727. 
In many ways, the emergence of the autonomous trade unions had their roots in 
the previous social movements such as Amazigh cultural movement, students, 
doctors, human rights movement and so forth, who had already long time aspired 
from formation of independent professional associations728. As Myriam Aït-
Aoudia729 has shown, since 1988 their official claims, programs and documents have 
included surprisingly similar formulations and inferences that existed already during 
earlier years, even decades in some cases.  
During the beginning of 1990s, democratic claims and demands continued and 
there were important number of recorded strikes: 2290 in 1990 and 2023 in 1991730. 
For example, CNES went to the front paralyzing the universities in November 1991 
in spite of police violence directed to their peaceful action731. The contestation 
developed especially in the public sector: education, services and administration 
(teachers, hospital staff, transport workers and communications732. From the 
geographic point of view, most of the strikes took place in Kabyle (Bejaia and Tizi-
Ouzou), but the wilaya of Algiers had important amount of strikes and lockouts as 
well while Oran and Constantine stayed relatively calm733.  
Another important actor within the field of autonomous trade unionism in 
Algeria that ought to be analyzed is the Islamist movement, which is also a pluralist 
movement bringing together various personalities and groups, as I will show below. 
The Islamists had a longer tradition of being more concerned with social matters 
linked to religion, moral or politics in general while the issues related on labor were 
rather ignored734. After the 7th Congress of UGTA in March 1990, FIS also decided 
to create its own labor union called Islamic Trade Union of Work (Syndicat Islamique 
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du Travail, SIT). According to Hassane Zerrouky735, it was member of the board of 
FIS Ikhlef Cherati, surrounded by Saïd Makhloufi, Omar Eulmi, Bouras Slimane and 
Ahmed Ghitry, who announced the creation of SIT in 20 July 1990 in the Ferhani 
stadium of Bab el-Oued, Algiers. It aimed to displace UGTA in the workers zones 
in various cities such as Algiers, Oran, Annaba and Skikda. SIT, created within the 
structures of FIS, was composed of ten leagues implanted in the postal office (PTT), 
Sonelgaz, sector of chemical and petrochemical industries, administration of social 
and health affairs, Air Algérie ground staff, Islamic municipalities, public transports, 
tourism, education and the banks.  
Zerrouky736 analyzes how the SIT was organized differently from traditional trade 
unions. At the bottom was the so-called trade union family (ousra nakabia) that was 
led by sergeant (arif). Together these families formed leagues of Islamic Work to 
every branch or sector that were managed by the captain (naquib). Between the latter 
and the upper levels were commanders (muqadem) and at the top colonels (amid) 
who formed the national office. Colonels, such as Omar Eulmi and Ikhlef Cherati, 
were obliged to be members of the consultative assembly, governing body of the 
FIS. SIT explicitly announced that its aim was to support the creation of Islamic 
state governed along the Sharia law737. In February 1991, SIT held its first national 
conference among 140 members behind the closed doors. The meeting was presided 
by important figure in the FIS Hachemi Sahnouni738.   
Chikhi argues that the fundamentals of trade unionism and methods of action 
stressed by the SIT were constructed on religious basis, where class struggle or 
citizenship did not have a visible role to play and therefore Muslims should unionize 
within Islamic union739. SIT stressed the unity of the Muslims instead of social 
classes, fraternity (or brotherhood) instead of citizenship: worker and employee were 
brothers. From the beginning SIT formed antagonistic approach on UGTA. Its trade 
union action was clear example of politicization related to trade union performance 
and working life in general, while its patriotism was rather religious than nationalist 
oriented. Chikhi also argues that most of the actions conducted by the SIT were 
rather directed to oppose the activities of the UGTA than to support the 
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mobilization of the working class740. When UGTA organized extensive general strike 
in March 1991, SIT published statement:  
Algerian workers have been able to attend the funeral of the UGTA since 
independence, its treacherous fingerprints have been erased forever from the annals 
of history. By their gesture, the workers once again proved their attachment to the 
Islamic ideas, hence their mistrust of this dubious union.  They continued their 
normal activity and boycotted categorically and unequivocally this anarchic strike. […] 
Thank God, the appeal launched by the SIT received a very favorable response. This 
reflects the adherence of all workers to the foundations and ideals of the SIT, which 
in their eyes is the only legitimate representative and also the only guide to the 
establishment of an Islamic regime that should lead to their well-being.741. 
However, is it really possible to frame SIT as unpatriotic possessing only religious 
aims when SIT defined the national strike organized by the UGTA as “contrary to 
Islam” and as “communist maneuver”?742. In a way, their nationalist or patriotic aims 
may just have been politicized differently? According to their political goal, Islam 
was seen as salvation for Algerians and Algeria. SIT did not share traditional labor 
and worker ideology, but that did not prevent them to politicize trade unionism to 
their own ends, as all the other actors were doing as well.  
The Algerian military observed developments in the country with concern. FIS 
showed determination in its governed municipalities to prohibit alcohol, require 
women to wear the hijab, and to separate boys and girls in schools, therefore 
implemented concretely its political program743. Military Commander Khaled 
Nezzar, who had played significant role during October uprisings, was appointed as 
Minister of Defense744. The state tried to contain the power obtained by the FIS by 
doubling the number of constituencies that increased the power of rural areas where 
FIS did not enjoy vast support745. FIS called for general strike746. 
FIS organized a general and unlimited strike in May 1991, not just to close down 
factories but also to gather their supporters to the streets747. This was a major show 
of force taking place in the public space. According to members of SNAPAP, 
especially the older ones who were already active during the period, SIT managed to 
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become the major force in new pluralistic arena of trade unionism. As solid part of 
the Islamist movement, SIT was able to challenge UGTA, which transformed 
various oppositional secular elements of the associative movements to side with the 
state authorities748. The academic research aiming to problematize the years of 
instability (1988-1992) in Algeria, especially related to strikes organized by SIT in the 
context of development of pluralistic trade union scene, has in many ways been 
covered relatively superficially, with few exceptions.    
However, during the early period of emergence of autonomous trade unions SIT 
had major impact within the scene. Salim Mecheri, 51 years old, whom I interviewed 
in Oran in December 2014, recalled the beginning of the pluralist trade unionism 
and the role of the SIT: 
SM: In 1990 started the trade union pluralism. SNAPAP was the first trade union that 
was created. It was created 16th of September 1990 [officially 9.9.1990]. It was 
registered as the number 001. After SNAPAP came the SIT. Then, if I remember 
correctly, there was one trade union related to hydrocarbon [COSYFOP749]. 
Nevertheless, the essential was that there were two major trade unions present: 
SNAPAP and SIT. I was contacted by SIT and asked whether I was interested in 
joining in their union. I personally believed in the spirit of solidarity of trade unionism. 
I said, I am not against but I cannot affiliate with their trade union because I support 
the whole trade union movement. I am ready to support the whole trade union 
movement that is engaged to the protection of the workers’ rights, which is very 
important, and to defend the institution, because it is … how to call it … it is our 
bread (khobz). They said to me that: “we totally agree with you but we would hope 
you could join us…”. At the time, they had a policy where they identified persons 
that had certain credibility. What is essential is that SIT established itself in large scale. 
They called a strike. Why FIS wanted to organize a strike? If I remember well, it was 
because the power (pouvoir) wanted to reform the law regarding the electoral code. 
They invited the experts to elaborate one of the texts so that they could preserve their 
sustainability in the system. FIS was against this reform and called a strike and SIT 
responded to its call. Automatically we said to SIT that you are not autonomous 
because you responded to the FIS. They said no. SIT is the creation of the FIS but 
the law, the Algerian legislation prohibit the political party to create … because one 
the texts in the legislation … to create its own trade union organization. That is really 
one of the advantages of the Algerian legislation. I personally consider it as an 
advantage for the autonomous trade unions. It is not like the other Arab countries 
such As Morocco for example where political parties are authorized to create their 
own trade union organizations. […] In Algeria, we can take a look to SATEF. Before, 
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when SATEF was aligned to FFS it was very strong. When FFS exploded [meaning 
the weakening of FFS during the 2010s], SATEF disappeared750.  
While Mecheri stresses the roles of SNAPAP and SIT, the autonomous trade union 
scene was more heterogeneous. Mecheri brings up the politicization of trade unions, 
SIT with FIS and SATEF with FFS, and their problematic connection to political 
parties, stressing the importance of solidarity among the worker’s movement at large. 
Trade unions and workers should not be politicized and used as political tools for 
parties. However, Secretary General of SATEF, Mohamed Salem Sadali, argues that 
SATEF has always been independent actor from FFS: 
When FFS was a leftist oppositional movement, we carried out many struggles 
together. There was also PT [the Workers’ Party, Parti de travailleurs] before it 
changed. It is a party that was close to the workers so we had cooperation. However, 
there were never organic relations, never. It was impossible. We have a council of 
more one hundred persons who represent all the political tendencies. However, in 
1997, there was Secretary General of SATEF who was candidate in the list of FFS. 
Meanwhile there were many members in UGTA who had membership in RND and 
FLN and so forth. What is more, we were mainly labeled as trade union of the 
Kabylia, because in the beginning everything started from the Kabylia. Then we were 
attached to FFS. Then we were connected to external powers because we were part 
of international institutions related to education, human rights and so forth. However, 
in the streets it is impossible to be prolongement of one political party because it 
gathers all the different tendencies751.  
Wider strikes began on 25 May 1990. I asked Mecheri to describe the participation 
and atmosphere in those manifestations that took place in Oran:  
SM: You mean those that were organized by the SIT? I assisted in those that were 
held in Oran because of my curiosity. As far as I am trade unionist, I went out with 
them. There is nothing better than to see from the inside. I think that they marked 
something very important. They were able to do the marches. I can assure that the 
march surpassed ten thousand in Oran. After that, they had a strategy where they 
regrouped and occupied public space (lieu public) in every neighborhood, or by what 
we mean a small square, where they stayed until Isha-night prayer before they finally 
dispersed. However, in Algiers they did not disperse. In Algiers, they occupied Shahid 
Shuhada for 24hours752.  
 
750 Salim Mecheri. Interviewed in Oran December 2014.  
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The importance of occupying various public spaces meant important showing of 
force by the FIS. They were able to show that they have great number of supporters, 
which probably increased their popularity even more, as Mecheri continues: 
First, second, or third day after, the protest started to grow. Then they called workers 
in the SONATRACH to stop the gas exportation. It was the affair of Italy. When 
they responded to this strike … the workers of the Tamanrasset and the workers of 
the south in general … they were warranted by the army. It was Khaled Nezzar, who 
gave the instructions to evacuate participants from the public spaces with repression. 
They used even the real bullets. I remember, more than 500 wounded. There were 
50-100 dead [I have not been able to verify the numbers]. Especially in Algiers. They 
prohibited to conduct marches and strikes in other wilayas. They proceeded the 
arrests of Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj, those considered as responsible. They were 
put in prison. The young engineer called Hachani replaced them. He took the 
presidency. There were parliamentary elections. The state stopped the electoral 
process753.  
Mecheri clearly stresses the show of force of the SIT, often forgotten in the history 
of the development of autonomous trade unions. The presence in the public spaces, 
which I will take a closer look at in the next section, were also part of constructing 
an image of popularity, strength and power. SIT also wanted to effect the state’s own 
oil and gas company SONATRACH. This was strategically extremely important, 
because energy exports cover great majority of Algerian income. Today, the 
autonomous trade unions are almost totally absent from the economic sector. State 
authorities have managed to keep them away to prevent their abilities for economic 
pressure. When Mecheri highlights the problematics related to close link of political 
party to trade unionism, this reminds me of the Leninist approach (More in Chapter 
IV754), where a political party was seen on the contrary as vital tool for the workers’ 
movement. This recollection also depicts the uncertainty and complexity of the 
situation and how autonomous trade union activists observe organized action in the 
public spaces that may lead to their own possible acts in the future.  
The general strike never took place due to reluctance of the other trade unions to 
support FIS but turned out to transform into large series of demonstrations showing 
the strength of the Islamist movement. It also proved to the state authorities that 
FIS had the capacity to occupy public spaces in the capital755. SIT renounced that 
their aim was to bring down the government and called for better wages and working 
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condition756. According to Malaoui, the strength of the SIT within the economic 
sector sprang from the weakness of the UGTA: 
RM: Workers, especially those in municipal and wilaya administrative services, have 
invested heavily in SNAPAP. At the same time, so-called Islamist trade unions were 
allowed to operate but without being able to penetrate the sector. Without a past, the 
Islamist unions could not enter. But on the other hand, they managed to make an 
incursion in the economic enterprises since it is the UGTA - true empty shell - which 
had to assume the union supervision. Since the people at the central trade union had 
a bad press, it was easy for the Islamist militants to enter in droves. Continuing their 
infiltration into the economic sector, Islamists eventually decide to infiltrate 
SONATRACH. But what may have happened in this sector was hardly possible in 
the public service757. 
The capacity of the SIT to expand on the economic sector made it extremely 
challenging for the state authorities. If the strikes are organized only in the public 
sector, they cannot cause serious economic damage and do not have significant 
international impact regarding energy exportations.  
However, Chikhi does not share the view of the great impact of the SIT strike on 
the economic sector. He argues that SIT’s general strike had only a minor resonance 
among the workers and in the vast industrial centers, such as Arzew, Rouiba, El 
Hadjar, as well as in main harbors, which did not follow the strike758. Even the cities 
were FIS had presumably support experienced modest turnout: Tlemcen 8.5 percent 
and Blida 7.5 percent759. However, the sectors of administration, local communities 
and education involved higher rates of participation as well as some Southern regions 
such as El Oued and Hassi R’Mel that suffered from precarious life conditions760. 
What is more, the strike disclosed divisions among the types of supporters among 
UGTA and SIT: those who followed SIT were mostly excluded and precarious 
workers, while UGTA’s supporters were more included in the system of regular 
salaries, organized labor and benefits761.  
There are various interpretations regarding the success of SIT in general from the 
historical point of view. According to Andrea Liverani, SIT managed to acquire 
dominant position in an organized labor in a quite short period of time and severely 
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menaced the power position of the UGTA762. Especially during the first half of 1991, 
FIS was eager to show its power calling strikes and showing force and they benefited 
from the attempts of those, considering themselves as reform politicians, trying to 
show their distance from the FLN763. According to Malaoui, the Islamists were not 
able to gain an influence in the public sector, where longer tradition of trade 
unionism and presence was needed. However, SIT was able to gain for a short period 
of time an important position in the new pluralistic arena of trade unionism and had 
the force to occupy important public spaces, such as Place des Martyrs and Place du 
1er Mai in Algiers, as Mecheri also recounted.  
The government considered the demonstrations organized by the SIT in major 
public spaces as a threat to the stability of the country but wanted to avoid the 
repetition of the use of force during October uprisings764. Nevertheless, was the 
official approach unanimous regarding their management of crisis? It seems that 
there were different opinions how to maintain the stability and simultaneously 
continue democratization process. Prime Minister Mouloud Hamrouche argued that 
FIS should be allowed to continue the strike as long as it refrained from violence 
and tried convince through negotiation to halt the action765. Meanwhile, President 
Chadli was reluctant to ban the FIS766. Gradually various spokesmen within FIS 
started to refer to jihad and the overthrowing of the government. It resulted the so-
called “Nezzar Plan”, which meant replacement of Prime Minister Hamrouche by 
the Sid Ahmed Ghozali, the imposing of a state of emergency (for three months) 
and the arrests of FIS leaders of the Islamist party such as Abassi Madani and Ali 
Belhadj767.  
In order to break the spiral of radicalization and repressive measures by the 
government, the FIS nominated a moderate Abdelkader Hachani as their new 
president at the Batna Conference in August 1991768. When the democratic political 
process and constitutional reform led to a landslide victory of the FIS (Front du Salut 
Islamique) in the first round of parliamentary elections in December 1991, both the 
domestic and international actors were surprised769. FIS occupied nearly 188 seats 
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(out of a total of 430 seats) against FLN 15 and FFS 25, independent candidates took 
what was left770. The victory of FIS rang the alarm bell among the army and political 
elites and the Prime Minister Ghozali warned about the continuation of the electoral 
process, even though first supported the continuation of democratic transition771. 
Later in his published interview with Mohamed Chafik Mesbah, Ghozali explained 
his concern that the motivation of the voting Algerians were more driven by the 
hatred towards FLN than supporting the Islamist agenda: the majority of the votes 
were abstentions and zero ballots, in the end only 26 per cent voted FIS772.  
On 11 January in 1992, President Chadli announced his resignation and the 
dissolution of the parliament probably to sustain the stability of the country while 
the army decided to cancel the democratic transition773. This move has been 
considered by autonomous activists among some others as the coup d’état. These 
measures indicate that the situation was slipping from the control of state authorities 
and leading towards destabilization. Already immediately after the election in 
December there were many voices, such as the Secretary-General of the UGTA 
Abdelhak Benhamouda, who called army to halt the democratic transition and to 
stem the FIS despite the opposition from the ground root level of the union774. How 
does it reflect the official position within UGTA related to stability and 
democratization? For many autonomous trade union activists it is one prove that 
UGTA opposes plural trade union environment and even opposition to whole 
democratization process, UGTA was not the only civil society actor that wished the 
intervention from the army. 
How do the autonomous trade union activists, young and old, recall the 1988 
October uprisings? Approaching the collective memory and its social dimensions, 
requires studying those social conditions where the individual constructs his/her 
understanding of cognitive the social space structured by inter-individual relations775. 
Therefore, when searching after the collective memory of contemporary youth 
activists within autonomous trade unions, it means localized construction of 
collective memory of an event, because as Maurice Halbwachs (1877-1945), 
considered as founder of the collective memory studies, argued, individuals 
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“remember as a members of a group”776. Reminiscence is a product of human being, 
who is effected by social conditions that are structured by collective memories in this 
context. The October 1988 uprisings, are often dealt by the young activists more as 
an opening of the window to democracy than destabilization; a possibility that was 
confiscated by the power and ruined by the Islamists.  
While conducting an interview with photo elicitation, the picture of President 
Chadli Bendjedid instigated the remembrance of the October uprisings, whether 
personal memories or historical informative beliefs. This is what young activist Samir 
Baroud, 29 years old, had to say about the picture of President Chadli: 
SB: He became the President after the Boumedienne. When we see his picture, we 
think about the events of 1988. There were 500 deaths. When we see picture of Chadli 
Bendjedid, we think immediately the drop of oil prices and the opening of the 
democracy in Algeria in the context of October 1988777.  
There are different estimates of how many died during the October uprisings. Aït-
Aoudia778 has drawn attention to the official numbers using El-Moudjahid (21-22 
October 1988) as a source, where 159 were killed and 154 wounded. Then she raises 
another number, given by hospitals and various associations, that counted 
approximately 500 dead. Another activist and the spokesperson of the Pre-
Employment Committee Idriss Mekkideche, 33 years old, clearly saw the 1988 
uprisings and the democratization process as a positive experience that was 
nevertheless lost, or postponed:     
IM: October 1988 … he is part of those generals [showing picture of President 
Chadli]. Maybe it was due to national and international atmosphere what Algeria went 
through. However, he participated to this small opening [beginning of the 
democratization process]. In the end, it was adjourned. Still, it is somehow positive in 
the sense that the multitude of the trade unionism and party politics exist as well as 
civil society and the associations. We can say that during this epoch there were small 
opening, but after started enormous pressure that led to his resignation. However, it 
was unique experience in anyway. It was an experience, from which we were not able 
to profit immediately because it drove us towards the cycle of violence. However, we 
can always learn from the history and not repeat the same mistakes779.  
Against this background, the democratic opening was not taken away only by the 
power (pouvoir). Samir Baroud accuses the Islamists of wasting the possibility of 
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democratic sustainable development in Algeria, when picking the picture presenting 
two FIS leaders, Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj: 
SB: Two leaders of the FIS. They left negative mark in the history of Algeria. They 
gave nothing to the country. In 1988, we had opening of the democracy in this 
country but because of these two men, we went off the track. They drifted Algeria to 
the path of violence780. 
The younger generation do not refer to SIT as does the older generation. They were 
too young and mostly their personal memories are scattered and constructed from 
inter-personal experiences or historical documents. Mekkideche was a child when 
the 1988 uprisings took place. Therefore, he merely connect his clouded personal 
memories with narrations he has heard, read or studied afterwards:  
IM: Here we can see the leadership of the FIS, the party that was activated during 
opening of the democracy in Algeria, which enabled the creation of political parties 
and autonomous trade unions. There were also the SIT and a strike, but I do not 
remember very well … I was still very young. I remember few small thing, but not 
very well, what really happened. However, regardless of ideologies and such, what I 
remember is that in Algeria there is really a huge recession regarding the individual 
and collective freedoms. Because since 87-88 we expressed ourselves normally. We 
had a right to the public space. There were marches of hundreds of thousands of 
people. There were of course serious incidents during the strike as well. They opened 
fire towards people with real bullets. In the end, the power (pouvoir) used it to show 
like look what it brought now. Be careful! Today, there are no more manifestations 
or marches. That is the problem. Simultaneously there were those leaders, not the 
people, but those Islamist leaders who misused the space or atmosphere that existed. 
We moved too fast and that caused the problems. The violent verbal use led to violent 
physical use781.  
Instead of referring to destabilization these young activists rather constructed visions 
that are more related to the positive connotations regarding the events that due to 
some actors, generals and the Islamists, led to an impasse and contemporary complex 
situation.   
It is also pivotal to notice the generational variations between the experiences of 
the older generation of trade union activists, who experienced the October uprisings, 
and the younger generations who mainly reflect versatile trajectories formed by 
various discourses. An 58-year-old activist Mohamed Haimouni, currently working 
in the Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights (La Ligue algérienne pour la 
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défense des droits de l'homme, LADDH), was more linear regarding his views. 
About the picture of President Chadli, Haimouni said: 
MH: He was a colonel, who became a head of the state. He is a general like the rest 
of them. He is a dictator. He was known as big idler. He liked to fish to live and so 
on. He left his ministers to… Chadli wanted to compose with the Islamists, but the 
generals refused and threw him out782.  
Haimouni believes, that it was the army generals who sustained the power in Algeria, 
not the President. About the picture of General Khaled Nezzar, he said: 
MH: He was the Minister of Defense in 1988, when the army shot the demonstrators. 
There were, I don’t remember exactly, but around 1000 deaths. He is also the 
craftsman of the coup d’etat over Chadli. After he retired, and now he writes books783.  
Haimouni doubled the amount of those who died during the October uprisings, 
arguing that the death toll during the 1988 uprisings was as high as 1000. He argued 
that FIS and the whole Islamist movement was instrumentalized by the power 
(pouvoir) to halt the democratization process: 
MH: FIS is a product. Terrorisme (l’integrisme) is a product of Algerian power 
(pouvoir) during Chadli. Product of the United States and Saudi Arabia. It [FIS] was 
created to finish all the social demands and democratic aspirations. They created the 
monster called FIS with many other satellite parties that also were Islamists. Its only 
purpose was to block the democracy in Algeria. It happened just after the democratic 
opening in 1988 when there were also the creation of autonomous trade unions and 
political parties784. 
Many activists in autonomous trade unions come from leftist backgrounds, or can 
be considered as sympathizers of the social left. They criticize political Islam already 
from principle, while taking a more supportive stance towards SIT and its struggle 
for pluralism within the trade union movement. However, I also met activists, a 
minority, who were more sympathetic towards the Islamist movement or those who 
were religious and practiced Islam in their private lives, reflecting the larger social 
identities within the Algerian society.   
After the resignation of President Chadli, the army transferred temporarily 
legislative and executive powers to the High Security Council (Haut Conseil de Sécurité, 
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HCS)785 that established the High Council of the State (Haut Comité d’Etat, HCE)786, 
which received presidential powers to function as a provisional government and 
restore the stability787. Both the HCS and HCE received official support from the 
neighboring countries Tunisia, Libya and Egypt788. Mohamed Boudiaf, a former 
prominent figure in the Independence War (1954-1962) now exiled in Morocco, was 
invited as the new head of state only to be assassinated few months later, on 29 June, 
in Annaba by his bodyguard789. The assassination was immediately politicized by the 
authorities and HCE authorized the arrest of the FIS leader Hachani790. The state of 
emergency was imposed again and became effected in 9th of February in 1992. In 
March, the FIS was banned and in a few weeks about 10 000 alleged FIS members 
were arrested and removed to prison camps in the Sahara desert791. SIT, that was 
never formally authorized, functioned until 1993 preparing logistics for the armed 
struggle against the official authorities792. It became therefore officially a party of 
war. The cancellation of the elections, the exclusion of the Islamists and finally the 
assassination of the President Boudiaf led to a process that plunged Algeria into civil 
war793. Stability was lost. 
Against this narrative background, I trace and depict the socio-political context 
where autonomous trade union movement emerged. While the discourses in Algeria, 
related to stability and instability, can be tracked until the independence and ever 
since, the October uprisings mark significant reference point regarding the history 
of the autonomous trade unions. Similarly, as Aït-Aoudia has argued, William B. 
Quandts wrote in the mid-1990s, past and future narrations will shape the October 
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uprisings and its meaning, when discussing about democratization process that led 
to the civil war in Algeria:  
All Algerians who lived through the events of October 1988 have a theory of what 
happened. Where the precise truth lies is impossible to say, but the mass protests of 
October 1988 proved to be one of those turning points that define a country’s 
political trajectory for years to come. Those events become a reference point, a source 
of bitter debates by those who defend the actions of the protesters, and those who 
feel they were dupes being manipulated by occult forces within the regime. How to 
ensure this never happens again, or how to ensure that it happens peacefully next 
time, are the dividing lines between the partisans of order and the partisans of 
democratic politics. There is little middle ground794. 
It is also important to keep in mind, as David Reiff stresses, that it is common 
practice for nations to revise and rewrite history and their collective memories795. 
However, he also argues that it is not enough to acknowledge that social memory is 
a social construct because it does not tell anything about the moral of the 
remembrance nor what should be remembered or forget796. Rather the collective 
memory is often instrumentalized for national and political purposes and therefore 
the memory itself transforms into object of history797. Construction of collective 
history is a consequential social process, where selectiveness regarding its details, 
nuances and power structures reflect the settings, social conditions and boundaries, 
where it constructs. It is also a process that carries on interests of those participating 
in its build-up798.  
5.3 Contentious politics in the public space: the years of 
uncertainty 
Aïssa Kadri799 believes that the political transformations at the turn of 80s and 90s 
in Algeria opened significant socio-political development, where different 
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associations, independent trade unions, foundations and non-governmental 
organizations emerged. However, “the explosion” of associations, as Kadri 
describes, occurred mainly in urban centers (80%). Only 7% were established in rural 
areas while 13% in semi-urban areas. It is clear that social movements wanted to 
occupy and contest public spaces to be able to communicate with wider audiences, 
to generate pressure and to have an impact on decision makers who compose 
legislation that finally produce the public space. The civil war, nevertheless, slowed 
down, if not paralyzed the democratic process.  
The next ten years of violence caused the death of 100 000-200 000800 Algerians 
and started by targeting members and supporters of the FIS transforming the 
conflict into urban civil war during 1992-1994 between security forces and Islamist 
groups and finally into civil war during 1994-1998801. The first Islamist guerrilla 
movement that confronted the regime was the Armed Islamic movement (Mouvement 
Islamique Armé, MIA) led by Abdelkader Chebouti. MIA was supported by other 
guerrilla groups, formed by the former Algerian Afghan conflict (1979-1988) 
veterans802. The MIA mostly fled the Algiers region into rural areas aiming to form 
solid guerrilla bases meanwhile mobilizing among radicalized youth803. In 1993, a 
new organization, the Armed Islamic Group (Groupements Islamiques Armés, GIA) 
reorganized a loose network of guerrilla groups in the Algiers area and started attacks 
on civil servants, members of the government, and foreigners in the country804. The 
dissents between MIA and the GIA led to a formation of the the Islamic Salvation 
Army (Armée Islamique du Salut, AIS) with the help of MIA that represented as the 
official military wing of the FIS and was built within the remnants of the MIA and 
other independent groups805.   
In January 1994, the Minister of Defense Liamine Zéroual was appointed to head 
of the HCE. Simultaneously Algeria tasted the sweet and bitter bowl of international 
economic globalization in the forms of trade liberation and privatization, when 
Algeria agreed with International Monetary Foundation (IMF) debt-rescheduling 
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deal806  to settle its fiscal imbalance that was encumbering macroeconomic 
stability807. In May 1994, Algeria reached a deal with IMF on the economic structural 
adjustment program (SAP) which included 5 billion dollar debt from the Paris Club, 
that represent the world’s 19 wealthiest nations, and one billion stand-by loan from 
the IMF808. Next year IMF and Algeria renegotiated 1.8 billion dollar per year loan 
over the next three years and another 5 billion loan from the Paris Club while private 
creditors of the London Club granted an 3-billion dollar loan809.  
In return, it meant economic austerity measures and massive public sector 
downsizing, reductions on subsidies, and other governmental cutbacks810. According 
Frédéric Volpi811, state planning had already been incoherent in the past. Now it led 
to even further deterioration of suburban districts due to rapid urbanization: the 
disposition of roads and railway lines were merely in the wealthy privileged areas. 
Volpi and Isabelle Werenfels argue that the 1994 IMF deal exposed the public 
services to private “oligopoly” enterprises owned by military-bureaucratic apparatus 
at low price, which further deteriorated social conditions812. Austerity policies that 
included privatization of the state enterprises meant loss of 380 000 jobs in three 
years813. The dinar was devalued by 40 percent814. Military expenditure went up due 
to armed struggle, while oil prices fluctuated between 15-21 dollars per barrel during 
1992-1997815. While by 1995 Algeria had become Europe’s third largest natural gas 
producer, it was indebted to the tune of 25-billion of dollars, an astonishing foreign 
debt816. In November 1995, Zéroual was elected as the fourth President of Algeria 
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and clearly overpowered other candidates817. He won 61 percent of the vote in an 
election with 75 percent voter participation818. 
The civil war years, or décennie noir (black decade), created massive challenges to 
Algerian society as a whole. Algerians experienced an abrupt outbreak of political 
violence and economic hardship. It was very difficult for autonomous trade unions 
to develop their operations, action, and mobilization amidst the deteriorated security 
situation and the antecedence of governmental military operations. The autonomous 
trade unions had just emerged and lacked stable ground to establish their presence, 
as Malaoui explains: 
RM: SNAPAP had no time to assert itself on the ground among the newly emerging 
trade unions because of the worsening political situation the country has not yet 
recovered. In 1992, after the victory of FIS at the parliamentary elections, the UGTA, 
certain political parties and state institutions created the National Committee for the 
Saveguard of Algeria (CNSA). The state of emergency was established, the elections 
were canceled. This way the UGTA decided to stop the nascent trade union 
movement. The UGTA thus posed itself as a decision-maker in the institutions of the 
state at the very moment when it capsized. Subsequently, we entered a situation of 
lawlessness. The war sets in and it's total anarchy819.    
This interpretation of Malaoui shows an antagonistic position vis-à-vis UGTA 
accusing it of preventing the development of a pluralist trade union scene working 
in cooperation with state authorities. Meanwhile this contradicts with the collective 
memory of some of those active in UGTA.  They, on the contrary, stress the role of 
the UGTA behind the birth of the pluralist trade union movement and struggle 
against the Islamist take over820. It is important to note that UGTA really played an 
important role in the confrontation with the political Islamist movement. In the early 
1990s, UGTA was also struggling with the SIT (FIS) and payed heavy price, when 
in the civil war 800 of its managerial staff and activist were assassinated between 
1993-1997821. In addition, the Secretary-General of the UGTA, Abdelhak 
 
817 Quandt (1998, 72-73). 
818 In the first plural Presidential elections, Liamine Zéroual (National Rally for Democracy, RND) 
won 61% of the votes, Mahfoud Nahnah 25% (Hamas), Said Saadi 9% (Rally for Culture and 
Democracy, RCD) and Noureddine Boukrouh 4% (Algerian Renewal Party, PRA) (Quandt 1998, 73).  
819 Graïne (2010, 27).  
820 Le Soir d’Álgérie 17.1.2017. Dialogue social: l’UGTA et les syndicats autonomes autour de la même 
table. Abder   Bettache. 
821 Zerrouky (2002, 103). 
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Benhamouda, was assassinated in January 1997822. Current Secretary-General 
Abdelmadjid Sidi-Saïd was elected as his successor.    
However, the period of civil war in Algeria was also extremely difficult time for 
the young independent trade union movement, what the well-known activist 
Kaddour Chouicha compared to “crossing the desert” regarding the maintaining the 
activities of the CNES during 1993-1996823. President Malaoui of SNAPAP recalls 
widespread rumors, manipulation and conspiracy that polluted the air. In addition, 
he stresses the active role of autonomous trade unions in the fight against the 
Islamist movement as well: 
However, the SNAPAP activists have not given up even if the authorities are giving 
them hard times. The climate is riddled with rumors, it was said that the SNAPAP is 
against the state at the very moment when it was engaged in a fierce fight to reduce 
the power of FIS. In a context marked by conspiracy and suspicion, the repression is 
soon coming down on the SNAPAP and other unions likes of CNES and SATEF. 
Unions with a strong backbone must resist, that is, fight for their survival. This 
pushed them to defend priorities that are neither those of the workers nor those of 
the law of democracy. In the end, the priorities of the war prevailed. Despite the 
strong pressure they had to face when keeping up the flame of protest824. 
Malaoui highlights SNAPAP, CNES and SATEF as important autonomous unions 
that were struggling against Islamist movement and the austerity measures imposed 
by international institutions. Regardless of the severe living conditions due to 
atrocities and austerity measures, it was more than difficult for the autonomous trade 
unions to organize strikes and manifestations in the public space, influence on public 
opinion and mobilize Algerians. Violence combined with economic distress and 
various limitations to press, even the killing of journalists, put the autonomous trade 
unions on winter wool825.  
The autonomous trade unions were not entirely silent during the civil war, 
although the state of emergency was declared in February 1992. Strikes still existed 
but less in the field of public administration, education, health, and transport while 
fields of manufacturing and construction experienced more strikes and lockouts. 
Since the interruption of the electoral process, the leadership of the CNES took 
shortly more subservient position towards state authorities and in March 1994, this 
trend was confirmed officially when its secretary general was designated a member 
 
822 Quandt (1998, 75). 
823 Chouicha (2008, 292). 
824 Graïne (2010, 27-28). 
825 Chouicha (2008, 288). 
 175 
of the National Transitional Council (Le Conseil national de transition, NTC) that 
functioned as the quasi-parliament until its dissolve in 1997826. The secretary general 
was forced to live in isolation from the union, when in 1996 its root level organized 
continuous strike that lasted three months (15.10.1995-15.1.1996). This famous 
strike gave a possibility to reconstruct a more oppositional identity within the 
CNES827.  
 
Table 1. Table 1. Strikes in Algeria in various sectors 1993-2000828. 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Strikes  537 419 432 441 292 195 173 187 
Manufacturing 63 59 68 93 64 37 45 50 
Construction 253 217 244 253 145 51 52 56 
Transport 29 30 22 10 5 7 6 10 
Public 
administration 
3 12 9 9 8 2 6 7 
Education 52 21 17 18 27 36 16 30 
Healthcare and 
social work 
18 8 8 6 10 4 3 6 
SATEF was able to continue its struggle during the whole 1990s and kept the social 
debate on regardless of persecutions while in 1994, their headquarter was set in 
fire829. SATEF took actively part with CNES and SNAPAP in creation of the 
 
826 Graïne (2010, 170); Werenfels (2007, 45 and 87). 
827 Graïne (2010, 171).  
828 http://laborsta.ilo.org/STP/guest (Retrieved 13.2.2013). 
829 Graïne (2010, 176). 
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Autonomous Trade Union Confederation (Confédération des Syndicats Autonomes, 
CSA), which nevertheless never managed to receive the official authorization830. 
SNAPAP pushed administrative reform of the public admin that had suffered 
from the austerity policies to transform it for the service of the citizens and opposed 
the NTC that obtained power to impact on the new communal code that was drafted 
in the spirit of austerity policies831. SNAPAP worked for the sensitizing the base to 
enrich the status of trade unionism and to install the regional offices and national 
coordination sectors, as the then National Secretary M. Ammar stated in an 
interview832: 
Our first objective is to raise awareness of the union's principles and positions, as well 
as its orientations and working methods regarding the exercise of the right to 
organize, and the orientation of the relations with the employers while keeping 
highlighting the necessary defense of the moral and material interests of civil servants 
and workers833. 
Due to obstacles, such as the civil war and state of emergency, it was challenging to 
organize rallies or demonstrations in the public space, though austerity policies 
offered possibilities for mobilization in the context of increased dissatisfaction 
among the workers in the public sector.  
Ratiba Hadj-Moussa834 argued at the beginning of 1990s, that three principal 
challengers competed about controlling the public space in Algeria at the time. First 
was of course the state, which pursued a quasi-monopoly over radio and television 
and was challenged by the independent press835. The second contender, according 
to Hadj-Moussa, was the “media-savvy” Islamist groups who had an access to 
significant resources of communication through newspapers, magazines and other 
technologies of audio-cassette tapes and Friday prayers. The third force was formed 
by the satellite television, which was introduced to Algeria in the mid-1980s. Before 
 
830 La Tribune 7.10.1995. Le CNES-USTO et le SNAPAP rejoignent la CSA: La Confédération des 
syndicats autonomes élargit sa base. A.K. (A.K. indicates the first letters of the forename and surname 
of journalist who wrote the article). 
831 El Acil 4.1.1995. Pour une réforme de l’administration : Réunion du conseil national de la SNAPAP. 
Zoheir B. 
832 Ouest Tribune 27.3.1995. Sensibiliser la base… Conseil régional du SNAPAP. Ounezar Med ; El Acil 
4.1.1995. Pour une réforme de l’administration : Réunion du conseil national de la SNAPAP. Zoheir 
B. 
833 Ouest Tribune 27.3.1995. Sensibiliser la base… Conseil régional du SNAPAP. Ounezar Med. 
834 Hadj-Moussa, Ratiba (2003, 453) New Media, Community and Politics in Algeria. Media Culture 
Society 2003, Vol. 25: SAGE Publications, pp. 451-468.  
835 Even though the state owned the main printing house, La Société d’impression d’Alger, that maintained 
almost a monopoly on the import of paper (Hadj-Moussa 2003, 453). 
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Algerians had only access to the national broadcaster ENTV, which was referred as 
l’Unique. Satellite television was in the beginning an urban experience and was 
available for the ruling class (including the comfortable middle class). Gradually it 
reached lower classes around the country. The spread of the internet, especially since 
the 2000s in Algeria, had a major impact on public space as well.  
During the civil war in the 1990s the contestation and mobilization relocated 
from the streets to indoor spaces and workplaces. For example, one of the most 
visible struggles took place during the 90s in CHU Oran, where SNAPAP, or its 
section called Ahmed Zabana, made number of protests and strikes to claim socio-
professional reforms836. Sometimes protests and hunger strikes continued for several 
days. 
At the time, SNAPAP was still considered by many as to be close to power 
(pouvoir), even though in its ranks there existed more radical sections. In general, it 
was CNES that represented as the most radical and visible oppositional union that 
was able to organize large protests regardless of the atrocities during the civil war. 
Kaddour Chouicha recalled how the government tried to use the civil war as an 
excuse to blackmail CNES to halt its activities. He also explained in our interview 
how 1996 strikes enabled CNES to get rid of the leadership, considered too close 
with state authorities, with the help of grass-root activists and overall sensitization:  
KC: As if, others should not do anything? No, we told “that it is your problem. You 
created it. Try to handle it”.  
KM: What was SNAPAP doing at the time? 
KC: It was still derailed. They had not decided yet about their strategy because it was 
full of the people who each pulled it into his own direction. We [CNES] had been 
from the beginning introduced people by the authorities and they were able to calm 
us in 1993-1994. We managed to maintain our aims, until we were able to launch 
massive national strike in 1996. It enabled the cleaning of the CNES and the 
formation of the new direction that was more radical. Since 1996, we conducted 
activism in the radical way and we were an example for many socio-professional 
categories in Algeria, especially among the officials. 1996 was important because there 
was the first massive strike. It continued more than three months and it started from 
here [Chouicha points himself], because I launched it. Immediately the military 
security arrested me, and my 3- year-old son. However, the strike in 1998 was also 
 
836 Ouest Tribune 29.10.1996. Hopital d’Oran: Le SNAPAP appelle à un rassemblement aujourd’hui; 
Ouest Tribune 20.4.1997. CHUO: Section syndicale gelée depuis 4 mois; Le Quotidien d’Oran 20.11.1997. 
À trois jours de grève. E. Khadidja; Ouest Tribune 2.12.1997. Grève du CHUO: Reprise du travail mais 
… ! Dey B.  
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important. It continued more than four months. It obliged the intervention of the 
National Commission of Arbitration837. 
Through its activities CNES was able to gain ground, use public space as contested 
space838. Seeing public space as a space of representation839, and through its 
contestation, CNES saw a possibility to change politics through mobilizations and 
political activism. If one assumes that the society can be roughly split into private 
and public space, what is then public space in Algeria? According to Salim Mecheri:  
In Algeria, the public space is defined as the street (la rue). That is the public space. 
The gardens also. However, the squares like Martyr’s Square, are not defined as the 
public space. The public spaces must be defined. Those are the streets. The squares 
are not considered as the public space like those places, where you cannot stop the 
car. Hospitals and fire stations are considered as the public space840.  
Surprisingly, Mecheri do not consider squares as public space. However, he as well 
as many others that I interviewed often referred “the street” as the public space in 
Algeria. “The street” in general and “the Arab street” in particular has long tradition 
in encapsulating many negative, even orientalist, connotations such as volatility and 
irrationality and is often used as metaphor when referring to (Arab) public 
opinion841. According to Mourad Moulai-Hadj, we cannot imagine public space 
without its contribution in the formation of public opinion, which is considered side 
by side with other institutions, such as schools, factories, universities and mass 
media, as well as other institutions of socialization or re-socialization in different 
social categories842.  
Asef Bayat sees the street as a central space in urban settings for contestation and 
political struggle843. He has initiated the understanding of the concept “Street 
Politics” to analyze how urban public space is used as space to communicate the 
 
837 Kaddour Chouicha. Interviewed in Oran in January 2015. 
838 More about definition of contested space by Vairel in chapter III: Vairel, Frédéric (2011, 27) 
“Protesting in Authoritarian Situations”, in Beinin, Joel and Vairel, Frédéric (Eds.) Social Movements, 
Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
839 Mitchell, Don (2003, 34) The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space. New York – 
London: The Guilford Press.  
840 Salim Mecheri. Interviewed in Oran in December 2014. 
841 Regier, Terry and Khalidi, Muhammad Ali (2009, 12) The Arab Street: Tracking a Political Metaphor. 
Middle East Journal Volume 63, NO. 1, Winter 2009, pp. 11-29. 
842 Moulai-Hadj, Mourad (2011, 66) Espace public et participation politique en Afrique: le cas de 
l’Algérie. Afrique et développement, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, 2011, pp. 63-73.  
843 Bayat, Asef (2013, 12) Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East.  
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discontent and to mobilize citizens for political action844. Therefore, as Don Mitchell 
suggests, an uncontrolled public space can instigate fear as well845. Contested public 
space as site of resistance for oppositional groups and movements generate fear or 
concern by those who are in power. 
In Algeria, during the 1988 October uprisings, demonstrators by multiple 
movements occupied public spaces in numbers generating popular unrest and 
leading to crumbling of the political order and instability. The political chaos and 
civil war led to setting of state of emergency, which denied expression of opinion or 
communication regarding the discontent in the public spaces invoking to security 
concerns and fears for further instability. This leads me to understand two 
competing discourses that shape partial fixation of meaning, nodal point or empty 
signifiers, to contemplate the different meanings that are attached by Algerian 
authorities and autonomous trade union activists, antagonistic forces, in regard of 
stability-instability nexus. Competing discourses form within the field of discursivity 
“to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a center”, as Laclau and Mouffe 
theorized846. Through hegemonic processes that involve politicization through 
articulation define dominant discourses.   
It is clear that stability-instability nexus are constructed as opposite things for 
state authorities and autonomous trade union activists. My aim is not to judge or 
take a sides but rather discover the opposite interpretations related to specific 
contexts to track the construction of the discourses related in the context of 
production of empty signifiers, that temporarily intercept the flow of various 
meanings and differences847. I will further show in the coming chapters, how this 
stability-instability nexus plays role even nowadays through construction of 
collective trajectories of 1988 October uprisings and civil war that followed. 
For the authorities, the stability is the argument that is regularly used to construct 
their political position, which enable critical approach on oppositional social 
movements such as autonomous trade unions. Both sides use available media and 
other communicative tools to strengthen their interpretation of social processes to 
justify their own activity through hegemonic struggles. Because autonomous trade 
unions criticize governmental conduct of policies, the state authorities confront 
 
844 Bayat (2013, 12). 
845 Mitchell (2003, 13). 
846 Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal (2001, 112) [1985] Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics. Verso: London and New York. 
847 Howarth, David R. (2013, 193) Poststructuralism and After: Structure, Subjectivity and Power. Houndmills: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
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these oppositional groups as their political opponents aiming to undermine their 
activities. Simplifying, one could say that the state authorities use the 1988 October 
uprisings, as an event and collective memory, to argue that autonomous trade unions 
present a danger of instability.   
On the other hand, the autonomous trade union activists view the stability-
instability nexus from the opposite perspective: with the repressive conduct of 
politics and obstruction of sustainable democratization, the government is drifting 
the country towards destabilization and chaos, as young, about 20 years old, activist 
of the SNAPAP Mustapha Larbi argues:  
In Algeria, the pacific politics do not exist. The Algerians are now in madness. 
Therefore, we trade unionist or human rights defenders are afraid. We ask from this 
power (pouvoir) to give rights for the people, because if these people boil over, it will 
burn everything. We do not want to have similar revolution what happened in Tunisia, 
Egypt, Syria or Libya. Because, they did already a revolution, but nothing came out 
of it. The same problems and questions still exists: who governs?848  
Young activist Larbi is also concerned about the instability, especially in the context 
of the 2011 uprisings that shook the North Africa and the Middle East. However, 
he accuses the governmental policies that are creating anger and despair among the 
population, which will sooner or later explode and lead to similar disastrous situation 
that Syria and Libya, or especially Algeria during the 1990s, experience. This is of 
course nothing new. Already in 2003, Malaoui stated: 
Today, if we do not try to find seriously appropriate solutions to the problems that 
arise on the political scene, we are heading towards disaster.849.  
The major concern of gathering the masses to streets points to public space. As 
Bayat argues, “[A]ny active or participative use infuriates officials, who see 
themselves as the sole authority to establish and control public order”850. 
Simultaneously, the autonomous trade unions use the public space to generate 
collective political pressure because that is the only space they have to achieve 
visibility, as Samir Baroud states: 
Because the media is closed, dialogue is closed there is only the streets left to invest 
so that people can hear our demands851.  
 
848 Mustapha Larbi (name changed). Interviewed in the bus heading from Algiers to Tunis World Social 
Forum in March 2013. 
849 El Watan 8.9.2003. SNAPAP: « La bibartite est un échec ». Nabila Amir. 
850 Bayat (2013, 12). 
851 Samir Baroud (name changed). Interviewed in Algiers in December 2014. 
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Factors that mobilize Algerians to political participation in the autonomous trade 
unions generates importantly from the vague daily social challenges they face in their 
everyday life: work and working conditions, salaries, youth unemployment, 
marginalization and lack of prospects, corruption and housing. Movements stress 
the importance to maintain the right for peaceful demonstrations to express social 
discontent. Mohamed Haimouni also stress the importance to come out in pacific 
way from offices to the streets, so that Algerians can see and hear them: 
We must get out our demands. The power (pouvoir) wants that we close ourselves 
inside the halls and our offices so that our demands would not get out to the streets. 
We have always privileged the street but in a peaceful and organized way to sensitize 
the authorities and the people so that they can see that there exist people who claim 
for different issues such as work, salaries or difficulties with housing. In any case, 
even without us, the Algerians always get out for any cause or problem. They go out. 
If you follow the press, you will see that there does not exist one day when our citizens 
do not go to the streets demanding better housing, sanitations or living conditions. 
The street is the public space. There is not any other definitions for it852.  
Haimouni explained that public space is a necessity for activism and resistance to 
raise their experienced social grievances such as those related to work, salaries and 
housing. He also stressed autonomous trade union action as nonviolent. Regarding 
the connection between the action conducted by the autonomous trade union 
activists and sustainable democracy building, Mitchell combines civic rights directly 
to public space. He argues that one must struggle to gain space to achieve just laws 
that guarantee aspired rights and freedoms: 
Social action is structured through law, and social action creates abstract or 
differentiated spaces in proportion to the power possessed by each side in a struggle. 
So social action – including oppositional work by social movements – always operates 
simultaneously to influence the production of law and the production of space. […] 
Rights themselves, therefore, are part of the process of producing space853. 
The streets can be used as “the ultimate arena to communicate discontent”854. Bayat 
argues that the social conflict is most apparent in the streets855. They can also be 
 
852 Mohamed Haimouni (name changed). Interviewed in Oran in December 2014. 
853 Mitchell (2003, 29). 
854 Bayat (2013, 12). 
855 Bayat (2013, 52). 
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considered, as Jürgen Habermas856 depicted public sphere, “warning system with 
sensors” meaning that streets are sensitive to social problems within society. 
Therefore, public space is an important component of development of civil society, 
which can be considered through politicization as site of resistance, a theatre of 
confrontation of the ideas, discussions and negotiations between different social 
strata that is imminent in the heterogeneous public space.  
Meanwhile, trade union and human rights activist Kaddour Chouicha denounced 
the existence of the whole concept of the public space in the country, at least in its 
form of political space: 
Public space [in Algeria] is not a public space. It is governmental space, in reality. 
Nothing is permitted in the public space if you do not have accordance from the 
authorities. We do not have real notion of public space, because normally the society 
have right to use this space. Of course, according to the conditions that are defined 
by the space itself. We have totalitarian space that does not left us even margin of it 
to exercise857.  
Chouicha referred to the ban on organizing demonstrations in the capital Algiers and 
restrictions protester face elsewhere as well. However, Algeria is not the only country 
in the world where demonstrations are restricted, as Occupy Wall Street in United 
States and protests of the so-called Yellow Vests in France have shown.  
Autonomous trade unions emerged in the first place due to various socio-
economic challenges that workers faced in their daily lives. Autonomous unions aim 
social change. They use public space to spread their demands and increase future 
mobilizations. During the civil war, the public space was controlled with the state of 
emergency that blocked the manifest actions. Michel Foucault famously wrote: 
“Where there is power, there is resistance”858. From the 1980s until today, the 
autonomous trade unions struggle for this space to get attention and because they 
want to show that public space belongs to the citizens, not only to the power 
(pouvoir), Hamid Derradji, 26 years old activist of SNAPAP, also argued 
pessimistically:  
In reality, the public space does not exist in Algeria. Everything is squatted by the 
power (pouvoir). If you speak politics in the café, your risk being arrested. In the bar 
as well. Therefore, when you go out to the street with demands in the sign, you risk a 
 
856 Habermas, Jürgen (2012 [1996], 469-470) Civil Society and the Political Public Sphere, in Calhoun, 
Craig, Gerteis, Joseph, Moody, James, Pfaff, Steven and Virk, Indermohan (Eds.) Comtemporary 
Sociological Theory. United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 469-489. 
857 Kaddour Chouicha. Interviewed in Oran in January 2015. 
858 Foucault, Michel [1976] (1990, 95) History of sexuality. Volume 1: Introduction. New York: Vintage. 
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lot. Unfortunately, they have managed to depoliticize our society. This means that to 
speak politics in Algeria has become a taboo or something very sensitive. The people 
do not get mixed up, they disengage from everything. People have lost the solidarity. 
People are afraid to engage into dynamics of demands and claims, because our power 
(pouvoir) is known. How many of our activists are in prison? How many of our 
workers has been fired? How many students have been excluded. Therefore, they 
have really invested on the ground so that they stay in power. People are left in 
mayhem to die like a flies. Of course, today through social media we can see certain 
information and hear how certain decision makers own the villas in foreign countries, 
in France or elsewhere. They have bank accounts in Switzerland859.  
This quote from Derradji clearly contain exaggeration, politics is common subject of 
discussion in the cafés in Algeria. However, his argument on de-politicization is 
interesting. Various surveys860 indicate that political passivity, in the sense of 
manifest political engagement, is widespread in the country especially among the 
youth, while politicization of the youth can be considered more constitutive within 
environments of football stadiums and various genders of music. Therefore, 
participation within sectorial politics such as voting or taking part in party politics 
may not illustrate the whole picture, but indicate rather the process of politicization 
itself? Asef Bayat argued in the context of the 2011 uprisings:  
“[T]he discontent subaltern groups – the poor, the youths, women, and the politically 
marginalized – do not sit around passively obeying the diktats of their police states, 
nor did they tie their luck to the verdict of destiny. Rather, they were always engaged, 
albeit in mostly dispersed and disparate struggles in the immediate domains of their 
everyday life – in the neighborhoods, places of work, street corners, courthouses, 
communities, and in the private realms of taste, personal freedom, and preserving 
dignity”861. 
Similarly, Daho Djerbal described in an interview how multiple non-sectorial 
political mobilizations take place in public space in Algeria: 
One occupies the street, sets up barricades, stops traffic. Sometimes these contests 
point to a social struggle, but sometimes they are for more general demands—such 
as the demand for housing. The young generation who are coming of age want 
housing, employment, a legitimate future. Since the unions, political parties, and 
 
859 Hamid Derradji (name changed). Interviewed in Oran December 2014.  
860 Moulai-Hadj (2011); Robbins, Michael (2014) Skipping the Arab Spring? The Arab Barometer surveys a 
Changing Algeria. April 2014; SAHWA National Case Study (Algeria) (2016) Centre de Recherche en 
Economie Appliquée pour le Développement (CREAD). Alger: Algeria; Thomas, Kathrin (2018) Civic 
Engagement in the Middle East and North Africa. Arab Barometer, October 2018. 
861 Bayat, Asef (2013, xi) Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East. Cairo: AUC Press. 
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parliament no longer play their role, protests and riots have become the most 
common mode of negotiation between various groups and the state. 862
Regarding the fieldwork, Derradji was interesting individual to interview because 
social movements are often sites that attract individuals who lean on the so-called 
secret histories that are typical in the environment of political repression. However, 
these embellished metaphors, such as “People are left in mayhem to die like flies” 
did not represent the majority view of those who I was in contact with. On the 
contrary, they had in many ways quite a realistic understanding of society and how 
various actors, such as security guards, acted during protests. 
Bayat stresses that streets reflect the power relationships: “streets are also the 
public places where the state has the most evident presence, which is expressed in 
police patrol, traffic regulations, and spatial divisions – in short, in public order”863. 
Samir Baroud described how, according to him, the authorities use oversized police 
force to prevent demonstrations in Algiers: 
[…] as in 27th of February [2013] in front of the Ministry of Labor, imagine more 
than 10 000 police men surrounding the ministry preventing independent trade 
unionist of claiming the worker’s rights. That is a real example. There are videos in 
Facebook where you can see them. There were more than 10 000 police men 
surrounding the ministry and that is contradiction regarding the Algerian constitution 
and its article 57 that provides right to unionize and claim the rights864. 
When Baroud is saying that there were 10 000 police men, I understand him meaning 
a lot of police men, not exactly 10 000. However, young SNAPAP activist Madjid 
Rezag from Mostaganem said that in other cities than the capital it is possible to 
organize action in the public space: 
In our wilaya [Mostaganem] we can conduct actions such as sit-ins, but in the capital 
it is very difficult. They say that the capital is always under the state of emergency, so 
they can commit the repression, corruption, the police… it is serious. Last sit-in 17th 
of March in front of the Grande poste they aggressed six members of the national 
bureau (office) … they entered inside the Mustapha Pacha hospital where they 
arrested 75 members and moved them to the police station. We made an 
investigation, they were released six a clock in the night. I was injured. One police 
aggressed me when I entered Mustapaha Pacha. I took certification of ten days. I 
 
862 Davis, Muriam Haleh (2012) Knowledge and Power in Algeria: An interview with Daho Djerbal 
on the Twentieth Anniversary of NAQD. Jadaliyya: https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/25201  
863 Bayat (2013, 52). 
864 Samir Baroud (name changed). Interviewed in the bus heading to World Social Forum in Tunis in 
2013.  
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informed other medias such as El Magharibia, I did some broadcasts. My other 
friends were also aggressed865. 
The descriptions of police violence that activists face during their protests is 
common and they are publicised in various human rights reports866. State authorities 
deny acts of violence. It seems that there is not a lot of space left to protest. Still 
Derradji argued that protesting in the streets is the only way to draw attention. All 
the institutional channels are closed:  
If you try to have an effect by writing, they do not answer. When you denounce them 
in administration, they do not take it into account. Therefore, the only thing that is 
left is the street. In the street, you are able to gain attention. You can also reach the 
journalists. Those journalists who work with their hearts and rapport the message as 
it is. In our country, they manipulate the media as well. The TV channels are there 
only to protect the Presidential project. They censure or won’t tell the message the 
people are sending in the streets867.  
In Algeria, one can find vast variety of newspapers and growing number of electric 
media and blogs that cover the action conducted by the autonomous trade unions 
and transmit their message. The largest widely spread newspapers that often 
broadcast critically towards the government are El Watan and Liberte (in French) 
and El Khabar and Echorouk (in Arabic). Today social media and internet news sites 
give more space to oppositional civil society actors to convey their message. These 
virtual spaces offer the possibility for critical social movements and their activists, 
especially the youth, to communicate with each other without interference or other 
institutional constrains868. This is important for those movements and associations 
that are most contentious, and whose access to social space in concrete public sites 
is restricted869.  
As Habermas870 articulates, the diffusion of information through media is not the 
only important factor in the public processes of communication. However, Algerian 
society is not different from any other society, where the media has the power to 
 
865 Madjid Rezag (name changed). Interviewed in the bus heading from Algiers to World Social Forum 
in Tunis in 2013.  
866 International NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, EuroMed Rights and Amnesty International. 
867 Hamid Derradji. Interviewed in Oran in January 2015. 
868 Herrera, Linda and Sakr, Rehab (2014, 2) Introduction: Wired and Revolutionary in the Middle 
East and North Africa, in Linda Herrera and Rehab Sakr (Eds.) Wired Citizenship: Youth Learning and 
Activism in the Middle East. New York and London: Routledge. pp. 1-16. 
869 Taib, Essaid (2014, 382) Associations et société civile en Algérie. Alger: Office des publications 
universitaires.  
870 Habermas (2012, 471). 
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impact on culture of discussion and exchange of ideas. In Algeria, citizens are very 
critical towards different media outlets while simultaneously they have plenty of 
political perspectives available in heterogeneous, wide-ranging and versatile news 
landscape. Therefore, it is often common to see Algerians consuming those media 
outlets that are supporting their worldview and understanding of the political 
development, which may not make easier for different opposite political actors to 
exchange ideas and to understand opposite perspectives and opinions.   
One of the aims of the autonomous trade unions is to gain visibility: every protest 
or demonstration can have an effect on future mobilizations. They want to find new 
ways to impact on public opinion  to show to other Algerians that they should not 
be afraid to join them to express their potential discontent towards state authorities 
and to participate the construction of more effective and coherent social movement 
that have capacity to struggle for workers’ and citizenship rights. Meantime, 
authorities control these public actions to maintain social order in general and 
stability of the country in particular, as Idriss Mekideche explained: 
In Algeria, the Algerians need to reappropriate the public space. Because it is closed. 
[…] We have conducted maybe 50 different actions or more especially since 2011. 
We organized them in Algiers and elsewhere. Every time we were repressed and 
arrested. Maybe there were few occasions in some places, where they left us 
untroubled for a while, when they saw that we were only 20 to 50 participants. In 
general, they stop us quickly and then question us. Even when they leave us 
untroubled, they make some arrests further away  to prevent some demonstrators to 
participate. That is for sure. So regarding the public space, the Algerians are prevented 
to express themselves in the streets and in the public space871. 
Stability, as a floating signifier, seems to be part of ongoing struggle between 
antagonistic discourse construction of state authorities and autonomous trade union 
activists. Joel Beinin and Frédéric Vairel872 highlight the importance of investigating 
“what people do when they protest and contest”. Beinin and Vairel urge the study 
various repertoires of collective action, especially in authoritarian contexts when the 
contention is never self-evident, to approach and explain internal structures, 
functioning and behavior of protest movements. For example, autonomous trade 
unions continue to organize public sit-ins and demonstrations aiming to 
reappropriate the public space, as Kaddour Chouicha states: 
Therefore, this is new mode of contestation that demand that public space must be 
given back for the public and permitted for the use of the people so that they can 
 
871 Idriss Mekkideche. Interviewed in Algiers in December 2014 
872 Beinin and Vairel (2011, 13-15). 
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create their demands according to their will, ambition and claims. It is new form of 
contestation that refuses this one (showing picture of Bouteflika)873. 
As Beinin and Vairel stress, the repertoire of methods also comprises “symbols, 
stories, rituals, and world-views, which may [be used] in varying configurations to 
solve different kind of problems”874, which open access to process diverse agencies 
through identities and positions. As previous quote from Chouicha demonstrates, 
he wants that the public space is returned for the use of ordinary Algerian people, to 
whom he seems to identify himself, so that they can voice their needs and demands.  
Mostefa Boutefnouchet875 writes about the process of transition and 
democratization of public life and public opinion in Algeria among the ruling 
authorities and oppositional forces in the 1990s. He argues that the majority of 
Algerians rejected political violence, aspired for peace, wished to pacify the struggle 
between different political groups and hoped to return back to their normal lives 
without curfew, attacks, sabotage or roadblocks. In the general context, 
Boutefnouchet underlined three main characteristics related to public opinion in 
Algeria during the civil war: 
1) The distrust regarding democratic experience that brought only misery. 
2) The low interest regarding political dialogue between competing political forces 
so that strong mutual interest could be found for common political interest.  
3) Expectant attitude regarding the short-term political orientation of the country.  
Social change, which I link to sustainable democracy building, suffered a major 
setback in Algeria due to the civil war, which instigated violence and restrictions on 
already achieved political rights guaranteed in the constitutional reform in 1989. Due 
to atrocities and economic challenges, politically active Algerians became reticent 
and sceptical. According to Boutefnouchet, they found themselves in the middle of 
confused political scene not knowing how to emerge from the conflict876. This 
entanglement can be viewed as one important factor that has transformed into low 
political participation in national electoral processes and participation in the street 
activities within social movements.  
 
873 Kaddour Chouicha. Interviewed in Oran in January 2015. 
874 Beinin and Vairel (2011, 14). 
875 Boutefnouchet, Mostefa (2004, 94) La Société Algérienne en Transition. Alger: Office des Publication 
Universitaires.  
876 Boutefnouchet (2004, 94-95). 
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5.4 Members and political participation: mobilization and 
collective action     
I will now analyze the various backgrounds of autonomous trade union activists and 
the environment in which they started to engage in autonomous trade unionism or 
in other social movements, such as student groups or human rights associations. I 
am interested in the factors behind and the moments that transform ordinary 
individuals to activists through acts of citizenship. Autonomous trade unions recruit 
members from various backgrounds: teachers, the unemployed, women, men, old, 
young, leftist, communist, anarchist, Islamist, secular, rural and urban citizen. 
Therefore, I am interested in their backgrounds, whether socio-economic, gender, 
religious, ideological, religious or ethnic.  
Sidney G. Tarrow877 argues that “people engage in contentious politics when 
patterns of political opportunities and constrains change, and then by strategically 
employing a repertoire of collective action, creating new opportunities, which are 
used by others in widening cycles of contention”. In Algeria, the 1988 October 
uprisings offered societal change that enabled young politically concerned youth and 
other age groups to join different social movements to advance their social interests. 
Secondly, Tarrow stresses engagement in contentious politics when “struggle revolve 
around broad cleavages in society”. Without extensive socio-political problems it is 
challenging for social movements to grow and maintain their popularity. Thirdly, 
Tarrow argues that mass engagement requires “inherited cultural symbols”, that has 
strongly been present within Islamist, Amazigh and leftist movements, but also 
within political parties close to state authorities as well. Finally, Tarrow highlights 
capacity to construct “dense social networks and connective structures”. However, 
it is also necessary to observe politicization of afore mentioned “broad cleavages”.  
How should we conceptualize political participation and approach multiple 
agencies that the political actors conduct? I define the action conducted by the 
autonomous trade unions as nonviolent manifest political participation according to 
critical conceptualization introduced by Joakim Ekman and Erik Amnå878, who argue 
that there exists different forms of disengagement879, involvement, civic engagement 
 
877 Tarrow, Sidney (2011, 28-29) Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
878 Ekman, Joakim & Amnå, Erik (2012) Political Participation and Civic Engagement: Towards a New 
Typology. Human Affairs 22, pp. 283-300. 
879 Ekman and Amnå (2012, 295) divide disengagement into active and passive forms, which means 
that sometimes disengagement can be a conscious action to boycott elections, newspapers or conduct 
non-political or non-consumerist lifestyles. 
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and political participation. Ekman and Amnå880 distinct latent881 and manifest882 
political participation. They argue that nonviolent manifest political participation is 
mostly legal in its collective level, but that it can include forms of illegal extra-
parliamentary manifest political participation in the individual level.  
I mainly interviewed activists of SNAPAP, and asked about their individual 
motives in joining an autonomous trade union and to conduct activism, because 
while Engin F. Isin883 argues: “[a]cts cannot happen without motives, purposes, or 
reasons […]”, the acts cannot be reduced only to calculability, intentionality or 
responsibility. SNAPAP often claims to cover884 about 300 000-500 000 members 
of which 40 000-50 000 contributive members. The General Autonomous Confederation 
for Algerian Workers (Confédération Générale Autonome des Travailleurs Algériens, 
CGATA) is claimed to gather 268 000885 members. I spoke with younger and older 
activists who situated their engagement on different timeframes between 1980s and 
2000s. How did they start nonviolent acts of citizenship in autonomous trade 
unions? Who are they?  
In 2013, I met the President of SNAPAP Rachid Malaoui with few other long-
term trade union activists, one of them was Kaddour Chouicha, in a café in Oran. I 
had, a few years earlier, read an article in which the chairman of the Algerian Business 
Leaders Forum (Forum des Chefs d'Entreprise, FCE) stated that he had nothing 
against autonomous trade unions in general, except those empowered by 
 
880 Ekman and Amnå (2012, 292). 
881 Latent political participation encapsulates two forms of action: Involvement (personal interest and 
attentiveness to politics and social issues at the individual level and a sense of belonging to a group or 
life-style in the collective level). Civic engagement (activities based on personal interest in and attention 
to politics and social issues in the individual level and voluntary work to improve conditions in the 
local community in the collective level). 
882 Manifest political participation seal in: Formal political participation (electoral and contact activities at 
the individual level and organized political participation such as membership of conventional political 
parties, trade unions and other civic organizations in the collective level). Activism, extra-parliamentary 
participation, they split into: Legal activism (signing petitions in the individual level and participation to 
loosely organized forms of networks such as demonstrations, strikes and protest in the collective level). 
Illegal activism (politically motivated illegal acts in the individual level and illegal violent activities and 
protests such as demonstrations, riots, squatting in buildings, damaging property, and confronting the 
police or political opponents on a collective level). 
883 Isin, Engine F. (2008, 38) Theorizing Acts of Citizenship, in Engin F. Isin and Greg M. Nielsen (Eds.) 
(2008) Acts of Citizenship, London & New York: Zed Books, pp. 15-43.  
884 http://www.maisondessyndicats-dz.com/historique.php (Retrieved in 7.2.2012, website does not 
function anymore); Graïne, Larbi (2010, 44) Algérie: Naufrage de la fonction publique et défi syndicale. Paris: 
L'Harmattan.  
885 www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/15_01_22_list_affiliates_14th_gc-3.pdf 
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“Trotskyist” class-war perceptions886. I had also read another article, dating from 
2008, where the head of the Workers’ Party (Parti des travailleurs, PT) Louisa 
Hanoune in turn accused autonomous trade unions of threatening destabilization in 
Algeria887. 
Malaoui on the other hand refered to Hamiani as ”le patron des patrons” referring 
to mafia equivalent to the capo di tutti (the boss of all bosses) and told me in March 
2013 in Oran: 
RM: Hamiani said we are Trotskysts, Hanouna said we are agents of the west, 
governmental women organizations said we are Islamists, so you can chose. At least 
we are not said to be agents of the government. You have to take all these accusations 
together and ask “who we are?”  
KM: Who are you? 
RM: We are independent. 
RM: Hamiani is part of the power (pouvoir). He is a former minister and he represents 
the power (pouvoir). He was removed and became the boss of all bosses. He is the 
boss of Forum of bosses [The Algerian Business Leaders' Forum FCE]. So, he was a 
minister. He supported Bouteflika. He is a man of power (pouvoir). So, a man of 
power attacks us. These associations of the power (pouvoir) attack us and call us 
Trotskyists. Louisa Hanoune, who has now become a woman of the president, attack 
on us too and calls us the agents of NATO. It is the power (pouvoir) that attack on 
us because we are independent888. 
When SNAPAP activists underline their independence or autonomy, they mean 
independence from the UGTA and the state. Malaoui was hinting that political 
parties such as PT of Louisa Hanoune is part of machinery of power (pouvoir). Her 
attack and accusation of autonomous trade unions of destabilization, or being 
“agents of NATO”, spring from the interests of power (pouvoir). While Hanoune 
often criticizes governmental policies in Algeria, Malaoui and others did not buy the 
argument that PT led by Hanoune was a genuine oppositional actor, at least not any 
more from their perspective. Real oppositional action was not taking place within 
political sector neither, because everything was controlled by those in power.    
Political multipartyism in Algeria generates extensive criticism among 
autonomous trade unionists. What is more, various reports show that Algerians are 
 
886 El Watan. 7.10.2011. Réda Hamiani: Oui aux syndicats autonomes, mais on ne veut pas de 
surenchère de type trotskyste.  
887 L’Expression 6.4.2008. Les syndicats autonomes dérangent: attaqués de toutes parts. Farouk 
Djouadi. 
888 Rachid Malaoui. Interviewed in Oran in March 2013. 
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in general weakly organized within political parties. According to Arab Barometer889, 
in 2011 the majority (87%) of respondents said that none of the political parties 
represent them or their political, social and economic aspirations. The greatest 
support were political parties often considered as close to the power (pouvoir) such 
as the National Liberation Front (FLN, 6%) and the National Rally for Democracy 
(RND, 3%). The youth are even less active than the older populations. Similarly, 
scholars have criticised political multipartyism in the country890. They argue that the 
political parties do not offer alternatives, and are distant from the people or citizens. 
The authorities are able to integrate parties to their political interests, or if they 
confront the power (pouvoir), they are neutralized. The weakness of the political 
parties to represent citizens seems to drive individuals from different political 
backgrounds to engage within autonomous trade unions, which have been more 
successful in protecting the citizens in matters related to salaries, for example891. 
In another interview Malaoui described the political scale of the members in 
SNAPAP: “In the SNAPAP there are Benflists, Bouteflikists, FFSistes, everybody 
are represented”892. My personal experience of those members of SNAPAP that I 
met affirm what Malaoui depicted. In many ways, multiple identities of Algerian 
society was represented. It would be difficult to generalize the members of the 
SNAPAP as Islamists or Amazigh activists. Similarly, the President of SNPSP, Lyès 
Merabet, describes the membership of their union: “There are Islamists, people from 
the left, Communists, atheists, centrists, nationalists, etc. SNPSP gathers 
practitioners who are academic, open minded people”893. Similarly, leader of 
CNAPEST, Larbi Nouar, depicted their membership: “All the fringes of Algerian 
society are represented. We have Islamists, democrats, who are all unified in 
defending the teachers’ and school’s interests”894.  
When I was able to have deeper and more personal discussions in 2013, some of 
my interlocutors hinted that they supported FFS. However, they insisted that their 
 
889 Robbins, Michael (2014) Skipping the Arab Spring? The Arab Barometer surveys a Changing Algeria. April 
2014. 
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892 Rachid Malaoui interviewed by Larbi Graïne (2010, 36). 
893 Lyès Merabat interviewed by Larbi Graïne (2010, 53). 
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belonging to the FFS did not affect their activity in the autonomous trade union and 
they felt that their activity in both bodies as separate. Therefore, it was natural, not 
preferred, that one could be a member of SNAPAP while being member of the 
political party as well. Some criticized the FFS and its popularity among Algerians. 
In addition, I was asked many times whether I have an Amazigh background. I 
answered that majority of the Algerians have Amazigh roots and represent today a 
mixture of various ethnical backgrounds as a result of multiple historical chapters.  
Women were also visible in the ranks of SNAPAP. However, as I wrote in 
Chapter III, I managed to conduct fewer interviews with them due to a multiplicity 
of reasons such as my gender, scant suitable occasions, the environment and socio-
cultural role expectations. Therefore, it would be too reductive to explain the limited 
amount of interviews with female activists exclusively related to gender. However, I 
believe that a female researcher might have had better access to obtain more female 
perspective regarding the women activists in the context of autonomous trade union 
performances. Though I was not more successful in conducting recorded interviews 
with women activists, it does not mean that they were not strongly represented. In 
general, women activists have many role models in Algeria. Amazigh warrior queen 
Dihya (or Kahina) was a religious and military leader in the 7th century who formed 
significant resistance against the Muslim conquest in Numidia while Lalla Fatma 
N’soumer and Lalla Khadidja bent Belkacem participated to the combats against the 
French occupation in the 19th century895. During the Independence War (1954-1962) 
Djamila Boupacha and Hassiba Ben Bouali, to mention only two, became 
internationally known revolutionaries896.  
With Malaoui, we spoke about the gender and the role of the women activists in 
SNAPAP. I told him that I have heard some critics from the governmental women 
organization about the religious conservatism among the SNAPAP women. 
Naturally, Malaoui did not agree with the critics:  
RM: General Secretary of SNAPAP General Office is a woman [Ghozlane Nassira]. 
I am the president. In the General Office, we are six, three men and three women. 
Our women who entered into field and started hunger strike, have you heard of them? 
[…] Our women have nothing to do with the Islamists. When you meet them, you 
can ask them. They represent Algerian reality. They are Muslims but not Islamists, as 
99% of Algerians are Muslims and they are Muslims who defend the values of 
democracy and the human rights as trade unionists. They go to the streets and combat 
 
895 Rebzani, Mohammed (1997, 28) La vie familiale des femmes algériennes salariées. Paris – Montréal: 
L’Harmattan. 
896 Lazreg, Marnia (1990, 767) Gender and Politics in Algeria: Unraveling the Religious Paradigm. Signs, 
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the police and occasionally these Muslim women share the same office day and night 
with other men activists. […] The women in our ranks are the women who combat. 
They organize gatherings. They are beaten by the police. Their wages are suspended 
due to their activities in the trade union movement. They are not women appreciated 
by the Ministries or upper crust897.  
Generally speaking, SNAPAP activists represent mostly the lower or upper middle 
class. It is of course reductive to generalize about the membership of the trade union 
after meeting only handful of its members. However, this description would become 
to my mind, if I had to generalize according to my understanding of Algerian society. 
In my interviews, I asked how the interviewees started to conduct activism or join 
to SNAPAP. I was interested in the concrete act, how did they register in practice, 
but also what were the larger factors behind: why someone start to think about 
joining to trade union or why did they chose particularly autonomous trade union 
instead of UGTA for example. According to Charles Tilly898, political actors typically 
give individualized accounts of their participation, though they could be seen to be 
bounded as collective actors through communities, classes, armed forces, firms, 
unions, interest groups or social movements. Young activist of SNAPAP, Mustapha 
Larbi, explained his participation in SNAPAP as follows:  
I was in probation [beneficiate de pré-emploie] with miserable salary. I could not find 
anybody, who could help us to integrate into workstation. In the end, we only found 
SNAPAP who took over the topic of probation [pré-emploie], which is a political 
related to employment that has been practiced in Algeria. After we searched other 
trade unions that could speak on our behalf but we did not find. That is why we chose 
SNAPAP, which has given us many things. They have organized seminars to instruct 
trade union methods. During the time I have worked with SNAPAP, two years, I 
have felt free having around people, who help. It is also the question of 
socialization899. 
Larbi showed gratitude regarding the help that SNAPAP was able to offer him. It is 
also interesting that he justifies his choice of joining SNAPAP due to the lack of 
other actors available for help related to his problem of integration. Why SNAPAP? 
Where are political parties? Next Larbi’s account stressed the role of social networks, 
friendship and belonging to a group, which supports the participation and 
mobilization in general after individual enters to a movement. Similarly, Tarrow 
highlights the importance of face-to-face groups, social networks and connective 
 
897 Rachid Malaoui. Interviewed in Oran in March 2013. 
898 Tilly, Charles (2002, 115) Stories, Identities, and Political Change. United States: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishing Group. 
899 Mustapha Larbi. Interviewed in El Kala in March 2013. 
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structures as significant factors that sustain participation900. However, it is also the 
societal grievances that trigger the desire to improve one’s social condition:  
I believe SNAPAP wants to be free. It wants freedom of expression. It wants dignity. 
It is like more than a work. Now when I am within SNAPAP, I do not search for 
work anymore. Work is our right, but today we speak about other things such as 
dignity (karama). We are against the indignity (hogra). In Algeria, there is no other 
trade union that can speak out of probation (pré-emploie) or precarious work. There 
is not, only SNAPAP. Even the political parties are afraid to speak about the 
precarious work. Only SNAPAP exists. Even the parties such as PST (Parti socialiste 
des travailleurs) or PT (Parti travailleurs) are afraid to announce that they are against 
these employment policies. […] I work as a contractual but without any rights. There 
is no right to unionize or to participate on strike. You cannot even have the basic 
rights regarding the work. They say we are not contractual. What are we then? When 
we demand our rights, they say you are not worker. What are we? It is a clear message 
that we are not considered as workers, but as modern slaves. That is why I chose 
SNAPAP, because it gave us possibility and helped us to fight for a contract901. 
Larbi’s account reinforces the image that autonomous trade union activists share a 
critical relationship towards political parties that are considered too weak and 
cautious to take action. Autonomous trade unions have managed to ground their 
role and activity as one of the oppositional movements through politicization of 
work and working conditions. Similarly, Larbi’s account shows well how he no 
longer tries to find work but invests his time in protesting in SNAPAP. In many 
ways, the autonomous trade unions have become transformed more into political 
protest movements rather than functioning as a traditional trade union movement. 
Researcher Nacer Djabi argues that this is due to the restrictions that autonomous 
trade unions face:  
The increased use of strikes, long or cyclical in some cases, is a way for these unions 
to compensate for a lack of recognition and social rights for their members. The civil 
servant, new to trade union activity, continues to believe that the single trade union 
has abandoned many of its rights. Added to this is the negative attitude of the various 
political elites in power in Algeria, who continue, to this day, to deny the right to use 
trade union power, and they push the trade unions to manifest through protest to 
express their existence and voice their demands as long as the channels of dialogue 
and negotiation remain hermetically closed. In Algeria, we are faced with neoliberal 
political elites who either reject trade union activity or simply ignore it902.  
 
900 Tarrow (2011, 30). 
901 Mustapha Larbi. Interviewed in El Kala in March 2013. 
902 El Watan 27.11.2013. ”Le pouvoirs a encore besoin de l’UGTA” Nacer Djabi. Sociologue, 
enseignant à l’université d’Alger. Nabila Amir. 
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Neoliberalist economic policies started to spread increasingly already during the 
presidency of Bendjedid Chadli during the 1980s and were strengthened in the 1990s 
due to the economic structural adjustment program (SAP) orchestrated by IMF. 
Djabi constructs typical leftist antagonistic relation between neoliberal political elites 
and autonomous trade unions, were unpatriotic capitalists accumulate state’s wealth 
behind the faceless capital for their own benefit at the cost of Algerian workers. 
The young SNAPAP activist Samir Baroud similarly describes the beginnings of 
his activism in SNAPAP. He also starts from the individual account related to social 
grievances that he faced, but moves to instruction and the importance of collectivity: 
I finished my studies in 2010, so the first thing that I was interested in was the working 
place. I found myself in the situation, where I had contract for three years. I worked 
from 8.00h to 17.00h with the salary of 15 000 dinars. I tried to demand after the 
worker’s rights such as increase of the salary. I searched from the Facebook and I 
found one autonomous trade union, SNAPAP. I went there and we created 
committee, which was affiliated with the union. It gave us many things. It showed 
how to conduct activism. How to demand after our rights. We regrouped and started 
to participate to the sit-ins in Algiers and in wilayas like the trade unionist who 
demand for their rights and for the increases of salaries903. 
Baroud’s account shows how contentious politics does not emerge from nothing. 
As Tarrow argues, it is “culturally inscribed and socially communicated”904. Young 
activists learn from the conventions of contention, part of a society’s public culture, 
through the older generation of activists through instruction and obtain knowledge 
of particular routines905. SNAPAP also organizes training on trade union practices 
and to increase awareness of workers’ rights. It is also noteworthy that at first Baroud 
found information about the SNAPAP through the internet and Facebook. The 
young trade union activist of SNAPAP, Mohamed Lazri about 20 years old, also 
found information about the SNAPAP first time from the internet: 
The founders of SNAPAP have created the committee of Pre-Employ. They 
organized lot of sit-ins. I read about it on the internet. I was on Facebook when I 
heard about it. I contacted them. We met in Algiers and we had many meetings. We 
achieved something, but not really much906.  
 
903 Interviewed in the bus heading to World Social Forum In Tunis in 2013. 
904 Tarrow (2011, 29). 
905 Tarrow (2011, 29). 
906 Mohamed Lazri. Interviewed in the bus heading to from Algiers World Social Forum In Tunis in 
2013. 
 196 
To show the resemblance of these youth activists, Idriss Mekideche also explains 
how he got involved in trade union activism in SNAPAP: 
First, in general the life of the workers in Algeria is catastrophic. For example, I am 
not permanent, I am contractual. There are violations against the law because the 
precarious work is a very dangerous phenomenon, even more dangerous than the 
unemployment. It is very dangerous because when you are unemployed, the state is 
afraid of unemployed because they have time. They can create problems. But when 
you are precarious worker and you work every day from 8.00 to 16.00 while your 
salary is derisory and miserable, you are always preoccupied to take care of your basic 
needs. That is not normal. A person cannot blossom, start the projects, do politics or 
to do anything. He can just work from 8.00 to 16.00 and we do not have means. 
Therefore, if we are able to eat it is a wonderland. You can work years after years but 
you cannot do anything. You cannot get married, live or rent an … so the majority 
of precarious workers gain 12 000 to 17 000 dinars and the rent is 20 000 dinars or 
more. With your monthly income you cannot even rent a home. How can someone 
live? So being aware of all these problems I did some research on the internet if there 
is something that takes care of these … for example the other union. I mean state 
unions do not take care of these branches of issues in the society. There is only 
SNAPAP that looks after these unemployed, precarious workers, pre-employs, 
unemployed graduates and so forth. It creates committees for these branches in the 
society because what is the worst is that unemployed and precarious workers do not 
have right to unionize and to organize themselves. We speak about marginalized 
people. Therefore, SNAPAP established institutions for them through unionism. 
Within the SNAPAP there are the committees of the women, the youth, the pre-
employ, the unemployed, the unemployed graduates etc. It creates committees trying 
to integrate marginalized people. Therefore, I did the research on the internet and 
found that there are one committee of the Pre-employ within SNAPAP and I found 
a telephone number. I called them and I joined them907. 
These examples originate from injustice and societal grievances, such as working 
hours, the lack of housing, unemployment, corruption, oppression, marginalization 
and lack of prospects that are experienced by Algerians youth in the SNAPAP. In 
general, these grievances can be linked to the concept of waithood that describes the 
living condition of the youth in the eastern and western Mediterranean area in 
general. According to Djavad Salehi-Isfahani and Navtej Dhillon908, waithood results 
from demographic pressures (youth bulge), unequally distributed oil income, rigid 
institutions as well as from rigid social norms. They define the waithood as: “a long 
phase which refers to the bewildering time that a large proportion of Middle Eastern 
 
907 Idriss Mekideche. Interviewed in the bus heading from Algiers to World Social Forum in Tunis in 
2013. 
908 Salehi-Isfahani, Djavad & Dhillon, Navtej (2008, 6) Stalled Youth Transitions in the Middle East: 
A Framework for Policy Reform. The Middle East Youth Initiative. Number 8. October 2008. 
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youth spends waiting for a full state of adulthood”909. It is experience of transition, 
which is not directly linked to the age, but as complex reality that prevents obtaining 
adult status in the everyday life due to economic hardship. Diane Singerman910, who 
coined the term, link the waithood to prolonged adulthood meaning that the youth 
struggle with financial costs related to marriage (housing, dower, jewelry, 
celebrations and furniture) that prevents the youth to establish their independent 
private lives.  
Young Algerian autonomous trade union activists blame the state authorities for 
their economic discomfort. They accuse the officials not fulfilling their guaranteed 
constitutional rights, as young SNAPAP activist Madjid Ferras explained when he 
recounted how and why he joined SNAPAP: 
The article 55 states that every Algerian citizen has a right to work and live in dignity. 
Therefore, I, pre-employed working three years according to the contract non-
renewable, struggle with the salary of 120 euros per month. I work as the permanent 
worker paid 300 euros per month, and I am after all graduated from the university, 
while others maybe from other educational institutes.  We may have diplomas, but 
we do not have chance to work as the permanent workers. Therefore, I entered to 
the SNAPAP to ask after my rights, to have a work911. 
It is interesting to see generational differences among the activists and their political 
subjectivity. While younger generation often memorize the direct causes to their 
political participation, the older generation saw it as longer process from larger 
perspective that often included their childhood, youth and friend or family member 
that inspired them to acquire knowledge, join to social movement or to reflect 
critically the social environment in general. The youth often locates the beginning of 
their activism within a more subjective perspective, while the older generation seem 
to more often describe various personalities and characters that inspired them at 
different periods of their lives.  
The current President of SNAPAP Rachid Malaoui explained in an interview that 
during the 1980s students movements were important starting grounds for many 
current trade unionists and activists: 
RM: I belonged to the student activist movement of the 1980s. My activism at the 
university got me arrested during the events of October 1988. I was among those 
 
909 Salehi-Isfahani & Dhillon (2008, 6). 
910 Singerman, Diane (2007, 5-6) The Economic Imperatives of Marriage: Emerging Practices and 
Identities among Youth in the Middle East. The Middle East Initiative. Number 6. September 2007. 
911 Madjid Ferras (name changed). Interviewed in the bus heading Algiers to World Social Forum in 
Tunis in 2013. 
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young people of the time who had been tortured while others were killed. As long as 
we campaigned for democracy, we were considered shady individuals912.   
Salim Mecheri recalled how he got involved in political participation in the 1980s: 
Since 1986, I started working. I had an uncle, who was revolutionary. One of those 
that were sentenced to death during the French colonialism. He was an oppositionist. 
After we gained our independence, he held a position as the secretary general within 
the department of the moudjahids. That was during the period of Ben Bella. When 
they processed for the coup d'etat of the Ben Bella, he sticked with the supporters of 
Ben Bella. He worked at the health sector, where I work now. When I was reintegrated 
to my actual post in CHU, it enabled me to be closer to my uncle. He gave me advices 
how the politics were developing in Algeria About the period of colonialism. I was 
really attached to my uncle. He was one of the founding members of the UGTA in 
Oran. I remember when I reintegrated to my job in 1986, he asked me three things: 
“avoid approaching the UGTA which is a trade union organization that endorse only 
polishing the portrait, and which is an illegitimate organization. You should never 
approach UGTA. I advice you to concentrate to the function of your work. You are 
servant of the sick. Avoid joining or affiliating with political parties such as FLN or 
others. I advice you to follow the development of Algeria”. He knew that there would 
be an explosion in 1988. It was 1986 and he told me that there will be a popular revolt 
and we will enter to the multi-party system. I was young. I was 23. However, I was 
student activist and committee member among the paramedics. Then in 1988, there 
was an explosion. I remember we were called by the FLN party. […] There were 
sections of the FLN implanted in every establishment whether public or …  I 
remember we were called by these sections of the FLN and at the same time by the 
UGTA. FLN was the single party and the UGTA was an organization part of it. So I 
remember that we were called out to say us that we should be discreet, that we should 
not respond to these calls to destabilize the country. They were against it. They 
wanted to obstruct and halt this haemorrhage. We were young and we said to them 
that no, you are responsible. When we said that you are responsible, we were arrested 
by the police. When I returned to my work, me and our group not more than 10 
persons, were arrested and interrogated by the police: “why did you support the…” 
we said: “we haven’t supported anyone. We just said that it is one party system that 
pushed this revolt”. However, we were arrested. They did PV [procès-verbal] or 
[statement of the facts of the case] and returned ... […]913  
Salim Mecheri explains, how his uncle was extremely important to him, and how 
deep the impact his uncle had regarding the formation of his political views and 
outlook. Mecheri also remember how the country was ruled by single party and how 
the UGTA was considered as part of it. As part of the power (pouvoir). It is also 
important to notice, how Mecheri and authorities construct opposite discourses 
 
912 Rachid Malaoui. Interviewed by Larbi Graïne (2010, 25).  
913 Salim Mecheri. Interviewed in Oran in December 2014. 
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about the destabilization. He argues, that it was the conduct of one-party rule that 
led to destabilization of the country. He goes back to 1992 when President Chadli 
resigned: 
For example, when they called for the interruption of the electoral process, we went 
out with Kaddour Chouicha, Rachid Malaoui and the whole movement of the activist 
that existed and conducted the protest in Place d’Armes where we said no to the 
termination of the electoral process914. 
Chouicha, Malaoui and Mecheri are still active in the trade union movement and it 
is a good example of how friendship and networks are constructed alongside 
activism, and plays an important role in attachment of the movements. Mecheri also 
linked the events of 1992 to the contemporary situation: 
Regarding these events looking from the position of autonomous trade union 
organization, we are today paying the price of the interruption of the electoral process. 
This means the period from 1992 until 2000. Because there were the laws that were 
created after 1992, such as the famous 59-83 decree where no more than five persons 
could regroup. When you read the decree 59-83, it says that the gatherings 
(attroupement) are forbidden. Assemblies and marches are forbidden. General 
assemblies are forbidden. Gatherings are forbidden. Everything except from the 
autonomous trade unions. But we had huge difficulties because we were said: “no, 
even the trade unions must have authorization and we cannot give you that … “. It 
means that they forbid or they do not correspond favorably for your request to 
general assembly or to protest peacefully using this famous decree: “because we were 
on this state of emergency or we are afraid that the terrorist will come and …”. What 
it means is that we have passed last 20 years. One cannot say that we were “stand by” 
but that we have tried to be listened. We have hoped especially that the international 
opinion would listen us915. 
This recollection shows how the autonomous trade unions can gather religious and 
non-religious activists together. Mecheri argues that trade unions are the only 
platform available, because public space is restricted. Similarly, it shows how the 
older generation of activists construct their personal development and activism in 
general from childhood, and the influences they were surrounded by home and in 
societal structures in general. Another older generation activist, friend of Mecheri 
Kaddour Chouicha, also described the start of his activism: 
KC: I was born and I grew up in Oran. My father was responsible for the family and 
was working as a docker (at the bottom level, under middle class). However, because 
many French left Algeria after 1962 there was room for promotion for many 
 
914 Salim Mecheri. Interviewed in Oran in December 2014. 
915 Salim Mecheri. Interviewed in Oran in December 2014. 
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Algerians. My father was one of those who benefitted from this promotion and was 
able to rise socially in the port of Oran. However, to be honest, I was a bit estranged 
from our family who were the moudjahids. In our family, we did not have this certain 
kind of atmosphere where I learned to combat. No, I was a child of independent 
Algeria. An Algeria of socialism, Algeria of pan-Africanism more influenced by what 
happened in Algeria after the independence. Because during the independence, I was 
six years old. So during the time when I was at school we were surrounded by the 
values of socialism, but simultaneously Algeria non-aligned. Therefore, I was 
influenced by those values. I was also influenced by the religious values because I 
come from the family, like many families. However, very early I broke out because 
what I saw it did not correspond with what I was taught. When I was 17 years old, I 
dreamed that I was climbing towards God. During the climbing, I saw all the 
handicaps who told me to say to God “why we are like this”. “What have we done to 
merit this”? That is when I pushed the religion aside. This is my personal view, but I 
understand those who need its values simply to continue their lives. Because the 
religious question is above all answer to the existential question. What are we doing 
on the earth. What does life mean and so forth. Some people need a clear and evident 
answer at once. Others can accept that there is no answer. We are simply here916. 
Meanwhile, before the 1988 October uprisings Algeria lacked a clear and visible 
oppositional movement, which made it more difficult for the earlier generations to 
start political participation. It is of course wrong to therefore conclude that such 
movements did not exist at all. For example, the student movement was prominent, 
even though it was controlled in many ways by the FLN and its youth mass 
organization UNJA: 
KC: I was lucky to have one great teacher [in the highschool] who opened my spirit. 
It is fortunate to have those. He was a kind of teacher that did not have to brainwash 
you, while there are those as well. Nevertheless, he told that we must speak, discuss, 
debate. I was lucky to have good teachers, whether they were French or Algerians. At 
the time, there were also many French teachers. They helped me to open myself to 
various things and to be critical. After that, everything else comes naturally. At 
university, already very early, I mean two months after I went to a course, I found the 
Union National de la Jeunesse Algérienne (UNJA), who were organizing an 
exposition. They were linked to FLN, which mean that they were what we call mass 
organization. I remember, when I debated with them saying that “I don’t believe 
you”. Student movement must be autonomous in the regards of power (pouvoir). It 
was 1973. I remember it very well, because the one I debated is currently one of my 
colleagues. He tried to explain me the necessity to be part of the UNJA. However, 
because I really pissed him off, he told me: “if you want autonomy prepare yourself 
for what we will do to you with a bottle”. At the time, the most humiliating that they 
could do to you in torture was to force someone to sit down on a bottle.  
KM: Torture existed in the 1970s?  
 
916 Kaddour Chouicha. Interviewed in Oran in January 2015. 
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KC: Of course. There have always been torture. That is why I really remember that 
occasion. However, I passed through university refusing to join the UNJA. I am not 
saying I confronted them, but I refused to play their game. During the end of my 
studies, when the Islamism started, we were a small group of youngsters while the 
Islamists had closed the university on the national level in 80 or 81. At the time, UNJA 
was under influence of the PAGS and was considered as a communist movement. 
After we understood, that it was the military security who helped the Islamists break 
the influence of the PAGS. The whole university was closed. I remember that when 
we met with my friends in the morning in our institution, there were three bearded 
(barbus, name to describe an Islamist) who told us that it was closed. We were 
together with four or five colleagues when we returned next day. I had an iron chain 
and ax with me and we went to open the university. It was easy. Those three fellow 
men did not resist when we told them that if the university will be closed, it will take 
place according to our [students] own decision, not that you say it is closed. Then we 
organized a general assembly, which decided to close the university, maybe because 
they were afraid. Then we said ok, let’s close it then. However, that was one of those 
moments when I really hated the PAGS and its movement. I participated in one 
march in Oran organized by UNJA that was against the Islamists and we were many. 
We demanded opening of the university. It was 1980 or 81. The period of the 
culmination point of the rise of Islamism in the university917. 
Kaddour Chouicha, among many other autonomous trade union activists, believes 
that the Islamist movement was long used by the national security officers. He also 
remembers how the Islamists insulted the Amazigh activists at the university and the 
violence they used.  
Therefore, I had an idea of the Islamist violence before 1988, because I had lived it 
already in the beginning of the 1980s in the university. I also have to admit that I had 
not understood how much the elements of the security service intervened to 
strengthen the Islamists. At the time, I was not convinced or did I feel it completely. 
However, already then I knew that it was not FLN but the army who decided. One 
of my current colleagues who was then a student told me that I was one of the few, 
already then when we were students, who said that the problem is the army not the 
FLN. We were not very well formed at the time because I did not follow the 
formation of activism in the political party or else. Everything I know is through self-
learning. I have done everything by myself. I have learned everything by myself 
through debates with my colleagues and so forth. That is how I got through my 
studies at university in 1981918. 
Then Chouicha moved to France for five years, where he encountered the anarchist 
movement and other European left groups. It is important to note that the French 
activist scene and literature have had a significant impact on contemporary Algerian 
 
917 Kaddour Chouicha. Interviewed in Oran in January 2015. 
918 Kaddour Chouicha. Interviewed in Oran in January 2015. 
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activism. Chouicha stressed the importance of getting wider perspective of meeting 
with others, who share different socio-economic background, different nationality 
and religious viewpoints:  
One year in Paris and four years in Toulouse. It helped me a lot. I cannot deny that. 
I was there from1981-1986. It helped me because I met many people. I learned a lot 
about the politics, trade unionism, about the left and the extreme left and so forth. 
Especially when I was in Toulouse, which is close to Spain and where many people 
from the Spanish anarchist movement who had escaped to France. Therefore, I 
worked a bit with the so-called libertarians in France. For me those five years were 
determinant. It was important for me to live with the people who were not Muslims 
and who did not know about Islam. It shapes the mind. Instead of staying in your 
small corner thinking that there is nobody else than you, your family. It is bad. 
However, when you open yourself you find out what is essential in being human.  
I neither received any kind of political education. I worked with the people. I 
conducted a few radio broadcasts. All my political education is self-taught. Especially 
through books. I have read a lot. Already when I was a kid. When there were not a 
lot entertainment I read. Not about politics. In the beginning, I was not interested in 
politics. I read novels. About two novels a day. I really read a lot. Gradually I started 
to be interested in other things and wanted to understand more. Especially when I 
was in France. Through various debates, I wanted to know more. If you are afraid to 
speak, it means that you are not sure what you want to say919. 
Chouicha, as well as many other especially older generation activists in SNAPAP can 
be considered as intellectuals. They have a vast knowledge of various theories in 
social sciences and know profoundly many famous scholars such as Pierre Bourdieu 
and others. After five years in France Chouicha moved back to Algeria.   
First, when I came back in 1986, I was searched one year because of the military 
service and because in Toulouse I knew people who were extreme left and had been 
imprisoned due to Berber Spring in 1980 in Algeria. They had left to France to get 
political education. We met and became friends. Because of that, I was filed. Then 
when I came back, I worked one year. Then I went to make my military service. I was 
lucky to make it civil. It means that I did 45 days of military service, and the rest I was 
able to compensate by teaching. I did not receive salary from it. It was a bit difficult 
year, because 1988 was the year of the events of 1988, but I was in the army. All of 
us who were in the army where kept inside.  
KM: How would you describe the events in 1988?  
KC: I was not able to participate. In any case, there was no participation. It was the 
youth. It was not political. However, I went out with my wife, who was working as a 
journalist and had to go out to discover what happened. We went out to the city and 
 
919 Kaddour Chouicha. Interviewed in Oran in January 2015. 
 203 
to the districts that were a bit dangerous. We were even afraid. However, we observed 
all that. I was still in the army and I did not have a right to speak920.  
It is important to acknowledge that Chouicha argued that the 1988 October uprisings 
were not political from the outset, but were led by the youth and became politicized 
afterwards. Then Chouicha described how he entered to establish among others the 
important autonomous trade union CNES, which was the most visible oppositional 
autonomous trade unions during the civil war in the 1990s: 
Six months before finishing the army, the teachers in our university started to plan to 
launch a trade union. I joined this union. I did not have a right because I was in the 
army, but I joined in the meetings. I told them not to put my name in the papers 
(laughing), but I assisted the meetings. My adventure of trade unionism started from 
there. It was in 1989. Simultaneously, I was also a president of the committee in an 
association of our district where I lived. […] I even tried to regroup other quarters in 
the city level of Oran. By the way, many years later, one elected from the FLN told 
me that: “we knew what you was going to do and we stopped you”. Because I was 
trying to create a coordination of the associations in the city level. However, I was 
stopped. I always knew that there were something but I did not know who. 
Chouicha participated in the autonomous trade union CNES, known for its central 
and high-profile role during the emergence of the autonomous trade union 
movement, and especially during the civil war:  
KC: We started to work around 1990. However, we received authorization in 1992. 
But we were active even before. 
KM: How many autonomous trade unions existed at the time? 
KC: I do not know. Maybe we were sixth, seventh or eighth? In any case, we started 
in 1990. We did not even thought about the registration. It came later. I remember 
well, when we were in the meeting with the head of the government Ghozali [Prime 
Minister Sid Ahmed Ghozali] in 1991 or 1992, and many started to speak about the 
registration. He told us: “the question regarding the registration will not arise because 
we can clearly see that you are representative. Every time you organize a strike at the 
university, everything stops”. For him the registration was nothing else than 
administrative formality and it was right because at the time when we organized a 
strike every national university was closed.  
KM: Did you practice activism during the black decade? 
 
920 Kaddour Chouicha. Interviewed in Oran in January 2015. 
 204 
KC: Oh yes. One of our biggest particularities was that we conducted activism in a 
radical way during the most difficult periods during the civil war. During the state of 
emergency, we went out to the streets to demonstrate921.  
Chouicha explained how CNES occupied public spaces even during the most violent 
years during the 1990s. While the autonomous trade unions emerged in 1989 as a 
result of 1988 October uprisings, it is clear that they maintained their activities, even 
under difficult and challenging conditions, during the 1990s civil war and aimed to 
strengthen the pluralism of the trade unionism. This meant of course demanding 
citizenship rights through trade unionism and supporting the acquired gains in the 
fields of press, association and multiparty democratic political system in general. 
Malika Rebai Maamri922 stresses that Algeria is one of the rare states in Southern 
Mediterranean area that “possesses the important preconditions for a transition to 
democracy”: economic and social background conditions; consensus among 
Algerians to desire democracy; conflict and resolution mechanisms; and politicians 
that can be committed to democratic transformation. She believes that while the 
decision-makers endeavor to revitalize the public space in promoting the capabilities 
and activity of citizens, the decline of social capital negatively influences citizens’ 
confidence in political institutions (political parties and parliament). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
921 Kaddour Chouicha. Interviewed in Oran in January 2015. 
922 Maamri, Rebai Malika (2014) The Dimensions of Democratic Citizenship in Algeria. Germany, GRIN. 
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6 GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES 
My aim in this chapter is to continue to describe the development of autonomous 
trade union movement through discourse analysis and to concentrate on Algerian 
governmental responses regarding the collective action organized by them. For 
sources, I continue to use the interviews, newspaper articles and other descriptive 
literature available to contextualize the development of the autonomous trade union 
movement from the national peace process and reconciliation during the end of 
1990s until the regional 2011 uprisings. This period can be considered arguably as 
one of the most intense phase of the struggle of autonomous trade union movement 
so far.   
General employment policies organized by the state include various programs 
that aim to decrease poverty and precariousness of workers, and consist of tripartite 
negotiations with UGTA, considered by the state authorities as the sole 
representative of the workers. In addition to being responsible for the formation and 
maintenance of labor relations and general employment policies in the country, the 
Algerian authorities seem to use multiple forms of action in controlling the 
functioning and the visibility of the autonomous unions. Therefore, I ask: How the 
Algerian ruling authorities manage the non-violent acts of citizenship conducted by 
the autonomous trade unions?  
The peace process that began in the late 1990s, was followed by the 
transformation of the various autonomous trade unions, such as SNAPAP in the 
public sector, towards more oppositional character of political action. During the 
2000s, the civil war calmed down and Algeria witnessed major economic 
development due to high oil and gas prices. This development helped the 
government to gather support and justify its policy making under the leadership of 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who was elected President in 1999 elections with promise of 
bringing peace and prosperity.  
Meanwhile, the autonomous trade unions blamed the state authorities for 
systematic violations of the trade union rights. They argued that their functioning 
was deterred and their access in public spaces was restricted, which prevented their 
possibilities to organize activities. The conduct of tripartite negotiations exclusively 
with UGTA was criticized for marginalizing the autonomous trade unions and 
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bringing down trade union pluralism in general. While I introduce some of the 
repertoires used by the authorities to control the autonomous trade union 
movement, I will also present the employment policies in contemporary Algeria to 
better understand the demands and critics of the independent unions and 
governmental practices. I will also show how active labor market programs and main 
features are constructed in Algeria923 in comparison within the context of 
Maghreb924.  
Concerning discourse analysis, I am interested in how the antagonism appears in 
the context of the political. Autonomous trade unions frequently accuse UGTA for 
functioning as a political asset of the authorities. Meanwhile, the autonomous trade 
unions are themselves accused for transformation towards political opposition 
movement instead of conducting traditional trade union action. Each accuses the 
other for politicizing the work and trade unionism. Therefore, the acts of citizenship 
are politicized: whether functioning in the autonomous trade unions can be 
considered as acts of citizenship, or whether it is oppositional political action, as state 
authorities allege.  
I approach this politicization by examining how these antagonistic discourses are 
constructed, the context in which they are constructed, and how the concept of 
political functions as nodal point reflecting the construction of these discourses at 
large. I will show through different examples how certain social question are 
politicized for embellish one’s own action, which is on the contrary often 
disconnected from political purposes. I will process this problematic using the 
complex and versatile concept of the political reflecting how asymmetric power 
relations come into effect in qualifying something as political, and what 
consequences it encapsulate.  
6.1 Asymmetric negotiation: tripartite dialogue during the years 
of prosperity 
The turn of 2000s was a difficult phase for the young autonomous trade union 
movement. The security situation was still weak and the state of affairs was unstable 
due to insurgency of Islamist militant groups. The civil war had caused a setback 
 
923 Musette, Mohammed Saïb (2014) Employment Policies and Active Labour Market Programmes in 
Algeria. European Training Foundation ETF. 
924 Musette, Mohamed Saib & Hammouda, Nacer Eddine (2006) La question de l’emploi au Maghreb central 
– Volume 3. Alger: Office des publications universitaires. 
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regarding democratic reforms that were extremely important for the functioning of 
autonomous trade unions and other civic organizations. On the other hand, unstable 
social conditions could have offered and opportunity to the autonomous unions to 
increase their popularity as critic of governmental policies and possibility to increase 
their membership through mobilization. However, Algerians seemed to be tired of 
large-scale contestation after decade of violent acts and preferred stability and 
gradual pacification of civil war. 
Regardless of the peace process, which quelled the military and terrorist activity 
and gave more space for civic action, the economic improvement that followed 
challenged the criticism introduced by the oppositional trade union movement. The 
independent trade unions struggled to put in practice the achieved rights in the 
constitution in 1989. Nevertheless, autonomous unions, especially SNAPAP, were 
able to challenge the hegemonic position of the UGTA through various repertoires 
of action, such as strikes, hunger strikes, sit-ins and demonstrations. The beginning 
of the 2000s also witnessed the creation of the new autonomous unions925 that were 
able to challenge UGTA in educational sector, though their emergence dispersed the 
coherent autonomous movement even further. Creation of new unions and dispersal 
of trade union movement weakened the position of the UGTA even further. 
Simultaneously, it complicated the common action of the autonomous trade union 
movement as well. 
Next, I will analyze the peace and national reconciliation process in the context 
of civic movements such as autonomous trade unions, which stayed quite inactive 
in the turn of 2000s, as the current President of SNAPAP, Rachid Malaoui, stated in 
2010:  
SNAPAP did remain somewhat ”dormant” between 1998 and 2001. It became under 
the spotlight as a result of the change in management in 2001. The trade union, it is 
true, had suffered the absence of a trade union culture among its former executives. 
The new leadership emerging in 2001 is characterized by the refinement of a trade 
union strategy. The emergence of SNAPAP is due to the effort that it has continued 
to deploy to the field to be the spokesman of the workers and due to the ability to 
publicly state its claims. But also because the analysis and reflection that it has done 
regarding the country's social reality. It is particularly impressive in sounding the alarm 
on the precarious situation of the public service and workers in this sector. It can be 
 
925 Syndicat autonome des travailleurs de l’Education (SNTE), Syndicat National des Médecins 
Généralistes de Santé Publique (SNMG SP), Syndicat National Algérien des Psychologues (SNAPSY), 
Syndicat Algériens des Paramédicaux (SAP), Syndicat des Gestionnaires de la Santé (SGS), Syndicat 
National des Vétérinaires Fonctionnaires de l’Administration Publiques (SNVFAP), Syndicat National 
des Travailleurs de l’Energie (SNT Energie), Syndicat National du Personnel au Sol d’Air Algérie 
(SNPS Air Algérie), Syndicat National des Officiers de la Marine Marchande (SNOMMAR) and 
Syndicat National des Journalistes Algériens (SNJA). 
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said that the claims and strikes that illustrate this period are at the origin of the revision 
of the legal arsenal. Revision that led to the texts we are referring to today926.   
Malaoui stressed how SNAPAP was passive during 1998-2001 until new leadership 
with his lead took over and SNAPAP started to invest to the grassroots level as a 
strategy to protect the workers’ rights. Malaoui also stressed the analysis that the 
new, more radical, leadership of SNAPAP conducted regarding the social situation 
in the country. Due to so-called “social reality” on the ground, as Malaoui argued, 
SNAPAP invested on street demonstrations and other protests in the public space. 
Understanding of the precarious working conditions in the public sector, SNAPAP 
was able to mobilize young activists, as the interviews showed in the previous 
chapter. Likewise, it is interesting how Malaoui is using the term “reality” to 
reconstruct the discursive “reality”927. From the point of view of discourse analysis, 
it is not crucial here to investigate whether the analysis of the SNAPAP is accurate 
or not but to reflect how different perception of the so-called “realities” effect on 
representations and construction of discourses.  
Even during the peaceful years of the end of 1990s, there were contestation and 
strikes organized by the SNAPAP, especially affiliated to its association in the 
hospital CHU Oran928. Similarly, SATEF was able to widen since 1997 its action 
from Kabylia to nationwide under leadership of Arab Azzi, who was elected as the 
member of Parliament from the ranks of FFS929. Nevertheless, it was CNES, that 
was the most able to exert pressure on the social front on the state authorities until 
the end of the decade. In addition, there were some attempts to form common 
confederation and joint activities between SNAPAP and CNES related to common 
interests in the distribution of social housing related to higher education and 
especially after setting aside of the housing allocation commission, supported by the 
autonomous unions, in 1998 by the state authorities930. SNAPAP was even brave 
enough and pressed charges on Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia, whom they accused 
of anti-constitutional act when signing the decree that affected the distribution of 
 
926 Rachid Malaoui interviewed by Larbi Graïne (2010, 28-29) Algérie: Naufrage de la fonction publique et 
défi syndicale. Paris: L'Harmattan. 
927 Jorgensen and Phillips (2002, 9). 
928 La Tribune 28.9.1998. Le SNAPAP exige une démocratisation des œuvres sociales du CHU d’Oran. 
O.M.; Le Soir d’Algérie 16.8.1999. Le compte bancaire des œuvres sociales bloqué. S.H.A.; Ouest Tribune 
9.9.1999. Guiddoum se rétracte. H-Nora. 
929 Graïne (2010, 110). 
930 La Tribune 25.5.1998. Le SNAPAP et le CNES à Oran montent au créneau. Mohamed Ouanezar. 
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housing931. This act shows the confidence of these unions in challenging the state 
authorities and politicizing social issues.  
Confrontation between UGTA and SNAPAP was common. In March, then the 
General Secretary of SNAPAP Boumkhila Hamena condemned terrorism, 
destruction of economic infrastructure and accused UGTA of being “a fireman in 
service of power” that opportunistically searched for recover of the vast movement 
of discontent. UGTA was considered as partly guilty for the weak socio-economic 
condition, due to its position in the tripartite meetings showing antagonistic 
positions between UGTA and autonomous unions932. After 1990 the government 
had opened tripartite negotiation with UGTA, which was the only union accepted 
to official collective bargaining and social dialogue in the context of annual tripartite 
meetings (labor unions-employers-government)933.  However, the government was 
negotiating with various autonomous trade unions as well, even though they were 
excluded from the tripartite meetings. Negotiations between the government and 
autonomous trade unions can be considered as asymmetric due to differences in size 
and power, especially when power can be seen as ingrained in the structure of 
interaction934. The Algerian authorities have all the means of force at their disposal. 
According to Marwan Daoudy, power asymmetries impact on bargaining processes, 
which mean that weaker counterparts have to find innovative solutions to achieve 
their objectives935. 
Kaddour Chouicha from the CNES explained the strategy used by the CNES 
with the state authorities in these asymmetric negotiations during the major strike in 
1998:  
KM: Were you in contact with the government during this occasion? 
KC: No, we were all the time in dialogue. We met the President Chadli. We met Prime 
Minister Hamrouche. We met all the Ministers of Education. We met the Prime 
Minister Ghozali. We met Boudiaf when he arrived. We were a force that was hard 
to bypass. 
KM: How many were you in the National office? 
KC: I think we were nine. Maybe eleven. However, what saved us was that from the 
beginning we decided that we would not work like the other trade unions. Especially 
 
931 L’Authentique. 14.3.1998. Plainte contre Ouyahia: Distribution de logements sociaux.  
932 El Watan 14.3.1998. SNAPAP: Reconversion en confédération des syndicats sectoriels. Ziad Salah. 
933 Benamrouche, Amar (2000, 155) Gréves et conflicts politiques en Algérie. France: Éditions Karthala. 
934 Daoudy, Marwan (2009, 365) Asymmetric Power: Negotiating Water in the Euphrates and Tigris. 
International Negotiation 14 (2009) pp. 361-391. 
935 Daoudy (2009, 366). 
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in the beginning when we launched the strikes, we set three spokespersons. I was the 
spokesperson in the west. There was another colleague in the center and one in the 
east. Being a spokesperson means that you do not make decisions. You will go to 
discuss with the minister. You come back to the National Council and you introduce 
what you have obtained and what the others think about it. Even in the National 
Council, we said that it cannot make decisions before you go the General Assembly. 
Therefore, already from very early on we applied a method to prevent possibility of 
having CNES in the hand. Because I remember very well when at the time we were 
meeting the minister of Education [Aboubakr] Benbouzid, and immediately when we 
entered, we were spokespersons at the time, we were asked: “did you come here to 
make decisions or to discuss”. I responded: “can you make decision or is it the Prime 
Minister who will decide?” Then he got a bit angry and said: “I am the Minister of the 
Republic … “. We held this debate with our hands. Therefore, we applied this tactic, 
which disturbed them936.   
William Zartman argues that negotiation in the first place is realized when neither 
counterpart to a conflict possesses enough power to impose its interests 
unilaterally937. Negotiation is needed to achieve long-term solutions. In asymmetric 
power relations, the weaker party often tries to avoid direct confrontation and 
conduct flexible performances, such as “borrowing of power”, where power 
actualizes to the needs of negotiation itself and this condition is beneficial to the 
underdog938. The negotiating process can include different stages, where symmetry-
asymmetry positions manifest and weaker counterpart aim to negotiate on more 
equal terms939. Meanwhile, the stronger counterpart may seek to control the 
oppositional movements via influencing on its leadership. Chouicha explained how 
CNES avoided sending or electing the president for the governmental meetings due 
to fear of pressure, but sent a coordinator that did not have any executive powers. 
This was a clear negotiation strategy that yielded good results and enabled the 
continuation of action within asymmetric power relations: 
We organized a congress in 1997. We did not elect a president. We only elected a 
coordinator. Therefore, we elected the national coordinator and two national deputy 
coordinators to express that there did not exist only one person that could represent 
the CNES. In addition, those three cannot represent the CNES until they go to 
National Council. The National Council cannot decide until they go to General 
Assembly. It was tiring to travel back and forth. Especially travelling with the train 
 
936 Kaddour Chouicha. Interviewed in Oran in January 2015.  
937 Zartman. William (1997, 1) The Structuralist Dilemma in Negotiation, in Lewicki R. Greenwich 
(Ed.) Research on Negotiation in Organizations. CT, USA: JAI Press. 
938 Pfetsch, Frank R. and Landau, Alice (2000, 23) Symmetry and Asymmetry in International 
Negotiations. International Negotiation 5 (2000) pp. 21-42. 
939 Pfetsch and Landau (2000, 29). 
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during the civil war. However, it was as if we were able to combat and train thousands 
of teachers with us, who were the workers of the middle class. We opened a new 
course regarding the trade union activism. It is not the model of the UGTA or any 
other but a model where every voice was heard and taken into a consideration. 
KM: So we can say that the CNES was in the center of activism of the autonomous 
trade unionism? 
KC: Of course. From the beginning there were other trade unions as well but the one 
that conducted hard combats was the CNES. In addition, it represented a bit kind of 
academic cultural elite so there was symbolism when people from the university 
organized a strike. At the time, it was an extra-ordinary opening in the world of trade 
unionism in Algeria.  
KM: And in the office, how did you solve the problems? Where you always agreeing? 
KC: The people who observed from the far distance believed that the CNES was 
almost a political party. They thought that people in CNES were agreeing about 
everything. However, it was absolutely wrong. There were always debates and they 
were very open in the CNES. Nevertheless, when we made a decision, we made them 
together and only after then we advanced. Majority of us were leftist. I want to be 
clear. Some were related to PAGS, others to PST. I was also considered as leftist, but 
merely as social leftist that represented social movements. Then there were those who 
came from the Kabyle movement940. 
Political parties and their representatives were acting in close relationship with 
autonomous trade unions. Meanwhile, as Chouicha explained, autonomous unions 
offered possibility for political action without necessity of taking part into sectorial 
politics, in this example party politics. Being in the left, not participating in leftist 
party politics, was possible through autonomous trade unions for those who felt that 
they shared common leftist values (were part of the so-called social left) but did not 
necessarily agree with the party politics of the left. Meanwhile, it is also revealing that 
autonomous trade unions are quite closely connected to political protest movement.  
In August 1998, CNES and SNAPAP organized a conference in Oran, where 
they threatened to increase their activities and demanded increase on salaries941. 
Then Deputy National Coordinator of the CNES Kaddour Chouicha and National 
Secretary of the SNAPAP Rachid Malaoui were interviewed in the newspaper Le 
Soir d’Algérie, where they accused the Minister of Labor, Social Protection and 
Vocational Training Hacène Laskri for the exclusion and marginalization of 
 
940 Kaddour Chouicha. Interviewed in Oran in January 2015. 
941 Le Matin 3.8.1998. “Rentrée sociale explosive”. 
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autonomous unions942. They insisted that autonomous trade unions should be heard 
within the modification of general status in the public services. Malaoui also stated 
that SNAPAP was collecting money to affiliate into International Labor 
Organization, where UGTA had been the only representative from Algeria. This had 
enabled UGTA, according to Malaoui, to receive four billion centimes a year943. This 
move could be interpreted as the internationalizing of domestic conflict, which has 
been one major aim of autonomous trade union movement. 
The peace process and the gradual end of the civil war ushered in a new phase in 
the development of the autonomous trade unions in Algeria. From the peace 
research perspective, the post-conflictual society and formation of oppositional 
movement in Algeria offers an interesting case study. The functioning of non-violent 
autonomous trade unions in post-civil war Algeria have not been studied before. 
Meanwhile, the theoretical frameworks, e.g. popular peace and adaptive peace 
building, are problematic to contextualize within Algerian autonomous trade union 
movement, because while autonomous trade unions promote democratic 
institutional peace building, they confronted institutions such as International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, often highlighted as major contributors to 
democratic institutional peace building in the two aforementioned theoretical 
frameworks. These theoretical frameworks in peace research approach societies too 
reductively from certain macro-economic perspectives colliding with more 
grassroots based orientation of autonomous trade unions and the civic movement at 
large, which their aimed institutional building programs should on the contrary 
strengthen.  
The peace and reconciliation process as well as the application of amnesty needs 
to be further approached to gain a better idea of the social context in post-war 
Algeria. The immense atrocities that were committed during the civil war shaped the 
Algerian collective experience and memory in the context of the construction of 
societal structures for years to come. Civilians, families, journalists, academics, 
foreigners, musicians, writers and intellectuals in general had been murdered. It is 
therefore not possible to overemphasize the collective trauma that Algeria 
experienced during these violent years.    
 
942 Le Soir d’Algérie 4.8.1998. “Nous condamnons le silence des pouvoirs publics”: Point de presse du 
CNES et du SNAPAP à Oran. B.B. (B.B. indicates the first letters of the forename and surname of 
journalist who wrote the article). 
943 Le Soir d’Algérie 4.8.1998. “Nous condamnons le silence des pouvoirs publics” Point de presse du 
CNES et du SNAPAP à Oran. B.B. (B.B. indicates the first letters of the forename and surname of 
journalist who wrote the article). 
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The antagonism between the army and the Islamists pushed aside various other 
societal discrepancies on a mental level and aggravated other social contradictions 
present in the Algerian social culture: Francophony, Arabophony and 
Berberophony944. Intellectual elites that could have stand in as mediators between 
cultures, languages and morals were silenced, imprisoned, exiled or even killed. This 
of course complicated the potential openings for the national dialogue and 
reconciliation on the societal level945. 
Nevertheless, attempts to start national dialogue to end the spiral of violence 
existed during the civil war. President Liamine Zeroual worked behind the scenes, 
holding private negotiations with the Islamists but with little success946. In January 
1995, an Italian Catholic ecumenical Community of Sant'Egidio invited all the major 
societal counterparts947 and the parties at war to Rome on a platform of starting 
negotiations to halt the atrocities. The meetings included the Algerian oppositional 
forces such as Rabah Kebir and Anwar Haddam (FIS), human rights activist and 
former Minister Ali Yahia Abdennour, Hocine Aït Ahmed and Ahmed Djeddai 
(FFS), Louisa Hanoune (PT), former President Ahmed Ben Bella and Khaled 
Bensmain (MDA), Ahmed Djaballah (Islamic Renaissance Movement/al-Nahda), 
Ahmed ben Mouhammed (JMCA) and Abdelhamid Mehri (FLN). President 
Zeroual, who considered the platform an embarrassment, refused the offer out of 
hand, appealing the menace of foreign intervention to Algerian internal affairs.             
In 1996, President Zeroual turned down public negotiations with the Islamist 
groups, but secretly conducted dialogue between the army and the maquis948. He 
released some political Islamist leaders from the prisons and offered “rahma” 
(clemency) and reintegration into society for those elements who would lay down 
their arms949. In October 1997, an agreement was signed between the military 
command and the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS). This agreement, which was kept 
secret from the public and whose content is still largely unknown, was the foundation 
 
944 Bensmaïa, Réda and Melehy, Hassan (1997, 90) Reflections on the Nature of the Violence in 
Algeria. Diacritics, Vol. 27, No. 2, Writing between the lines (Censored). Summer, 1997. pp. 85-97. 
945 Bensmaïa and Melehy (1997, 86-90).  
946 Le Sueur, James D. (2010, 65-66) Between Terror and Democracy – Algeria since 1989. London – New 
York: Zed Books. 
947 Le Sueur (2010, 66 and 87). 
948 Maquis can be translated as busch, meaning land that is covered by shrubs (shrubland) used by 
armed groups to hide. This Corsican word was used to depict French Resistance fighters (maquisards) 
fighting against Nazi occupation of France during the Second World War.   
949 Hidouchi, Ghazi (2006, 2) “The Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation” in Algeria: 
Threatening Contadictions. Arab Reform Initiative. July 2006. 
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for the peace process that came into effect with the arrival of the new President, 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika950.   
In September 1998, President Zeroual unexpectedly announced his resignation. 
Brutal massacres during 1997-1998 had weakened his credibility in Algeria and in the 
international community951. The Presidential elections were set for the April 1999. 
In September 1998, the central trade union UGTA led by Abdelmadjid Sidi-Saïd, not 
satisfied with Zeroual’s decision to resign, had been in an impasse regarding its 
negotiations with the government952. SNAPAP and other autonomous trade unions 
used the situation to their advantage. While SNAPAP expressed its concern and 
stressed its support for the organization of new elections, it simultaneously 
announced a protest march to be organized in October953. In addition, it started the 
organization of its structures at national and regional level to organize national 
congress and to gain support from the congress to the project of creation of 
autonomous trade union confederation with other autonomous unions954. This 
confederation sought to challenge the position of the UGTA, first through a forum 
of organizations, which included955 with CNES, SNAPAP, SNM956, SNPDSM957, 
SNAPO958, UNPEF959, SPLA960, UNEP961 and ANPMC962.   
It was the second attempt963 by the autonomous trade unions to challenge the 
UGTA by trying to search possibilities to combine fragmented forces in 
concentrated forum to establish confederation, which could counterweight UGTA 
 
950 Hidouchi (2006, 3). 
951 Le Sueur (2010, 74-75). 
952 Ouest-Tribune 20.9.1998. L’Inter-syndicale: Naissance d’un forum. B. Mokhtaria. 
953 Ouest-Tribune 20.9.1998. L’Inter-syndicale: Naissance d’un forum. B. Mokhtaria. 
954 Ouest-Tribune 20.9.1998. L’Inter-syndicale: Naissance d’un forum. B. Mokhtaria. 
955 Soir d’Algérie 20.9.1998. Un forum d’organisations est préconisé: A defaut d’une confédération 
intersyndicale. 
956 The National Union of Magistrates (Le Syndicat national des magistrats, SNM). 
957 The Union of Professors and Docents in Medical Sciences (Le Syndicat des professeurs et docents 
en sciences médicales, SNPDSM). 
958 The Union of Community Pharmacists (Le Syndicat des pharmaciens d'officine, SNAPO).  
959 National Union of Personal Education and Training (Union Nationale des Personnels de 
l’Éducation et de la Formation, UNPEF). 
960 Union of Airline Pilots (Syndicat des pilotes de ligne, SPLA). 
961 The union of public entrepreneurs (L'union des entrepreneurs publics, UNEP). 
962 National Association of Professors and Heads of Confrences (l'Association nationales des 
professeurs et maîtres de conférénces, ANPMC). 
963 The first attempt took place in 1995, when SATEF sought to create a confederation, CSA, but 
which was blocked by the authorities. 
 215 
and achieve access to negotiation tables, such as tripartite, with the governmental 
officials. Forum signatories also expressed their support for the President of the 
SNM, Tayeb Louh, who was brought before the disciplinary council of the National 
Council of the Judiciary due to his political positioning. It is worth mentioning that 
four years later, in 2002, Louh became the Minister of Labor and Social Security, 
which was considered a setback among the autonomous trade unionists, as is shown 
in an interview with Malaoui published in 2010:  
A former trade unionist that I personally have helped when he was forced to his 
“turnaround” behind of which are none other than the ministry of justice and the 
UGTA. That's how he was pressed to form a new team. Louh was transferred from 
his post while he was preparing to organize its general meeting. He had constantly 
consulted us at the time we had to create a coordination among trade unions. He got 
help and assistance from us, especially for the publication of his press releases. In 
short he was our friend and partner, we supported him fully. He was among those 
present at the Oran congress in 1999. He delivered a speech in which he announced 
the creation of SNATA (I still have the videotape to show it). But since becoming a 
member of the government, he has changed964. 
In March 1999, SNAPAP held its second National Congress in the family center of 
Aïn el-Turck, Bouisseville (Oran) that transformed SNAPAP into National 
Autonomous Trade Union of Algerian Workers (Syndicat national autonome des 
travailleurs algériens, SNATA)965. Around 400 participants from 25-30 wilayas966 and 
representatives from the political parties such as FFS and RCD with the President 
of the SNM Tayeb Louh and National Coordinator Kaddour Chouicha from the 
CNES witnessed the new orientation where SNATA announced to target economic 
sector in the future. The economic sector is the most protected by the state 
authorities, because it opens vulnerabilities for the state vis-à-vis oppositional 
autonomous trade unions. In addition, on the contrary from the UGTA, which had 
supported officially the election of Zeroual in 1995 and now the election of 
Bouteflika, SNATA refrained from any political declaration regarding presidential 
elections. SNATA did not support the candidacy of the Bouteflika, or any other 
candidate, and wanted the workers to make their own decision whom to vote967. This 
 
964 Rachid Malaoui interviewed by Larbi Graïne (2010, 44).  
965 Le Soir d’Algérie 30.3.1999. Deuxième congrès: Le Snapap investit le secteur économique. S.M.A; Le 
Matin 31.3.1999. Le SNAPAP est devenu SNATA. A.T. Hassen. 
966 In the article of Le Soir d’Algérie the number of the wilayas was 25, while in the article of Le Matin 
the number of the wilayas was 30. 
967 Le Soir d’Algérie 30.3.1999. Deuxième congrès: Le Snapap investit le secteur économique. S.M.A; Le 
Matin 31.3.1999. Le SNAPAP est devenu SNATA. A.T. Hassen. 
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was also meant to be a clear message for the apolitical nature of the SNATA 
compared to the position of UGTA, while this apolitical stance contained an entire 
political aspect. SNATA did not want to support the authorities formally or 
informally.  
In April 1999, the experienced former Foreign Minister (1963-1979) of Houari 
Boumédiène, Bouteflika, who had been out of the country for many years, was 
elected as the fifth President when other candidates withdraw their candidacy968. 
During his election campaign, Bouteflika had promised to bring peace to Algeria: he 
won 74 percent of the votes while election turnout was a little over 60 percent969. 
Bouteflika met with autonomous trade union representatives, as long-time SNAPAP 
activist Salim Mecheri recalled: 
SM: There was leader of the government [Smail] Hamdani. It was either 1998 or 1999. 
When Bouteflika arrived, he submitted the status of public sector to the Popular 
National Assembly (APN) and we organized a protest in front of the APN to say No! 
We called Bouteflika to freeze the file regarding the future of the work of the public 
sector. Fortunately, he froze it and that it should go via… because if he would have 
passed that status in 1999, there would have been an explosion. Because there was 
poor attention that it could have ended in firing around 500 000 workers. Because it 
was sector that gathered around 1 400 000 workers. They froze it and Bouteflika was 
lucky. The oil prices got up. In 1999, we met with Bouteflika in Oran. During his first 
mandate he came out a lot. He called out all the associations of the civil society and 
conducted a campaign of sensitization. Concerning SNAPAP, there were questions 
that were posed to many other organizations as well. UGTA was the first organization 
that exposed a problem related to the installation of holding. The representative of 
the UGTA enrolled his response and then there was one representative of one 
autonomous trade union within healthcare sector SNPSP [Syndicat National des 
Praticiens de Santé Publique]. […]Malaoui posed two problems. 
KM: Did he meet Bouteflika? 
SM: Yes, in Oran, when he met all the organization. We gathered in the prefecture of 
the city of Oran. It was big hall where all the associations regrouped. They made the 
chain. 
KM: When was it? 
SM: In 1999 or 2000. 
KM: After Bouteflika became president? 
SM: Yes. Rachid Malaoui asked for the reintegration of all the trade unionists 
dismissed by the SIT. Because all the trade unionists of the SIT were evacuated in the 
 
968 Le Sueur (2010, 75-76). 
969 Le Sueur (2010, 76-77). 
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south in concentration camps in Reggane. […] SNAPAP, because we believe in 
pluralist syndicalism … […] He (Bouteflika) said: “I am preparing that Algerians can 
live. I did not come to give you work, housing or anything for free. I came to restore 
the peace, or musallah al watania, amnesty. I do not have money. I am interested that 
you can live”. For the question related to the health care he said: “I don’t trust to this 
system of health care. I only trust to my brother”. He had a brother who was a doctor. 
He said: “I trust a doctor only enough for one injection”. In a way, he denounced the 
whole Algerian system of health care. Bouteflika was clear and it is prerecorded. 
Concerning the response to Rachid Malaoui, he said. “I salute you. You spoke from 
the bottom of your heart. I will give instructions to reintegrate all those trade 
unionists”. Because among the basic principals to restore reconciliation was the 
reintegration of these trade unionists. To show benevolence. To be honest, in ten 
days they were all reintegrated. We had a great rival within these workers. They came 
to us and asked if they could join to SNAPAP and we said we cannot because we are 
trade union that present public sector. UGTA used this for their advantage. They had 
one or two year-long campaign to discredit SNAPAP. They said that SNAPAP was 
nothing else than regrouping of the old members of the SIT. Unfortunately we 
declined. That is why we had an idea to create a confederation. Before it was SNATA, 
Syndicat National Autonome des Travailleurs Algériens. 
KM: That was the first confederation? 
SM: It was the first. 
KM: When was it created? 
SM: It can be found from the press book. In 2001 or … I think. I remember. We 
made a campaign. We organized the first constitutional congress of the confederation 
SNATA. Congress was held in Oran. There was also Tayeb Louh, who is now 
minister of work and social security. That time he was representative of autonomous 
trade union. 
KM: Where there other unions as well? 
SM: Yes. It was a congress970. 
SNATA was never formally authorized by the state officials, which prevented the 
continuation of its functioning. However, new attempts to create common 
confederation as a counterweight to UGTA followed. Mecheri explained how 
President Bouteflika froze the file after pressure from autonomous trade unions 
regarding the status of the public sector, which would have defined the future of 
work and led to a “social explosion”. This is again an interesting example how 
patriotism acts in the context of destabilization in the formation of discourses and 
how autonomous trade unions helped the president to understand what is the best 
 
970 Salim Mecheri. Interviewed in Oran in December 2014. 
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for Algeria. Mecheri’s account also illustrates how the President Bouteflika showed 
an interest in meeting and negotiating with oppositional autonomous trade unions 
at the beginning of his Presidential term, and how he perceived the societal situation 
in Algeria after a decade of civil war. To achieve peace was vital, top priority. 
Bouteflika soon introduced the Law on Civil Concord (or Civil Harmony Law, 
CHL), which included partial amnesty, grace amnistiante (grace conferring amnesty) 
for those Islamist fighters, who had not killed, raped, caused permanent disability or 
placed bombs in public spaces971. This meant that the peace agreement would wipe 
away crimes committed during the black decade. This, partial amnesty, was widely 
criticized in the oppositional media as well as by some secular oppositional 
movements972. Nevertheless, SNAPAP declared in June that: “the dialogue as an 
civilizational instrument is the only way to dispel misunderstandings and block the 
way from opportunists of all kinds, whose interest is to see the country with fire and 
blood”973. In September, SNATA declared that it supported the CHL, though 
instead of only to conduct Civil Concord they called all the active forces in the 
country to struggle for the Social Concorde, because the real peace was only possibly 
through construction of trust between citizens and administration in all levels974. For 
example, Rachid Malaoui argued that the authorities should have taken into 
consideration related to the peace process the role of the unfairly incarcerated cadres 
who had been dismissed, instead of freeing terrorists who had left thousands of 
victims without financial resources and without a future975. 
Valerie Arnould has approached the peace process in Algeria critically. She has 
reminded about the contentious nature of amnesties in the context of international 
law and transnational justice processes arguing that “amnesties are rejected because 
they are in contradiction with current international law and the international 
community's stated objective of combatting impunity for international crimes and 
massive human rights violations”976. Meanwhile, she believes that amnesties involve 
 
971 Arnauld, Valerie (2007, 228) Amnesty, peace and reconciliation in Algeria. Conflict, Security & 
Development, 7:2, pp. 227-253. 
972 Hidouchi (2006, 3). 
973 Ouest Tribune 9.6.1999. Satisfaction du SNAPAP: Accord avec l’AIS. 
974 Le Quotidien Oran 4.9.1999. Syndicalistes du SNATA: Pour la suppression des oeuvres sociales. F. 
Naima. 
975 Le Soir d’Algérie 4.8.1999. Conférence de presse du SNATA: Le pluralisme syndical en danger. 
S.H.A. (S.H.A. indicates the first letters of the forename and surname of journalist who wrote the 
article). 
976 Le Soir d’Algérie 4.8.1999. Conférence de presse du SNATA: Le pluralisme syndical en danger. 
S.H.A. (S.H.A. indicates the first letters of the forename and surname of journalist who wrote the 
article). 
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more complex questions than international law. They should be approached from a 
larger societal perspective, because prosecution processes are essential for longer-
term sustainable peace, integrating retribution and deterrence, recognizing the 
suffering of the victims, restoring dignity, re-establishing the rule of law, promoting 
reconciliation and marginalizing those who maintain the conflict977. However, what 
other choices were available for Algeria: continue the civil war? Should the leaders 
charge those elements who fought against radical Islamist movements while possibly 
committing atrocities?  
Nations like Algeria often rationalize and justify the application of amnesties by 
pragmatic reasons: acts of violence and atrocities must halt. In many ways, the 
Algerian authorities had a legitimate reason to stop the conflict by all the means 
available, to stop the atrocities and start the post-conflict reconstruction. 
Nevertheless, while Arnauld’s argument can be considered as arrogant from the 
Algerian governmental and citizen’s perspective, she brings up two vital questions 
regarding Algeria: does peace exist without justice and should the aim for peace and 
stability prevail over normative pursuits for justice? 978 She argues that amnesty is 
acceptable only if it can be considered as responsible amnesty979. This means that 
human rights violations, such as torture, genocide and crimes against humanity, 
should be excluded from responsible amnesty. In 2003, the National Consultative 
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (Commission 
nationale consultative de promotion et de protection des droits de l’Homme, 
CNCPPDH), was established under Farouk Ksentini980. Two years later in 2005 a 
referendum981 was organized about the Charter for Peace and National 
Reconciliation (Charte pour la paix et la réconciliation nationale, CPNR) and 
accepted after the popular vote982. But, Arnauld983 argues, in Algeria the exercising 
of amnesty is only partially justified in the contexts of balance of power, the nature 
of human rights violations and the state of the judicial system.   
 
977 Arnauld (2007, 230). 
978 Arnauld (2007, 229). 
979 Arnauld (2007, 231). 
980 This instance is often considered by the members of SNAPAP and LADDH as unserious 
governmental tool without any credibility in practice. 
981 With participation of 79.76 percent, Peace and Reconciliation Project was favored by 97, 36 percent 
of the voters (Bustos 2006, 121). Meanwhile, independent sources estimated that the turnout was 
merely 40 percent (Arnauld 2007, 236). 
982 Arnould (2007, 228); Bustos, Rafael (2006, 121) The Algerian National Reconciliation Referendum 
of 2005. Med.2006, pp. 119-121. 
983 Arnauld (2007, 232). 
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Since the 2000, the economy of Algeria started to strengthen due to increasing 
oil prices984. That did not, however, prevented autonomous trade unions to continue 
their claims on pluralist trade unionism and rights guaranteed in the 1989 
constitution. The civil war started to calm down due to the weakness of the armed 
Islamist movements and successful management of peace process. 2001 September 
11 attacks in the United States instigated understanding from international powers 
to Algerian state in eradicating remaining armed groups that did not join the peace 
process985. It was a crucial time for the autonomous trade union movement to 
demand the realization of constitutional rights regarding the pluralism of trade 
unionism and to challenge the position of the UGTA as the official bargaining 
partner of the government. The civil war that had prevented the possibility to 
develop their socio-political significance was no longer an obstacle. In many ways, I 
consider this period as the most intense phase related to the combat between 
autonomous trade unions and state authorities. Struggles gained much media 
attention and autonomous trade unions manifested themselves as an important 
social and political force. Nevertheless, the autonomous trade unions were not able 
to construct a large popular movement especially, because they lacked the capacity 
to mobilize the youth, which comprised a significant force from the demographic 
perspective.   
The field research conducted in Oran in 2001-2004 by Mourad Moulai-Hadj986 
explained the challenges for the youth mobilization. As Moulai-Hadj argues, the 
1988 October uprisings in Algeria, and in wider international arena that followed 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, enabled the potential success for sustainable 
democratization alongside the formation of the multiparty system and electoral 
pluralism. After the civil war and atrocities ended, there was a genuine possibility for 
the shaping and construction of the dynamic public space, including associative 
movements, new citizenship, new forms of management of political conflicts as well 
as potential blossom of political culture.  
However, research material987 gathered by Moulai-Hadj examines the low 
political participation and widespread passivity of the youth in Oran, where 63 
 
984 Lowi, Miriam R. (2009, 127) Oil Wealth and the Poverty Politics: Algeria Compared. New York: 
Cambridge. 
985 Moulai-Hadj, Mourad (2011, 68) Espace public et participation politique en Afrique: le cas de 
l’Algérie. Afrique et développement, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, 2011, pp. 63-73. 
986 Moulai-Hadj (2011).   
987 Research group of CRASC, directed by Moulai-Hadj, conducted the survey during the years 2001-
2004 with a sample of 500 young Oranese in the context of research project called: “Jeunes Algériens 
entre marginalization et intégration”.  
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percent of the respondents considered politics as “not so important” in their lives, 
while only 12.8 percent considered politics very important. It is also depicting that 
36.2 percent were not interested in politics while 40.2 percent were “not at all” 
interested in politics. The aftermath of the October 1988 uprisings and the civil war 
of the 1990s can be considered as the most prominent factor leading youth to lose 
hope possibilities to impact on political system. Simultaneously, traditional social 
movements had mostly failed to convince the necessity of participation for the 
youth. Meanwhile increasing oil income enabled state authorities to distribute the 
wealth and conduct social reforms. 
Therefore, regarding political participation, only 0.8 percent were members in 
trade unions or political parties, while 77.4 percent had never took part in trade 
unions, political parties or charity associations. These results reveal, of course, many 
consequential particularities vis-à-vis Algerian society and public life. Other, more 
passive natures of political participation, were also remote, while 69 percent rejected 
signing petitions, 69.4 percent never took part in boycotts, 67.4 percent never took 
part in organized demonstration, 60 percent never participated in strikes, 72 percent 
never occupied offices or factories as a form of protest. Therefore, we can ask what 
was left from the 1988 October uprisings, the culture of political democratization 
and broad participation of Algerian citizens to develop the country?  
At the same time, Moulai-Hadj stresses that low participation is not only Algerian 
phenomenon. It is wider problem of de-politicization in the North Africa and Middle 
East in general, which has become common in many countries regardless of their 
traditionally vivid political culture in the past. Due to restriction and exclusion by 
state authorities, it was hard for autonomous trade unions to function in the 
traditional way. They were forced to find ways to politicize democratic practices and 
human rights deficits to decrease obstacles for their functioning. Simultaneously, 
both parties, the UGTA and autonomous trade unions, blamed each other for 
neglecting the interests of the workers and concentrating on conducting politics. 
Meanwhile, they both explicitly resigned from political practices due to that negative 
connotation that “doing politics” contained. Both counterparts politicized events 
according to their interests and for their benefits, which offers for this study an 
interesting space for discourse analysis. The presidential elections were politicized by 
both actors. Supporting President Bouteflika was seen as political, while not 
supporting Bouteflika was seen as political as well, depending on one’s perspective 
and political position. UGTA was accused of supporting both Zeroual and 
Bouteflika during their presidential campaigns, and even before, as in the article 
published in 1999 by the oppositional newspaper El Watan shows: 
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Beyond their large number, the autonomous trade unions fail to emerge as a major 
force to solve different problems that we still see at the working life. Work in the field 
is harder, knowing that the UGTA has not only lost its credibility but has also turned 
towards politics. That is not its role. The central trade union, in fact, associates with 
the “employers and intellectual elites of the country to found a Committee for the 
Safeguarding of Algeria and demand the cancellation of the parliamentary elections 
where FIS was victorious in December 1991”. Furthermore, “this drift of UGTA´s 
work towards a strictly political action is accentuated even more since the government 
of Belaïd Abdesselam […]988 
Autonomous trade unions were active on various fronts in trying to challenge the 
UGTA, such as on housing989 and health. Extremely long-term struggles were 
conducted in CHU Oran, where SNAPAP (Section Ahmed Zabana990) challenged 
UGTA (Section Aïssat Idir991) and the leadership of the hospital for the distribution 
of the budget and transparent conduct of the management. The names of both 
sections, Ahmed Zabana and Aïssat Idir, reveal patriotic connotations, where the 
past and the collective memory were politicized. In February 2000, 19 persons, most 
of them women, started a hunger strike due to mismanagement and silence that the 
management of the hospital showed concerning their demands, for the Hogra 
(humiliation or dignity) regarding working conditions and treating of the patients 
and requested the interference of the responsible Minister992. Meetings and the 
results with the Ministers of Health and Population Yahia Guidoum and Amara 
Benyounés remained modest, as Salim Mecheri, the Secretary General of the 
SNAPAP Chu Oran, stated in the interview in March 2000993. There were fierce 
struggles in the media, in the Administrative Council and on the streets, where 
 
988 El Watan 29.4.1999. Syndicats autonomes: En quête d’une force incontournable. A. Idir. 
989 Ouest Tribune 13.2.2000. SNAPAP: Prélèvement sur salaires de 700 milliards de centimes pour 
l’UGTA. B.M; Quotidienne Oran 12.9.2000. Université: Protesta des travailleurs non-logés. S. Ghada; 
Ouest Tribune 5.12.2000. Le SNAPAP accuse l’UGTA. Pour une histoire de 1000 logements. B. 
Soumya. La voix de l’Oranie. 20.6.2001. Pour des logements sociaux. Rencontre des syndicats 
autonomes autour des LSP. Him. (B.M. indicates the first letters of the forename and surname of 
journalist who wrote the article). 
990 Ahmed Zabana was Algerian independence activist from Oran, who was executed by guillotine on 
June 1956 by the French authorities. 
991 Aïssat Idir was well known trade unionist and one of the founders of the UGTA.  
992 Ouest Tribune 23.2.2000. Greve des membres du SNAPAP au CHUO : « On exige la présence de 
premier responsable ». B. Ibtissem; La voix de l’Oranie 24.2.2000. Centre hospital universitaire: Les 
raisons d’une grève. M. Hocine.  
993 La voix de l’Oranie 2.3.2000. La section SNAPAP du Chu d’Oran denonce: « On veut casser la 
santé ». B.N. (B.N. indicates the first letters of the forename and surname of journalist who wrote the 
article). 
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SNAPAP organized demonstrations, sit-ins, strikes and hunger strikes. Revealing 
interview of Mecheri was published in December 2000:  
[…] The working conditions are miserable and there is a lack of basic equipment. 
How can the nurse do his job if, for example, he is given two syringes to take samples 
from ten (10) patients or if the radiology machine is out of order? [...] The public must 
react to such situations. These practices must be denounced. The patient is, in 
principle, protected by law. He can choose the doctor and he has to pay only a 
symbolic sum of the service. In reality, we are trying to suffocate the hospital. Of 
course, it is necessary to start by changing the attitudes, but this is not achieved by 
the reform from above, by establishing traditions of relations of the type ill-team of 
care994. 
CHU Oran, where fierce battles were fought during the years, is great example how 
autonomous trade unions, SNAPAP in this case, sensitized working conditions in 
the public sector and acted directly in the working places. Mecheri stressed the social 
conditions aiming at revolution of the dispositions (mentalities) to politicize Algerian 
public life. Regarding the privatizations, Mecheri tried to defend the position of the 
public hospital, which recalls contemporary struggles in the context of neoliberal 
economic reforms caused by IMF structural adjustment programs (SAP), and 
stressed the decrease of confidence among citizens in the public welfare system in 
general: 
Lack of resources has led to a lack of trust towards the hospital, but we must not 
forget that the quality of care is better there. The hospital is still credible. It is open 
to everyone even if it cannot meet all the needs995. 
This interview can also be considered from the way that Mecheri presented himself 
as a patriotic defender of Algerian public health care that is credible and open to 
everyone, for all Algerians. All Algerians should join the struggle to defend public 
hospitals, because in the end they were only fighting for their own rights and health. 
Meanwhile, Mecheri stated that Administrative Council did not have power or any 
assets of control regarding the action plan and they were only able to effect on 
budget, which was actually composed based on repetitive routines. Meanwhile, the 
leader of the CHU Oran, Oukil Abderrahman, criticized by the SNAPAP, argued 
that 80 percent of the budget was spent on salaries and 20 percent was left for the 
 
994 La voix de l’Oranie 3.12.2000. « Il faut rapidement réformer le système de la santé » M. Mecheri Larbi 
Salim, syndicaliste et membre du C.A. du CHUO. Him.  
995 La voix de l’Oranie 3.12.2000. « Il faut rapidement réformer le système de la santé » M. Mecheri Larbi 
Salim, syndicaliste et membre du C.A. du CHUO. Him. 
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rest, such as medicines and other consumables, which did not enable a lot996. Related 
to his affiliation in SNAPAP, Mecheri said: 
We have always denounced the current system and we believe that it needs profound 
and urgent reform. Objectives will never be achieved if there is no real support for 
hospital staff and at all levels. There is a tendency in the current system to discourage 
the motivation of everyone. The health system is for war, not for social care … there 
is simply anarchy that reigns. The reform we are still talking about has to start with 
the protection of the staff. The director or manager must be integrated into the work 
of the group, this is how to avoid conflicts of the Administration-Union type. We 
must give responsibility to everyone997. 
Mecheri said that recruitment of the personnel (the amount of the staff was 7000) in 
CHU Oran was massive and anarchic, while timetables were not respected, and often 
nobody knew their job description. If the workers could have more power in 
organizing the working environment in the hospital, it would increase its efficiency. 
Now these, what he calls, “pseudo-unionists” of UGTA are confusing the 
identification of the workers possibilities to recognize their interests and prevent 
democratic reforms: 
Social work at the CHU was managed by pseudo unionists who are self-appointed 
defenders of workers' interests. But UGTA membership cards were paid for by social 
service money, and loans were given without paying any money back. Like the CHU, 
the management of social work was in anarchy. SNAPAP was the first to call for 
autonomy of all structures including the committee of social works. In 1998, there 
was a committee election where everyone could stand as a candidate without any 
union status. Once the committee was elected, an action plan was developed that the 
UGTA refuted. It managed to sidestep all the actions of democratization998. 
In 2014, more than ten years later, I visited CHU Oran with Mecheri. I asked him 
for an opportunity to visit the workplace to have an idea of conditions where trade 
unionists functioned in workplaces as such. I was able to visit in various departments 
of the hospital and met its personnel. Mecheri, who had been working in the hospital 
since the 80s, was known for his activities in SNAPAP. I realized then that it 
necessitates courage and determination to raise questions related to working 
conditions in the workplace. Personnel can be divided to those who struggle among 
 
996 Quotidien Oran 26.8.2000. Entretien avec Oukil Abderrahmane, DF du CHUO: « 80% du budget de 
l’hôpital vont aux salaires ». M. Mazari.   
997 La voix de l’Oranie 3.12.2000. « Il faut rapidement réformer le système de la santé » M. Mecheri Larbi 
Salim, syndicaliste et membre du C.A. du CHUO. Him. 
998 La voix de l’Oranie 3.12.2000. « Il faut rapidement réformer le système de la santé » M. Mecheri Larbi 
Salim, syndicaliste et membre du C.A. du CHUO. Him. 
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the autonomous trade unions and to those, who do not participate secure their job 
while benefitting from the sacrifices of their colleagues. I was a little surprised about 
the relatively high amount of workers in the department. Mecheri told me that he 
was worried about the possible reductions in the working force in the near future as 
part of the continuous neoliberal economic adjustments. He told me: “Look at all 
this people working around here. As you see, many of them are not constantly 
working”. It was true. I saw many, especially younger nurses hanging around. He 
continued: “What happens to them, if they are fired when more strict efficiency 
measures are actualized?”. At least now, they had possibilities to watch and learn and 
participate, and therefore to socialize, within the working conditions in the hospital. 
Who would benefit, if they were moved to the unemployment registers?  
In 2001, the contestation and competition between SNAPAP and UGTA 
continued. In March, the members of National Secretary Board elected Rachid 
Malaoui as the Secretary General of SNAPAP. This change is often depicted in the 
collective memory related to the autonomous trade unions as a radical turn by 
SNAPAP. One of the most visible and important actions conducted by the SNAPAP 
during the year was the hunger strike, which received a significant amount of media 
attention in Algeria, especially in the oppositional newspapers, and forced even some 
of the political parties and authorities to react. The hunger strike became an 
international matter when the European Parliament and International Labor 
Organization got involved. The hunger strike can be considered as the ultimate 
transformation of bodies into objects of struggles where needs are converted into 
demands in the context of political action. It transforms the body into resistance at 
the risk of death. Hunger strikes as embodied protests have been used as political 
weapon in many historical and contemporary struggles within social movements and, 
according to Amanda Machin, they “deftly interiorize the violence of the opponent 
within body of the protester”999. 
The hunger strike followed broad uprisings, known as the “Black Spring”, which 
took place in Kabylia in May 2001. Regardless of mediation attempts by political 
parties, such as FFS or RCD, a huge demonstration took place in Tizi-Ouzou on 21 
May organized by the council of village assemblies (aarch)1000. The event was 
triggered by the killing of a schoolboy, Guermah Massinissa, in police custody on 26 
 
999 Machin, Amanda (2016) Hunger Power: The embodied protest of the political hunger strike. 
Interface: a journal for and about social movements. Volume 8 (1): 157-180 (May 2016). 
1000 Volpi, Frédéric (2003, 107) Islam and Democracy – The Failure of Dialogue in Algeria. London: Pluto 
Press. 
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April in Tizi-Ouzou1001. A couple of days later, three other youth suffered from 
police brutality, which was followed by spontaneous and angry protests and massive 
riots1002. On 25 May, new demonstrations emerged that lasted for several days, and 
finally the council of village assemblies were successful in moving the demonstration 
to Algiers on 14 June1003. The large-scale protest march led to violent clashes 
between protesters and security forces and there were ethnic dimensions1004 linked 
to social grievances1005. According to Yassin Temlali, the demonstrators were mostly 
unemployed and high school students, unlike in 1988 October uprisings, where 
workers were also behind the manifestations1006. The use of force by the government 
further antagonized relations between the regime and Amazigh activists affirming 
discrepancies that had been pushed aside during the conflict between the 
government and the Islamists in the 1990s1007. President Bouteflika took a political 
decision and prohibited all demonstrations in the country1008.  
It was against this background that SNAPAP launched the hunger strike 
campaign. The hunger strike also coincided with the eve of the International Youth 
Festival organized in Algiers, which brought together youth and various NGOs from 
all over the world1009. The hunger strike started on 7 August and lasted for 15 days. 
During the strike, SNAPAP was able to bring up various demands on public through 
media and the beginning of the hunger strike was announced already in the late 
July1010. SNAPAP was able to gain a lot of attention and transmit its message to 
wider audiences. Several direct quotations of the Secretary General Maaloui were 
published in the journal L’Authentique1011: 
 
1001 Volpi (2003, 106); Le Sueur (2010, 83).  
1002 Le Sueur (2010, 83). 
1003 Volpi (2003, 107). 
1004 Protesters demanded official recognition for Tamazight language not being satisfied by the 1995 
formal recognition of Amazigh culture as element of Algeria’s national identity (Le Sueur 2010, 83). 
1005 Volpi (2003, 107); Le Sueur (2010, 83). 
1006 Temlali, Yassin (2003) La révolte des Kabylie ou l’histoire d’un gachis. Confluences Méditerranée – No 
45 Printemps 2003. 
1007 Bensmaïa and Melehy (1997, 90); Volpi (2003, 107). 
1008 Volpi (2003, 107). 
1009 L’Authentique 1.8.2001. Grève de la faim illimitée au SNAPAP: Elle interviendra a la veille du 
festival international de la jeunesse. Faïza B. 
1010 L’Expression 26.7.2001. Grève de la faim au SNAPAP: Une action majeure pour soutenir ses 
revendications. A. Saïd. 
1011 L’Authentique 1.8.2001. Grève de la faim illimitée au SNAPAP: Elle interviendra a la veille du 
festival international de la jeunesse. Faïza B. 
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- “The policy of repression and hogra [humiliation] can no longer be 
tolerated. Everyone has to react”. 
- “The power [pouvoir] has handled it so well to pass all its reforms. It is 
these corrupt men it needs. We do not want to be manipulated”.  
- “This fund [Fonds national de péréquation des œuvres sociales or 
National Social Equalization Fund, FNPOS], which is owned by all 
workers, is violently diverted by the government for the exclusive benefit 
of the trade unionists of the UGTA for the construction of housing, of 
which, at least 100 were awarded per wilaya”. 
- “The UGTA is too involved in questionable business to be able to 
continue representing the workers, who have actually now preferred to 
withdraw from the parent organization joining to other independent 
unions functioning within the limited space they are allowed”. 
Malaoui even went as far as linking the hunger strike to those young Amazighs that 
were killed during the “Black Spring” stating in the journal La Liberte1012 and La 
Tribune1013: 
- “If we must die like the youth in Kabylie, we will do it. Anyway, we will 
continue our action until death”.  
- “[T]he peaceful demonstrations bring nothing with such kind of Power 
[pouvoir]. We shall die if our death gives something positive for our 
country”.  
These statements surely fulfill the definitions regarding populist philosophy of 
conducting politics, trend that can be easily applied to state authorities and their 
communication in the media as well, while social grievances behind the statements 
should not be underestimated. Meanwhile, they stressed the pacific nature of their 
protest regardless of the criticism of their efficiency in front of the “such” 
authorities. The hunger strike was tactical choice to gain pressure through media to 
reach into genuine dialogue with state officials, because public marches of the 
citizens did not yield anything but repression, as Malaoui hinted in an interview1014. 
The quotes reveal also the antagonistic construction of discourses referring the 
 
1012 Liberté 1.8.2001. “…jusqu’à la mort!” Grève de la faim du SNAPAP. Hassan Moali. 
1013 La Tribune 1.8.2001. Des membres du SNAPAP en grève de la faim à partir du 7 août. Karima 
Mokrani.  
1014 L’Expression 23.8.2001. Conférence de presse du SNAPAP: La grève de la faim est un choix 
tactique. B.T. 
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authorities and UGTA as “corrupted manipulators”, whose arguments and games 
are of course not bought by SNAPAP. These discourses show how the meanings 
are fixed in particular domains. When hunger strikers denounce the hogra 
(humiliation) of the Algerian people to whom they insisted they represented, they 
construct ed an understanding of an unfair Algerian society, unfair conduct of 
politics, and bad governance by the state authorities.  
When the actual hunger strike began involving 23 members of SNAPAP, the 
media coverage grew intensively1015. The media showed pictures of decisive activists 
that only drank water and who stated: “Our action poses a problem on freedom of 
association that does not exist in Algeria. We are determined to resist until death or 
until our claims are taken care seriously”1016. For the patriotic sake, these 
autonomous trade union activists were ready to sacrifice themselves for the 
freedoms, necessary to defend Algerian workers. Amnesty International, which had 
attempted to have an access to explore the committed violence and crimes in Algeria 
already during the atrocities in the 1990s, announced their hope for international 
intervention to pressure the Algerian government to improve the conditions of the 
autonomous trade unions1017.  
These international efforts were considered as meddling into Algerian internal 
affairs by authorities and their supporters. These attempts of international human 
rights groups were used against autonomous trade unions accusing them from 
unpatriotic acts letting foreign powers to interfere in Algerian domestic affairs. 
Meanwhile, autonomous trade unions benefitted from these statements as part of 
their attempt to internationalize their domestic struggle, hoping to at least gain moral 
support and generate foreign pressure on the state authorities. The authorities were 
accused of being mute, while Malaoui stressed the support from the European 
Parliament and the continuation of their hunger strike until the demands gained 
results1018. Other autonomous trade unions, such as CNES joined to show their 
 
1015 Liberté 8.8.2001. Les cadres du SNAPAP en grève de la faim: Devant le mutisme des pouvoir 
publics. Rafik H.; L’Expression 9.8.2001. Une grève de la faim illimitée. Karima Ouallouche. 
1016 Liberté 8.8.2001. Les cadres du SNAPAP en grève de la faim: Devant le mutisme des pouvoir 
publics. Rafik H. 
1017 Le Matin 11.8.2001. Aucune réaction des autorités. SNAPAP, les syndicalistes entament leur 5e jour 
de grève de la faim. Samira I. 
1018 Le Maghreb 12.8.2001. ”Le combat continue”. Les cadres du SNAPAP en grève de la faim. A.F.; Le 
jeune indépendant 12.8.2001. Jamais le département de Zerhouni n’a été aussi fermé: 6e jour de la frève 
de la faim des syndicalistes du SNAPAP. Samira M. 
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support for SNAPAP1019. The next day 8 August Association RAJ1020 expressed its 
support1021 as well as Algerian human rights organization LADH. Meanwhile various 
oppositional newspapers, created within democratic reforms after the 1988 October 
uprisings, published communications of the SNAPAP in their entirety: 
SNAPAP press release 
The executives of National Autonomous Union of Public Administration Staff, 
SNAPAP, observing the 7th day of hunger strike because our grievances, which are 
summarized as follows, were not resolved: 
1 – Algerian trade union law is designed in such a way that it is impossible to create a 
trade union confederation either directly or through the grouping of approved unions 
who then give the monopoly to the leading union. 
2 – The same law gives the employer the power to grant representativeness, which is 
inconsistent in the event of a conflict, and the right to authorize or not to allow 
workers' meetings outside working hours, with or without the availability of premises.  
3 – The promulgation of a decree and the specification of the leading union which is 
only representative in the commissions of allocation of housing at the level of the 
communes. 
4 – The social assistance regulated by a decree of the single party continues to be in 
force with misappropriation, with giving 1/6 of the fund to the leading union UGTA 
for the construction of housing for the benefit of their trade unionists and the 
exclusion of others organizations even if the funds belong to all workers. 
5 – The exclusion of our organization from the boards of directors of social funds 
and arbitration bodies and the allocation of seats entirely to the leading trade union 
despite our agreement with the government in 07.04.1992 1022. 
6 – We have been waiting the general statute of the Public Service since 1991, and its 
slow in coming. 
7 – The intimidation of the representatives of our union and the decision of the party 
in power to promote administrative instruction of the trade union system.  
NB: On the 6th day, a SMU team and the labor inspectorate moved to our 
headquarters and a medical consultation was carried out for all strikers, and 2 strikers 
are on drip during the day and 2 more at night with the support of the National 
Council of Public Health Practitioners. On the morning of the 7th day, SNAPAP 
 
1019 Le Matin 12.8.2001. Le CNES apporte son soutien. Au sixième jour de la grève des cadres du 
SNAPAP. Yasmina F. 
1020 Rassemblement Actions Jeunesse. 
1021 Le Matin 13.8.2001. Association RAJ, message de soutien au SNAPAP. 
1022 According to autonomous trade union activists, the agreement was signed in 7.4.1992 between the 
government led by Sidahmed Ghozali and SNAPAP to distribution of seats in the CNES, CNAS, 
CNR and National Arbitration Commission.  
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received the visit and support of Mr. Abdellah Djaballah along with the deputies of 
his party El-islah. 
Algeria 14.8.2001, The general secretary of SNAPAP, Rachid Malaoui1023. 
These demands depict well the premises of the SNAPAP to function as an 
autonomous trade union. Political parties also started to show up and exploit the 
significant media coverage that SNAPAP was able to achieve. The first political 
leader to show up was Abdellah Djaballah from the El-Islah party1024. The next day 
another Islamist party MSP, led by Mahfoud Nahnah, expressed its solidarity with 
SNAPAP1025. FFS had sent a delegation already in the first days of hunger strike to 
support SNAPAP1026. At this point, the hunger strike had gained so much attention 
that political parties wanted to show their support and thereby possibly increase their 
own popularity.  
However, this raises an interesting problem. It can be considered contradictory 
that at this point SNAPAP did not resigned from oppositional sectorial political 
support, while accusing UGTA for its political support for state authorities. In order 
to stress its aspectual political conduct of trade unionism, it had now mixed sectorial 
politics in its political action, an aspectual side of political action outside of the 
traditional sectorial conduct of politics. How far was this still a question of work and 
workers’ conditions? We can also ask whether SNAPAP itself was guilty of politically 
supporting domestic oppositional parties, human rights groups and international 
human rights groups such as Amnesty International or European Parliament. Should 
SNAPAP rebuff their help and risk being isolated within its struggle? Regarding 
politicization, this question is also related to hegemony and context: who has the 
power to decide what is political and in what context it is articulated as such?  
Newspapers showed pictures of prostrate SNAPAP activists who were ready to 
die for their struggle against the injustices committed by those in power. Other 
representatives of the SNAPAP also showed their solidarity around the country and 
joined the hunger strike in nine different wilayas: Aïn Defla, Oran, Annaba, Tiaret, 
 
1023 L’Authentique 15.8.2001. Communiqué du SNAPAP. 
1024 Le Jeune indépendant 14.8.2001. Djaballah solidaire. 7e jour de grève de la faim des syndicalistes du 
SNAPAP.  S.M. (S.M. indicates the first letters of the forename and surname of journalist who wrote 
the article). 
1025 L’Authentique 16.8.2001. Le MSP soutient le SNAPAP et condamne le « carnaval ». 
1026 La voix de l’oranie 18.8.2001. Plusieurs syndicalistes évaqués vers l’hôpital: Onzieme jour de grève 
de la faim du SNAPAP. Him. 
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Chlef, Batna, Oum El Bouaki, Naâma and Djelfa1027. Soon the amount of the 
activists were stated in the press reaching 1501028. The hunger strike was animated 
by more dramatic features when state of condition of some of the strikers started to 
deteriorate and some of them were carried to hospital.  
In the newspaper, La Tribune, journalist Ahmed Kaci1029 wrote that SNAPAP 
has shown determination through their action that cause fear among those in power. 
The International Labor Office of the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
started to be interested in the hunger strike, and offered its help via two options: 
either ILO would directly approach the Algerian government or SNAPAP would file 
official complaint1030. In addition, the French Democratic Confederation of Labor 
(Confédération française démocratique du travail, CFDT) expressed concern 
regarding the condition of the hunger strikers1031. On 19 August, after 13 days of 
hunger strike, the autonomous trade unions gathered at the headquarters of the 
SNAPAP, decorated with banderols of the hunger strike that hung from the 
windows1032, and issued a common declaration supporting the efforts of the 
SNAPAP1033. In the declaration, signed by SNAPAP, SNPSP, SMMCC1034, 
SNAM1035, SATEF and UNPEF, autonomous trade unions called on civil society at 
large to demonstrate for the just cause of SNAPAP and condemned the irresponsible 
attitude of the country’s authorities, the Prime Minister and the President, regarding 
their indifference in front of danger of death regarding the hunger strike. They also 
demanded adherence to Convention 87 of the ILO.  
UGTA responded immediately with their own communication and answered the 
accusations delivered by SNAPAP during the hunger strike. Stressing their 
engagement as the real defender of the workers, they questioned the unpolitical 
 
1027 L’Echo d’Oran 14.8.2001. Dix syndicalistes du SNAPAP entament une grève de faim: Par solidarite 
avec le bureau national. H. Nora; Le Matin 16.8.2001. Les syndicalistes sollicitent Benflis: Dixième jour 
de grève des cadres du SNAPAP. Samira L. 
1028 El-Moudjahid 13.8.2001. SNAPAP: 150 cadres observent une grève de la faim; L’Expression 
13.8.2001. Des revendications rejetées: 150 membres du SNAPAP en grève de la faim. A.B. (A.B. 
indicates the first letters of the forename and surname of journalist who wrote the article). 
1029 La Tribune 16.8.2001. Éditorial: Ces syndicats qui font peur. Ahmed Kaci. 
1030 Le Matin 16.8.2001. Les syndicalistes sollicitent Benflis: Dixième jour de grève des cadres du 
SNAPAP. Samira L. 
1031 El Watan 20.8.2001. Syndicats: Solidarité avec le SNAPAP. Ziad Salah. 
1032 L’Expression 19.8.2001. Que veut le SNAPAP? Salim Benalia. 
1033 L’Authentique 20.8.2001. Déclaration des syndicats autonomes réunis au siège du SNAPAP en date 
du 19 août   2001. 
1034 Union of Magistrates of the Court of Accounts (Syndicat des magistrats de la cour des comptes) 
1035 National Trade union of the Sailors (Syndicat national autonome des marins). 
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motives and patriotism of SNAPAP, accusing it for its recourse to international 
bodies, such as the ILO: 
It is a grotesque scenario cynically mounted and inspired for political purposes by the 
vengeful and state’s supporters, themselves directed by their masters and the outside 
pressure1036. 
In other words, UGTA accused SNAPAP of conducting national politics for the 
benefit of external power rather than defending the cause of the Algerian workers. 
According to Laclau and Mouffe, political processes can be significant, because 
contingent articulation of fluid meanings determine in many ways how the society is 
experienced1037. When communication mentions that SNAPAP has foreign 
“masters”, this means to construct reality through the argument that SNAPAP had 
internationalized a domestic conflict for outside interests at national expense and is 
not really protecting Algerian workers but rather instigating instability. In the seventh 
chapter I deal in more detail with how international actors influence nationalistic 
perceptions of patriotism. Here again the concept of political is explicitly used to 
decrease the objectives into simply political power struggle instead of operating 
strictly in the sphere of the traditional trade unionism. Regarding the SNAPAP’s 
accusations and prosecution related to state subventions1038, UGTA stated: 
In response to the accusations and threats made by SNAPAP towards the General 
Union of Workers, the latter decided to bring justice to all the individuals who publicly 
defended the honor and the dignity of the management of the organization and its 
executives at the base. We do not have to account to this pseudo-union as to how we 
continue our work1039. 
UGTA rejected the discourse constructed by the SNAPAP activists, where SNAPAP 
is the real authentic trade union that defend the material and moral rights of the 
workers through acts of citizenship, and instead in turn renounce its credibility 
describing SNAPAP as a “pseudo-union” that lack all the authenticity in the base.  
 
1036 L’Expression 20.8.2001. « L’UGTA bluffe » Après les déclarations de la centrale syndicale. Le 
SNAPAP réagit. Salim Benalia. 
1037 Jorgensen and Phillips (2002, 34 and 37). 
1038 L’Authentique 22.8.2001. Après les milliards… les comptes. Le SNAPAP dépose plainte contre 
l’UGTA et le ministère du travail. Faïza B. 
1039 L’Expression 20.8.2001. « L’UGTA bluffe » Après les déclarations de la centrale syndicale. Le 
SNAPAP réagit. Salim Benalia. 
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Nevertheless, SNAPAP managed to put pressure so that even the governmental 
newspaper El Moudjahid1040 published next day (21 August) an article, where they 
described the serious conditions of the remaining 25 hunger strikers and discovered 
that the movement had received support from the political formations, civil society 
and other trade unions. On the same day, the leaders of the SNAPAP, Malaoui and 
Hacène Achour, received a delegation led by Kinane Rachid and Bendjebla Yazid 
from the Ministry of Work and Social Security1041. After the meeting and the 
assurances of the dialogue and platform to discuss the demands, SNAPAP 
interrupted the hunger strike after the 14th day1042. The agreement to start the 
dialogue with the minister was considered by Malaoui and SNAPAP as victory and 
the beginning of an end for the monopoly of the UGTA1043, albeit many doubts were 
left related to previous rounds of negotiations between autonomous trade unions 
and the state authorities. In the media, newspaper articles speculated that nothing 
had been won yet1044.  
On 22 August, the oppositional newspaper El Watan1045 published an article in 
which the leader of SATEF Arab Azzi was interviewed where he hinted that the 
conditions change through laws. This recalls what Don Mitchell had to say about the 
connection between action conducted by the autonomous trade union activists and 
sustainable democracy building. Mitchell combined civic rights, in this case the 
demands of the SNAPAP during the hunger strike, directly to public space. He 
argues that one must struggle to gain space to achieve just laws that guarantee aspired 
rights and freedoms: 
Social action is structured through law, and social action creates abstract or 
differentiated spaces in proportion to the power possessed by each side in a struggle. 
So social action – including oppositional work by social movements – always operates 
simultaneously to influence the production of law and the production of space. […] 
Rights themselves, therefore, are part of the process of producing space1046. 
 
1040 El Moudjahid 21.8.2001. 15e jour de la grève de la faim des syndicalistes du SNAPAP.  
1041 Le Maghreb 22.8.2001. Le SNAPAP suspend sa grève de la faim. Suite à l’accord avec le Ministre 
du travail. Arab C.  
1042 Le Quotidien d’Oran 22.8.2001. Le SNAPAP met fin à sa grève de la faim. Le ministère du travail 
pour un dialogue. Hamid G.  
1043 L’Authentique 22.8.2001. Après les milliards… les comptes. Le SNAPAP dépose plainte contre 
l’UGTA et le ministère du travail. Faïza B. 
1044 Le Matin 23.8.2001. Rien n’est encore gagné. Les syndicalistes de SNAPAP ont suspendu mardi 
leur grève de la faim. Yasmine F. 
1045 El Watan 22.8.2001. Syndicats: La réforme passe par le changement des lois. Djamel Amrouche. 
1046 Mitchell, Don (2003, 29) The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space. New York – 
London: The Guilford Press. 
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SNAPAP, like other autonomous trade unions often refer to legal texts that protect 
the trade union freedoms1047. However, many autonomous trade union activists 
argue today that it is not a question of laws as such. There is nothing wrong in the 
ILO conventions 87 and 98 ratified by Algeria in 19621048 or article 90-14 of the 
Algerian constitution, but rather in their implementation in practice1049. The action 
conducted by the autonomous trade unions aimed at the implementation of rights 
guaranteed amid the constitutional change since 1989. The action conducted at the 
beginning of the 2000s was more about to force the governmental authorities to 
activate the legislation. Autonomous trade unions were for example still struggling 
to create confederation, after the failed attempt of SNATA came attempt at a 
confederation CASA1050, challenging the monopoly of the UGTA, so that 
autonomous unions would be taken as social partners to construct policies in 
healthcare, education or the public sector.  
SNAPAP of course did not have the strength to challenge the Algerian authorities 
by force. Therefore, through peaceful acts of citizenship repertoires, such as 
mobilization, collective action and negotiation, SNAPAP sought to operationalize 
its normative endeavor attaining “the broadest unity of democracy regarding the 
personal struggles of the civil servants as well as equal rights against all forms of 
discrimination, inequalities and exclusion”1051. As explained on their website1052, 
SNAPAP sought to offer a space for dialogue, exchange and solidarity and 
cooperated with other social movements, such as national autonomous unions 
(CNES, SATEF, SNPSP, UNPEF), political parties (FFS, MSP, RCD), human rights 
groups (LADH) and international associations (ILO, EU, CFDT, Amnesty 
International).  
Dialogue within mixed commission (SNAPAP and delegation from the 
Ministry1053) was challenging and different interpretations on the law 90-14 sprout. 
 
1047 Rapport Préliminaire du C.N.L.S. Sur les libertés Syndicales en Algérie. CNLS No. 01. Avril 2005. 
1048 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:1029
08  
1049 Interview with 26 years old Hamid Derradji in Oran December 2014.   
1050 Algerian Confederation of the Autonomous Trade Unions (Confédération Algérienne des 
Syndicats Autonomes).  
1051 http://www.maisondessyndicats-dz.com/Pour_Quoi%20se%20Syndiquer.php (Retrieved in 
7.2.2012, website does not function anymore).             
1052 http://www.maisondessyndicats-dz.com/Pour_Quoi%20se%20Syndiquer.php (Retrieved in 
7.2.2012, website does not function anymore).             
1053 La Tribune 2.9.2001. Les pourparlers SNAPAP-ministère du Travail clôtures aujourd’hui. Hasna 
Yacoub. 
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Malaoui accused in an interview published in Le Matin: “This law makes believe to 
the international opinion that we are a democratic country where the trade union 
pluralism is devoted like the political one”1054. According to Malaoui, Algerian 
government was politicizing democracy by creating an image of the country for 
internationalizing domestic conflict for their own gain: Algeria is democratic country 
and articles of the constitution, such as 90-14, guarantee the democratic conduct of 
state affairs. Malaoui also alleged that, according to interpretation of 90-14 by the 
authorities, autonomous trade unions only exist reductively in sectors or sectorial 
confederations, not as one single coherent body, such as CASA, that could challenge 
UGTA:  
“Before that, we held a congress to create SNATA [...] in 1999. The minister of labor 
then reminded us that in view of this same law we have no right to do so, since this 
structure does not include the economic sector, which led us to create the CASA. 
Here again, we are shown bizarre legislation to tell us that it will be necessary to create 
several confederations sector by sector”1055.  
While Malaoui accused the government of politicking through trade unionism, 
another newspaper closer to the official line, L’Expression, attacked SNAPAP, 
asking: “SNAPAP, does it make politics?”1056. The article predicted that the real 
intention of SNAPAP was to construct large social movement that generated its 
power from the civil society, while Malaoui refused accusations saying: “The only 
clan that is behind the SNAPAP is that of hunger”, and continued:  
“We are the defendants of the workers, unlike the UGTA, which is complacent with 
power (pouvoir). The latter wants, at whatever the cost, to pass the train reforms. We 
must defend the workers, because the disaster is imminent”1057.  
“We wanted to have concrete evidence, signed by the anachronism that characterizes 
trade union legislation. It's done”1058. 
According to reporter Salim Benalia this meant that Malaoui had, accidentally, 
admitted the merit of the authorities in recognizing trade union pluralism as well as 
authority of the government in its definition, even though in a widely publicised 
 
1054 Le Matin 23.8.2001. Entretien avec le secrétaire général du syndicat: Rachid Malaoui : « Non à 
l’autonomie sectorielle ! ». Yasmine F. 
1055 Le Matin 23.8.2001. Entretien avec le secrétaire général du syndicat Rachid Malaoui : « Non à 
l’autonomie sectorielle ! ». Yasmine F.  
1056 L’Expression 4.9.2001. Le Snapap passe à la vitesse supérieure. Salim Benalia. 
1057 L’Expression 4.9.2001. Le Snapap passe à la vitesse supérieure. Salim Benalia. 
1058 L’Expression 4.9.2001. Le Snapap passe à la vitesse supérieure. Salim Benalia. 
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press conference1059 organized by the SNAPAP Malaoui refused the recognition of 
the government regarding the trade union pluralism1060. On the contrary, SNAPAP 
announced that international tribunal of the ILO would determine the question1061. 
Because negotiations did not bring the solution, SNAPAP decided to return to the 
streets and started to organize sit-in in front of the Ministry of Labor1062. The only 
way to put pressure on the government was through civil society and international 
arena. By using populist tactics, SNAPAP declared “war” on the state authorities 
and invited Algerians to:  
” […] demonstrate together and to carry out a joint action capable of overthrowing 
the established order, because we declare war on the State”1063. 
Regardless of the non-authorization from the state officials for the confederation 
CASA, autonomous trade unions (SNAM, SNPSP, CNES, SATEF, SNAPAP) 
continued to organize joint meetings using it as platform for more orchestrated 
action1064. These repetitive gatherings manifest also about indifference regarding 
official attempts to prevent functioning of unauthorized confederation. In addition, 
political parties such as RCD, FFS and PST were present1065. It was obvious, that 
these movements were in the process of forming common political opposition that 
challenged the state authorities and institutions through vast social front. After two 
hours of the sit-in in front of the Ministry of Labor, the delegation formed by six 
members of various autonomous trade unions was invited to meet with Minister of 
the Labor and Social Protection Mohamed Larbi Abdelmoumene. Minister 
Abdelmoumene gave an official answer in a long communication, where he replied 
that the accusations of the autonomous trade unions were merely “allegations”1066. 
While the Minister stressed that there are still lot to do regarding the socio-economic 
development in the country, he denied that the measures conducted by the 
authorities regarding the trade union pluralism did not contradict with Algerian 
 
1059 El Moudjadid 4.9.2001. Le SNAPAP hausse le ton; La Tribune 4.9.2001. L SNAPAP déclare « la 
guerre ». Hasna Yacoub; El Watan 4.9.2001. Echec des négotiations. Amnay Idir.  
1060 La voix de l’Oranie 4.9.2001. « Le gouvernement ne reconnaît toujours pas le pluralisme syndical ». 
Him. 
1061 Le Matin 4.9.2001. ”C’est le tribunal international de Genève qui tranchera”. Yasmine F. 
1062 Liberté 4.9.2001. Le SNAPAP veut porter sa colère dans la rue. Farid Belgacem. 
1063 L’Authentique 4.9.2001. « Nous repartons en guerre » Le SNAPAP exprime sa déception des 
résultats de la commission mixte. Amel H. 
1064 Le jeune indépendant 15.9.2001. La CASA rate son rendez-vous. Nabila K. 
1065 Le Quotidien d’Oran 15.9.2001. Sept syndicats autonomes interpellent le gouvernement. Khalil M. 
1066 Le Quotidien d’Oran 22.9.2001. « Vos critiques sont des allégations ». H. Ziad. 
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responsibilities in the context of ILO conventions1067. The communication of the 
Minister was responded by SNAPAP with their own communication1068.  
The year 2001 was important regarding the development of the autonomous 
trade union movement. The following year (2002) started with the preparation of 
the general strike for April, meanwhile autonomous trade union movement waited 
the decision from ILO regarding the controversy related to the interpretation of the 
conventions and constitution. Contestation continued simultaneously in the CHU 
Oran1069 related to social issues in the hospital where nine SNAPAP activists started 
hunger strike that lasted only few days, when solution was found via negotiations 
between unionists and authorities1070. Negotiations were also held in the health 
sector between autonomous unions (SNAPAP and SNPSP1071) and the Minister of 
Health and the Population Abdelhamid Aberkane, who assured the freedom of trade 
unionism and the integration of the contractors1072. How fruitful were these 
asymmetric negotiations? How their failure impacted on the future openings, 
believes in dialogue and trust between the antagonistic actors? 
The conflict between autonomous trade unions and the state officials enlarged 
into international level when the permanent secretariat of the ILO published its 300 
hundred-page report composed following the SNAPAP complaint of September 
2001. In the report, both sides had sent communications to explain their position. 
The Committee’s conclusion were in many ways assent regarding accusations of 
SNAPAP: 
154. As regards the SNAPAP’s application to establish confederations 
(entitled SNATA and CASA), the Committee notes the Government’s reply 
to the effect that these applications were turned down in view of their non-
conformity with sections 2 and 4 of Act No. 90-14 of 2 June 1990 respecting 
procedures for the exercise of the right to organize. In this respect, the 
Committee considers it appropriate to recall the content of these provisions. 
Section 2 provides that “workers and employers in the same occupations, 
trades or sectors of economic activity shall have the right to set up trade 
unions for the purpose of defending their material and moral interests”. 
 
1067 Le Quotidien d’Oran 22.9.2001. « Vos critiques sont des allégations ». H. Ziad. 
1068 Le Quotidien d’Oran 25.9.2001. Le SNAPAP répond au ministère. Djamel B. 
1069 Le Carrefour d’Oran 12.2.2002. Rien ne va plus au CHU d’Oran. Hadj Allal.  
1070 La voix de l’Oranie 17.2.2002. Neuf syndicalistes entament une grève de la faim. B. Nacéra; El Watan 
21.2.2002. La grève de la faim suspendue. T. Ameur. 
1071 L’Authentique 3.1.2002. L’espoir renaît: Rencontre aujourd’hui des SNPSP, SNAPAP et SNPD. 
Amel H. 
1072 Le Quotidien d’Oran 10.3.2002. Pas de compression de travailleurs dans le secteur de la santé. 
Abdelkader Mostefai. 
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Section 4 provides that “associations, federations and confederations of trade 
unions shall be subject to the same provisions as those applying to trade 
unions”. In the view of the Committee, these provisions do not pose a 
problem from the standpoint of the principles of freedom of association since 
they may be applied to first-level organizations and the latter are free to 
establish interoccupational organizations and affiliate to federations and 
confederations in the manner deemed most appropriate by the workers or 
employers concerned, without prior authorization being required. 
155. However, it seems to be the Government’s interpretation of these 
provisions which poses a problem in this case. In the light of the information 
available, the Committee observes that the Government, citing various 
requirements laid down in legislation, in practice prevents workers in the 
public sector from establishing a confederation. The Committee recalls that 
the right of workers and employers to establish organizations of their own 
choosing is one of the fundamental aspects of freedom of association. In 
particular it implies the right to take the following decisions freely: the choice 
of structure and composition of organizations; the establishment of one or 
more organizations for an enterprise, occupation or branch of economic 
activity; and the establishment of federations and confederations. Thus, the 
principle laid down in Article 2 of Convention No. 87 that workers shall have 
the right to establish and join organizations of their own choosing implies for 
the organizations themselves the right to establish and join federations and 
confederations of their own choosing. Moreover, the Committee has always 
considered that the preferential rights granted to the most representative 
organizations should not give them the exclusive right to set up federations 
and affiliate with them [see Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom 
of Association Committee, 4th edition, 1996, paras. 606 and 619]. 
Accordingly, the Committee requests the Government to take the necessary 
measures to ensure that the workers who are members of the SNAPAP may 
establish and join federations and confederations of their own choosing. It 
requests the Government to keep it informed in this respect. 
156. As regards the allegations of favouritism displayed by the Government 
towards the UGTA trade union, the Committee notes that the Government 
has not provided specific observations on this subject. The Committee 
reminds the Government that, by according favourable or unfavourable 
treatment to a given organization as compared with others, a government may 
be able to influence the choice of workers as to the organization which they 
intend to join. In addition, a government which deliberately acts in this 
manner violates the principle laid down in Convention No. 87 that the public 
authorities shall refrain from any interference which would restrict the rights 
provided for in the Convention or impede their lawful exercise. The 
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Committee trusts that the Government will take these principles fully into 
account in future. 
157. As regards the allegations that the SNAPAP was denied the right to 
participate in the management boards of social security funds on the pretext 
that only the most representative trade union is authorized to sit on them, the 
Committee notes the Government’s statements to the effect that, under 
section 39 of Act No. 90-14 of 1990, only organizations that are representative 
at the national level may sit on these boards and that the SNAPAP cannot 
claim to be representative at the national level. In this respect, the Committee 
recalls that it has always considered that certain advantages, especially with 
regard to representation, might be accorded to trade unions by reason of the 
extent of their representativeness. However, the determination of the most 
representative trade union should always be based on objective and pre-
established criteria so as to avoid any opportunity for partiality or abuse. The 
Committee notes in this respect that, in this case, the complainant does not 
seem to challenge the status of the UGTA as the most representative 
organization.  
158. As regards the allegations concerning obstacles to the holding of general 
assemblies, the Committee notes that, according to the Government, the latter 
explained to the SNAPAP that general assemblies may be organized freely and 
without prior authorization of the employer, unless they are held at the 
workplace during working hours. However, according to the SNAPAP, the 
employers constantly refuse to allow general assemblies even outside working 
hours for security reasons. In this respect, the Committee reminds the parties 
concerned that the right of occupational organizations to hold meetings in 
their premises to discuss occupational questions, without prior authorization 
and interference by the authorities, is an essential element of freedom of 
association and the public authorities should refrain from any interference 
which would restrict this right or impede its exercise, unless public order is 
disturbed thereby or its maintenance seriously and imminently endangered 
[see Digest, op. cit., para. 130].  
159. Moreover, the Committee notes that the Government rejects outright all 
the allegations referring to presumed threats of prohibition on establishing 
trade union sections, closures of premises, dismissals, transfers and 
suspensions of pay of trade union members. However, the Committee 
observes that, in a recent communication dated 15 October 2001, the 
SNAPAP once again reports numerous obstacles to freedom of association in 
different branches of economic activity: prohibition on establishing a trade 
union section in hospitals; sanctions, suspensions, physical assault, transfers 
and intimidation of trade union members and officers; and closure of trade 
union premises. The SNAPAP provides a detailed list of persons subjected to 
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such measures and the branches of economic activity and places where these 
violations are alleged to have occurred. The Committee accordingly requests 
the Government to send without delay its observations concerning the 
specific allegations put forward by the SNAPAP on this subject. Moreover, 
since the SNAPAP has not provided any detailed information concerning the 
allegations of dismissals, internment and other arbitrary measures against its 
members forcing them to take exile, the Committee requests the SNAPAP to 
provide any additional information it considers useful in this regard. 
160. Lastly, the Committee notes that in its communication of 16 October 
2001 the Government deplores the fact that the SNAPAP did not exhaust all 
of the remedies available in Algeria before appealing to the ILO. In this 
respect, the Committee reminds the Government that although the use of 
internal legal procedures, whatever the outcome, is undoubtedly a factor to be 
taken into consideration, the Committee has always considered that, in view 
of its responsibilities, its competence to examine allegations is not subject to 
the exhaustion of national procedures [see Digest, op. cit., Annex 1, para. 33]. 
Moreover, the Committee expresses its profound concern at the SNAPAP’s 
allegation that, since it presented its complaint to the ILO, the Algerian 
authorities have refused all contact with it and reneged entirely on the 
promises previously made to the SNAPAP. The Committee requests the 
Government to send its observations in this respect without delay1073.  
Report also express its concern regarding the situation in Algeria, stating that: “[T]he 
Committee expresses its profound concern at the SNAPAP’s allegation that, since it 
presented its complaint to the ILO, the Algerian authorities have refused all contact 
with it and reneged entirely on the promises previously made to the SNAPAP”. 
However, although five autonomous trade unions (SATEF, SNTE, SNAPAP, 
CNES and SNPSP) were supposed to organize the general strike in April, only 
SNAPAP and CNES did so, which ended in modest participation1074. After these 
victories, one could ask why Algerians did not want to join for struggle of 
autonomous trade unions? Were people already enjoying the fruits of the economic 
growth or were they worried about risking the fragile stability in the country or their 
own situation? Were autonomous trade unions and oppositional political parties in 
general lacking the confidence of the citizens for being credible alternative vis-à-vis 
state authorities?  
 
1073 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50002:0::NO:50002:P50002_COMPLAINT_TEX
T_ID:2906533  
1074 Liberté 15.4.2002. Seuls le CNES et le SNAPAP: Grève de la coordination syndicale. R.M/M.B. 
(R.M/M.B. indicates the first letters of the forename and surname of journalist who wrote the article). 
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During the year 2002, various strikes and sit-ins were organized during the year. 
In the health sector, SNPSSP accused that the negotiations during February with 
Minister of Health and Population Aberkane did not bring any change or concrete 
results, because the promises were not kept regarding the specialization and 
salaries1075. An average salary of 14 000 dinars did not motivate specialists to work 
in the public sector and it was time to go back to the streets to put pressure on the 
authorities. In the summer, the Minister of Work and Security Social Tayeb Louh 
met with the leader of UGTA Abdelmadjid Sidi-Saïd regarding the reform in the 
public sector and promised to consult autonomous trade unions as well1076. The 
reform became important especially for many of those who were worried about the 
effects of the globalization in the public sector through privatizations. Sidi-Saïd 
alarmed all the trade unions for common battle against it denouncing the “war 
between unions”1077. Was UGTA using its “enemy”, autonomous trade unions, to 
pressure the government? 
In the autumn, SNAPAP denounced the reform plan of the Head of the 
Government Ali Benflis. SNAPAP’s unanimity fractured after one of its members 
and the member of parliament Belkacem Felfoul1078 voted for the plan in the 
People’s National Assembly1079. Simultaneously, various oppositional newspapers 
started to connect SNAPAP in their headlines and articles to the protest organization 
that aimed at constructing a large social protest movement. This movement followed 
the example and rhetoric of the leftist international global protest movement that 
organized anti-globalist manifestations against multilateral institutions such as IMF, 
World Bank, WTO and G8 meetings1080. SNAPAP denounced the reform, 
continued to criticize UGTA as an “aspirin union”, giving energy to the power, and 
 
1075 La Tribune 24.4.2002. La grogne des praticiens spécialistes de la santé publique reprend de plus 
belle: Selon le SNPSSP, les promesses et engagement du ministère de tutelle n’ont pas été tenus. Amel 
Bouakba. 
1076 Le Matin 15.7.2002. Tayeb Louh élargit les consultations. Samira I. 
1077 Le Quotidien d’Oran 22.7.2002. Sidi Saïd annonce une bipartite sur la fonction publique en octobre. 
M. Abdelkader; L’expression 23.7.2002. Des syndicats unis autour de causes peu « communes ». 
Mohamed Abdoun. 
1078 In 2004 SNAPAP was divided between SNAPAP Malaoui and SNAPAP Felfoul due to 
dissenssions. 
1079 L’Expression 14.8.2002. Le Snapap approuve. S.B. (S.B. indicates the first letters of the forename 
and surname of journalist who wrote the article). 
1080 Le Soir d’Algérie 14.8.2002. Vers un large mouvement de protestation. Zineb A. Maïche; La Presse 
14.8.2002. « Sauver la Fonction publique ». B.M and M.O. (B.M/M.O. indicates the first letters of the 
forename and surname of journalist who wrote the article). 
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shooting down the argument that reform would include increases in salaries1081 by 
showing, or politicizing from governmental perspective, how fragile the purchasing 
power of the public sector worker was1082.  Meetings between the Government and 
UGTA, were severely criticized by autonomous trade unions that accused them as 
fraud and organized sit-ins in front of the Parliament. Representative of the UGTA 
Boualem Bouzidi defended the negotiations by demoting autonomous trade unions:  
“We are against this law! The UGTA has 1,279,408 members, while the autonomous 
unions do not represent more than 20% of the civil servants. We are the ones who 
really represent the workers”1083. 
Bouzidi distanced the UGTA of being the underling of the state authorities while 
touching the patriotic sentiments by arguing that UGTA was the one that represented 
and looked after the interests of Algerian workers. The importance of the 2003 Law 
of the Finance, integrating questions such as status of the public sector and salaries, 
pushed Malaoui to issue severe statements: 
Everything has been prepared since August and we shouldn’t expect much. That they 
do not take us for idiots, all cannot be achieved in one fell swoop with twenty-five 
ministers1084.  
[T]he government is meeting with itself since the members of the organization of 
Sidi-Saïd are part of the power structure ... if not, how to explain that the so-called 
trade unionist like Mohamed Lakhdar Badredine is an FLN deputy and will definitely 
vote for the hydrocarbons bill1085.  
Negotiations were referred to as theatre meanwhile the 1600 dinars increase in 
salaries were considered insufficient1086. The government was meeting with itself 
because Malaoui did not see any difference between UGTA and the state. 
Meanwhile, newspapers more close to the power elite saw the negotiations as 
pacification meaning the increase of the salaries for more than half million workers, 
 
1081 L’Expression 15.8.2002. Le FMI, cet absent présent: Augmentation de salaire et « dépermanisation ». 
Mohamed Derar; L’Actualité 15.8.2002. Les salaires seront augmentés. Ali Oussi. 
1082 With average salary of 10 000 dinars. Regarding all the expenditures (2000 dinars for taxes and 
social security, 1600 dinars for rent, 1900 dinars for electricity, gas and water) only 4500 dinars were 
left for living including food. (El Watan 20.8.2002. Le SNAPAP déplore l’érosion des salaires; Le 
Quotidien d’Oran 20.8.2002. Le SNAPAP tire la sonnette d’alarme. Omar S; Le Matin 20.8.2002. « Il faut 
nous associer au dialogue social ». Nadir Benseba.) 
1083 El Watan 8.8.2002. L’optimisme de l’UGTA. Des dossiers chauds au menu de la bibartite. Adlène 
Meddi. 
1084 Le Matin 10.9.2002. « La bibartite est un échec ». Yasmine Ferroukhi. 
1085 Le Matin 10.9.2002. « La bibartite est un échec ». Yasmine Ferroukhi. 
1086 Le Quotidien d’Oran 10.9.2002. « On n’achètera pas notre silence pour 1.600 dinars ». Omar S. 
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which meant about 30 billion dinars cost for the state1087. The president of the 
SNPSP Salah Bensebaïni criticized that all the victories achieved by the autonomous 
trade unions were delivered as merit for UGTA, even though they had already 
reached to the similar agreement with the Minster Berkane earlier: 
We welcome this achievement, but we strongly deny and denounce the will of the 
UGTA to do everything possible to recover the hints of a substantive work we had 
to do with the Minister of Health well before1088. 
Bensebaïni was disappointed that the fruits of their combat was delivered to UGTA 
and accused the bipartite-negotiations of being nothing else than double war against 
SNAPAP. SNPSP hold in September its third Congress, which gathered other 
autonomous unions CNES, SNPSSP and SNAPAP. However, it marked the absence 
of UGTA1089. Malaoui and Bensbaïni had not been in good terms all the time, the 
previous having accused the latter being bought by the Minister1090. Now it was time 
for reconciliation and attempt for coordinated action. In the next chapter, I deal with 
various strategies that state authorities used to manage the concerted challenge of 
autonomous unions. 
6.2 Divide and rule: doubling the movements 
In 2003, after a year of many victories, SNAPAP continued its scramble with UGTA 
and state authorities campaigning for trade union pluralism through organizing 
repeated strikes, sit-ins and demonstrations in the public space. There was news 
about the members of the UGTA leaving the union towards autonomous 
parallels1091. One of them was Mourad Tchiko, who I met several times during my 
field research in the ranks of SNAPAP. Tchiko was member of the general direction 
of the civil protection SNAPC, affiliated to UGTA1092.  
The accusation related to political and to non-political antagonistic perceptions 
continued, when Malaoui displayed the announcement of the UGTA to hold a 
 
1087 L’Expression 17.9.2002. Les pouvoir publics jouent la carte de l’apaisemant. S. Benalia. 
1088 El Watan 19.9.2002. Bensebaïni: ”Halte aux manœuvres!”. K. Ouahab. 
1089 El Watan 29.9.2002. Les praticiens en congrès. Djamila Kourta. 
1090 El Watan 29.9.2002. Les praticiens en congrès. Djamila Kourta. 
1091 El Watan 17.2.2003. Des syndicalistes quittent l’UGTA. Arab Chih. 
1092 Le Soir d’Algérie 17.2.2003. Vers la création d’un syndicat autonome. K.B. (K.B. indicates the first 
letters of the forename and surname of journalist who wrote the article). 
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general strike 25-27 February 2003 as political. Malaoui accused UGTA of 
negotiation with the government  to appease the angered atmosphere among the 
workers for the benefit of the power (pouvoir): “It is a strike that has been negotiated 
between the UGTA and the government,  to absorb the discontent of the workers 
in the different sectors”1093. Therefore, UGTA and negotiations were politicized as 
political play and its action constantly linked to power (pouvoir). However, few days 
later Malaoui announced that SNAPAP will join to the strike organized by UGTA, 
but with goal of unlimited strike starting from 25 February 20031094: “[T]he fact that 
SNAPAP, which has no political ambitions, joins this strike will take its political 
weight into action”1095. Suddenly Algeria was confronted with a general strike 
organized simultaneously by two contestants: UGTA and SNAPAP. According to 
international media, the general strike shut down Algeria and was followed by 95 
percent of the workers1096. Meanwhile, the pro-government media forgot to tell in 
their news that while the strike was called by UGTA, it was also advanced through 
autonomous trade unions. Marginalizing autonomous trade unions UGTA’s 
strength to mobilize workers were thus amplified.  
2003 also witnessed two considerable developments: the establishment of the 
National Committee of Trade Union Liberties (Comité National des Libertés 
Syndicales, CNLS) and broad struggles in the sector of education. CNLS was 
established in October as observatory organization by seven autonomous trade 
unions (SNPSP, SNAPAP, CNES, SNPDSM1097, SNMASM1098, CNAPEST and 
CLA). Its main motivation came after arrests of unionists related to strikes in the 
education sector as well as when two important autonomous trade unions that were 
established in the secondary education sector did not receive official 
authorization1099. They were the Autonomous National Council of Secondary and 
Technical Education Teachers (Conseil National Autonomes des Professeurs de 
l’enseignement Secondaire et Technique, CNAPEST) and Council of Secondary 
 
1093 El Watan 19.2.2003. « C’est une grève politique » selon les syndicats autonomes. Nabila Amir. 
1094 El Moudjahid 22.2.2003. Le SNAPAP appelle à une grève le 25 février.  
1095 Le Matin 22.2.2003. « Nous ferons grève avec l’UGTA » Conférence de presse de M. Rachid 
Malaoui, secrétaire général du SNAPAP. Yasmine Ferroukhi. 
1096 BBC News 25.2.2003. Strike shuts down Algeria. Mohamed Arezki Himeur. 
1097 National Union of Professors and Docents in Medical Sciences (Syndicat National des Professeurs et 
Docents en Sciences Médicales). 
1098 National Union of Assistant Professors in Medical Sciences (Syndicat national des maîtres assistants en 
sciences médicales). 
1099 Le Matin 18.10.2003. Le Comité national des libertés syndicales élabore un programme d’action. 
R. M (R.M indicates the first letters of the forename and surname of journalist who wrote the article); 
Graïne (2010, 172). 
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Schools of Algiers (Conseil des lycées d’Alger, CLA). Important figure in the context 
of Algerian autonomous trade unionism, Redouane Osmane1100, aimed at the 
construction of one single body representing the workers in the field of education 
from the teachers to the cleaners and cookers, which did not fit to the vision of part 
of those forming the CNAPEST1101. CNAPEST organized its first strike that lasted 
45 days in January 2003 in the wilaya of Sétif, the city where the union was created1102, 
and soon spread to the wilaya of Bordj Bou Arreridj and elsewhere in the area1103. 
Later in the year, CNAPEST and CLA organized one of the longest strikes in the 
education sector that continued for about three months, demanding higher salaries 
for teachers1104. 
Politicization within autonomous trade union-UGTA antagonism took place also 
in the sector of education. Autonomous trade unions accused UGTA for using their 
affiliated union the National Federation of Education Workers (Fédération 
Nationale des Travailleurs de l’Éducation, FNTE) for interfering to the protest while 
the leader of UGTA Sidi-Saïd accused autonomous trade unions for “political 
ambitions”1105. The leadership of CNAPEST responded that their union was non-
political1106. CNAPEST and CLA were supported by the Kabyle citizens Aârouch-
movement, leftist and Islamists from El-Islah party1107. Therefore, it was true, that 
oppositional forces were behind CNAPEST and CLA. Remarkable amount of 
women, especially among CLA, also participated to the strike1108.  
Regarding the contestation in the educational sector, there is one interesting 
element to add, which describes well the versatility and richness of the field of trade 
 
1100 Redouane Osmane (1951-2007) founded in 1987 National Union of Algerian Students - Autonomous 
and Democratic (Syndicat National des Etudiants Algériens-Autonome et Démocratique, SNEA-AD) 
and was activist in the PST, trade unionist in the UGTA and founder of the autonomous trade union 
CLA. 
1101 Graïne (2010, 18-19 and 82-84). 
1102 According to Larbi Nouar CNAPEST emerged already in December 2002 within meeting in Sétif 
(Graïne 2010, 85). 
1103 Graïne (2010, 82). 
1104 Graïne (2003, 166); Werenfels, Isabelle (2007, 75) Managing Instability in Algeria: Elites and political 
change since 1995. London and New York: Routledge. 
1105 Liberté 9.11.2003. Démocratie syndicale et démocratie. M. Hammouche; Le Quotidien d’Oran 
11.11.2003. Le CNAPEST réplique à Sidi Saïd. Amel B. 
1106 Le Quotidien d’Oran 11.11.2003. Le CNAPEST réplique à Sidi Saïd. Amel B. 
1107 Werenfels (2007, 75). 
1108 Graïne (2010, 166). 
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unionism in Algeria. David Porter1109, who wrote an interesting work about the 
anarchist movement in the Algerian contemporary and past context, interviewed 
Redouane Osmane in 2003, who pointed out the significant difference between “the 
center and periphery”. Osmane argued in the interview that the significant female 
participation in the strikes was mainly related to culture that prevailed in the capital 
of Algiers and was therefore part of the “democratic practices” of the CLA. Osmane 
argued, that women's participation was not accepted and understood within 
CNAPEST, established in Eastern Algeria, fand unctioning in “authoritarian way” 
accusing the previous for non-transparent running of their trade union, especially 
regarding the decision making processes when CNAPEST was negotiating with state 
authorities (ministry) for an end to the strike. Osmane said: “the agreement signed 
by CNAPEST with the ministry was first revealed to strikers on television”, meaning 
that only small elite group in the leadership of CNAPEST made decisions without 
consulting the activists on the base level1110. This cultural inference is revealing and 
may inform us about the differences between large urban areas and smaller cities in 
the periphery, or they may reveal certain urban-centric attitudes on the part of the 
teller.  
However, many activists were arrested during the strike invoked by the fact that 
CNAPEST and CLA were functioning without official authorization1111. I 
interviewed the president of the CNAPEST, Nouar Larbi, in January 2015 in Algiers, 
where he depicted the establishment of the union and the strikes that were organized 
in the autumn: 
When we created our union, it was based on protest action. UGTA is union that is 
representative. Union is not present only to be representative. We wanted to add to 
the sauce of the government something else that represents workers. When it is time 
for decisions, it cannot always begin with the refusal or acceptance of those decisions. 
There were three or four autonomous trade unions before us. However, they 
functioned almost in the same way as UGTA. They wanted to negotiate year after 
year without gaining anything. We did a revolution. We conducted a strike that 
continued almost two months in the end of 20031112.  
Before shifting towards autonomous unions, Larbi was already experienced trade 
unionist in the ranks of UGTA. However, he felt that something more should be 
 
1109 Porter, David (2011, 413-414) Eyes to the South. French Anarchists & Algeria. Oakland – Edinburgh 
– Baltimore: AK Press. 
1110 Porter (2011, 414). 
1111 Interview with President of CNAPEST Nouar Larbi in Algiers in January 2015. 
1112 Interview with President of CNAPEST Nouar Larbi in Algiers in January 2015. 
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done. His personal reminiscence, interviewed by Larbi Gaïne, is interesting in the 
context of acts of citizenship:  
I had previous experience at UGTA before the advent of CNAPEST. I was facing a 
dilemma. It was necessary either to give up teaching or to struggle to change it. Finally, 
I opted for the second solution. Colleagues supported me. If they had not done it, I 
would have given up1113. 
As if answering to the criticisms presented by Redouane Osmane, Larbi stresses the 
importance of the support from his colleagues that was crucial for the continuation 
of his acts of citizenship. It is also important to highlight the importance of, 
supportive or discouraging, impact of social surrounding in the cumulative political 
activity of the individuals. 
In addition to active employment policies, the authorities have a variety of other 
strategies to undermine the autonomous trade union movement. According to Amar 
Benamrouche, since the independence in 1962 until the 1980s, the government 
integrated their own representatives inside the protest movements and aimed 
through this infiltration to integrate and rule various independent social 
movements1114. Redouane Osmane stated that especially after the civil war it was 
hard to organize meetings without governmental presence1115. Autonomous trade 
union activists have also accused authorities for direct physical interference such as 
arrests and harassment.  New autonomous trade unions, such as CNAPEST and 
CLA, faced the refusal of official recognition when their licenses were canceled. 
During my discussions with many union activists they blamed the authorities for 
bribing and corrupting individual union members to disperse unions and other 
oppositional movements and associations, which created suspicion among activists 
themselves.  
Trade union pluralism can be considered as inherent right according to ILO 
Conventions 87 and 98 in the context of freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining1116. However, it does not make it 
obligatory, regardless of its inherent legitimacy1117. Neither can the obligation be 
found from Algerian constitution, which makes it challenging for autonomous trade 
 
1113 Nouar Larbi interviewed by Larbi Graïne (2010, 79). 
1114 Benamrouche, Amar (1999, 152) Grèves et conflicts politiques en Algérie. Paris: Karthala – Institut 
Maghreb Europe. 
1115 Porter (2011, 414). 
1116 International Labour Office (2010) Trade union pluralism and proliferation in French-speaking Africa. 
Geneva: International Labour Office. 
1117 International Labour Office (2010). 
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unions to legally condemn the reluctance of the Algerian government to complicate 
their actions1118. Regarding the recent history of the autonomous trade unions in 
Algeria, the prevention of the functioning of the Islamist SIT symbolized the first 
attempt to restrict the pluralism of the trade unionism in the country. In the interview 
conducted by Andrea Liverani in 20021119, Rachid Malaoui described government 
activity aiming to undo trade union pluralism as an early example how the state 
officials implement divide-and-rule tactics to break the SIT: 
RM: We had the law [on unions] through marches and demonstration because even 
if initially [the authorities] included “la liberté syndicale” in the constitution, they later 
did not want to implement it. And then they did not give us recognition, because you 
know, the Algerian power (pouvoir) does not grant recognition if inside they haven’t 
got somebody they can manipulate as they like. With the SIT the “pouvoir” required 
the sectoriality criteria to be respected: but the Islamists set up different unions, and 
then without the agreement they declared themselves united in the SIT, and de facto 
the SIT became the Islamists’ union. Now what people do not know is that they 
drained all the workers from the public economic sector off the UGTA: and this why 
the UGTA backed the army in 1992, because with the Islamists there, nor necessarily 
in power, but simply there, its destiny was doomed. Today, since the law forbids the 
dissolution of a union, the Islamist Leagues are disbanded by decree every six months 
… and now the workers of the public and private sector are left only with the 
UGTA1120.  
Before I started my fieldwork regarding the autonomous trade unions in Algeria, I 
read the history of the development of trade unionism in the country and tried to 
follow as much as possible the events through various media sources. However, 
there were multiple details and practices that I could have not figured out by myself 
and if I did not have had possibility to speak with activists of the autonomous trade 
unions themselves as part of the participant observation in the fieldwork. In 2013, I 
met Rachid Malaoui, Kaddour Chouicha and other trade unionists in a cafe in Oran. 
During our discussions, I unexpectedly faced a problem that had caused me troubles 
when I was still gathering information and trying to construct larger picture about 
the field of autonomous trade unions, their orientations and functioning: There were 
two different unions that were both called SNAPAP:   
KM: You have just organized a strike in the public sector.  
 
1118 Chouicha, Kaddour (2008, 277-278) Évolution du pluralism syndical, in Mohammed Chentouf 
(Eds.) l’algérie face à la mondialisation. Éditions Codesria: Dakar. 
1119 Liverani, Andrea (2008, 112) The Civil Society in Algeria: The political functions of associational life. Oxon: 
Routledge. 
1120 Liverani (2008, 112). 
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RM: Did you see any strike?  
KM: No. It was approximately two weeks ago.  
RM: Did you see it, were you here already?  
KM: No, I was not in Algeria yet. I only read about it in the press. El Watan [I 
probably remembered inaccurately the newspaper] said it was success and 
L’Expression said it was exaggerated.  
RM: El Watan did not say that it happened. All the newspapers said it was success. 
Did you see it on the ground? Did you feel the strike? Do you know what is strike 
organized in the public sector? A strike in the public sector means health, communes, 
education … everything. Did you hear that it was a legal strike? Did you hear that 
from the press? You were not in Algeria? That was a strike that existed only in the 
press.   
KM: Who organized it?  
RM: A clone. You have to understand this before we can move on. A clone of the 
power (pouvoir) had asked permission from the power to organize a strike, which 
does not have any base. A clone makes a strike, newspapers and television tell lies. 
The strike was never illegal. Majority of the press are part of the power or there are 
journalists in the press that are part of the power. Therefore, they may speak about 
the strike but on the ground, there is nothing. […] All the strikes that are not directed 
against to the power are announced legal. However, they knew that there was a 
movement that was gaining ground so they have … this false trade union, which 
organizes a false strike to diminish [the real movement?] … but it did not work. That 
is why it is difficult and you have to read and understand the CISA report1121 well in 
details. You cannot do the research by leaning to the articles in the press, because the 
press is manipulated1122.  
I felt stupid and started to consider by myself whether I was really sure that there 
was an article, which said that SNAPAP was organizing the strike. Actually, I felt 
many times quite foolish, asking silly questions. Especially the older generation of 
male activists were sometimes frustrated to explain me in plain, in concrete and 
simple terms, how things worked within civic contestation within autonomous trade 
unions. Sometimes they must have been disappointed about my lack of 
understanding about the situation, in some cases it was just their way of discussing a 
bit arrogantly. They also must have felt frustrated because after years of struggle their 
arguments seemed to be obscure. Nevertheless, I must also bring out that I met and 
interviewed many older male activists that were always eager to share their 
 
1121 CISA - Comité international de soutien au syndicalisme autonome algérien. (Octobre 2013). Algérie 2013: La 
poursuite des violations des libertés syndicales par le pouvoir.  
1122 Interviewed in Oran in March 2013.   
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knowledge, explain and teach me about the history and contemporary situation 
related to unionism in Algeria. 
There were multiple autonomous trade unions that were created from the internal 
struggles and contested, which had right to use the name of the union. The members 
of the autonomous trade unions call this process as the cloning or doubling the 
movements. From the research point of view, the cloning was extremely interesting. 
While the Algerian state authorities seem to aversely tolerate the autonomous unions, 
various obstacles according to autonomous trade union activists are created to 
undermine their activity. One tactic was the “creation of doubles”, or “cloning”, as 
the autonomous union activists called them. Cloning seems to be, according to 
SNAPAP activists, one of the responses from the Algerian authorities to create 
ambiguity among Algerians and external observers. I have to admit that before I 
understood the logic of cloning, argued by the activists, I was confused when trying 
only to depend on newspaper articles and in relation to SNAPAP and other 
autonomous unions. On some occasions, I saw articles where SNAPAP was said to 
be organizing events or even cooperating occasionally with the UGTA or with some 
elements of it. When I asked from Rachid Malaoui: “Does SNAPAP work in some 
occasions with the UGTA”, he answered: “No, never”. I was told that it was the 
SNAPAP-Felfoul, considered as clone by those supporting SNAPAP-Malaoui that 
actually cooperates with UGTA. The division into two SNAPAPs dates back to 
internal struggle inside SNAPAP in 2004. 
The discourses that were constructed around the concept of political were once 
again strongly present in the occurrences of 2004, which divided SNAPAP, and were 
closely linked to the presidential elections of April 2004. SNAPAP refused to 
support the candidacy of the incumbent President Bouteflika, who won the elections 
with 85 percent of the votes. His main opponent, former Prime Minister, Ali Benflis 
received only 6.4 percent while Abdallah Djaballah from the Movement for National 
Reform (El-Islah) got five percent with 58.1 percent turnout. In the end of May 
2004, one of the founding members of the SNAPAP and deputy in the People’s 
Assembly, Belkacem Felfoul led a congress in the hotel Riyad (Sidi Fredj), National 
Council meeting, which voted for new Secretary General to take out current 
Secretary General Malaoui from his position1123. The congress that gathered around 
60 participants, accused Malaoui for:  
 
1123 Le Quotidien d’Oran 26.5.2004. Malaoui contesté de l’intérieur: Mouvement de « redressement » au 
SNAPAP. S.E.K. (S.E.K. indicates the first letters of the forename and surname of journalist who 
wrote the article). 
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… using the organization for political purposes and for zaâma [...] It advertises 
internationally and, in particular the International Labor Office (ILO), without 
recourse, was ignoring the legal ways of settling labor disputes [...] uses the 
representations of the organization in the wilayas in favor of Ali Yahia Abdennour’s 
League of the Human Rights (LADDH), and present its claims1124. 
Malaoui organized a press conference where he denounced the legality of the 
congress and accused Felfoul of misusing his position as deputy in the Parliament 
and as a member of SNAPAP to confuse the public1125.  According to Malaoui this 
was an orchestrated attack by the state officials, because SNAPAP did not support 
President Bouteflika’s candidacy: 
We opposed the government's actions and publicly opposed several projects. We also 
refused to support the presidential candidate, considering that we are an apolitical 
union1126. 
Felfoul and Hassan Achour also affirmed that the straw that broke the camel's back 
regarding their action to substitute Malaoui was the non-support for President 
Bouteflika’s candidacy1127. However, Malaoui stressed the unity of SNAPAP, which 
could not be broken by the attempts of destabilization through this kind of “pseudo-
congresses”: 
We are united. It's the outcasts of the union that came out today. They contacted their 
friends to organize the congress without any meetings in the wilaya level. None of the 
members of the National Council were present at this meeting. It is clear that there is 
a will to break SNAPAP1128. 
SNAPAP received support from the CNLS, when its leader Tahar Besbes 
condemned the violation of trade union freedoms1129. The SNAPAP sections in 
Annaba, Chlef and Béjaïa announced one week after the congress in Riyad that they 
 
1124 Le Quotidien d’Oran 26.5.2004. Malaoui contesté de l’intérieur: Mouvement de « redressement » au 
SNAPAP. S.E.K. 
1125 El Watan 26.5.2004. « Le pouvoir ne veut pas d’un syndicat autonome ». Nabila Amir. 
1126 El Watan 26.5.2004. « Le pouvoir ne veut pas d’un syndicat autonome ». Nabila Amir. 
1127 Le Quotidien d’Oran 26.5.2004. Malaoui contesté de l’intérieur: Mouvement de « redressement » au 
SNAPAP. S.E.K. 
1128 El Watan 26.5.2004. « Le pouvoir ne veut pas d’un syndicat autonome ». Nabila Amir. 
1129 Liberté 1.6.2004. ”Les libertés syndicales sont confisquées » Tahar Besbes, coordinateur du CNLS à 
Liberté. Nadia Mellal; La Tribune 2.6.2004. Les syndicats autonomes dénoncent « les atteintes aux 
libertés syndicales ». Karima Mokrani. 
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did not recognize the new leadership of Felfoul1130. Few weeks later in June, 
SNAPAP behind the Maaloui organized national conference in Rouiba, which 
gathered more than 300 participants from 41 wilayas as well as representatives from 
CLA, SNPSP and SNPSSP1131. In addition, there were representatives from political 
parties such as FFS and RCD and from the German Friedrich Eber Foundation1132. 
The meeting was a show of force from Malaoui to assure his position as secretary 
general of SNAPAP1133. Six years later in an interview with Larbi Graïne Malaoui 
explains the incidents:   
[...] there has been attempts to stick labels on us and to get us involved in debates that 
do not fall within our competence. When that did not succeed, as a punishment, they 
created doubles to our unions. In 2004, we were asked to support publicly the 
candidacy of Bouteflika for the second mandate. We had already lived this scenario 
during the presidential elections of 1999. I remember that at the time we had to make 
a passage on state television to say that we will observe the neutrality in these 
elections. However, the people in power did not digest our position. The breaking 
took place when in 2004 we refused to march for the second time. We were told that 
if we did not support their candidate, they would create us a clone. “Expect the 
destabilization. If it necessitates your imprisonment, we will do it”, our interlocutors 
told us1134. 
Malaoui explained how they were threatened being imprisoned by the authorities or 
destabilized in the organizational level if they would not to support the second 
mandate of President Abdel Aziz Bouteflika: 
We told them that we need to change the laws. Because they prohibit unions, it is 
written in black on white, to be affiliated with a political party or any other organ. So 
the law is very clear. [...] Why the authorities did not sanction unions or associations 
that supported nominations? Yet the law 90-14 expressly forbids them to do it. In 
other words, what is being asked of us is neither more nor less than violations of the 
law1135. 
 
1130 Le Jeune Indépendant 1.6.2004. Les sections d’Annaba, Chlef et Béjaïa ne reconnaissent pas la 
nouvelle direction. N.O. (N.O. indicates the first letters of the forename and surname of journalist 
who wrote the article). 
1131 La Tribune 20.6.2004. Les partisans de Malaoui dénoncent la mainmise du pouvoir sur le SNAPAP. 
Amel Bouakba.  
1132 La Tribune 20.6.2004. Les partisans de Malaoui dénoncent la mainmise du pouvoir sur le SNAPAP. 
Amel Bouakba 
1133 Le Soir d’Algérie 21.6.2004. Conference nationale consultative des cadres du SNAPAP: Malaoui lève 
le doute. Zineb A. Maïche. 
1134 Rachid Malaoui interviewed by Larbi Graïne (2010, 34-35). 
1135 Rachid Malaoui interviewed by Larbi Graïne (2010, 35). 
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Malaoui defended the non-political orientation of SNAPAP by taking neither 
Bouteflika’s nor Benflis’s side. He explained that during the period when rival 
candidate Ali Benflis worked as Prime Minister, SNAPAP was organizing sit-ins in 
front of Interior, Vocational training and Health Ministries to oppose antisocial 
politics of the Benflis-government. These protests, however, failed to attract any 
media attention. Therefore, if SNAPAP wanted to do politics why did they not used 
the supportive media attention given to Benflis campaign in supporting his candidacy 
for their own political purposes?  
[…] the press was politically allied with Benflis. But if we were to attack Bouteflika, 
we should be sure to occupy one of the newspapers. We did not want to play this 
game. We said that we did not support anyone. And we had to assume the 
consequences of our stance: retaliation from the ministry of the interior and the 
president. We are a trade union and we have duties to our members. Nothing obliges 
us in the statute to adhere to this or that party. People come to us because they want 
to defend their moral and material interests, no more. I cannot avoid this. At 
SNAPAP, there are benflisists, Bouteflikists, ffsistes, everyone is represented. We 
cannot instruct them how to vote, the law forbids it, and trade union ethics does not 
allow it. Imagine that you support a candidate who will later without telling everyone 
privatize the public service, what are you going to do?1136 
When Larbi Graïne, who did the interview, asked who contacted Malaoui to support 
Bouteflika, he does not want to answer: 
I cannot tell you more. They were the decision-makers, we will tell more when the 
time is right1137.  
In 2014, ten years later, I spoke with Salim Mecheri about the incident. He recalled 
in detail the sequence of events:  
KM: What happened with Felfoul? 
SM: It is true that Felfoul was before the representative of the autonomous trade 
union SNAPAP. We worked together during the arrival of the Bouteflika. Felfoul 
presented to deputation in 2001. If I remember well, he presented himself as the free 
candidate. We knew very well the Algerians and that a free candidate could never 
pass. If it is not designed by the power (pouvoir) one can never … We understood 
that Felfoul had a clan who was directing him1138.  
 
1136 Rachid Malaoui interviewed by Larbi Graïne (2010, 36). 
1137 Rachid Malaoui interviewed by Larbi Graïne (2010, 36). 
1138 Salim Mecheri. Interviewed in Oran in December 2014. 
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Mecheri explained that they started to be convinced that Felfoul had the power elite 
behind him, because otherwise he could never be elected as a free candidate. 
Simultaneously Mecheri explained that SNAPAP leaders used this occasion to get 
rid of him by appealing to the organizational codes of the union: 
Luckily, leaders of SNAPAP made a reflection that it can be a good occasion to make 
him disappear. We can impose on him the status of our organization that whoever 
direct or deceive the trade union organization and who presents within the electoral 
organs such as APC [l’assemblée populaire communale] or APW [l’assemblée 
populaire de wilaya] must depose his resignation within the trade union organization. 
We believe that trade unionist has the ambitions and it is not forbidden, but you are 
subjected to the status of the organization. If you chose to be the deputy, you cannot 
represent the organization. […] He was elected. We spoke with him telling that now 
was up to him to depose his resignation because his status has changed. […] One is 
detached from his position and paid by the APN. Supposedly, he was agreeing, more 
or less1139.  
Mecheri also accused that while Felfoul was deputy, he did nothing to help SNAPAP 
meanwhile the latter organized protests and strikes. 
I remember the second mandate of the Bouteflika. We were called by Felfoul. I 
remember that I was in Algiers. No, before that we made one hunger strike that had 
really an effect [hunger strike in 2002]. We entered into negotiations. We were told 
that there will be less problems. We were told that they [state authorities] will 
recognize the autonomous trade unions and so forth. After the second mandate [of 
the Bouteflika], we were called by Felfoul. I was personally called by Felfoul. I was in 
training in Annaba. We had a program supported by the Commission of the European 
Union. The one who was the interlocutor of the program was the Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation. I remember I was in Algiers. He asked: “Selim, why do you work with 
the Friedrich Ebert Foundation”. I told: “Because it is foundation that supports the 
trade union organizations. We have elaborated on program of formation properly 
Algerian, where those who communicators and consultants are Algerians. At the same 
time, I was not able to combine what was the problem. UGTA was also supported 
by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. There were SNAPAP, UGTA and one cultural 
organization from Tizi Ouzou and another in Algiers. European Commission had 
reserved a sum to support and promote this formation. However, we did not touch 
any money. It was the Friedrich Ebert Foundation that organized everything, such as 
the accommodation of the participants, the reimbursement and who paid for those 
who communicated [speakers] so we were nothing but organizers doing the work 
from the voluntary basis. We deposed the technical sheet […] After he [Felfoul] asked 
what would I think if we would support the candidacy of the Bouteflika’s second 
mandate. I told it is not me to answer whether we support or whether not. It is 
National Council [SNAPAP] that must decide whether it wants to adopt this position. 
He was like you are against the elections, I said it is not about that. I asked, do you 
 
1139 Salim Mecheri. Interviewed in Oran in December 2014. 
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ask me the question as a citizen or trade unionist? He said it is as you wish and I said 
no, it is not the same. I told him that: “If you want my personal position I can tell you 
I have never voted and I will never vote”1140.  
Mecheri openly admitted that he does not vote. This shows how the autonomous 
trade union activists differentiate formal political participation and activism (extra-
parliamentary participation) within manifest political act according to framework of 
Joakim Ekman and Erik Amnå (introduced in the previous chapter)1141. Also, 
Mecheri’s disengagement from elections can be considered as active disengagement, 
because he boycotted formal elections since 1992, when he believes democratic 
development was halted: 
I was clear with my position. It is true, I have never voted since 1992. Boycott is also 
a right? He started to contact people one after another. Then we invoked the National 
Council [SNAPAP] […] The day before the National Council meeting, there was a 
congress of the CNES in the center of Tipaza. The day before our National Council 
meeting, we were accommodated in the center where we met Kaddour and others. 
He had just resigned to prevent reappoint of their General Secretary. […] When they 
terminated we started ours. I remember, there was a messenger, the one who is today 
Head of the Government [Abdelmalek] Sellal. He was then the leader of the electorate 
cabinet of the Bouteflika’s second term. He was sent to follow our National Council 
saying that the President ask you to support his candidacy. I remember that we were 
clear that as members of National Council we do not have possibility to decide but 
that it will be decided within the National Council. We finished the National Council 
and with a huge majority we … Felfoul did not participate to this [meeting of] 
National Council … because he understood that we are not going to support this 
[candidacy of Bouteflika] but the debate was held transparently and it was open. It 
was even decided that if majority votes for the support of the candidacy of the 
presidential elections it is up to them to assume this responsibility. Every member 
gave his opinion. Personally, I gave my opinion that was against. With overwhelming 
majority … it was the final declaration … I remember that it is inscribed in some of 
the journals that the SNAPAP is supposed to cherish its neutrality of autonomous 
trade unionism. The door is open to all the workers to vote whom ever is in their 
aspiration to avoid the polemic. Because one should not forget that SNAPAP is big 
autonomous trade union of the public function that is supposed to cherish its 
neutrality1142.  
SNAPAP does not prevent its members from choosing their political orientation but 
refrains as an organization from taking a stance in politics, while critics could also 
 
1140 Salim Mecheri. Interviewed in Oran in December 2014. 
1141 Ekman, Joakim & Amnå, Erik (2012) Political Participation and Civic Engagement: Towards a 
New Typology. Human Affairs 22, pp. 283-300. 
1142 Salim Mecheri. Interviewed in Oran in December 2014. 
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argue that SNAPAP’s non-political stance can be considered as active 
disengagement? However, from the democratic aspect Mecheri brings out important 
element why organizations such as SNAPAP should not take political stance: 
There are the circulars and decrees that call the workers in the public establishments 
to be vigilante and cherish their neutrality, because it is them, who organize the 
election in the levels of prefectures in the wilaya level. We are the trade union of the 
public function we have the section that are represented by the committees of the 
state. These committees of the state are the ones that control and organize … If you 
push them to affiliate or display with one candidate automatically you have a fear of 
fraud. […] Sellal came back and told to Rachid [Malaoui] that Bouteflika is not happy 
and that you will pay expensive bill for your position. One week later we received a 
mission order designing that Felfoul Belkacem, President of the trade union 
SNAPAP, organizes the electoral campaign of Bouteflika. […] After Bouteflika had 
the second mandate they rented a hotel called Tipaza Riyad. It is known state hotel. 
All the persons that organizes congress, assembly or whatever meeting in that hotel 
is automatically the power (pouvoir). I remember very well, the wali of Oran called to 
people, no matter who, musicians … that they have to assist to the congress. We were 
informed that there will be a congress. We precipitated asking: hey, what are you 
doing? We were called by the gendarmerie of Tipaza. They proceeded arrests of the 
45 voluntary members in the surroundings [of Tipaza]. Our other affiliates of 
SNAPAP were dispersed. Me, one of my friend called Toco and Madame Ghozlaine 
[currently Secretary General of SNAPAP] were in one office, where came one colonel. 
He told us: “you are legitimate organization. You are not wrong. I won’t hide from 
you the fact that I received the orders that the participants of the congress of Felfoul 
Belkacem must be securitized”. I assure you, he said it with these words. He said: 
“You have right to go out but you must not do anything. You should not create us 
problems”. I told him that I will close to the door and just watch. He said: “no 
problem”. I said: we will not touch them1143.  
Then Mecheri described the atmosphere within the congress organized by Felfoul: 
There were gendarmerie with German Shepherd Dogs. The participants of the 
congress were accompanied from the congress to the hotel1144.  
Mecheri spoke with the journalists from Algerian television, who according to him 
understood well what was going on, meaning that the congress organized by Felfoul 
was an act of theater organized by the power (pouvoir):  
Ten minutes past midnight, they had designed Felfoul Belkacem as Secretary General 
of the trade union [SNAPAP]. Luckily, we filmed everything. We photographed 
everything and we have proof that the power (pouvoir) that wanted to destabilize 
SNAPAP created one [clone] … The first thing we did was to draw complaint, a file 
 
1143 Salim Mecheri. Interviewed in Oran in December 2014. 
1144 Salim Mecheri. Interviewed in Oran in December 2014. 
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of consistence, to ILO [International Labour Organization]. They sent commission 
and called Minister of the Employment Tayeb Louh. I remember one friend of my, 
an expert, who worked in Geneva, told me: “I was in Algiers meeting the Minister of 
the Labour with Felfoul in his office. I was surprised”1145.  
This personal reminiscence of Mecheri related to occurrences of 2004 bring out 
various aspects related to the concept of political, manifest political action and 
cloning as an asset of power (pouvoir) to control oppositional movements. From 
the research point of view, my aim is not to say whether Mecheri’s account is correct 
or not, but to bring elements significant related to theoretical framework of this study 
at large and to depict an individual narrative of an autonomous trade union activist. 
To be able to verify whether things proceed as explained by Mecheri are beyond my 
reach, without having possibility to hear the narrative of the state authorities about 
the event. However, I am more interested here in the understanding of autonomous 
trade unions activists regarding the cloning, of which they accuse state authorities. 
Ten years later I asked SNAPAP activist Idris Mekideche in 2013, what is according 
to his view the so-called clone. It is simultaneously interesting to reflect how little 
appreciation trade union activists give to oppositional political parties. He answered:  
That is a problem, they [the authorities] do. Actually, the political parties do not 
disturb too much the power (pouvoir), they are weak and the real opposition does 
not exist. However, for the autonomous trade unions they create the clones. How? 
First, they infiltrate someone from their side to the union and create problems and 
finally create a new instance from the same union to make obstacles. These people 
are not representative. They do not have a base. They are only implanted by the state 
like what they did with SNAPAP when they implanted Felfoul. Felfoul was implanted 
to SNAPAP. Today, every time when SNAPAP declare a strike he [Felfoul] 
announces after one day that he stops the strike and that he has found a solution with 
the government only to wreck the strike (laughs) and many other things also. It is not 
honest. However, we are aware of all of that and we know all the difficulties we 
face1146.  
A similar process took place according to various autonomous trade union activists 
in educational sector as well, when the Autonomous National Union of Teachers of 
Secondary and Technical Education (Syndicat National Autonome des Professeurs 
d'Enseignement Secondaire et Technique, SNAPEST) was established in 2006 and 
received official authorization along with CNAPEST next year. The President of 
CNAPEST Larbi Nouar depicts the events: 
 
1145 Salim Mecheri. Interviewed in Oran in December 2014. 
1146 Interviewed in the bus heading to World Social Forum in March 2013 
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Therefore, what they do is that every union that they find really strong with leaders 
that are not corrupted, they search someone among them to create another union. 
SNAPEST is a double of the CNAPEST. Why, because CNAPEST was created in 
the East-Algeria, in Sétif. We chose one Kabylian [Meziane Meriane], because he 
spoke well French. At the time, there were a problem of the movement called 
Aârouch. It was maybe in 2002 and they were negotiating [Aârouch movement and 
the government]. Therefore, when we chose a Kabylian it meant that the authorities 
could not go too far with him. It was kind of a strategy that we had. Unfortunately, 
the one we chose, Mr. Meriane, is corrupted. He was not really trade unionist. Later, 
they obliged him to create another union, which is SNAPEST. That was in 2006. We 
were both unions authorized at the same period. As if, they wanted to create an 
amalgam among the educational sector: CNAPEST, SNAPEST and so forth. 
However, they [members] are academic and they can make the difference between 
CNAPEST and SNAPEST. There are also SATEF of the [Mohamed Salem] Sadali 
and SATEF of [Boualem] Amoura. There are now ongoing process in the court that 
prevents Sadali to speak in the name of SATEF, because they created dissidents inside 
the SATEF and there are today two SATEFs1147. 
Kaddour Chouicha explains about similar development in CNES: 
There were people already inside the CNES who waited that we would make one 
mistake. I was really tired, because we had in the National Council one party, one of 
them was the friend of Said Bouteflika [younger brother of President Bouteflika]. So 
for sure there were pressure. One party was related with the PST, who wanted that 
we would become a branch of the PST. It meant that we had to take care of all this 
at the same time. It was difficult moment and tiring as well. Of course, you had all 
the challenges related to power (pouvoir), but that is normal. That is its work. 
Therefore, there were people inside who waited. After I withdrew and some others 
as well, the new group who took control were a bit arriviste, not all of them1148. 
In the CISA report, Algérie 2013: La poursuite des violations des libertés syndicales 
par le pouvoir1149 exists a chapter, where the so-called “real” autonomous trade 
unions are separated from their clones. The report makes separation between 
SNAPAP (Malaoui) and SNAPAP-bis (Felfoul). CNAPEST (Nouar) and SNAPEST 
(Meriane), SATEF (Sadali) and Satef- bis (Abdelmadjid Basti, later Boualem 
Amoura), CNES-Chouicha and CNES-bis (Abdelmalek Rahmani) and SNTE 
(Mohamed Bennoui) and SNTE-bis (Abdelkim Boudjnah). In addition, the division 
was also made between the Inter-Union of the Public Service (Intersyndicale de la 
 
1147 Larbi Nouar, interviewed in Algiers, January 2015. 
1148 Kaddour Chouicha. Interviewed in Oran in January 2015. 
1149 CISA - Comité international de soutien au syndicalisme autonome algérien. (Octobre 2013). Algérie 2013: La 
poursuite des violations des libertés syndicales par le pouvoir.  
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function publique, IAFP1150) and the Coordination of the unions of the Public 
Service or Confederation of the Autonomous Trade Unions (Coordination des 
syndicats de la fonction publique or Confédération des syndicats autonomes, 
CSA1151). The CISA report can be considered as supportive of the perspectives of 
the autonomous trade unions, but it gives clear concerns regarding clones and 
doubling of the movements. 
At the same time, the Algerian autonomous trade union leaders are not different 
from those of other social movements around the globe in the sense that personal 
disputes are common as related to power struggles and other personal discordances. 
While my intention is not, as a researcher, to discount the experiences of cloning, I 
have also observed that whenever these personal conflicts set the autonomous trade 
unions apart from common action, the other counterpart has often been relatively 
readily called a clone, double agent, or governmental agent, and so forth. Actually, 
personal power struggles are also present in the Algerian autonomous trade union 
movement, which does not exclude the possibility that the governmental authorities 
would not use them or even create them for their own interests. There are various 
international examples of how the security forces infiltrate social movements so as 
to control them. For example, a well-known example from the United States, 
COINTELPRO (Counter Intelligent Program) was a cover operation used by the 
FBI to create disputes and doubts among the activists in the nexus of activists’ social 
network and social movements during 1950s to early 1970s1152.   
It is very difficult to figure out who are considered by whom as a clone, who is 
working with the state authorities, who are cooperating, and when, and how much 
inter-personal relations and disputes impact on labeling. In 2008, the United States 
was interested in trade union activism and planned nationwide strikes organized by 
autonomous trade unions in Algeria. From the Wikileaks cables, it is possible to read 
the reports, were Deputy Chief of Mission Thomas F. Daughton reports on these 
strikes and discusses meetings with union leaders. In the report Daughton writes 
about his meeting with the president of UNPEF Mohamed Ider:  
 
1150 Established in March 2006 by CLA, CNAPEST, SATEF, SNTE, SNAPAP, CNES and the National 
Union of Teachers of Paramedical Education (Syndicat National des Professeurs de l’Enseignement 
Paramédical, SNPEM). 
1151 The Coordination of the unions of the Public Service, or since 2012 the Confederatation of the 
Autonomous Trade Unions regroup UNPEF, SNPSSP, SNPSP, CNES-Rahmani, SNAPEST, 
SNPEPM and the Algerian National Union of the Psychologists (Syndicat National Algérien des 
Psychologues, SNAPSY). 
1152 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COINTELPRO 
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(C) SUMMARY: Algeria's autonomous unions are gearing up for two nationwide 
strikes in February as they continue to make demands on the state. While the unions 
largely agree among themselves on the issues underlying the strike calls, there is less 
agreement on who speaks for whom, with splinter movements forming inside some 
unions. […] 3. (C) Throughout the meeting, Ider underscored the apolitical nature of 
Algeria's autonomous unions. UNPEF, he said, had been officially recognized by the 
Algerian government since 1990 and had steadfastly relied on the country's legal 
system to advance its agenda. “We are not an opposition movement”, he stressed, 
but an organization that “cares about Algeria and will fight for Algeria”. […] 5. (C) 
COMMENT: The clear divisions within the autonomous union community make it 
difficult to know who speaks for whom. The protests planned for February by 
different autonomous unions may end up being noteworthy although, as Ider points 
out, the unions have the ability to speak to the government but not the power to 
negotiate with it1153. 
These cables show that the officials of the United States are also struggling to identify 
and map the autonomous trade union movement. In the context of this chapter, it 
is depicting how President Ider also stressed their apolitical nature. However, there 
are also other more direct preventions by state authorities according to autonomous 
trade unions. Idriss Mekideche explains the governmental efforts to obstruct the 
operation of the autonomous unions in the context of democratic development: 
IM: Indeed, it (power) does not declare straight that it refuses it [action of the 
autonomous unions]. It says that there are democracy and that there are any problems 
and so on. However, in reality there are lot of restrictions and impediments. By the 
way, there are many trade unions, who have deposited their registration to the 
ministry of labor where you register to create trade union but they are not given 
registration. […] Therefore, one prevents the others to organize and to unionize. That 
is how I see it. Because they know, that they violate the laws and human rights. Once 
there is an autonomous trade union, democracy, freedom of expression and freedom 
to unionize, it constitutes a danger for them. Secondly, there is a phenomenon, which 
is universal but propagates terrible ways in Algeria. I mean corruption and all that. 
When there is freedom to unionize it means a shame for them. Therefore, it is normal. 
The newspapers speak about the scandals related to the corruption every day. They 
have a problem with independent organizations so they want to be the godfathers of 
these unions and they want order what they can do or not do. That is not normal but 
they cannot claim anymore that there cannot be autonomous unions because the 
world has changed, but at the same time, they make obstacles for them.  
KM: Like what kind of obstacles?  
IM: For example, every time when SNAPAP organizes activity or action there is a 
problem. […] They prevent us to organize demonstrations. We are prevented from 
 
1153 Wikileaks. Unions plan nationwide protest surge: 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08ALGIERS140_a.html (Retrieved 26.2.2018). 
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organizing gatherings and sit-ins. Every time when there is a strike, they say it is not 
legal. How a strike can be illegal? I have heard that in democratic countries one person 
can be in strike. He do not work, there is something that does not please and he starts 
a strike. How it can be said about the entire national union, that has representatives 
in public sector in entirety. Education, justice, local collectives and the others have a 
strike, which is considered illegal. For us the legality … we do not look for to be legal 
anymore because we know that they say we are not. What we seek now is legitimacy, 
because we have a base and we are representative. That is the most important. The 
question is not whether you are legal or not. The laws can be changed. There are many 
autonomous trade unions due to non-access of SNAPAP to enter into economic 
sector, because they know that it constitutes a danger for them1154. 
Mekideche argued that they are no longer searching for legality in their acts of 
citizenship, but rather legitimacy, which elucidates what Mitchell had to say about 
how social action is structured through law1155.  Through legitimation of their 
existence and representation autonomous trade unions aim to impact legislation. 
Mekideche used the rhetoric of describing the state authorities as mafia by describing 
them as “the godfathers” who are afraid of letting autonomous unions to settle 
whether in the public sector and especially in the economic sector, where they would 
obtain more economic power and lever in pressuring the government through their 
action. Simultaneously Mekideche believed that the legitimation related to 
democratic pursuits have reached to culmination point, where there is no more 
return. He also suggests that the Algerian authorities need to show to the outside 
world that Algeria is democratic and respects its international commitments. I often 
felt during the interviews that autonomous trade union activists were quite hopeful 
for international pressure that could generate a more favorable situation for their 
activities. They also had had quite a normative expectation regarding European 
democracy, while being highly critical of their foreign policies. Another young 
activist Mohamed characterized the autonomous trade unions as part of the “real 
opposition movement”, unlike the other political parties:  
They [autonomous unions] disturb them. If you search for the establishment of 
autonomous union, I mean a real opposition party … because there are parties that 
play the game as if they are real opposition party, but it is more a theater play that is 
designed in advance. A conqueror that will fail … it is like that. The same thing in the 
field of economy, if you try to create something strong you will face obstacles. I think 
it disturbs them. Because, if you ask after the real workers’ rights it disturbs them … 
 
1154 Idriss Mekideche interviewed on the bus heading to World Social Forum in March 2013. 
1155 Mitchell (2003, 29). 
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because this is not democratic country. Therefore, they refuse to give permission of 
registration1156.   
These interviews show some of the means that are, according to them, used by the 
state officials to restrict the functioning and development of the autonomous trade 
union movement. They also consider the autonomous trade union movement and 
the network of other civil society actors as the real oppositional forces instead of 
some political parties, weakly rooted in the society, that “play the game” of the state 
authorities and remind merely “fake opposition” in the “theater play” rather than 
challenging the power in reality.   
Governmental politics regarding employment are much more than just the 
suspected breaking of the autonomous trade union movements. Using various 
programs, the government aims to improve working conditions and sustain labor 
policies. I believe that the autonomous trade union activities should be understood 
as a reaction to governmental employment policies and strategies in general in the 
context of the active labor market, and therefore their functioning should be 
reflected against the larger labor policy background as well. To approach this 
environment, it is possible to understand social, economic and political conditions 
in which autonomous trade union movement functions and to reflect the main 
features of Algeria’s labor markets: the employment services and active labor market 
programs, job placement services for unemployed people (men, women, youth) and 
state support services in broad societal context. Government regulates and balances 
labor markets through various programs that have been developed by the state 
during the past decades.   
In 2006, Mohamed Saïb Musette, who has published numerous analyses on 
Algerian employment policies, argued that sustainable and decent job creation in 
Algeria, and Maghreb in general, has been weak and deficient1157. Job creation was 
disturbed by informal employment, considerable unemployment and low activity of 
female labor1158. In 2010, the government announced a five-year plan (2010-2014) 
to encourage employment production with initial budget of DZD 350 billion (USD 
4,7 billion)1159. Musette published in 2014, through the European Training 
 
1156 Idriss Mekideche interviewed in the bus heading to World Social Forum in March 2013. 
1157 Musette, Mohamed Saib (2006, 21) Le Marche du travail au Maghreb central, in Mohamed Saïb 
Musette and Nacer Eddine Hammouda (Eds.) (2006) La question de l’emploi au Maghreb central. CREAD: 
Alger. 
1158 Musette (2006, 21). 
1159 Musette, Saïb Mohamed (2014, 3) Employment Policies and Active Labor Market Programmes in Algeria. 
ETF. 
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Foundation (ETF), a comprehensive summary: Employment Policies and Active 
Labor Market Programmes in Algeria, where he introduces the main features of the 
Algerian labor market as well as employment policies and strategies. According to 
Musette, employment policies have been developed around the National 
Employment Agency (ANEM) since 1980s and by creation of four new agencies: 
the National Unemployment Insurance Fund (CNAC), the Social Development 
Agency (ADS), National youth Employment Support Agency (ANSEJ) and the 
National Agency for the Management of Microcredit (ANGEM). Furthermore, 
Algeria has worked to decrease unemployment with foreign international programs 
within United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), ILO, World Bank, EU 
and various NGOs. 
Since the 1990s, due to IMF Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), the private 
sector has dominated the labor markets, while still in 1989 public sector was major 
employer providing 54 percent of jobs1160. In 2011 public sector’s volume decreased 
to 40 percent, which is of course weakening trend considering the role of the 
autonomous trade unions functioning in the public sector1161. This does not mean 
that an Algerian would still not want to work in the public sector, where salaries and 
other work benefits are still more extensive1162 and what is more, in the private sector 
the employment contracts are often more temporal1163. One of the major struggles 
that autonomous trade unions have conducted links to the minimum wage, which 
was adjusted in 2012 to 18 000 dinars1164. In 2014-2015, deep struggles took place 
related to revoke the article 87 bis dating from IMF SAP’s in 1990s, where the 
minimum wage was defined in the constitution. In 2015, regardless of lower energy 
prices the article was abrogated1165.  
Employment services in Algeria are divided under two ministries: ANEM, 
ANSEJ and CNAC under the Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security 
and ADS and ANGEM under the Ministry of National Solidarity. These ministries 
and their functioning have also been under observation by autonomous trade unions. 
The main function of the reorganized ANEM in 2006 is job intermediation, which 
organized through seven central departments in 11 regional centers, 48 wilaya offices 
 
1160 Musette (2014, 7). 
1161 Musette (2014, 7). 
1162 Liberté 27.11.2013. En Algérie, le public paye mieux que le privé. Amina Hadjiat. 
1163 Musette (2014, 7). 
1164 Musette (2014, 11). 
1165 Le Quotidien d’Oran 6.7.2015. Abrogation du 87 bis : Une si chère paix sociale. Yazid Alilat. 
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plus 167 local offices1166. ANEM also include five youth employment programs for 
duration between 1 or 1.5 years: DAIP1167, CID1168, CIP1169, CFI1170 and CTA1171, 
that have significant role in decreasing the job-related tensions. ANSEJ was 
generated in 1996 and launched two years later to promote micro enterprises initiated 
by the youth through support, advice and training and its services are found from 
the internet1172, while the amount of its funded projects has raised from 7279 (1998) 
to 62 812 (2012)1173. CNAC was created in 1994 to reduce the social costs related to 
IMF Structural Adjustment Programs by granting unemployment benefits to older 
workers, aged between 35-60 years old, that lost their job due to economic 
factors1174. ADS was organized in 1996 to decrease poverty and social exclusion plus 
to support the unemployed within eleven regional offices, 48 wilaya offices and 254 
field social units targeting social integration of jobseekers in general and young 
graduates in particular1175. According to Musette1176, it has been an important asset 
for the government with ANEM to ease social tensions through several programs: 
PID1177, AIG1178 and social inclusion programs1179 DAIS, ESIL and IAIG1180. 
Finally, ANGEM, created in 2004, provide microcredit for the use of the poor 
through 10 regional offices, 49 local coordination offices at wilaya level and 549 
 
1166 Musette (2014, 14). 
1167 Vocational integration assistance mechanism for the youth that regroup three sub-programs: CID, 
CIP and CFI (Musette 2014, 15). 
1168 Graduate integration contract targeting first-time job seekers within public and private economic 
sector: 15 000 DZD for university graduates and 14 000 DZD for senior technicians (Musette 2014, 
15). 
1169 Professional integration contract pointed to first-time youth jobseekers leaving secondary or 
vocational education and training centers (Musette 2014, 15). 
1170 Training insertion contract for youth without training or qualifications through work projects 
organized by local authorities or other sectors (Musette, 2014, 15).  
1171 Subsidised work contract aimed at those whose 3 years CID, CIP or CFI contract comes to an end 
(Musette 2014, 15). 
1172 https://www.ansej.org.dz/index.php/fr/  
1173 Musette (2014, 17-18). 
1174 Musette 2014, 18). 
1175 Musette (2014, 16). 
1176 Musette (2014, 16). 
1177 Insertion programme for graduates between 8000-10 000 DZD (Musette (2014, 16). 
1178 Allowance for activity or community service targeting social inclusion for disadvantaged people of 
employable age with 3000 DZD (Musette 2014, 16). 
1179 Can last twice times two years with compensation of 6000 DZD (Musette 2014, 16). 
1180 Musette (2014, 16). 
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support units that offer finance for self-employment, working at home, small 
businesses, goods and services1181. 
These governmental instruments are highly criticized by the activists of the 
autonomous trade unions. For example, ANEM is called Agence Nationale 
d’Esclavage Moderne (National Agency of Modern Slavery). However, they give a 
more diverse picture regarding the employment policies of the state authorities 
targeting to calm social tensions related to socio-economic challenges such as youth 
bulge, rapid population growth, housing and poverty. Regarding the efficiency of 
these programs, according to Musette, there are limited amount of information 
related to their operations and results, at least in public1182. 
The autonomous trade unions seem to have few possibilities to influence 
governmental employment policies, even though they have been able to stress issues 
such as the minimum wage, working conditions and the status of the public sector. 
Mostly, their activities seem to concentrate on social and political issues related to 
trade union freedoms, corruption and authoritarian rule and the sensitization of 
these question in public. Towards the end of the 2010s, SNAPAP and other 
autonomous unions struggled in challenging environment: boosting economy due to 
high oil prices and tightening grip of state authorities. Manifestations, declaring 
“Barakat” (enough), “y en a marre” (fed up), “à bas la répression” (down with 
repression), were prevented1183 meanwhile long strikes were conducted in sector of 
education, as Larbi Nouar, President of CNAPEST, describes:  
In 2009, we made a coalition with UNPEF to defend the rights of the sector. It was 
a big strike that effected on all the establishments such as elementary, intermediary, 
high school and so forth. We were able to arrange many things. We believe that we 
are a trade union, not a political party. I even assisted in the congress of SNAPAP-
Malaoui. When he was elected as the President he said that we must work to change 
the Algerian political system. I spoke and said that everyone want to change the 
political system of Algeria, even those that are inside. We are not tranquil. Those who 
are inside are afraid that one day people will overflow and those who are outside want 
change as well. All the Algerians want to change political system. Only when we have 
rule of law we can solve the problems without having support of someone in the 
administration and so forth. I told him, there are families, people who work there 
have rights that are violated there are and there are... one must work inside the system 
within union. To gain increase in salary and to improve the conditions of the workers 
rather than wait that we can change the political system is not our vision. We make 
 
1181 Musette (2014, 18). 
1182 Musette (2014, 26). 
1183 El Watan 16.4.2008. Des manifestants bastonnés par la police: Le rassemblement des syndicats 
autonomes empêché. 
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our strikes and demands through negotiations, even though the real negotiations does 
not exist1184. 
Larbi Nouar brings out common dialogue regarding the change, should one work 
from the inside or outside to be successful?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1184 Interviewed in January 2015 in Algiers. 
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7 SOCIAL CHANGE THAT NEVER TOOK PLACE 
In this last chapter, I will study how acts of citizenship shape the individual agents’ 
view of surrounding societal structures within the context of post-2011 uprisings and 
the discourses that justify these acts. I ask: how the citizenship demanded by 
independent trade union activists is negotiated through nonviolent acts in the public 
space? While I am interested in how the autonomous trade union activists view the 
citizenship related to patriotism, I am simultaneously interested in the construction 
of antagonistic discourses between oppositional autonomous trade unions and state 
authorities. I will show that the concept of patriotism and the Independence war 
(1954-1962) as a collective memory are contested by the both actors, oppositional 
and state authorities, to further legitimize the chosen political action. Therefore, both 
justify their action and viewpoints through concepts of patriotism, citizenship and 
nationalism.  
Allegations of external interference by the major powers, mainly the United 
States, with the use of new technological and mental instruments such as social media 
came up in various discussions, debates and research related to 2011 uprisings and 
their aftermath. Both counterparts, state authorities and autonomous trade unionists, 
accuse each other of unpatriotic action that leads to the destabilization of Algeria 
benefitting external powers, especially United States and France. The United States 
is criticized for its aggressive interventionist policies in the Middle East and North 
Africa while France’s colonial legacy, Independence War and complex relations 
continue to instigate debate within the heritage of the collective memory. Therefore, 
I use patriotism, including political and stability, as the nodal points that gather 
several floating signifiers (such as democracy, nationalism, transparency, freedom) 
that represent divergent meanings and experiences within the antagonistic subject 
positions.  
This chapter analyzes the development of the autonomous trade union 
movement’s latest performances starting from the regional upheavals (2011 
uprisings) and their impacts on Algeria until the 2019 uprisings. These processes 
reflect in many ways the 1988 October uprisings in Algeria and were often compared 
in the discourses of autonomous trade union activists and in the media as well, as I 
will later show. In all cases with the October uprisings in 1988 and the 2011 uprisings 
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the demonstrations were organized and mobilized extensively by the youth. After 
the respective state authorities were forced to make concessions, the democratic 
political processes were “captured” by the religious movements: FIS in Algeria, 
Ennahda in Tunisia, Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and so forth. Religious groups 
and movements were able to mobilize their supporters efficiently, winning the 
elections that forced the former state authorities with the help of the army to halt 
democratic reforms paving a way for political marginalization of the oppositional 
groups, activists and Islamists altogether. For the Algerian trade union activists, the 
cancellation of the political process in 1992 indicated the end of the democratization 
process, and unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, led to bloody civil war.    
Almost 20 years later, when uprisings erupted in Tunisia and spread around the 
region, various Algerian oppositional social movements entrusted that the process, 
glossed over as “the Arab Spring”, would offer political and social opportunity for 
their aspiration. Also in Algeria, the youth rioted in various cities linking the social 
upheavals, though modest, to wider regional uprisings. The events instigated 
expectations for the new momentum for democratic change that had been 
interrupted since 1992. Some oppositional political parties, unions, youth 
organizations and human rights groups established the Coordination for Democratic 
Change (Coordination nationale pour le changement démocratique, CNDC), which 
expressed openly its pursuit for regime change. However, the Algerian people did 
not follow the oppositional movements. State authorities have been successful in 
dispersing oppositional movements, whether due to their targeted action or due to 
the inability of these movements themselves to construct a credible image and 
serious alternative among the population.  
I start this chapter by introducing 2011 uprisings and their implications in Algeria. 
Next, I will reflect my personal experiences related to travel, which took place during 
the spring 2013, where dozens of oppositional activists were denied exit from Algeria 
to participate the World Social Forum in Tunisia. Finally, I will reflect the 
internationalizing of the internal struggle between autonomous trade unions and 
state authorities in the context of patriotism, stability-instability nexus and the 
concept of political relating to fear and impact of external powers. I discuss the Post-
2011 environment in Algeria arguing that Algeria lacks credible oppositional force 
that could instigate protests in the country and challenge the state authorities. In the 
end of 2014, energy prices started to fell, which severed the economic situation in 
Algeria. The announcement of the sick President Abdelaziz Bouteflika aspires the 
fifth mandate led to vast protestations around Algeria in February 2019 and released 
the discontent towards the state authorities. However, these uprisings were not 
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organized by the oppositional movement, but were spontaneous protest by the 
people. This study will stop the analysis to these massive manifestations that forced 
President Bouteflika to resign.   
7.1 The 2011 uprisings 
The wave of revolts that are connected to 2011 uprisings started in Tunisia 17th of 
December 2010. Algerian protests throughout the country (Algiers, Oran, Djelfa, 
Boumerdes, Annaba, Tipaza, Ouargla, Bechar) begun about ten days later in 28th of 
December. They were mostly unorganized violent riots that presumably did not have 
any connections to political parties or organizations. Demonstrators, mainly the 
youth, blocked roads and put tires on fire. However, these protests were the widest 
in the country since the 1990s upheavals. Autonomous trade unions, such as CNES, 
SNAPAP, CLA, SATEF and human rights organization LADDH, published 
common communication, where they expressed their support and solidarity for 
Algerian youth while condemning the repression of the authorities: 
We regret that violence has become the only way to be heard, but faced with a 
dictatorial and authoritarian management, making violence an instrument of 
management of society, and facing the asphyxiation of civil liberties and obstruction 
of all the peaceful ways of claiming, including the prohibition of strikes, rallies, 
peaceful marches, one can only expect a social explosion1185.   
This statement contains multiple aspects related to violence, political and instability. 
While it takes critical approach on violence in general, it understands its conduction 
by the youth as the only resort left. The violence is fault of the state authorities and 
their management of political processes or rather due to continuous blocking of 
political processes that finally lead to violent atrocities. This position clearly accuses 
the state authorities of destabilizing the county. However, this statement differs from 
previous communications published by the oppositional autonomous trade unions 
because it did not condemned the violence de facto. Meanwhile, the autonomous 
trade unions such as SNAPEST and UNPEF, labeled by some autonomous trade 
union activists as “clones”, denounced the protests as vandalism1186.  
On 21 January 2011, political parties, unions, youth organizations and human 
rights groups organized a meeting in Algiers that decided to set up National 
 
1185 El Watan 11.1.2011. « La révolte est le résultat d’une asphyxie des libertés ». Nabila Amir.  
1186 El Watan 11.1.2011. « La révolte est le résultat d’une asphyxie des libertés ». Nabila Amir. 
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Coordination body. The meeting was widely mediatized in the oppositional media 
such as El Watan and Le Soir d’Algérie. It gathered almost all the known 
oppositional movements and parties1187. With the presence of well-known 
oppositional personalities such as honorary president of LADDH and former 
Minister Ali Yahia Abdennour, National Coordination aimed at the change of the 
regime, not only changes in the regime1188. The typical “Arab Spring” –rhetoric were 
used: the wall of fear must be broken and the public spaces, confiscated by the power 
(pouvoir), must be reappropriated by the citizens. The first march, whose pacific 
nature was highlighted1189, would take place on Saturday 12 February. New body of 
the movement, the Coordination for Democratic Change (Coordination nationale 
pour le changement démocratique, CNDC), published its first communication, 
where it stressed its support for the uprising and to those arrested. In addition, the 
communication expressed its solidarity with the Tunisian people in its struggle 
against the totalitarianism and for the democracy1190.  
Therefore, the most of the radical opposition were present, expect autonomous 
trade unions CNAPEST and SNPSP and political party FFS, that possibly took some 
distance for strategical or personal reasons. However, only few days before the 
awaited Saturday 12 February SNAPAP and SATEF as well as LADDH announced 
that they would withdraw from the CNCD1191. These acts can be seen as attempts 
to confuse the general public understanding of the forming oppositional movement, 
because behind the headlines one could find that actually it was all about SNAPAP-
Felfoul, SATEF-Amoura and LADDH-Zahouane: those unions that are considered 
by SNAPAP-Malaoui and others as clones. However, one can also assume that their 
 
1187 The signatories were Ali Yahia Abdennour, Fodil Boumala, LADDH, SNAPAP, CNES, CLA, 
SATEF, SOS Disparus, Rally for Youth Action (Rassemblement action jeunesse, RAJ), Syndicat des 
étudiants de l’université de Tizi Ouzou (UMMTO), Comité de chômeurs du Sud, Collectif Algérie 
pacifique, Comité de quartier de Bab el Oued, Association Tharwa Fatma n’Soumer, Comité de 
l’institut des sciences économiques (UMMTO), Association Afak, Association estudiantine Nedjma, 
Université de Bouzaréah and political parties such as Democratic and Social Movement (Mouvement 
Démocratique et Social, MDS), Rally for Culture and Democracy (Rassemblement pour la Culture et la 
Démocratie, RCD) and Party for the Justice and Freedom (Parti pour la Justice et la Liberté, PLJ). 
1188 El Watan 22.1.2011. Une coordination se met en en place. Zine Cherfaoui; El Watan 6.2.2011. 
« C’est le système qui doit changer ». M.B. (M.B. indicates the first letters of the forename and surname 
of journalist who wrote the article). 
1189 El Watan 1.2.2011. Le 12 février, nous marcherons. Madjid Makedhi. 
1190 El Watan 23.1.2011. Communiqué de la Coordination nationale pour le changement et la 
démocratie.  
1191 Le Quotidien d’Oran 7.2.2011. La LADDH se démarque de la marche du 12 février. Salah-Eddine 
K.; La Tribune 9.2.2011. Algérie: Les SG du Satef et du Snapap se démarquent de la CNCD – Les 
annonces de participation n’engagent que leurs auteurs. Samir Azzoug. 
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intention was not at all to confuse the public opinion but rather to make clear that 
their respected movements were not part of the CNCD. From the research 
perspective in the context of media-analysis, the timing of the declarations gives an 
impression that their main purpose was to offer a negative image about the 
coherence of the CNCD, because none of the previously mentioned movements 
ever participated to any of the meetings organized by the coalition. If they did not 
want to trick, maybe they just wanted to resign and cut any suspected involvement 
with them and CNCD?     
Despite the attempt by CNCD to occupy public space in Algiers and Oran, they 
did not success to follow similar patterns that took place in the neighboring 
countries, where demonstrators were able to capture symbolic public squares. Day 
after President of Egypt Hosni Mubarak stepped down, assemblages in May 1 Square 
in Algiers and 1 November Place in Oran where both prevented by massive 
deployment of the police. First the demonstrators were few hundred in Algiers, but 
later on their amount rose to few thousands according to newspapers, meanwhile 
according to witnesses the assemblage gathered more police (around 30 0001192) than 
civil participation1193.  
Regardless of spectacular attempt to hold manifestation in the capital and 
utterances how “taboo fell”1194, “the wall of the fear is destroyed1195” and “this was 
a good beginning”1196, the authorities managed to prevent CNCD to kick off nation-
wide mobilization via arrests and blocs. CNCD published communication, where 
they announced new march for the next Saturday 19 January 2011 and condemned 
the repression of the state, stressing the pacific tendency of the citizens to use their 
constitutional rights, therefore citizenship rights:   
[T]he tendentious maneuvers and the demonization of the peaceful actions of the 
citizens, the Algerians were able to thwart all the obstacles by adhering to the last 
demonstration1197. 
CNCD accused the state authorities of demonization and restricting citizenship 
rights as the reasons that prevented their peaceful actions. Foreign Minister Mourad 
 
1192 L’Expression 13.2.2011. El Bahdja, une journée de non-marche. Karim Aimeur. 
1193 Le Soir d’Algérie 13.2.2011. De la place Tahrir à la place du 1er Mai. Brahim Taouchichet. 
1194 Le Soir d’Algérie 13.2.2011. Un tabou est tombé. S.A.I. (S.A.I. indicates the first letters of the 
forename and surname of journalist who wrote the article). 
1195 El Watan 18.2.2011. « Le 12 février a brisé le mur de la peur ». Salim Mesbah. 
1196 L’Expression 13.2.2011. « Je suis venu juste pour voir ». Hadjer Guenanfa. 
1197 Liberté 16.2.2011. La CNCD répond à Medelci. N.A. (N.A. indicates the first letters of the forename 
and surname of journalist who wrote the article). 
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Medelci assured that the state of emergency would be lifted in the coming days1198. 
Government had also decreased the cost of cooking oil and sugar already in 
January1199. Finally, on 19 February 2011 protest turned out to be nothing more than 
the repetition of what happened a week earlier. Citizen march transformed into 
police march. According to the narrative of the activists, their citizenship rights were 
restricted.  
The sensitization of the dimensions related to citizenship had been under scrutiny 
already many years. In August 2010, for example, LADDH organized a campaign 
“The duty of citizenship is our right”1200. President Mustapha Bouchachi stated: 
The regimes of these countries in question know how to coordinate their efforts, but 
for security reasons, and show solidarity, but against their respective civil societies. 
Therefore, why not to consider a coalition of these [respective civil societies] to make 
their voices heard on a minimum on the issue of promoting human rights and 
citizenship? [...] When we break the law, we are sanctioned by society, but the 
representatives of the order must respect our dignity by refraining from abusing or 
using violence on us1201.     
Therefore, the concept of citizenship has been one of the central concerns of the 
mobilization of the autonomous trade unions and other social movements. As 
Bouchachi mentions, sometimes activism is in conflict with the law but this is 
integrated within the theory of acts of citizenship, which, as Engin F. Isin1202 writes, 
“do not need to be founded in law or enacted in the name of law”. Through acts of 
citizenship autonomous trade union activists hope to improve citizenship rights, 
formed by the complex web of rights and responsibilities that materialize 
contingently in varying degrees of influence and autonomy through economic, 
political and social integration1203. The citizenship deals with various human 
categories in the society. It is according to Malika Rebai Maamri one of the 
fundamentals of the modern democratic state1204. However, in this study I stress 
more the meaning of how one is transformed into a citizen through acts of 
 
1198 Liberté 16.2.2011. La CNCD répond à Medelci. N.A. 
1199 Al Shaykh, Issam bin (2011) The Algerian reform proposals: an initiative for change, or continued 
monopolization of power by the authorities? Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies 14.8.2011. 
1200 El Watan 8.8.2010. La campagne pour la citoyenneté relancée à Oran. Djamel Benachour. 
1201 El Watan 8.8.2010. La campagne pour la citoyenneté relancée à Oran. Djamel Benachour. 
1202 Isin, Engine F. (2008, 38-39) Theorizing Acts of Citizenship, in Engin F. Isin and Greg M. Nielsen 
(Eds.) (2008) Acts of Citizenship, London & New York: Zed Books, pp. 15-43. 
1203 Isin (2008, 15). 
1204 Maamri, Malika Rebai (2014, 1) The Dimensions of Democratic Citizenship in Algeria. Norderstedt 
Germany: GRIN. 
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citizenship, not so much the impact or consequences that political action can 
generate to increase those rights, though they are obviously interconnected.  
The concept of citizenship is largely perceived as a link between an individual and 
a state (previously city-state) as well as between the ideas of democracy and the rule 
of law. From the ideological perspective, citizenship is at the center of republicanism 
related to state’s organization that guarantees popular sovereignty for the people. 
Citizenship denotes rights and responsibilities of a citizen. According to Catriona 
McKinnon and Iain Hampsher-Monk, citizenship means qualities and conditions 
that individuals share as membership of a political community to act as political 
equals1205. However, while this possession of citizenship is linked to the nationality 
with the right to work and live in a country and to participate in public debates and 
political life in general to discover the common good of the society, it differs from 
the act of citizenship that transforms an individual into citizen. When Algerians 
search for consensus, stability and common ground, sharing membership in a 
particular political community, such as social movements or other communities, it is 
effected by the politicization of their acts that are defined through articulation. 
Therefore, citizenship can be linked to patriotism as well appearing within the forms 
of special affection and love, identification and sacrifices for ones attachment to a 
homeland.  
In contemporary Algeria, Mohamed Mebtoul has questioned the fulfillment of 
citizenship from a critical perspective, as “unfound citizenship” of Algeria1206. This 
is revealing for this study because it describes well how the oppositional activists 
experience the realization of the citizenship in the country: 
Citizenship is forbidden in a social system that strongly rejects the autonomous and 
plural debate, to present and give space to forms of doubtful ideological 
indoctrination. They have succeeded in producing a simplistic populism that is not 
endowed with any political and intellectual depth, reduced to operating in isolation, 
breaking with the social and cultural dynamics deployed daily by social agents. The 
socio-political refusal of proximity and the plurality of confrontations results in 
multiplying institutions not well prepared to integrate and to take into consideration 
the constraints and the expectations of the people forbidden from access to the status 
of user, only to allow them a right to see how system works.  
We are referring to the political production of a deformed bureaucracy that operates 
less on the rule than on personal relationships. Its effects are multiple: confusion, 
uncertainty, mistrust, stress, indifference, social distancing of people from state 
institutions. The lack of citizenship is also the lack of a decentralized social regulation 
 
1205 McKinnon, Catriona & Hampsher-Monk, Iain (2000, 1) The Demands of Citizenship. Great Britain: 
Continuum. 
1206 Mebtoul, Mohamed (2013, 9) La citoyenneté en question (Algérie). Oran: Editions Dar El Adib.   
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that builds on people's social experiences in the interests of equity and solidarity, not 
on ruptures and split between those who are protected through to their relation 
network, and the other anonymous, little people, who are constraint by social 
wandering. It is a question of going beyond a too simplistic labeling of the behavior 
of the people, deeply anchored in certain social representations, which focus 
recurrently on the collective guilt in the face of situations of incivism and indifference. 
“We are not educated”, “we see dirt everywhere. People throw their garbage 
anywhere”. “We Algerians are violent, aggressive”, and so on. In the absence of a 
rigorous and critical analysis, the affective and moral dimension seems to 
predominate, centered on a form of social impotence that doesn’t really question its 
social mechanisms1207.  
Despite this quite structuralist point of view, Mebtoul manages to connect the 
interplay between individual and larger social structures in the context of social 
indifference due to lack of citizenship. Passive participation in politics, even within 
civil society organizations, form a huge obstacle that autonomous trade union 
activists confronted before and during the 2011 uprisings, when trying to profit from 
the political opportunity, social grievances and resources, created by the structural 
change related to wider regional uprisings1208. In addition, Mebtoul in a sense 
questions, whether citizens exist in a state for their rights, or their gratitude and 
charity of the state? When Algerian citizens reflect their own acts, how do they 
incorporate them to wider social environment and what instigate the acts?  
Against Mebtoul’s structuralist perspective, Engin F. Isin and Greg M. Neilsen 
investigate citizenship from the perspective, as mentioned before, where it activates 
through acts and is not seen as solid status1209. The importance of active citizenship 
and political participation has been repeatedly called by many scholars and politicians 
as well1210. The acts of citizenship conducted by the autonomous trade union 
activists, perceived as manifest political participation1211, is seen as distinct from 
those Algerians who have an Algerian passport and may only vote or take part within 
the general social community building, such as working life and unorganized 
contingent interaction with their fellow countrymen. The acts create the actor not 
 
1207 Mebtoul (2013, 10-11). 
1208 Derradji, Islam Amine (2012, 7) La Coordination nationale pour le changement et la démocratie algérienne et 
le réveil arabe: Griefs, ressources et opportunité. Mémoire de maîtrise déposé au mois de juillet 2012 (McGill 
University Thesis). 
1209 Isin, Engin F. & Nielsen, Greg M. (Ed.) (2008) Acts of Citizenship. London & New York: Zed 
Books. 
1210 For example : Benbitour, Ahmed (2011, 14-15) Radioscopie de la gouvernance Algérienne. Alger: Edif 
2000; Maamri (2014,19). 
1211 Ekman, Joakim & Amnå, Erik (2012) Political Participation and Civic Engagement: Towards a 
New Typology.  Human Affairs 22, pp. 283-300. 
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vice versa, shifting the focus from the institutional way of understanding citizenship 
as status to collective or individual deed breaking the socio-historical design1212. As 
Jonathan Darling1213 argues, acts are not dependent on any particular conception of 
deeds of an actor, but enable identifying of the production of new subjects. 
Therefore, citizenship transforms into a negotiated and contested field of 
possibilities and impossibilities, as Sidney G. Tarrow displays the engagement “when 
patterns of political opportunities and constrains change” offering strategic 
“repertoire of collective action, creating new opportunities, which are used by others 
in widening cycles of contention” 1214.  
CNCD aimed at using the political opportunity from neighboring regional 
countries to mobilize Algerians to challenge the authorities with its stated goal of 
regime change1215. The massive police deployment and lack of large participation 
nevertheless prevented mass gatherings and outset of the similar processes that took 
place in Tunisia and Egypt. Sidney Tarrow1216 links the power of protest and 
collective action into the boundaries of the accepted limits of social behavior. CNCD 
assured that taboos fell and the wall of fear was destroyed — typical rhetoric used 
during the uprisings, whether in Tunisia, Egypt or Syria connecting Algerian 
occurrences to the larger regional movement. According to Tarrow, “the power of 
protests” does not lie “in its numbers nor in its level of violence, but in its threat to 
burst through the boundaries of the accepted limits of social behavior”1217, one 
reason why protests are often blocked in the capital Algiers. Therefore the “power 
of collective action can be used by ordinary people faced by unjust authority, by 
organized social movements, by insurgents within institutions – even by constituted 
interest groups and parties” as an “almost the only resource they have available to 
gain attention, rally a following, and insert themselves in the political 
community”1218.  
 
1212 Isin & Nielsen (2008, 1-3) 
1213 Darling, Jonathan (2017, 730) Acts, ambiguities, and the labour of contesting citizenship. Citizenship 
Studies, 21:6, pp. 727-736. 
1214 Tarrow, Sidney (2011, 28-29) Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
1215 Derradji (2012)  
1216 Tarrow, Sidney (1991, 7) Struggle, Politics, and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and 
Cycles of Protest. Western Societies Program, Occasional Paper No. 21. Ithaca, N.Y.: Center for 
International Studies, Cornell University. 
1217 Tarrow (1991, 7). 
1218 Tarrow (1991, 7). 
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Mancur Olson1219 argues that even though groups of rational self-interested 
individuals with common interests are often expected to act to achieve their 
common goals, it will not be actualized unless the group consists of only a few 
individuals or unless “there is coercion or some other special device to make 
individuals to act in their common interest”. In other words, groups do not 
automatically always act according to the assumed common or self-interest, so why 
does collective action actualize in some contexts, for example in Tunisia and Egypt, 
but not in others, and how can collective action be defined? Todd Sandler1220 refers 
to collective action as “activities that require the coordination of efforts by two or 
more individuals”. Acts of citizenship, however, approaches acts of individual, 
whether within collective or singular form. Collective action comprises group actions 
that target to promote “the interests or well-being of the members”. According to 
Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow collective action designates: “coordinating efforts 
on behalf of shared interests or programs”1221. While autonomous trade unions, civil 
society organizations and some political parties were able to agree on common 
objectives and compose common communication when establishing CNCD, they 
were unable to deliberate and convince the wider audiences, especially after the show 
of strength by the governmental authorities.   
Therefore, reflecting how Tarrow sees the collective action as a synonym for 
social protest referring to Tilly’s definition on collective actions as “joint action in 
pursuit of common ends” or “people’s banding together to act on their shared 
grievances, hopes and interests”1222, the majority of Algerians seemed to have 
divergent sentiments about how the country should be developed. In turn, political 
actors that were behind CNCD, such as the leader of RCD Said Sadi were highly 
unpopular among Algerians, which was also stated by the youth organization RAJ, 
when they withdraw from the movement one week after its establishment and before 
the first march of 12th of February1223. After the second march, 19th of February 
2011, the rows of the CNCD began to crash due to the role of the political parties. 
Especially the youth collective Pacific Algeria required the withdrawal of the political 
parties from the CNCD, which finally divided into two different structures. Initiator 
 
1219 Olson, Mancur (2002, 1-2) [1965] The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and Theory of Groups. New 
York: Harvard University Press. 
1220 Sandler, Todd (1992, xvii-3) Collective Action – Theory and Applications. The United States: The 
University of Michigan. 
1221 Tilly, Charles & Tarrow, Sidney (2015, 8) Contentious Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
1222 Tarrow (1991, 9). 
1223 El Watan 30.1.2011. Le Raj se retire de la coordination. R.P (R.P. indicates the first letters of the 
forename and surname of journalist who wrote the article). 
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of the Pacific Algeria Facebook –group, 29-years old Amine Menadi, opposed 
political ideologies brought in by political parties and claimed instead: “The only 
ideology that we allow ourselves is that of the citizen's truth”1224. Menadi politicized 
the incomplete realization of the citizenship in Algeria stressing its importance to 
create common ground for joint political action, which is endangered due to 
fragmented party politics. The importance regarding this individual connotation over 
collectiveness may reflect generational difference between younger and older 
generation or not.   
Political parties RCD, MDS, PLD plus Collective of the students, Wassila-
network, National Association of Disappeared Families (ANFD), National 
Collective for the Freedom of the Press (CNLP) and Ali Yahia Abdennour stayed in 
CNCD supporting the continuation of the Saturday marches each week. LADDH, 
SNAPAP, CLA, SATEF, CNES, Collective of the unemployed youth, Pacific 
Algeria and SOS Disparus created new body called Coordination of the Civil Society 
(Coordination de la société civile), which transformed later into form CNCD-
Barakat (enough)1225. The Chairwoman of the SOS Disparus, group CNCD-Barakat, 
Nacera Dutour explained: “If we want citizens to walk with us, we need to explain 
to them our vision related to the problems of unemployment, human rights, 
freedoms ... Some did not want to do this work”, hinting at CNCD-political1226. The 
united opposition was no more and step by step during following Saturdays, the 
movement gradually melted away. In March, some youth even attacked protesters 
and tried to lynch leader of the RCD, Said Sadi1227.  
Isin and Nielsen stress that being a citizen means more than exercising rights or 
fulfilling obligations, such as paying taxes, voting, learning languages or teach: acts 
of citizenship means breaking the same old repetitive proceedings to concrete 
acts1228. Isin1229 differentiates “activist citizens” and “active citizens”. For him 
“activist citizens engage in writing scripts and creating the scene” while “active 
citizen follow scripts and participate in scenes that are already created”. Therefore, 
it is also necessary to make clear distinction between the movements and the 
 
1224 El Watan 26.2.2011. CNCD version Bouchachi : « Nous, nous marcherons en mars prochain ». 
Saïd Rabia. 
1225 El Watan 23.2.2011. La CNCD divisée en deux structures. Madjid Makedhi; El Watan 15.3.2011. 
L’organisation opte pour les meetings: La CNCD-Barakat reprend du terrain. Madjid Makedhi. 
1226 El Watan 15.3.2011. L’organisation opte pour les meetings: La CNCD-Barakat reprend du terrain. 
Madjid Makedhi. 
1227 Al Jazeera English 5.3.2011. Youths “attack Algerian protesters”.  
1228 Isin and Nielsen (2008, 1-3). 
1229 Isin (2008, 38). 
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individuals that make the actual decisions to act. As Karl Mannheim has argued, it is 
the individual that has capacity to think as far as we lack metaphysical entity of group 
mind reproducing our ideas or thinking instead of us1230. In the research 
concentrating on activism, it is focal to stress the factors implicating on individual 
entries and engagement in structured collective action1231. Mannheim however 
points put that while the individual thinks, it rather means thinking with the others 
or participating in collective thinking1232. Similarly, Tarrow has highlighted the 
importance of the networks and face-to-face groups and other connective structures 
where collective action is the most activating and sustaining1233. 
At the end of March 2011, about 500 contract teachers required meeting with the 
President Abdel-Aziz Bouteflika to realize the promise to regularize their posts and 
barricaded themselves in front of Presidential palace Mouradia for 10-15 days1234. 
Their representative Meriem Maârouf stated in the Le Soir d’Algérie –article in the 
beginning of the protest: “We will spend this night and every night here until the 
President decides to receive us”1235. Two days later two contract teachers tried to set 
themselves in fire1236 while after fourth night Meriem Maârouf said they will throw 
their identity cards to garbage and suicide all together1237. What impels teachers to 
act with such devotion and desire threatening to commit such self-sacrifice? 
Actualization of acts provokes both responsibility and answerability, because acts 
always concern others and the Other. What creates the determination to devote 
oneself to challenge the authorities? Is it the anger towards the state authorities or 
joint action when people act together? How much social networks and identity 
construction impacts on this devotion from the individual-collective –dichotomy 
perspective?   
When activists and members of autonomous trade unions make a decision, 
whether righteously or not, to become a claimant of their citizenship rights and in a 
 
1230 Mannheim, Karl [1929] (1955, 2) Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. 
London: Routledge.  
1231 Lefort, Bruno (2013, 35) A Recited Community: Figures of an Identity Foretold – Narrating Heritage and 
Positioning Boundaries among Student Partisan Groups in Plural Lebanon. Tampere, TAPRI. 
1232 Mannheim [1929] (1955, 3). 
1233 Tarrow, Sidney (2011, 30) Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
1234 Sources vary from 10 to 15 days.   
1235 Le Soir d’Algérie 21.3.2011. Jour de colère devant la présidence. Salima Akkouche. 
1236 El Watan 23.3.2011. Deux enseignants contractuels tentent de s’immoler: Lors du troisième jour 
du sit-in devant la présidence. Samir Ghezlaoui. 
1237 El Watan 24.3.2011. Enseignants contractuels: Menace de suicide collective. Samir Ghezlaoui. 
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way break temporarily out with habitus in a specific momentum, they show 
creativeness in imagining the possible social transformation compared to those who 
believe that the change is not possible. Therefore, Isin argues, the “difference 
between habitus and acts is not merely one of temporality but is also a qualitative 
difference that breaks habitus creatively”1238. He is also interested in which 
conditions subjects act as citizens, how do they transform into actors, how do they 
become claimants of rights, entitlements and responsibilities, how should we name 
those acts and how to investigate them and their transformation into citizens1239? 
These questions should be asked from the members and activists themselves instead 
of just concentrating on the acts as such to perceive experiences and motives behind 
the acts.   
Two years later, I interviewed Maârouf, who is clearly respected among the other 
SNAPAP activists due to her previous struggles and sacrifices, and asked how she 
started her activism and why. Often the activists, especially younger ones, narrated 
the start of their activism through experiences of social injustice. The older 
generation usually constructed their memories in the context of larger life courses 
instead of pointing to an actual “moment”, where everything began: 
I started in 2008 by creating a teachers’ contractual office, affiliated to SNAPAP that 
aims for permanent working contracts for teachers. First, we started in two wilayas, 
Algiers and Blida, and then it spread into 33 wilayas. The first act we did was the 
hunger strike for 40 days. After that, the minister of education started negotiations 
which however did not responded to demands and into real solution. Unfortunately, 
after hunger strikes many teachers had health problems. The Ministry of Education 
had not given any reply and those involved in the sit-ins organized opposite to 
presidential palace, because it is near to the Ministry of Education where the sit-ins 
were conducted, have been prevented from organizing protests. However, protests 
were organized every week. After the protests, there was intimidation by the police. 
We did 18 PV [Proces-verbal] […] They took the protesters for the whole day and 
asked “why do you protest, you must stop, you must stay at home”. Therefore, there 
was finally so many problems that it was not possible to continue the protests and 
continue claiming the rights. However, even after these intimidations I was not afraid. 
The Minister himself called me and said that leave the movement and I will give you 
an apartment and work, but I refused. I have since been without work for two years 
now and I have been prevented from working only because of refusing to leave the 
movement. In 2011 we organized a sit-in in front of the Presidential palace, where we 
stayed day and night 15 days demanding the transformation of 30 000 contractual 
jobs to permanent contracts1240. 
 
1238 Isin (2008, 18). 
1239 Isin (2008, 18). 
1240 Meriem Maârouf. Interviewed in the bus heading to World Social Forum in March 2013. 
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Creating the teachers’ contractual office was an act that was followed by hunger 
strike and protests in front of the presidential palace Mouradia to struggle for 
regularization of the teachers’ posts. The motives constructed within longer period 
of time compared to the actual act. While there have been much attention on the 
status and habitus of citizenship, which Isin1241 sees as ways of thought and conduct 
internalized over long period of time, acts of citizenship should be understood as 
related but distinct from them. Distinction could be seen related with the everyday 
creative momentous acts, or breaks regarding structural and even determinist 
concepts of habitus and practice connecting individual acts to common engagement 
within the group1242. Within the theoretical framework of acts of citizenship, it is 
more fruitful to reflect how the acts are reproduced focusing on the exact moments, 
regardless of status and substance, when subjects constitute themselves as citizens 
instead of concentrating too much on actual start of activism, or wake-up1243. Acts 
are easier to recognize and analyze than processes of formation of habitus. There are 
no fixed identities nor solid habitus or practice but more fluid temporal subject 
positions.   
Malika Rebai Maamri also highlights the citizenship not only as a “legal status, 
but also as a way of life”1244. In general, it is possible to resume that the autonomous 
trade union activists argue that citizenship rights are not implemented concretely or 
entirely. They believe that Algeria is lacking freedom of speech, democracy, just 
economic wealth distribution and justice. Many of them construct discourses where 
Algeria is ruled by unfair and oppressive non-patriotic government that benefits 
from the natural resources through nepotism and corruption enriching foreign 
countries instead of citizens of Algeria. They insist that natural resources belong to 
the people and profits should be equally shared. They see the authorities as brutal 
and corrupted working for their personal interests instead of common good. They 
suppose that their dignity is on the line and they do not have anything to lose. They 
are motivated to act within unions such as SNAPAP to defend workers’ rights as 
fulfillment of the citizenship. Isin claims that “[a]cts cannot happen without motives, 
purposes, or reasons, but those cannot be the only grounds of interpreting acts of 
citizenship” 1245. Acts of citizenship are constructed from the individual’s own life 
 
1241 Isin, Engine F. (2008, 15) Theorizing Acts of Citizenship. Isin, Engin F. & Nielsen, Greg M. (Ed.) 
(2008) Acts of Citizenship. The Pages 15-43. London & New York: Zed Books. 
1242 Isin (2008, 18). 
1243 Isin & Nielsen (2008. 3). 
1244 Maamri (2014, 17). 
1245 Isin (2008, 38). 
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experiences and perceptions that are certainly connected to larger social encounters 
and formation of discourses, but spring from individual, consciousness or 
unconsciousness, desire. Actualization of an act cannot be foretold or decided in 
advance.  
The demands of the oppositional trade union and human rights movement are 
personified within the rhetoric of former Minister and founder of the Algerian 
human rights organization LADDH, Ali Yahia Abdennour. He was also one of the 
founding members of the UGTA before the independence and became the Secretary 
General of the UGTA. When I had possibility to interview1246 him on autonomous 
trade union movement, he started reminiscing about his beginnings far from the 
1940s when he was a member in the party PPA-MTDL and activities during the early 
years of the creation of UGTA. He was organizing famous, internationally 
recognized, general strike between 28.1-4.2 1957 with Abane Ramadan1247, Saad 
Dahlab1248 and Youcef Benkhedda1249 disagreeing with his friends about the length 
of the strike that it could last only two days for tactical reasons. Then he explained 
how they run UGTA from the prison where they were captured by the French in 
1957. After four years of prison he was released, leading UGTA in practice from 
Tunisia. He also told about how Ferhat Abbas1250 called him to join the Provisional 
Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) to help with the drafting of 
Independence Program of Algeria together with Benyoucef Benkhedda, Franz 
Fanon1251, Lamine Khene1252, Omar Oussedik1253 and Messaoud Aït-Chalaal1254. Ali 
Yahia Abdennour assured that when Ferhat Abbas was elected as the first acting 
President, he appropriated the program under his own name though it was actually 
 
1246 Ali Yahia Abdennour. Interviewed in Algiers in January 2015. 
1247 Abane Ramadan (1920-1957) played key role during the War of Independence, but was 
assassinated by the FLN. 
1248 Saad Dahlab (1918-2000) was important political activist in various nationalist movements and was 
involved with the creation of FLN newspaper El Moudjahid. 
1249 Benyoucef Benkhedda (1920-2003) played also the key role during the War of Independence and 
was head of third GPRA exile Government in 1961 and was hailed by many as the first Algerian 
President after the independence before he was sidelined. 
1250 Ferhat Abbas (1899-1985) was the President of GPRA during 1958-1961 and the first acting 
President of independent Algeria. He was also important political activist in various nationalist 
movements and political parties. 
1251 Franz Fanon (1925-1961) was psychiatrist, philosopher and revolutionary representing the editorial 
collective of El Moudjahid and Ambassodor of the GPRA in Ghana. 
1252 Lamine Khene (born in 1930) is an important political activist and Algerian nationalist politician. 
1253 Omar Oussedik (1920-1992) was an important political activist and Algerian nationalist politician. 
1254 Messaoud Aït-Chalaal was a longtime leader of UGEMA (Union générale des étudiants algériens) 
since 1957. 
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joint work. At first, I thought that he just wanted to contextualize the autonomous 
trade union movement to the larger context of Algerian historical development, 
which is surely necessary. However, he also wanted to emphasize his role during the 
Algerian War of Independence to strengthen his criticism towards contemporary 
state authorities challenging the monopolies of nationalism and patriotism.  
At over 90 years old, Ali Yahia Abdennour is considered by many as the symbol 
of human rights movement in Algeria. He works closely with the autonomous trade 
union movement participating regularly to the general political discussion in Algeria 
through various oppositional media outlets. Ali Yahia challenges official narrative of 
the state authorities as maintainers of the legacy of the independence and does not 
save the words when criticizing state authorities and contemporary situation in 
Algeria: 
What was it that we achieved in 1962? We achieved territorial independence, but we 
did not achieve human independence. Neither the autonomy of the people, people’s 
sovereignty. We liberated the territory, that’s all. Normally, we must liberate two 
things: popular sovereignty meaning that the people are sovereign. What does it mean 
that people are sovereign? It means that people are sovereign to choose freely its 
representatives in all the state’s institutions elected by the state from the mayor to 
wilaya assembly, from the PNA [People’s National Assembly] and Senate [Council of 
the Nation] to President of the Republic. Therefore, Algeria has never elected the 
President with sovereignty. The elections have always been tricked. Secondly, did we 
liberate the citizen? We are still subjects. […] In 1962 the leaders who returned from 
the exterior, the army from the borders that occupied the country considered the 
Algerian people as the enemy and it stroke [on people]. There was a war. There were 
people who died ... Wilay d’Alger, wilaya 4 … wilaya 3 … there was a war in 1962. 
Because they considered the people who fought against the emperor, they took the 
place of the colonizers1255.  
Arguing that Algerians never fully gained liberty, Ali Yahia Abdennour discredited 
the heritage of Algerian independence and especially those who are in power. He 
insisted that Algerians still lack real freedom meaning that “truly patriotic” Algerians 
should change the political system to finalize the independence struggle. 
So what brought the autonomous trade unions? When the Algerian leaders took the 
place of the colonizers with the use of force, there are the rich that are more rich, and 
the poor whose number increases. There are those who suffer from the hunger. There 
are seven million Algerians who do not have enough to eat, even ten million. […] The 
social is totally eliminated by those who govern. What we wanted to do? The situation 
is actually extremely difficult due to the illness of Bouteflika1256.  
 
1255 Ali Yahia Abdennour. Interviewed in Algiers in January 2015. 
1256 Ali Yahia Abdennour. Interviewed in Algiers in January 2015. 
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Ali Yahia Abdennour equated current state authorities and colonizers. He argued that 
Algerians are again poor as they were during the French colonial period. The 
discourses constructed about the social reality and shared in the activists’ networks 
strengthen the discourse of righteous struggle of the “real” patriotic Algerians against 
corrupted authorities who work as agents of foreign countries such as United States 
and France. The collective memories they construct about the history supports their 
discourse, as this communication of the CNCD “Barakat” shows: 
We do not seek the throne, but only the change. [...] After 132 years of colonization 
and at the price of enormous sacrifices including more than seven years of armed 
struggle, Algeria finally regained its sovereignty in 1962. But, to date, the Algerian 
people have not yet enjoyed of his sovereignty and entire freedom. While a wind of 
freedom and hope is blowing over the region, our country, after having been at the 
forefront of the democratic aspiration in October 1988, finds itself today stuck by a 
regime that refuses to look for a different direction1257. 
The references to the 1988 October uprisings were common when 2011 events were 
reflected on. Abdel Nasser Djabi offered interesting perspectives how to 
contextualize 2011 and 19881258. He stressed that weak organizational structure and 
the absence of political parties or labor organizations in the management of the 
protests combine 1988 and 2011 uprisings and highlight the weakness of the civil 
society in the country1259. He also found a similarity regarding the democratic socio-
economic demands in both events and their nature, meaning that they emerged in 
the popular neighborhoods initiated by the youth residents1260. The creation of the 
CNCD came only at a later stage and was not able to take control or benefit from 
the popular demonstrations that preceded its establishment neither did it enjoy wide 
support among the youth protestors. Some of the autonomous trade unions also 
remained outside and continued in April their own activities, such as the strike 
organized by CNAPEST and UNPEF1261.  
Finally, I will show how young autonomous trade union activists describe the 
citizenship themselves. During my interviews in March and April 2013, the concept 
of citizenship emerged in the subordinate clause. Often when interviewees spoke 
about their individual motivation behind their activism, the question of citizenship 
emerged. The question of citizenship was most often tied to the values of basic civil 
rights that should be provided to all Algerian citizens as stated in the constitution 
 
1257 Le Soir d’Algérie 26.3.2011. CNCD “Barakate” – Meeting à la salle Atlas. 
1258 Djabi, Abdel Nasser (2011) Protest Movements in Algeria. Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies 
May 2011. 
1259 Djabi (2011, 8).  
1260 Djabi (2011, 8-9). 
1261 Le Quotidien d’Oran 25.4.2011. Education: Les syndicats gèlent la grève. Salah C. 
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and the socio-economic condition they were living and experiencing. Sometimes 
citizenship was mentioned as a synonym with karama (dignity), as young activist of 
SNAPAP Sofiane Sellami explained: 
Until today, they (the authorities) have not accepted our autonomy. They always want 
to prevent us to conduct our action. They prevent us to work in peace … they harass 
our members. There is always repression by the police and security guards. I think 
that because this authoritarian system … this is dictatorship that does not want people 
to demand their rights whether related to the work or citizenship. They want to 
control everything. That is why they do not accept independent trade unions. […] I 
became activist because I asked after my rights. The article 551262 states that every 
Algerian citizen has a right to work and live in dignity1263.  
This interview clearly explains the close connection between the concerns of 
realization of the citizenship and the beginning of activism. When Sellami states:”I 
became an activist because I asked after my rights”, it shows clearly how an 
understanding of acts of citizenship transforms an individual into an actor. Similarly, 
the experienced injustices, environment that spring into acts, are supported with 
group mates through interaction and connection with other individuals 
strengthening the experience, as another young SNAPAP activist Samir Baroud 
explains:  
An association, political party or trade union that really asks after Algerian citizenship 
rights, they [the government] create a double organization to crush the movement 
[…] I am active in the trade union movement to claim my rights. Many rights are 
confiscated by those in power. There are no freedom of expression. The real Algerian 
citizens are suffering. Today there are two Algeria: those who share the oil revenues 
and those who are simple citizens. Therefore, we claim our rights and unionize1264. 
It is easy to see the construction of an antagonistic picture of those who are rich, in 
power and who profit from common natural resources, and those, an average people 
or citizens, who do not. The situation is unjust and citizenship rights are not realized. 
Mustapha Larbi, again another young SNAPAP activist, went even further in 
explaining the lack of realization of the basic rights contextualized in work, state 
assistance, and healthcare:  
 
1262 Algerian Constitution, First Chapter, Article 55 (Work): 1) All citizens have right for work. 2) The 
right for protection security and hygiene at work is guaranteed by the law. 3) The right to rest is 
guaranteed; the law defines the relevant clauses. 
1263 Sofiane Sellami (name changed). Interviewed in the bus heading to World Social Forum in March 
2013. 
1264 Samir Baroud (name changed). Interviewed in the bus heading to World Social Forum in March 
2013. 
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If the power (pouvoir) can manage to give us stable work, we will be ok. If they 
cannot, ok, we ask unemployment compensation. If someone is given unemployment 
compensation, at least one is being noticed. Normally someone pays compensation 
for the other, he will prefer to find a real work instead of just paying compensation, 
you understand? If I have right for compensation, then I should have right to health 
care, transportation... I am unemployed. I need to move, I need health care, I am a 
human being, I have my dignity. Through unemployment compensation or stable 
jobs the power (pouvoir) should give us what we call easy neighborhood (quartier 
facile), free healthcare, free medicines. We are human beings. Now it is catastrophe. 
Young Algerians are dying. Most of the youth has become schizophrenic. It is disaster 
in the streets. We are afraid that this Algerian youth doesn't have anything to lose. If 
this people will make a revolution they will burn the whole country as simply as that. 
We instead, we are afraid for Algeria. We ask from this power (pouvoir) to give to the 
youth its rights, or their citizenship rights. Dignity1265.  
Mustapha Larbi stressed that they are worried or “afraid” what will happen in 
Algeria. They care about the country and as the activists they are ready to make 
sacrifices for the better tomorrow within patriotic frame. Young activist of SNAPAP 
Hamid Derradji stressed the duties related to citizenship and its importance in the 
democracy building: 
Citizenship is the base of the construction of democratic state. As citizens, we have 
our duties and our rights. However, one must really stress the duties to construct our 
country, because in Algeria there is not good faith to construct this country. They are 
here to destroy our homeland1266.  
It is clear that citizenship can mean different things for different activists, but 
according to SNAPAP’s project in November 2013, Appel a la concretization du 
droit de citoyenneté (Call for the concretization of the right of citizenship), regarding 
the demands of their citizenship rights, they claimed citizenship rights as:   
- to recognize the popular will expressed through free and transparent 
elections as the only source of political legitimacy. 
- to respect the freedom of choice and expression of the citizens. 
- for achieving compliance with all policies, trade unions and associations 
freedoms and effective legal equality between women and men. 
 
1265 Mustapha Larbi (name changed). Interviewed in the bus heading to World Social Forum in March 
2013. 
1266 Hamid Derradji. (name changed). Interviewed in Oran in January 2015. 
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- to support the unemployed by the state through the provision of 
unemployment allowance to all citizens without their uses and allow free 
access to the public service. 
- for social housing and guarantee health coverage to all workers with a 
lower monthly income 30,000 DA. 
- for the reinstatement of all trade unionists and suspended and revoked for 
the cause of human rights1267. 
Sellami, Baroud, Larbi and Derradji all stressed that they saw SNAPAP as the only 
existing platform to change precarious working structures in Algeria. However, it is 
also interesting how consistent their experiences are, which can mean at least that 
their shared discourses are shared in practice, or constructed in common networks 
in groups in participatory thinking, as Mannheim would describe1268. Many activists 
also take part in a similar formation, where concepts such as citizenship are 
instructed. Algerian civil society is pluralist and rich compared to the role of the 
political parties, considered as weak and ineffective1269. While discontent and 
pessimism may be vast among Algerians, social movements and other actors are 
nevertheless also relatively marginal phenomena. In 2014, I asked more targeted 
questions regarding citizenship and the acts of citizenship. Next I present a dialogue 
with a middle-aged SNAPAP activist, responsible for union’s communications, 
Idriss Mekideche: 
KM: And could you describe what the citizenship means to you?  
IM: The citizenship, in short, means to have rights and responsibilities and to exercise 
them in reality. To live with a dignity. To respect the others. To respect the liberties 
of the others. It is all that. When we are citizens, we have responsibilities and rights. 
We exercise them in reality. We have and we use those liberties in reality.  
KM: The actions that are conducted by SNAPAP are they related to the citizenship?  
IM: Of course. Last year we assembled in Oran to call and to regain our citizenship. 
We made this call to the press as a result of this meeting in the context of trade 
unionism and SNAPAP and all the Algerians in general. It is related to freedom and 
democracy. The trade unions are here to protect the moral and material interests of 
the workers. However, without these rights such as freedom and democracy and 
 
1267 Journalistes Citoyens Algérie 13.10.2013: Appel a la concretisation du droit de citoyenneté. Idriss 
Mekkideche. http://www.jcalgerie.be/?p=9096  
1268 Mannheim [1929] (1955, 3).  
1269 Liverani, Andrea (2008, 99) The Civil Society in Algeria: The political functions of associational life. Oxon: 
Routledge. 
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without right to organize in the context of civil society, we cannot defend the workers. 
Therefore, we decided to fight on two fronts: freedom and democracy as well as the 
rights of the workers. They are interconnected. We want to defend the workers but 
then we are told that we have not right to protest or that we do not have right to 
organize meetings or to assist in international manifestations. We are prevented to 
travel. Without these freedoms, we cannot protect the interests of the workers. We 
cannot be a trade union if we cannot protect the workers. We cannot exist1270. 
How Mekideche described how the fulfillment of citizenship rights also explains the 
transformation of the autonomous trade unions into protest movements and close 
cooperation with human rights organization such as LADDH and Amnesty 
International Algeria. Autonomous trade union activists argue that unions are not 
able to practice basic trade unionism and are therefore forced to conduct struggles 
transforming public spaces into spatial politics hoping to transform them into spaces 
of rights to gain conditions that are necessary for functioning within more traditional 
framework. However, there are differences in regard of experiencing the citizenship 
among unionists and unions. The President of CNAPEST, Larbi Nouar was in many 
ways less critical in his depiction of socio-political situation in Algeria: 
First of all, one must understand that we are not like the citizens in Morocco or other 
countries. The social classes do not exist regarding the laws and so forth. However, 
in practice there exist some abnormalities. We do not have the social ranks as in Gulf 
countries that cover everything. On the contrary in Algeria, you can find a son of 
farmer (fellah), who represent Algeria in the United Nations. We do not have social 
classes. We are all Algerians. There are people who are in power and there are people 
who are not in power but there are not criteria who we accept among those in power. 
An average citizen can reach whatever position. This is grace of the November 
revolution. There are no different classes between Algerians. However, during the 
years of Bouteflika, there are now people who have became ultra rich, and those who 
have become really poor. These are the abnormalities, that we can register in 
Algeria1271.  
This statement shows the versatility of experiences within the trade union 
movement, while similarities as well. Nouar stresses the lack of hierarchies in Algeria 
compared to Morocco and other countries due to independence war that made 
Algerians equal with one another. However, he also brings out the income 
inequalities that were according to him on the rise.  
Finally, the 2011 uprisings did not lead into largescale political upheaval as in the 
neighboring countries, though many similar socio-economic features were clearly 
 
1270 Idriss Mekideche. Interviewed in Algiers in December 2014.  
1271 Larbi Nouar. Interviewed in Algiers in January 2015. 
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present and experienced within the autonomous trade union movement. A few years 
later, the glimmer of change that followed the regime changes in Tunisia and Egypt 
started to vanish. Expectations for democratic transitions experienced setbacks 
within Mohamed Morsi’s Egypt as well as in Syria and Libya due to ever escalating 
civil wars. This was the context where I started my fieldwork in Algeria, in spring 
2013. 
7.2 Restrictions at the Tunisian border 
In March 2013, I travelled to Oran, the second largest city in Algeria, where I had 
possibility to visit the anthropological research center CRASC (Centre de recherche 
en anhtropologie sociale et culturelle) and to meet with the trade union members of 
SNAPAP. In the evening two SNAPAP activists picked me up from my hotel and 
drove me a cafeteria, where I met Rachid Malaoui, Kaddour Chouicha and other 
trade unionists. The café was typical public cafeteria in Algeria with little luxury but 
a nice atmosphere.  
We discussed about autonomous trade unions and I told them about my research.  
They were friendly and insisted that as an Algerian citizen I had the right to make 
research and I would not need any official authorization to interact with them: it was 
my duty to participate in a discussion, criticize, and develop the country. They said: 
“are you going to ask permission from the government to speak with us?” and 
laughed. They corrected many factual errors and misunderstandings that came up 
and gave me various new viewpoints for my study. I felt quite foolish after that 
meeting because I started to understand how complex and extensive topic I had 
chosen and how little I knew about it. Simultaneously, I was not sure whether I was 
able to try to manage such a challenging question.   
During the discussions, they started to speak about the World Social Forum in 
Tunisia, where I was also supposed to travel from Algeria, because I had some 
friends from Finland participating there from various Finnish NGOs. Malaoui and 
Chouicha told me that there were dozens of SNAPAP activists, young and old, 
women and men, from all around Algeria, who were leaving by bus to Tunisia for 
the forum. They offered me possibility to join them. I promised to think about this 
appealing possibility even though I first thought that I would travel to Tunis as I was 
planned, by airplane from Algiers. They asked me: “Are you afraid? We are ready to 
sacrifice ourselves and you are afraid of a bus trip”.  
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After the visit in Oran, I traveled back to Algiers and started to think about the 
travel. I had been told by many researcher colleagues that it could be risky to go with 
the anti-governmental activists to the places where I might face the authorities and 
be reported in the same context with them. The border would be definitely one place 
to avoid. Meanwhile, I was reflecting on the unique possibility to meet, to interview 
and construct relations with so many activists around Algeria, to follow them to 
international conference and observe how they interact with other international 
actors.  
After a few rather sleepless nights I decided to take the risk and participate. I 
called to the organizer of the trip, the number I was given, and asked for further 
information. On the Sunday morning 24 March, I went to the office of SNAPAP in 
El Harrach, a suburb in Algiers, where I found dozens of activists who were 
gathering from different cities around Algeria. The office was in a building, which 
did not appear very luxurious, but which seem to be of practical for an autonomous 
trade union. There were few rooms, a kitchen and obviously it was used to hold 
meetings and education with flip chart and chairs to different floors.  
I introduced myself to the various people I met in the corridors. I was asked to 
wait until we would move to Maison des syndicats in Bab-Ezzouar, Algiers. There 
would be buses that would take us to Tunis.  However, while discussing with some 
SNAPAP youth activists, I found out that when crossing a border, one must pay 
taxes first. I was not aware about that before and I caused a bit of problem because 
time was limited. Finally, two youth activists, one from SNAPAP and another from 
FFS, promised to accompany me to an official establishment where I could pay the 
taxes, about a few hundred dinars, if I recall correctly. It was a rainy day and I 
remember being a bit ashamed for causing this extra bother due to my ignorance. 
Due to lack of time, these two activists were able to negotiate so that I was let to 
pass the queue. Finally, we were able to join the others in Maison des syndicats.  
Maison des syndicats was a famous place were some of the most important 
meetings and gatherings among the autonomous trade unions were held. I remember 
seeing news, just some weeks before, were police had besieged the building. There 
were many posters in the walls and dozens of activists waiting for the buses to pick 
us. It was a cold rainy day and we moved to wait under the bridge on a highway not 
far from the house. The buses arrived and one bus was full of activists of the 
SNAPAP and another with activists from various movements, such as Amnesty of 
Algeria, SOS Disparus and FFS to mention just a few. I went to the bus of SNAPAP. 
We started our long trip towards Tunis. I was told that we will cross the border 
at Tebessa. We were almost a hundred and the atmosphere in the bus was promising. 
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Young activists were dancing and occasionally shouting anti-governmental slogans 
or singing y'en a marre. I was able to communicate with many activists and decided 
to ask if I was able to conduct some recorded interviews. Our bus contained activists 
from different cities, as I was told beforehand, and during the way to Tebessa I was 
able to conduct about ten interviews and observe interaction between the activists. 
They were women and men, young and old. 
From the beginning, I was very well received and I found them polite and 
friendly. I had thought that it would be difficult to have permission to interview the 
activists or to have an access to their experiences in the first place. However, 
everyone were eager to share their thoughts and they were pleased that someone was 
interested in their struggle in the first place. I asked permission to conduct interviews 
from the organizers of the trip already in the beginning when I arrived and I was told 
that I was free to speak and interview whoever I wanted. Actually, I noticed that 
many activists were so eager to share their perspectives that I had to take everyone 
into consideration and not exclude someone who wanted to speak, otherwise those 
excluded could be offended. Therefore, the only limit was time.  
We stopped few times during the trip and these stops offered a possibility to get 
to know new members. Unfortunately, many prominent conversations were left 
unrecorded. During the so-called “unofficial” discussions, I tried to make as many 
notes as possible but it was challenging due to the full schedule and continuous 
discussions and happenings. We had left Algiers at about midday and it was getting 
dark. We made few other stops during the long trip and finally, in the night or early 
morning around 3.00 a clock, we arrived to border control in Tebessa. 
Every bus had the main person responsible who always counted us before we 
continued after the stops. Now those in charge collected our passports to be checked 
by the border officials. Everyone was tired. We waited in the hall, but nothing 
happened. Gradually, after some hours when sunrise begun, people started to go 
back on buses to have few hours of sleep. Soon rumors started to circulate that there 
might be some problems. In the morning, between six and eight o’clock, the 
information was verified. We were denied exit from Algeria to the World Social 
Forum in Tunisia by the state authorities of the border.  
When the final information came, dozens of activists from the buses jumped out, 
took their returned passports from those in charge and started to protest at the 
border. They waved their passports in the air, symbolically stressing the violation of 
their citizenship rights. Why their access to pass the border was denied? A cold desert 
wind was blowing while these activists shouted anti-government slogans. Everyone 
were tired and angry. The buses left and I heard that there could be other border 
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controls that could be easier to pass. First, the buses stopped at the village or small 
town of Meskiana, birthplace of well-known Algerian novelist and psychiatrist 
Yamina Méchakra (1949-2013), where we ate breakfast. I remember the old men in 
the town center with their brown burnouses, traditional Algerian cloth.  
Then the buses continued to the beautiful city called Souk Ahras, birthplace of 
important Church Father Saint Augustine of Hippo (354-430). From there a few 
activists took taxis to the border hoping that they could pass individually. The group, 
around 100 activists, was too large and attracted too much attention. The rest 
continued to the fourth largest city called Annaba in the North located by the 
Mediterranean, which was about 80 kilometers close to the EL Kala, next to a border 
crossing to Tunisia. We arrived to Annaba late in the evening. Everybody was 
starting to feel tired and a bit nervous. I was told that the bus drivers would drop us 
at the main bus station and leave. They had been driving for two days and for some 
possible disagreements they decided to leave. We were waiting for a few hours in the 
middle of main railway station in Annaba, known for its youth delinquencies, and 
some of the activists urged and recommended me to be exceptionally careful because 
of some potential criminals that could easily recognize our confusion in the station 
with our travel luggage and so forth. 
However, soon we moved to youth hostel were we could have a shower and 
dinner. It was touching to see how united and helpful all these activists were despite 
their fatigue and the setbacks they faced over the last two days. It was easy to 
recognize some youth figures who continuously kept up a good spirit, organized 
things such as accommodation, lunch and so forth. They enjoyed respect among the 
others as well and somehow expressed their willingness to receive responsibility. I 
was told that next morning we would all continue to the border crossing near El 
Kala and try once more to pass to participate to the World Social Forum. 
Next morning, 26 March, we took our breakfast quietly and again I had many 
fascinating possibilities to conduct discussions with the activists. I also had the 
opportunity to leave the youth hostel and buy some newspapers. I was positively 
surprised at how our travel was mediatized in various oppositional journals: El 
Watan, Liberté, Al Khabar and Le Soir. In the article of El Watan one activists was 
quoted saying: 
[W]e arrived at the border around 3am. We gave our passports and all our papers 
were in order. We waited until 9am for the police to tell us that it is impossible to 
leave the territory, without any explanations1272. 
 
1272 El Watan 26.3.2013. Des militants algériens empêches de quitter le territoire nationale. Mehdi 
Bsikri. 
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Other quotes published told: 
The decision comes from above, the police told us. Preventing Algerians from 
participating in the WSF is a serious act that affects the dignity and freedom of our 
fellow citizens. [T]he Algerian Power is frightened by any act that could lead to a 
“democratic contagion” as a result of the latest developments in the region1273.  
Then a few smaller buses were organized to take us to the border crossing near El 
Kala. Again the delegation was prevented from crossing. This time there were many 
outsiders crossing the border and they were a bit astonished when activists started 
to shout anti-governmental slogans, to sing the Algerian national anthem and wave 
the Algerian flag they had with them. Their demonstration was a kind of 
performance, and these young activists seemed to be professional demonstrators 
when conducting their protest. Some army soldiers arrived to inspect the situation, 
but they were rather smiling and calm. After sometime, we jumped back onto buses 
and moved to a new hostel, with better conditions than at the youth hostel, where 
we spent the first night. In the evening some of the activists gathered, around 20, to 
a room to discuss about tactics to cross the border or to organize protests at the 
border. I thought that it was time for me to get back to the capital Algiers next day, 
because many had left already. Some of these activists nevertheless remained and I 
heard later on that they had stayed for several days.   
On the last morning we had breakfast and I started to know some of the activists 
better. We had many interesting discussions about the constructs of life in Algeria, 
marriage and regional differences in the marriage ceremonies. We discussed about 
the position between men and women, politics and experiences of life in general. 
Both women and men participated in these discussions. I was told by the young 
activists that SNAPAP was like a family. They even referred to Nassira Ghozlane, 
the secretary-general of the SNAPAP, as their mother figure who always took care 
of them. We took some pictures together and finally I left with three other unionists 
from Annaba to Algiers by long-distance taxi. We arrived so late that we all stayed 
the night at the office of SNAPAP in El Harrach. The next morning, I left and 
continued my stay in the capital with my family and friends. 
Later on, I contacted one member from UGTA, who I was supposed to meet 
and interview in Tunis. I told him that I was not able to contact him before because 
I was conducting my field research among the activists that were stopped at the 
border. He asked me whether I participated with the SNAPAP people? I answered 
 
1273 El Watan 26.3.2013. Des militants algériens empêches de quitter le territoire nationale. Mehdi 
Bsikri. 
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yes, when he told me that if he had known that I was going to travel with those 
people he would have explained me that it is not worth it. He told me that this trip 
had been organized by Morocco and we were carried like sheep. The relations with 
Algeria and Morocco have been cold for few decades and since 1994, the border 
between the countries has been closed. Especially the dispute related to Moroccan 
occupation in Western Sahara have led to an impasse regarding the development of 
their relations.  
According to Frédéric Vairel, it is revealing to study the setbacks suffered by the 
activists’ associations because it increases one's knowledge about the methods that 
are used by the authorities. The first impression after the unsuccessful trip to World 
Social Forum was that it had been a disappointment and setback for these 
oppositional activists. Vairel, when dealing with contentious spaces, stresses that 
“they function under coercion”1274. He continues: 
The contentious arenas constitute a “new discipline” adopted by regimes against 
activist’ organizations and mobilizations; they are part of the way authoritarianism is 
reinventing itself1275. 
The contentious practices of SNAPAP can be linked to the way the activists define 
the political situation in Algeria and reformulate their political identities. Therefore, 
repertoires of contention of SNAPAP transforms into the subject of their struggle 
when they “define and implement tactics and gauge their potential efficacy” in 
Algerian social environment while simultaneously defining surrounding social and 
political reality. In December 2014, I spoke with Idriss Mekideche in the CGATA 
meeting, whom I have met first time in the trip to World Social Forum. I showed 
him a picture, where activists were waving their passports in the morning in Tebessa: 
Oh yes, that is when we were in the border. I did not see the passports. This is part 
of the violations of human rights and restrictions regarding the freedom of 
movement. Meanwhile Algeria has ratified all the international conventions. You 
experienced that with us. We were prevented to pass the border to Tunisia to assist 
the World Social Forum without any explanation or reason. In the end, they did not 
say anything, unfortunately. It was an experience for the people who did not know 
how things happen. However, I believe that there are always possibility to find 
interests from such incidents. For example, we stayed on the border about one week 
and conducted protestations. There were of course those who left but we continued 
to protest day after day and those people who passed the border saw us and were 
 
1274 Vairel, Frédéric (2011, 27) “Protesting in Authoritarian Situations”, in Beinin, Joel and Vairel, 
Frédéric (Eds.) Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press.  
1275 Vairel (2011, 27-28). 
 294 
really surprised. Otherwise, they had ever heard from us. Now, all the World Social 
Forum spoke about us and in other circumstances it would probably ever happened. 
In the end, their action had other consequences that they probably expected1276.  
I will now show how the patriotism in the antagonistic discourses are constructed 
and what role does play the foreign human rights organization and other foundations 
in the context of Algerian autonomous trade unions. While the Algerian authorities 
are highly sensitive about any external interference on Algerian internal issues, the 
autonomous trade unions and other oppositional movements use their help as a 
strategic choice to internationalize the internal conflict in their struggle for the 
realization of citizenship rights and freedom of action in the sense of a pluralist trade 
union environment.  
7.3 External relations: citizenship rights or patriotism? 
In this final chapter, I will develop in more depth the link between the antagonistic 
discourses related to patriotism in the context of international framework. I will 
stress patriotism and stability as the nodal points as well as the political in relation to 
internationalization of the conflict between the state authorities and autonomous 
trade unions. The United States and France often come out as foreign powers that 
instigate significant elements in the construction of discourses. The United States is 
an important military hegemonic and economic power in the world. Its military 
interventions in the Middle East, North Africa (Libya) and Sahel during recent years 
are followed closely in Algeria. However, due to complex relations, close and distant, 
between Algeria and France, antagonism anchors even deeper to historical events. 
The 132 years of colonialism, the war of independence, immigration and 
development of relations between Algeria and France, among others, play significant 
role in the construction of antagonistic discourses that appear in various interviews 
related to autonomous trade unionism in Algeria.    
Why Algeria skipped the so-called “Arab Spring”? The country was suffering 
from many similar characteristics that raised unrest in Mediterranean area and 
elsewhere. There is little research conducted about the issue. However, Arab 
Barometer1277 published thin opinion poll that revealed increasing satisfaction 
among Algerians related to living condition since the 2011 uprisings. The study 
 
1276 Idriss Mekkideche. Interviewed in December 2014 in Algiers.     
1277 Robbins, Michael (2014) Skipping the Arab Spring? The Arab Barometer surveys a Changing Algeria. April 
2014. 
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depicts well why Algerians were content to observe the events from the sidelines. A 
recent analysis of three public opinion surveys revealed that while only minority of 
citizens evaluated positively the government or the state of democracy in the 
country, the overall trend was increasing satisfaction with living conditions since the 
so-called Arab Spring.  
For example, in 2013 four times as many Algerians rated the government’s 
performance as good compared with just two years earlier (40% vs. 10%). Likewise, 
the percentage who believe that the state of democracy and human rights is good or 
very good has gone up from just 8 percent in 2011 to nearly a third (32%) in 2013. 
Satisfaction with the state of the economy has similarly heavily increased during the 
same time-period. About twice as many Algerians said the economy is doing well or 
very well in 2013 (66%) compared with 2011 (32%). The report states:  
This change may be due to the government’s dramatic increase in social spending 
following the Arab Spring. Nevertheless, the vast majority of Algerians (77%) state 
that economic issues remain the biggest challenge facing their country. Similarly, in 
2013, Algerians were more likely than in 2011 to say that their basic rights were 
guaranteed, including freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom to 
vote in elections. In 2013, fully three quarters of citizens said each of these liberties 
was ensured1278.  
However, it is also important to reflect critically aforementioned surveys, though 
they can indicate about the wider public opinion in the country. The increased 
economic situation meant of course a huge challenge for the fragmented 
oppositional movement to mobilize citizens to protest. While small demonstrations 
and sit-ins were common in different sectors, such as education, health and public 
sector around the country, they lacked largescale popular participation. In many 
ways, for oppositional groups Algerians appeared ignorant and passive regarding 
manifest political engagement.  
Secondly, the 2011 uprisings led to political instability in Tunisia and Egypt, and 
even civil wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen, which did not attract Algerians after a 
decade of bloodshed during the 1990s. The 2011 uprisings have also initiated wide 
discussions related to timing and geopolitical power politics. While revolts where 
depicted as authentic and incidental regarding their timing, concerns of foreign 
meddling and manipulation related to new social media technologies and 
transformation of media landscape have been manifested. These warnings of 
destabilization via social movements have been common in the narrations of 
 
1278 Robbins (2014, 1). 
 296 
authoritarian governments, but discussion and doubts have been generated by 
scholars as well.  
Immediately after the 2011 uprisings, Tariq Ramadan1279 presented two opposing 
analyses on the 2011 uprisings, where one saw direct manipulation of the United 
States and some European countries that aimed for a new type of control through 
the destabilization of the eastern and western Mediterranean countries. The other 
repealed this view by explaining that no one can control social movements. 
However, then Ramadan offered an interpretation that went between the two 
aforementioned analyses. He argued that uprisings were not produced through 
manipulation, but were not totally autonomous either1280. In addition, Ramadan 
wrote how the US and some European countries cooperated with Google, Yahoo, 
Twitter and Facebook and gave training for young Tunisian and Egyptian activists 
and bloggers since 2003-2004 and during 2006-2007 even more systematically1281. 
Similarly, Ramadan described how the Otpor (Resistance) movement was formed 
within internet dissidents in Serbia and managed to topple the government of 
Slobodan Milosevic in 2000 and how similar movements were behind Rose 
Revolution in Georgia, Orange Revolution in Ukraine and Tulip Revolution in 
Kyrgyzstan.  
In Algeria, the autonomous trade unions are also accused for receiving funding 
from the outside of Algeria  to destabilize the country for the interests of foreign 
powers. The institutions, such as the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID)1282, National Endowment for Democracy (NED)1283, 
International Republican Institute (IRI)1284, National Democratic Institute for 
International Affairs (NDI)1285, Freedom House1286, Albert Einstein Institution1287 
and Open Society Institute (OSI)1288 are known for their promotion of democracy 
 
1279 Ramadan, Tariq (2011, 41-43) L’Islam et le réveil arabe. Paris: Presses du Châtelet.  
1280 Ramadan (2011, 21). 
1281 Ramadan (2011, 42-43). 
1282 Created in 1961 by the President John F. Kennedy for administering civilian foreign aid.  
1283 Founded in 1983 by the President Ronald Reagan to strengthen democratic institutions around 
the world. 
1284 Founded in 1983 to expand the freedom throughout the world and is chaired by Senator John 
McCain since 1993. 
1285 Founded in 1983 to increase effectiveness of democratic institutions and is connected to 
Democratic Party.  
1286 Founded in 1941 to promote democracy, political freedom and human rights. 
1287 Founded in 1983 by Gene Sharp that specializes in the study of methods of non-violent resistance. 
1288 Founded in 1993 by George Soros, wealthy businessman and political activist who is also object 
of various populist foes and conspiracy theories.  
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and are funded by US budget or American private capital1289. Ahmed Bensaada 
argued that these institutions combined with the formation of activists and bloggers 
in various non-governmental organization provided with new technological 
instruments targeted more on destabilization than sustainable democratization1290. 
Training includes non-violent ideology theorized by Gene Sharp, called as 
“Machiavelli of the non-violence” or “Clausewitz of the non-violence war”, who 
also founded Albert Einstein Institution as is well-known for his academic research 
on non-violence. According to Bensaada, various color revolutions and 2011 
uprisings contain similar practices and symbols, as for example, raised fist that have 
been attached to these non-violent movements from Serbia to Egypt, Tunisia and 
Algeria1291.  
These suspicions relate to the Algerian autonomous trade unions, because 
Bensaada accuses the Algerian human rights organization LADDH for receiving 
money from the NED in 2002, 2004 and 2005, while SNAPAP from Solidarity 
Center, one of the satellites of NED1292. Solidarity center even devotes one page for 
SNAPAP in its website1293. I asked Selim Mecheri, the longtime activist of SNAPAP 
from the health sector, about the accusations related receiving financial aid from 
international institutions such as the Solidarity Center or about the accusations of 
being controlled by abroad:  
SM: Ah, foreign countries. For us it was necessary to get help from the Solidarity 
Center because otherwise we wouldn’t have had chance to go out [from Algeria]. For 
example, I do not have resources to go out without invitation from these international 
organizations. I do not want hide the fact that my salary is not enough neither is the 
financial resources of my organization. Sometimes when I go for a mission in Algiers, 
I use about 30 percent of the costs from my assets. It is not my organization that will 
… but I am sure that I am defending a real cause and we have arrived to our objective, 
which is that we have become trade unionist. That’s a choice. People respect us, 
because in the morning I arrive before my workers. I put on my doctor’s coat. They 
know well whether I have a trade union meeting in Algiers. I go during the weekend. 
If I am for example invited [somewhere], the law authorize me to be absent from the 
work. There is a law that defines the modalities regarding rights to exercise trade 
unionism in Algeria. I have right to be absent from the work. I must present my 
convocation or my invitation for administration. Then I am authorized in the frame 
 
1289 Bensaada, Ahmed (2011, 20) Arabesque Américaine: Le rôle des États-Unis dans les révoltes de la rue arabe. 
Québec: Michel Brûlé. 
1290 Bensaada (2011). 
1291 Bensaada (2011, 21, 24 and85). 
1292 Bensaada (2011, 83-84). 
1293 https://www.solidaritycenter.org/algeria-reinstate-rachid-malaoui-end-union-rights-violations-
now/  
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of training. It is administered in the new status of the public function that training is 
a right and that the administration must authorize possibility for trade unionist or a 
worker in the public function to assist into congress or seminar of training. It is an 
achievement that was claimed especially by the autonomous trade unions, because the 
UGTA is not interested1294. 
Mecheri explained that the cooperation of autonomous trade unions with foreign 
institutions was part of the strategy to challenge UGTA within the international level. 
He questioned why UGTA had the right to international cooperation but the 
autonomous trade unions did not? 
SM: The first track of the UGTA was in Germany. UGTA was the first partner that 
worked with Friedrich Ebert Foundation. It was created by the first German 
President that was elected democratically in 1922 [in reality it was created in 1919]. 
Friedrich Ebert is similar to FLN. It is a foundation that regroup multiple 
departments that form trade unionists, politicians and candidates. It is a school. Now 
they are saying that you are internationalizing the problem. I would like to ask from 
the power (pouvoir) or the UGTA why Algeria is ratifying international conventions? 
If they are ratified they are more reliable and weight more than constitution? […] 
Algeria has ratified all the conventions related to work or working life. Eight 
conventions have been ratified. There exists eight conventions related to work. All of 
them are ratified by Algeria. It is subjected to engage to respect these conventions. 
The law 90-14 [relative aux modalités d’excercice du droit syndical] authorize to knit 
the relations between Algerian trade union organizations and international trade 
union organization. If we are, what is-called, harkis1295 or mercenaries or whatever, 
they can just depose the complaint.  
KM: They accuse you for creating the Algerian Arab Spring? 
SM: I consider that the people of the UGTA … I am human being, defender of the 
human rights. I am against the humiliation of the human beings. They are the people 
that hide themselves behind the flag of the UGTA. They are thugs with fine clothes 
who treat the workers as idiots. If the worker denounce these representatives of the 
UGTA, they are automatically punished. They can speak whatever, because you feel 
that they are telling you the talk of the power (pouvoir). They are against Algeria … 
they want to internationalize the problems of the Algeria … they are inscribed to 
foreign agenda to destabilize the country …  
KM: What do you think about this external menace? 
SM: I don’t believe that there is external menace.  
KM: What about uprising? 
 
1294 Selim Mecheri. Interviewed in Oran in December 2014. 
1295 On page 287 I deal with the concept of harki and how is it used as qualifier in Algerian political 
language. 
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SM: There will be an uprising. I am totally agreeing about that. I will be objective with 
you. I am against an uprising because we have passed a phase … really… really … 
difficult. I am really afraid of this generation. It is not … it is representative. One 
million and then one million high school students. Three million university students. 
Don’t forget that there are unemployment estimated as 30 percent. It is a sign that 
makes afraid. This new generation that is born here in the university is not like those 
before. It does not think like … I class them as the protest generation. […] We are 
confronted by the protest generation and it makes me afraid and it will mark the […]. 
At the moment, it does not understand and it is not interested in […]. Karim, there 
is something that really touched me as being the ancient generation. I discuss 
occasionally with the youth and they say: “if the Americans come to colonize us, I 
would be happy”. It is really serious1296.  
This dialogue shows well how the discourses related to patriotism and stability are 
constructed. At this stage, it is enough to state that it is intrinsically part of the 
discourse construction related to patriotism. Mecheri was worried that one day the 
youth will be so frustrated that they will manifest and transform the country into 
turmoil. Mecheri also states about the generational difference and gap of 
understanding between older and younger generation. Because of the experiences of 
the 1990s, he would not want to go the civil war again. Significant part of the youth 
have dissenting generational collective memory compared to older generations and 
for example, they were born after the civil war and therefore comprise its memory 
differently. Meantime he was worried that the youth lacked the appreciation 
regarding the independence of Algeria and the sacrifices that former generations 
committed by bringing out the desire of the youth for new American colonization.   
It is difficult and challenging to find information on whether United States is 
directly in contact with the autonomous trade unions. However, I did some research 
through Wikileaks1297, which offers 68 653 results related to entry word Algeria. One 
cable from 2009 was extremely interesting regarding this study, because it shows the 
support requested by SNAPAP from the Solidarity Center: 
In addition, we have requested MEPI [The U.S. –Middle East Partnership Initiative] 
funding for a Solidarity Center project working with Algeria's labor unions, as well as 
a small grant for SNAPAP, Algeria's largest autonomous (i.e., non-government-
affiliated) labor union. The Solidarity Center is currently the best vehicle for sustained 
engagement with autonomous unions, but the SNAPAP small grant exercise is an 
effort to build the organizational and fund-raising capacity of a union with little or no 
previous experience in either area. If successful, the SNAPAP grant might lead to 
 
1296 Selim Mecheri. Interviewed in Oran in December 2014. 
1297 It is important to notice that Wikileaks was accused by various civil rights organizations of 
endangering of human rights activists and their identities and was criticized for not censoring 
documents that could put human rights activists at risk.  
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larger direct engagement, albeit in the distant future, without a MEPI implementer as 
intermediary. (FY09 MSP Goal 3)1298 
The US embassy in Algiers, as most likely embassies from other countries as well, 
keeps ties with autonomous trade unions and other civil society activists. Wikileaks 
cables also reveal other information regarding autonomous trade unions. For 
example, the leader of SNAPAP, Rachid Malaoui have met three times1299 in 2008 
with US officials and explained about the social situation in Algeria. Cables also show 
meetings with the President of UNPEF Mohamed Ider1300 and Secretary General Ali 
Lemdani1301 of CNAPEST. Coordinator of CNAPEST, Nouar Larbi explained in 
the interview with Larbi Graïne the request of American embassy to meet with 
autonomous trade union representative regarding their support for Bouteflika’s 
extension for the third presidential mandate: 
The American Embassy invited us, it is true, but for our part we declined the 
invitation. We were in favor of a meeting at the National Headquarters of SNAPAP. 
The Americans wanted to learn about trade union issues, such as the number of 
members, and the nature of our demands. We must not demonize trade unionists 
who have relations with foreign countries. The Algerian state itself has diplomatic, 
military and economic relations with the outside world. It's okay for unions to have 
relationships at this level. We are members of Solidarité Sud, Public Services 
International, International Education and CGT Maghreb-Europe. We are supported 
morally if only by press releases. On the material side, on the other hand, we are not 
assisted either by our State or by the foreigner. [...] We are an institution of the 
Republic1302. 
SNAPAP also maintains relations with Spanish General Confederation of Labour 
(Confederación General del Trabajo, CGT) and National Confederation of Labour 
(The Confederación Nacional del Trabajo, CNT), French SUD Unions (Solidaires 
 
1298 Wikileaks. Algeria and MEPI - Moving forward 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ALGIERS415_a.html (Retrieved 26.2.2018) 
1299 Wikileaks. Would the real autonomous trade unions please stand up? 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08ALGIERS332_a.html (Retrieved 26.2.2018);  
Wikileaks. “Year of the strike” continues: 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08ALGIERS458_a.html (Retrieved 26.2.2018);  Wikileaks. 
Mounting social discontent drives late May street violence in Algiers and Oran 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08ALGIERS661_a.html (Retrieved 26.2.2018) 
1300 Wikileaks. Unions plan nationwide protest surge: 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08ALGIERS140_a.html (Retrieved 26.2.2018)  
1301 Wikileaks. Would the real autonomous trade unions please stand up?  
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08ALGIERS332_a.html (Retrieved 26.2.2018) 
1302 Nouar Larbi interviewed by Larbi Graïne (2010, 99-100).   
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Unitaires Démocratiques, SUD) as well as with other North African, African and 
Middle Eastern unions. Malaoui explained their international cooperation with 
foreign organizations in 2010 in the interview with Larbi Graïne:  
Yes we are adherents to the ISP (Public Services International). We are part of a Euro-
Mediterranean network of trade unions. We have established working relationships 
with the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH). Complaints have been 
lodged with the ILO [International Labor Office] and the ILO [International Labor 
Organization]. We have taken the step because we realized that globalization is not 
only economic but also social. In front of the powerful bosses who shaped this new 
world, stand up the alter-globalists who intend to make global social fight. Since the 
multinationals control the world economy, our fight is also an international struggle. 
The international solidarity of workers has become more necessary as unions are 
being repressed at home, as is the case for us. It is in this context that we adhere to 
the international social movement1303.  
Maaloui also stated that they do not have any difficulties in approaching foreign 
organizations: 
No, it's a question of credibility. Foreigners are not fooled. They had the opportunity 
to come here. We invited trade unionists from Spain, France, PSI, International. They 
could meet everyone. They have their investigation. They know how to recognize the 
real unions of fakes. When you are credible, you adhere easily1304.  
The Algerian authorities accuse the unions of receiving foreign money and working 
as assets for the destabilization of the country. Questions of foreign economic 
support is often considered as working for external interests, which is denounced by 
autonomous trade unions. According to Idris Mekkideche, responsible for 
communications, SNAPAP does not receive any funding from the state.  
Not money nor any subventions. We have the contributions of the workers and we 
have the contributions or aids related to the traineeships, seminars and forums by the 
international organizations1305.   
Malaoui argued that SNAPAP is self-financed:  
We are self-financed, our members contribute each with 80 DA year1306. 
 
1303 Rachid Malaoi interviewed by Larbi Graïne (2010, 43). 
1304 Graïne (2010, 43). 
1305 Interviewed in the bus heading to World Social Forum in March 2013. 
1306 Graïne, Larbi (2010, 44). 
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Malaoui nevertheless admitted, as does Mekideche, that international solidarity 
groups contribute to the finance of the formations of SNAPAP members, while 
other support from international unions is merely moral:  
Moral support is important. International solidarity has also contributed to the 
formation of our unions. In addition, it assists us with every action we take. Therefore, 
we learn a lot in congress when we are invited1307. 
In September 2013 Hocine Zahouane, President of one branch of scattered 
LADDH accused the Worldwide Movement for Human Rights (FIDH)1308 of 
instigating the “Arab Spring” in Algeria and attached Rachid Malaoui of SNAPAP 
for those who were working for this agenda and receiving “important sums” of 
foreign funding  to “execute the plot”1309. Malaoui rejected the accusations in an 
interview with Larbi Graïne already few years earlier: 
An internal conflict between Zahouane and the members of the Bouchachi team split 
the league in 2009 and we took a stand in favor of Bouchachi and Yahia Abdenour, 
the former president of the league with whom we worked. Therefore, we became the 
target of Zahouane who then accused us of receiving foreign funding to divide the 
country in the midst of turbulant period. This position was also held by the 
government, politicians and journalists, and through this the government tried to 
destabilize us with the complicity of a DRS clan. There is always, within the DRS, a 
very active clan that causes us serious trouble. The League of Human Rights of 
Zahouane has repeatedly received funding of foreign NGOs which I will not name. 
SNAPAP receives no subsidies from abroad. We work with foreign trade unions 
because we belong to an international trade union organization, the International 
Trade Union Confederation, and other foreign trade union organizations to which we 
pay contributions each year. This practice is authorized by Algerian law, which allows 
Algerian trade unions to join regional and international trade unions1310. 
I visited the SNAPAP main office near El Harrach in the capital Algiers in March 
2013 before leaving with 96 other activists towards Tunis Social Forum. I also spent 
a night in the office after returning late in the night to Algiers from Annaba, where 
SNAPAP activists continued demonstrating in the border of El Kala after being 
refused to cross the Algerian-Tunisian border to participate to the World Social 
Forum. For me, it seemed that SNAPAP was dealing with very limited resources 
 
1307 Graïne, Larbi (2010, 44). 
1308 https://www.fidh.org/en/ (Retrieved 24.2.2019) 
1309 Algerie News 23.9.2013. Les vérités de Zehouane: Complot du FFS, tentative d’un printemps arabe 
en Algérie et crise de la LADDH. Aïssa Moussi.  
1310 El Watan 17.2.2014. « Le pouvoir a sa propre société civile et ne dialogue qu’avec lui-même ». Feriel 
Kolli. 
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regarding their office and conditions, and its performances seem to rely on mostly 
dedicated activists ready to sacrifice their free time and resources  to continue their 
struggle against the authorities, which recalls many ways a way of life. The outfit of 
their office and other mediums can be described as modest but practical.  
The accusations of destabilization from abroad are widespread. They operate via 
the construction of discourses integrating us versus them juxtapositions creating 
images, where one’s own patriotism is accented. Simultaneously, these discourses 
function as transformation of the others as the damagers of the state interests. 
Sometimes it is enough just to bring out foreign threats without accusing any 
counterparts, as the leader of the oppositional Algerian Workers’ Party (PT) Louisa 
Hanoune’s statement shows, when she accused in March 2013 that the US Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) was training 200 Algerian in Tunisia, recruited by the 
Freedom House  to use them for their political aims1311. National protests where 
linked to foreign interests to destabilize Algeria. In 2013, young unemployed of the 
National Committee for the Defence of the Rights of the Unemployed (la 
Coordination Nationale de Défense des Droits des Chômeurs, CNDDC) started to 
organize protests in various cities in the economically crucial oil-producing areas of 
south of Algeria (Ouargla, Ghardaïa, El-Oued and Laghouat). Protests initiated 
speculation about foreign meddling organized by US, some European countries and 
Gulf countries to destabilize Algeria. When I discussed with Rachid Malaoui in 2013 
in Oran, he did not hide that SNAPAP was supporting and helped the establishment 
of the movement in the south: 
Who created Committee for the Defence of the Rights of the Unemployed CNDDC? 
Did they not tell you? It is SNAPAP. The committee that we created was the member 
of CNDC (the Coordination for Democratic Change). We created it and then it joined 
to the CNDC. And the people who are now protesting in the south, also the 
committee of the unemployed, it is also created by SNAPAP. Who created the 
National Workers’ Committee on Pre-employment (Le Comité nationale des 
Travailleurs de Pré-emploi), who were beaten before yesterday [manifestation was 
organized in front of the Grande poste d’Alger]? It is the SNAPAP youth1312. 
The activities of SNAPAP can also be linked into network of other affiliates such as 
The Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Unemployed (Comité national 
pour la défense des droits des chômeurs - CNDDC), which was created separately 
 
1311 Le Grand Soir 12.3.2013: Déstabilisation de l’Algérie : des blogueurs entraînés par la CIA en Tunisie: 
https://www.legrandsoir.info/destabilisation-de-l-algerie-des-blogueurs-entraines-par-la-cia-en-
tunisie.html  
1312 Rachid Malaoui. Interviewed in March 2013 in Oran.  
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because SNAPAP did not have right to unionize in the field of unemployed 
according to the legislation. The National Workers’ Committee on Pre-employment 
(Le comité national des travailleurs de pré-emploi) is also established as distinct 
organ gathering mostly the youth. Similarly, SNAPAP also has separate section for 
the women, National Union of Women Officials (L’Union nationale des femmes 
fonctionnaires), which was created in April 2005, when about 120 women from 
various structures and wilayas gathered in Zeralda in a meeting led by Koumas 
Hafidha1313. In addition, SNAPAP works closely with other autonomous trade 
unions and civil society organizations such as the Algerian League for the Defense 
of Human Rights (La Ligue algérienne pour la défense des droits de l’homme, 
LADDH)1314, Collective of Families of Disappeared in Algeria (Collectif des Familles 
de  Disparus en Algérie, CFDA) and SOS Disappeared (SOS Disparus). In addition, 
cooperation can be found with various student, youth and district movements. These 
cooperative formations reflect the social and political environment in which these 
unions operate.  
On April 2014, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, recuperating following a stroke in April 
2013, was re-elected for the fourth time as Algerian President after a second 
constitutional amendment. The constitution was already amended for the first time 
in 2008, enabling the continuation of his presidency1315. The fourth mandate was 
widely criticized and the loose movement Barakat was created to protest against it. 
Autonomous trade unions protested against the fourth term of the President 
Bouteflika, but the Algerian public observed the situation on the sidelines and did 
not participate to the protests.  
In 2014, SNAPAP joined to Arab Trade Union Confederation (ATUC)1316, 
connected to International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), which was 
established by 17 trade unions from 11 North African and Arab countries1317. It is 
possible to generalize that recent years have witnessed larger pursuit of autonomous 
 
1313 Le Soir d’Algérie 27.4.2005. SNAPAP: Création d’une fédération des femmes fonctionnaires. A.G. 
(A.G. indicates the first letters of the forename and surname of journalist who wrote the article). 
1314 The Algerian human rights movement is currently split into three factions. The first is LADDH 
of Kaddour Chouicha from Oran, who is the leader of one important faction that is supported by 
honorary President of Ali Yahia Abdennour and contain sections e.g. in Laghouat, Chlef and Tlemcen. 
The second is LADDH of Béjaïa presided by Hocine Zehouane. The third is the Algerian League for 
the Human Rights (Ligue algérienne des droits de l’Homme, LADH) presided by Mokhtar Bensaïd in 
Algiers. 
1315 Djabi, Nacer (2014, 3) Algeria: The Man and the Regime. Arab Reform Initiative July 2014.  
1316 http://www.arabtradeunion.org/en (Retrieved 24.2.2019) 
1317 https://www.ituc-csi.org/new-trade-union-body-takes-up-the (Retrieved 24.2.2019) 
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trade unions to obtain international help. One youth activist of SNAPAP stressed 
the importance of international human rights groups:
SNAPAP must be helped because it is almost the only force among the unions in 
Algeria that resists all this. It must be helped by the international community, 
international civil society and international organizations that democracy, union 
pluralism, activism, workers’ rights and people in general can resist. Otherwise, if we 
suffer from obstacles, prevention, repression or ignorant international atmosphere we 
risk our ability to resist long time1318.  
Persecutions, harassments and arrests of the autonomous trade unions or other civil 
society actors are systematically published by various international organizations, 
such as ITUC – Annual Survey of violations of trade union rights 20121319, 20131320 
and ITUC continue to keep up the information in its website1321. In addition, 
Euromed Rights have published numerous reports on human rights violations 
related to autonomous trade unions in 20131322, 20141323, 20151324, 20161325 and 
20171326 as well as Amnesty International 2017/20181327. These human rights 
organizations operate within legal and observatory context stressing that Algeria has 
ratified ILO core conventions 29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138 and 182 related to work, 
working conditions and freedom to organize within trade unions. Simultaneously, 
 
1318 Interviewed in the bus heading to World Social Forum in March 2013. 
1319 2012 Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4fd88969c.html (Retrieved 24.2.2019) 
1320 2013 Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights – Algeria: http://www.refworld.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=printdoc&docid=51b851813e (Retrieved 24.2.2019)   
1321 Survey of violations of trade union rights: Freedom of association – Collective bargaining – Strike. 
Algeria: https://survey.ituc-csi.org/Algeria.html (Retrieved 24.2.2019) 
1322 Solidarity with Independent Unionists in Algeria: Call for the reinstatement of Rachid Malaoui: 
https://euromedrights.org/publication/solidarity-with-independent-unionists-in-algeria-call-for-the-
reinstatement-of-rachid-malaoui-president-of-snapap/ (Retrieved 24.2.2019) 
1323 Workers’ rights trampled: https://euromedrights.org/publication/algeria-workers-rights-
trampled/ (Retrieved 24.2.2019) 
1324 Algeria: The authorities must stop harassing labour rights activists: 
https://euromedrights.org/publication/algeria-the-authorities-must-stop-harassing-labour-rights-
activists/ (Retrieved 24.2.2019) 
1325 ALERT: Further Repression Against Independent Unions in Algeria: 
https://euromedrights.org/publication/alert-repression-independent-unions-alegeria/ (Retrieved 
24.2.2019) 
1326 Algeria, objective #UPR207: https://euromedrights.org/publication/algeria-objective-upr27/ 
(Retrieved 24.2.2019); Algeria: Joint Declaration: https://euromedrights.org/publication/algeriajoint-
declaration-march2017/ (Retrieved 24.2.2019). 
1327 Algeria 2017/2018: https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-
africa/algeria/report-algeria/ (Retrieved 24.2.2019)    
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these organizations cooperate in close relation with human rights and trade union 
activists. According to 2013 Annual Survey of violations of trade union rights in 
Algeria, published by ITUC, trade union rights are not guaranteed. The report 
blamed the Algerian authorities for restricting the functioning of the independent 
unions in the public sector:  
Travel bans against trade unionists: The Algerian authorities prevented a 
delegation of 96 trade unionists and civil society activists from crossing the 
border into Tunisia to attend the World Social Forum in March 2013. The 
only reason given by border police in Annaba was that the trade unionists 
were on a list of people banned from leaving Algeria because of "unrest". 
Interference in trade union activities and harassment by police: North African 
trade unionists visiting Algeria to take part in the first North African Forum 
to Fight Unemployment and Precarious Work were harassed by police. Police 
raided the hotel where the trade unionists were staying and proceeded to arrest 
five Moroccans, three Tunisians and three Mauritanians, including two 
women. They were then driven directly to the airport and deported from the 
country. The trade unionists detained were due to take part in a meeting at the 
Maison des syndicats. Police surrounded the trade union premises early in the 
morning and prohibited any attempt to access or vacate the building. 
Anti-union discrimination: In March 2013, nine trade union members were 
dismissed from their positions according to SNAPAP when they started to 
call a series of strikes from January onwards. The latest strikes were scheduled 
for 25, 26 and 27 February but were declared illegal by the Court of Algiers. 
Arrest and sanctions against trade unionists: In October 2012, Yacine Zaïd, 
International Union of Food Workers representative in Algeria, was sentenced 
by the court in Ouargla on Monday, 8 October, to a six-month suspended 
prison sentence and a fine of 10,000 dinars (about 100 euros). Accused of 
"insulting a police officer," he had been taken into custody for one week1328. 
The Algerian authorities seemed to dismiss the reports. Relations between UGTA 
and ITUC have especially been frosty. In December 2014, I visited the UGTA-
FNTE local office hoping make interviews with members of UGTA and have also 
more perspective and information from their views about autonomous trade unions. 
I met four persons, who told me that they could not give me recorded interviews 
without official permission. I was told that unlike the autonomous trade unions, they 
had rules and codes that must be followed. They had explicitly antagonistic notions 
 
1328 2013 Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights – Algeria: http://www.refworld.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=printdoc&docid=51b851813e (Retrieved 24.2.2019)   
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on autonomous trade unions and they knew many of them who were living in Oran. 
Therefore, I was not able to record our discussions but I wrote to my notebook 
subsequent notations1329:  
How autonomous trade unions are able to defend Algerian workers while they are 
not even able to defend themselves? 
UGTA defends the state whoever is the President. This is what UGTA has done since 
the founder Aïssat Idir. 
Autonomous trade unions only speak in the cafés trying to turn people against the 
state. They lack plan and responsibility. Some of them are even manipulated by the 
foreigners. UGTA defends Algeria. UGTA has rules and responsibility. 
UGTA is revolutionary and the only credible trade union in Algeria. UGTA trains the 
workers for syndicalism. Autonomous trade unions are “parasite” unions. They do 
not represent neither Algeria, nor workers. They are in marginal. They are politicized 
and do not defend Algerian workers. Malaoui speaks in cafés and do not even live in 
Algeria. 
In addition, I was told that UGTA’s wilaya of Oran contained about 80 000 members 
that were divided into six sections. They also arranged me a meeting in the wilaya 
headquarters of Oran with Secretary General Abdelkader Djattou on 23 December 
2014. The meeting lasted only about 15 minutes. Secretary General Djattou 
explained to me mainly about the laws related on trade unionism. Later on when I 
was interviewing Selim Mecheri in CHU Oran, I told him that I met with the 
representatives of the UGTA in Oran and that the I was told that everything I need 
to know about the trade unionism in Algeria exists in the Labor Code (Code de 
Travail). Mecheri asked me what was the color of the book and I answered that it 
was red. Then he continued: 
SM: […] They showed you the red book of the Labor Code [Code de travail], which 
is the ancient one. This shows that they are disconnected from the new project. The 
new project is composed of 174 pages. Personally, if they would ask from me, should 
I choose the former Code or the new one, I would answer that I prefer the ancient 
one. […]  
KM: In their rhetoric, UGTA says that they are the one that defends the sovereignty 
of Algeria related to external pressure. They are the ones that give formation for the 
trade unionists they protect the workers … 
SM: I totally agree. UGTA participate with us to the framework of affiliation PSI 
Public Service International. UGTA also affiliates to the ITUC International Trade 
Union Confederation. SNAPAP is the only autonomous trade union that is also 
 
1329 Notebook notations from 10.12.2014. 
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affiliated and is the competitor for the UGTA. We are not the representative to all 
the workers in Algeria. However, we are an alternative force. We have managed to 
impose the idea of the trade union pluralism throughout Algeria. For example, we 
have been able to create the CGATA. We are also the member of the ITUC. When 
we were only the SNAPAP, we could not join to ITUC, because being able to become 
a member in ITUC you have to represent all the workers. It is long work that dates 
back until 1990 […]1330 
Mecheri explained that creating the General Autonomous Confederation for 
Algerian Workers (Confédération Générale Autonome des Travailleurs Algériens, 
CGATA1331) in 2013 was the latest attempt to form confederation to challenge the 
UGTA. Likewise, the other attempts to form a confederation, CGATA, was still 
waiting for official authorization. However, next year (in 2014) it was accepted as the 
second representative to the ITUC, which was a major victory for the autonomous 
trade unions1332. The situation is paradoxical in many ways because CGATA, which 
is considered as legal representative from Algeria in the significant international 
institution ITUC, is simultaneously labeled without official authorization as illegal in 
Algeria itself. It is no secret that the Algerian state authorities and especially 
representatives of the UGTA have vocally criticized ITUC’s decision accusing it for 
meddling into Algerian internal affairs.  
The Secretary General of UGTA, Abdelmadid Sidi-Saïd, has issued numerous 
hostile statements on ITUC’s decision and criticized heavily especially the Secretary 
general Sharan Burrow. In a video uploaded in You Tube, Sidi-Saïd calls Burrow as 
a “dog”1333, strong word in Algerian Arabic rhetoric. In addition, Sidi-Said called her 
harka: “The ITUC's SG is a harka because she tried to break the union on the 
international scene and disrupt our UGTA, but found resistance. They (ITUC: 
Editor's note) no longer do union action but destruction”1334. He added that she: 
 
1330 Selim Mecheri. Interviewed in Oran in December 2014.  
1331 CGATA was established in 2013 and is affiliated by five autonomous trade unions: SNAPAP, 
SESS (Syndicat des enseignants du supérieur solidaire), SNATEG (Syndicat national des travailleurs 
de l’électricité et du gaz), SNAP (Syndicat national des postiers) and SAATT (Syndicat autonome 
algérien des travailleurs de transport). 
1332 Algérie Focus 25.12.2014. Syndicat autonomes algériens : reconnus à l’étranger mais hors-la-loi en 
Algérie. http://www.algerie-focus.com/2014/12/syndicats-autonomes-la-cgata-conforte-sa-
legitimite-a-linternationale-au-detriment-de-lugta/  
1333 You Tube – Video 5.11.2016: Abdelmadjid Sidi Said: la secrétaire générale SCI Sharan Burrow « est 
une chienne » https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7TPkSJSODgs (Retrieved 26.2.2019) 
1334 Liberté 2.3.2015. Sidi Saïd tire sur la Confédération syndicale internationale. D.L. (D.L. indicates 
the first letters of the forename and surname of journalist who wrote the article). https://www.liberte-
algerie.com/ouest/sidi-said-tire-sur-la-confederation-syndicale-internationale-221106 (Retrieved 
26.2.2019). 
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“[… ] wants to colonize the other trade unions and I say we are against it, we are the 
only ones who oppose, we refute this interference and that is why I treat them as 
harka”. Sidi-Saîd continued: “It is the role and the moral duty of the UGTA to 
defend the country and fight against the political and union harkas who want to 
attack Algeria. The other unions abroad are each defending their own country and 
they would like to break Algeria and I will not accept anyone who comes to run our 
house”. In 2017, the Secretary General Abdelmadjid Sidi-Saïd accused directly the 
autonomous trade unions of trying in “complicity with the International Labor 
Office (ILO) to destabilize Algeria1335”.  
Discourses related to destabilization and patriotism are especially common within 
official sectorial political level. Sometimes dissensions are labeled as fitna, division 
among the Muslims, which should be avoided refrain chaos and civil war and 
maintain peace and order. To evaluate further the discourses related to 
destabilization, I show few examples how the governmental officials and ruling 
politicians construct their view on stability-instability dichotomy. Such examples are 
relatively easy to find from the media. Next examples are chosen from the timeframe 
2014-2017 in various contexts. For example, in 2014 President Bouteflika 
downplayed rumors related to internal disputes inside the army: “The fictitious 
conflicts fomented between the structures of the National People's Army are part of 
a process of destabilization well elaborated by all those whom the weight of Algeria 
and its role in the region disturb”1336. This quote does not identify those actors, but 
it is clear that those forces are external threat to Algerian stability. In 2015, President 
Bouteflika stressed the internal security inside Algeria  to overpower any element of 
destabilization in the country: “We must, first and foremost, watch over and 
strengthen the home front for the exclusive benefit of the nation,  to face any attempt 
to destabilize the country”1337. This could mean terrorism as well as oppositional 
social movements, such as autonomous trade unions, that function in Algeria. The 
Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal stated in 2017: “There have been anonymous calls 
from some parties to destabilize Algeria” and continued: “There has been an attempt 
to destabilize the country. They think that Algeria can be remote controlled by 
 
1335 Presse-dz 4.2.2017. Après ses graves accusations: Les syndicats autonomes répliquent à Sidi-Saïd. 
Aïssa Moussi. 
1336 L’expression 18.2.2014. Bouteflika: Les conflits fictifs fomentés relèvent d’un processus de 
déstabilisation bien élaboré. 
1337 Midi Libre 9.3.2015: Bouteflika insiste sur la protection des droits de la femme : halte à 
l’obscurantisme. Ines Amroude. 
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anyone. They think of the Arab Spring with whom we have no relationship”1338. 
Prime Minister Sellal connected the “Arab Spring” and its negative implications 
within the region as external destabilization that menaces Algeria.  
What is interesting is how the identities are constructed through discourse 
building. In 2017, the President of the UGTA Abdelmadjid Sidi-Saïd accused 
autonomous trade unionists of being “traitors”, “bought by foreigners” and working 
for the destabilization of the country1339. These accusations target the question of 
the nationalism and patriotism of the autonomous union activists and is connected 
to larger discussion on identities and values. When autonomous trade unions take 
their struggle to the international arenas, they are considered as actors offering 
themselves for the foreign enemies of Algeria. They are accused of surrendering to 
US-EU human rights and democracy discourses constructed to enable the use of the 
practices of soft power in meddling to internal affairs of Algeria. As Idriss 
Mekkideche explained: 
When we live all this, we are treated as collaborators, as traitors and as assets of 
foreigners who manipulate us. This means everybody: trade union activists, human 
rights defenders and all who denounce the corruption. I think it is unfortunate. All 
these people love Algeria profoundly. Otherwise why we denounce? We could easily 
go and rob with them and be in peace. There are those who have their salaries and 
those who have not. Despite that they continue to suffer and fight. I think it is enough 
to show their sincerity. They have nothing. They have been suspended while they are 
50 years old. What do they really profit? I think that the people who are treated as 
traitors and collaborators and who does not have a goodwill are those who are the 
real nationalists and it reminds me of one old Algerian film, where someone spoke 
on the balcony behind the Algerian flag. Then in the audience there were someone 
who said: “show yourself, you are hiding behind the flag”. The people in power hide 
behind the Algerian flag and behind the nationalism and treat the others as traitors 
and all that but in reality they are those who are corrupted and make everyone else 
feel bad in this country1340.  
Both state authorities and oppositional activists construct competing discourses 
about who is in reality authentically defending the interests on the nation: who is the 
real patriot. Who really loves the country and is ready to make sacrifices so that the 
country could be stable, just and prosperous. These examples clearly show the 
 
1338 Sud Horizons 6.1.2017. Abdelmalek Sellal: "il y a eu tentative de déstabilisation de l’Algérie". Nouria 
Bourihane.  
1339 Algérie Focus 2.2.2018. UGTA/ Violente attaque de Sidi-Saïd contre les syndicat autonomes. 
http://www.algerie-focus.com/2017/02/ugta-violente-attaque-de-sidi-said-contre-syndicats-
autonomes/  
1340 Idriss Mekideche. Interviewed in Algiers in December 2014. 
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antagonistic construction of discourses as an effort to command the field of 
discursivity by dominating the central nodal point to rule other fixation of meanings, 
as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe configurate, that can be elicited within the 
context of stability and patriotism1341. These discourses base on collective memories 
related to colonization and the independence of the Algeria. Colonization and the 
War of Independence contain the connotations of self-sacrifice of those who died 
for the independence and betrayal of those who collaborated with colonial power. 
During a photo elicitation interview, Samir Baroud said of the Algerian flag:  
Algeria is our country. Our independence cost 1,5 million martyrs. Directly when I 
see our flag I have an image of these martyrs who gave their life for that we can be 
an independent people1342. 
Whenever activists are speaking of UGTA or the state authorities, they denounce 
their authentic will to work for the common interest of Algeria and Algerians 
through competing floating signifiers that underscore the hegemonic nationalist 
discourses used by those in power as their legitimate right being the representatives 
of the continuity of nationalist values of War of Independence. Middle-aged 
SNAPAP activist Amir Djilali recounts typically about the history of UGTA, where 
the founders of the trade unions are considered the real activists unlike those who 
today represent the central union:   
First, during the colonization of Algeria by the French, in the period “Algérie 
française”, the founders of the UGTA were real activists, because they conducted 
activism for independent Algeria during 1954-1962. However, after the 
independence, people who were in the government exploited the UGTA and changed 
its leadership. Therefore, they all work now for the system. Because of that, there is 
tension, which is arising. There are former activists of the UGTA and there are people 
who have never been part of UGTA, because UGTA does not work anymore for the 
needs of the people or for the workers’ rights. In other words, it works according to 
the will of the Power. That is why there are the real unionist, who work for the unions 
such as SNAPAP, in which I am also a member1343.   
UGTA is accused of representing the rich and those in power, unlike the first 
militants that struggled against colonial France. Oppositional political parties, 
activists in civil society and cultural personalities, such as the famous critic of the 
 
1341 Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal (2001, 112) [1985] Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics. Verso: London and New York. 
1342 Samir Baroud (name changed). Interviewed in Algiers in December 2014. 
1343 Interviewed in the bus heading to World Social Forum in March 2013. 
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contemporary state authorities, the award-winning author Boualem Sansal,1344 who 
wrote sardonically on the government’s use of patriotism, which expresses well how 
the understanding of the issue is contested:      
A tired reminder: the phrase “les constants national” is a registered trademark, among 
others (“the Revolutionary Family”, “the Worthy Heirs of November”, “sincere and 
genuine Algerians”, “the country of million and half martyrs”!!), invented by the FLN 
in the mid-80s as its totalitarian and absurd power cracked under the pressure of 
global recompositions following the collapse of the Eastern bloc1345.  
So when speaking of citizenship rights, autonomous trade union activists attempt to 
brake the official narrative, generated by those in power, of patriotism, nationalism 
and independence. According to Abdel Nasser Jabi, who contextualized his study 
premises on the supposition of existence of the role of generations on the basis of 
the work of Karl Mannheim1346, the current generation in power derives its 
legitimacy from the discourses that base on dominant and hegemonic patriotism 
related to independence war (1954-1962)1347. Those who fought during the War of 
Independence are getting older year by year, and it is increasingly challenging to 
continue the tradition in the coming years, whether in relation to those in power or 
those in opposition. In addition, I believe that “the generational moment” and 
partition on Algerian realities into three coarse generations is challenging and too 
generalizing. In this approach, the transition of power from first to second 
generation is seen as a smooth process due to connectedness between them while 
the transition of power from the older first generation to younger third, which is 
different in terms of upbringing and experienced social reality in post-independent 
Algeria, is seen as a more turbulent and acute rupture. Nevertheless, the tendencies 
to represent the independent Algeria will require new formation of identities and it 
will be interesting to see in the near future how those contestations are conducted.  
Discourse construction related to patriotism and stability is attractive, however, 
and in that debate, France still plays an important role. While youth may be in many 
ways tired of certain nationalist constructions of identity and discourses stressed by 
the older generations based on representations of power positions, the patriotic 
 
1344 Boualem Sansal is well-known critic and award winning author, who was himself heavily criticized 
by many Algerians after his visit in Knesset in Israel in 2012. 
1345 Sansal, Boualem (2006, 30) Poste restante: Alger – Lettre de colère et d’espoir à mes compatriotes. Paris: 
Gallimard. 
1346 Mannheim, Karl [1923] (1952) The Problem of Generations, In Kecskemeti, Paul. Essays on the Sociology 
of Knowledge: Collected Works, Volume 5. New York: Routledge. p. 276-322. 
1347 Jabi, Abdel Nasser (2012) The Impasse of Political Transition in Algeria: Three Generations and 
Two Scenarios. Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies. April 2012. 
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sacrifices and independence related to nationalism still plays powerful role among 
Algerians, even among those functioning in oppositional groups. For example, when 
the French Prime Minister Manuel Valls tweeted a picture of Algerian recovering 
President Bouteflika in 2016 after the high-level meeting between Algeria and 
France, even autonomous trade union activists started to publish ridiculed pictures 
of French Prime Minister, even though Bouteflika does not enjoy too much 
appreciation among number of union activists. 
Therefore, what seems to be more important for oppositional groups and 
autonomous trade unions, is to depict themselves as the real maintainers of Algerian 
tradition of nationalism, freedom and independence struggle, and to construct 
suspicious contributions and connections of those in power to that legacy. The 
young SNAPAP activist Hamid Derradji described his background, coming from a 
revolutionary family while contesting the representativeness of current authorities 
regarding patriotism and liberation of Algeria: 
The Algerian flag is our symbol. It represent the sacrifices of our ancestors. I come 
from a revolutionary family, so this flag is really close to my heart. When we see these 
people like Bouteflika, the President, for me he is not a President. He is just a boss. 
Boss of the Oujda clan. We were able to get out from the French colony and now we 
are colonized by the Oudja clan. By the way, they have been there since 1962. They 
just change the persons but the system stays the same. Those people did not do the 
revolution. They did not really sacrificed for the country. They were mostly waiting 
outside until Algeria got its independence and then came to take the power1348. 
Hamid Derradji used patriotic rhetoric to describe how his ancestors sacrificed 
themselves during the War of Independence for the independence of Algeria. He is 
made a clear division between current President and leaders and those who fought 
for the independence. He frames President Bouteflika and current leadership as the 
Oudja Clan, ta group that was formed around the former President Houari 
Boumédiènne in the Moroccan city of Oudja during the War of Independence. The 
Oudja Group, it is argued, were infiltrated into key power positions within the 
military and politics  to maintain power from other competing power groups since 
1962, when National Liberation Army under his command marched into Algiers and 
ousted the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) and its 
President Benyoucef Benkhedda.  
The antagonistic discourses are constructed to counter-argue the claims of the 
state authorities and their representations of being the sole hegemonic 
representatives of the Algerian patriotism and nationalism. As if they were the ones 
 
1348 Hamid Derradji (name changed). Interviewed in Oran in January 2015. 
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who sacrificed for the sake of independence and have power today to define what is 
good for the country and how to maintain the stability. The statement of an 
important figure among Algerian oppositional forces, Ali Yahia Abdennour, 
describes interestingly these attempts in challenging the monopoly of the state 
authorities to nationalism: “France left through the door in 1962, but came back 
through the window”1349. In addition, Ali Yahia has stated: “Independent Algeria is 
copy from the colonized Algeria”1350. It is common to use discourses constructed 
around the colonialism to challenge the ownerships related to patriotism, as Sidi-Saïd 
also did referring to ITUC’s undesired decision to accept CGATA as second official 
representative of Algeria.  
From the oppositional side, it is common to depict Algerian current rulers as 
modern colonizers and as puppet rulers controlled, in reality, by the former 
colonizers. According to these discourses, the current state authorities are not those 
“real independence fighters” that fought against the French, but those installed by 
the French to rule Françalgérie1351. In some occasions, the book De Gaulle mon 
père1352, published by Philippe de Gaulle that contain interviews with Michel Tauriac 
mentions that: “In addition – what no one has ever said – a hundred thousand 
former harkis are engaged in the new Algerian army of the FNL”. Sometimes this 
quote is used to hint that the French infiltrated harkis to Algerian army and that 
current state authorities stem actually from this infiltrated “traitors”. It is common 
to find from various anti-government internet discussion boards discussions where 
various known Algerian army generals are called as “harkis”1353. 
During the 1990s, the Islamists also launched the concept of hizb fransa (the 
Party of France) to describe the rulers of the country as being led from Paris, and to 
challenge through symbols and language the position of War of Independence to 
 
1349 TSA 30.10.2015. Ali Yahia Abdennour: « La France est sortie par la porte en 1962 et elle revenue 
par la fenêtre ». Imene Brahimi. 
1350 Rezzik, Mohamed (2013, 67) Le printemps arabe et l’exception algérienne. Alger: BOUNAGA. 
1351 Françalgérie is mimic for the term Françafrique, which in contemporary use depicts the assumed neocolonial 
relationship of France with its former colonies. However, the term was first used by President of the Côte d’Ivoire Félix 
Houphouët-Boigny with positive connotation referring that successful economic performance and political stability 
depended on good relation with France. 
1352 De Gaulle, Philippe (2004) Charles de Gaulle, mon père. Entretiens avec Michel Tauriac, tome 2. Paris: 
Plon. 
1353 Harkis were auxiliary military movement that fought alongside with the French during the Algerian 
war of liberation (1954-1962). French left the big part of Harkis after the independence to their own 
fortune and thousands were slaughtered as “traitors”.    
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those in power1354. Lahouari Addi1355 argues that Islamists were successful in 
challenging the cultural and political nationalism represented by the authorities 
during the 1980s and 1990s through multiple religious symbolism. In addition, in 
Algeria the Amazigh movement has also challenged the monopoly of the state 
authorities since the Independence. Meanwhile, President Liamine Zéroual coined 
the term famille révolutionnaire (revolutionary family), which aimed to gather 
various non-Islamist movements under one umbrella1356. It is typical that historical 
and political identities are constructed in states as tools to justify their own acts 
through the construction of socio-political imaginaries. This requires the 
construction of discourses that are powerful tools in controlling and structuring the 
experiences and collective memories under the social practices and conditions, where 
citizens live their everyday lives. In Algeria, post-colonial narrations are created 
through identity markers that stress the War of Independence and sacrifices of the 
Algerian people. Therefore, the competition related to discourses, whether 
challenging or maintaining them, contains the hegemonic struggle integrating values, 
customs, political principles and social relations as described within the theory of 
hegemony by Antonio Gramsci1357.  Nevertheless, the state is, according to Laurie 
Brand, never able to completely eliminate the competing alternative visions of the 
collective memories and construction of discourses1358. 
Therefore, oppositional forces also create and sustain counter discursive images 
regarding the collective memory, where the current state authorities are depicted in 
the exact opposite light, or at least their ownership on these representations are 
challenged. These accusations, the relation between France and state authorities for 
example, are also discussed and raised out in various literatures, such as Lounis 
Aggoun and Jean-Baptiste Rivoire: Françalgérie, crimes et mensonges d’États1359, 
Naoufel Brahimi El Mili: France-Algérie : 50 ans d’histoires secrètes1360, Lyes Laribi: 
 
1354 Brand, Laurie (2014, 174) Official Stories: Politics and National Narratives in Egypt and Algeria. Stanford, 
California: Stanford California Press. 
1355 Addi, Lahouari (1995, 15-17) L’Algérie et la démocratie: pouvoir et crise du politique dans l’algérie 
contemporaine. Paris: éditions la Découverte. 
1356 Werenfels, Isabelle (2007, 66) Managing Instability in Algeria: Elites and political change since 1995. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
1357 Brand (2014, 5). 
1358 Brand (2014, 13). 
1359 Aggoun, Lounis and Rivoire, Jean-Baptiste (2005) Françalgérie, crimes et mensonges d’États. Paris: La 
Découverte. 
1360 El Mili, Brahim (2017, 67-69) France-Algérie: 50 and d’histoires secrètes. Tome 1 (1962-1992). Italie: 
Fayard. 
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L’Algérie des Généraux1361, Habib Souaïdia: La sale guerre1362, and Hocine Malti: 
Histoire secrète du pétrole algérien1363, only few to mention. 
In the interviews, the autonomous trade union activists often argued that there is 
no democracy in Algeria and that it is the army that retains power behind the scenes. 
It is also illustrative, how the well-known trade unionist and human rights activist, 
Kaddour Chouicha, describes the picture of General Khaled Nezzar during the 
photo elicitation interview:  
He was a general in the army, started in the French army. He was not from early on 
in the resistance. He went to the resistance very late when it became clear that the 
liberation movement was seriously going towards independence of Algeria. Secondly, 
he is one of the architects of the civil war in Algeria that was carried out against the 
people after the events in 1990. These are two sides of the same person, because when 
he was in the French army he was against the Algerian people. When he became 
important in the Algerian army, he was again against the Algerian people1364.  
Autonomous trade union activists depict the army generals as unpatriotic authorities 
who design the structures of Algerian governance without transparency, as Ali Yahia 
Abdennour described: 
It is not said by many but as a human rights activist, I will say that Algeria is 
dictatorship. It is even deeper dictatorship compared to what is happening elsewhere, 
Stronger dictatorship than that of Ben Ali in Tunisia [in the past], because there is lot 
of money. They can buy people. […] It is deeper than in Egypt. Listen, it is even 
deeper than in North-Korea. It is close to pharaohs. When Bouteflika decides, 
everybody are included without any discussion, whether it relates to politics or 
something else. […] It is the party of the power (pouvoir) that designs the Ministers, 
choose the ambassadors, the President and take them away. Since 1962, it was the 
army that designed Ben Bella. It was the army that designed Chadli … Boumedienne 
was himself the leader of the army. It is the army that has designed everything until 
Bouteflika. Who brought Bouteflika? He was abroad. It is the army that designs. The 
army removed Ben Bella and Chadli. It was the army that designed […] Zeroual. He 
did not resigned himself as did not Chadli, it was them who removed him1365.  
Ali Yahia argued that France and United States benefit from current situation in 
Algeria, and therefore support current administration: 
 
1361 Laribi, Lyes (2007) L’Algérie des Généraux. Paris: Max Milo Éditions. 
1362 Souaïdia, Habib (2012) La sale guerre. Paris: Éditions La Découverte. 
1363 Malti, Hocine (2010) Histoire secrète du pétrole algérien. Paris: Éditions La Découverte. 
1364 Kaddour Chouicha. Interviewed in Oran in January 2015. 
1365 Ali Yahia Abdennour. Interviewed in January 2015 in Algiers. 
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We have now arrived until certain point that even Europeans and France, country of 
the human rights, assist the dictatorships because it is in their interests1366. 
This is of course exactly the opposite of what the state authorities argue, when they 
accuse oppositional social movements of being tools of the US and France to 
destabilize Algeria. Ali Yahia Abdennour explained to me how the world was 
changing and new emergent powers such as the BRICS countries and especially 
China are getting ever more stronger. He believed that the EU and United States and 
the Liberal world order at large were becoming weaker in terms of the international 
power struggle. He argued that French and Algerian elites need each other:  
They have lot of unemployment in France and they have need to send their 
enterprises to benefit from petro-money of the Algeria. They accept this. […] Today, 
many Algerian patrons have property in France. They have their apartments. If 
something happens in Algeria … a revolution … they have everything for the next 
three generations. […] However, even if the states or governments support the 
dictatorship in Algeria according to their interests, there is civil population that have 
principals such as democracy and freedom of speech. […]1367 
Again we return to the discourse on stability and patriotism. Ali Yahia argued that 
the rich Algerian elite does not care about the future in Algeria. If things go wrong 
and they can no-longer profit from their position and Algeria drifts into chaos, they 
just pack their things and move to France were luxury apartments await them. Social 
media is full of speculation about how much Algerian state authorities own assets in 
abroad and how many millions of euros they have in different bank accounts. Similar 
discussion preceded uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. Simultaneously, Ali Yahia 
appealed to “real” patriotic Algerians who should raise up to struggle for democratic 
principalities and values: 
We must struggle for the democracy. The future of the country depends on 
democracy, which can bring the change and from where does it come from? From 
the army, because they cannot stay aside anymore. Gaid Salah [Chief of Staff of the 
Algerian People’s National Army] has taken all the power. This cannot continue. 
When does it happen, we don’t know. Whatever simple moment can create the 
momentum. If a personality for example is killed or … or if in three wilayas people 
go out to the streets due to housing or… it will instigate the fire. If the army don’t 
move, if the oppositional parties such as CNLTD [La Coordination nationale pour 
les libertés et la transition démocratique] of the Benflis don’t move, the street can. 
Because the street does not take part in parties. The youth … for example, the south 
has never moved, and now they are thousands. […] If we don’t find a political 
 
1366 Ali Yahia Abdennour. Interviewed in January 2015 in Algiers. 
1367 Ali Yahia Abdennour. Interviewed in Algiers in January 2015. 
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solution, there will be an explosion. However, if the power (pouvoir) is intelligent and 
understands that Bouteflika cannot play anymore and they cannot delegate his powers 
anymore. How can they deliver the power to someone who is not elected by the 
people? How do they think that people would follow Sellal, who is leader of a daira, 
who is now elected as the Prime Minister? […] What do you think that the fourth 
presidential term can exist when it is not addressed by the people? It is not possible! 
It cannot endure. Either we find political solution or it will be a chaos1368. 
This describes the situation well, where Algerians gathered on the streets in February 
2019 to protest peacefully against the fifth term of President Bouteflika. Contrary to 
the state authorities’ configurations, Ali Yahia blames current state authorities and 
power elite for drifting Algeria into chaos with support of former colonial power 
France and United States. He was worried about the future of Algeria and predicts 
instability. At the same time, the next quote describes well the actual disperse of 
oppositional forces, whether political parties or trade unions. Solid and organized 
oppositional movement does not seem to exist in Algeria, and this may be partly due 
to the success of strategies by the state authorities, and partly to the lack of credibility 
of the oppositional movements among Algerian citizens. Ali Yahia, like many 
activists in autonomous trade union movement, feared that the lack of organized 
oppositional functioning will lead to unorganized rioting and chaos: 
Algerian society is broken. Civil society is broken. Even the smallest spark can create 
an explosion. Next Monday, it is the Yennaier in Kabylia. There is MAK1369 that will 
scroll in Tizi Ouzou and Béjaïa. Then the police will hit them or someone will die. It 
can explode. Imagine if someone hits somebody or kill? It can blow out. The army is 
actually divided1370. 
Ali Yahia was also concerned at the usage of the so-called baltagias, suspected goons 
used by authorities, to achieve desired momentum of chaos, which could enable 
those in power to use of force: 
DRS can mobilize the youth to go out to the streets. Those who are against Gaid 
Salah and against Bouteflika can use the youth saying: go out to the streets, and they 
will follow. DRS owns and knows them, meaning those that have been in prisons and 
so forth. They will go out, they are hit and the army will interfere. The army will say 
that we will not interfere to make a coup, but because the people demand. They went 
out to the streets and we just return the power to the people. Everything will and can 
happen. Until next April, there will be new Algeria1371. 
 
1368 Ali Yahia Abdennour. Interviewed in Algiers in January 2015. 
1369  Le Mouvement pour l'Autonomie de la Kabylie (MAK). 
1370 Ali Yahia Abdennour. Interviewed in January 2015 in Algiers. 
1371 Ali Yahia Abdennour. Interviewed in Algiers in January 2015. 
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Ali Yahia predicted that Algeria would face an uprising in April 2015, which of 
course did not take place. Important demonstrations took place in May 2018 in 
Oran, organized by resident doctors under Collectif Autonome des Médecins 
Résidents Algériens, CAMRA)1372. The protests drew thousands of participants and 
were strongly supported by different autonomous trade unions1373. However, on 22 
February 2019, tens of thousands participated to express their opposition to the fifth 
mandate of President Bouteflika. Oppositional autonomous trade union activists 
have been waiting impatiently for these vast popular uprisings. The candidacy for 
the fifth term has led to extensive protests all around the country. In the universities 
in dozens of cities thousands of students protested a week later. The demonstrations 
were peaceful and they were conducted in a good spirit. However, there is always 
the risk of escalation and some groups might have an interest in organizing protests 
that are more violent so as to increase polarization to their own advantage.   
Researcher Nacer Djabi reflected in an interview1374 the possible strategies that 
state authorities implement vis-à-vis demonstrations, especially the violent ones. 
Djabi argued that regime prefers violent non-organized manifestations instead of 
coordinated social movement action: 
Historically, the Algerian political system, with its elites and institutions, prefers to 
deal with unorganized violent social movements. It prefers rioting to a conscious, 
organized and clear political movement, otherwise it will be forced to negotiate and 
recognize movements representatives and representativeness. 
When it comes to rioting, the government is not obliged to do all that, because the 
riot does not give a clear direction and form structures. Therefore, it is refusing to 
negotiate with organized and politically supervised movements for fear of recognizing 
their legitimacy. In fact, the unorganized violent movement does not pose a threat to 
the political system. 
These challenges do not disturb the political system, because they do not produce 
alternative elites, let alone new legitimacy and do not pose political problems that can 
really disturb present order. It is in this sense that one can understand that the riot 
becomes a strengthening force for the political regime. By design or not, the 
government anticipates them whenever it finds itself facing a general upheaval, as was 
the case in recent years. It makes them disperse into small movements to avoid the 
big confrontation. 
We must go back in the political history of Algerian society - elites and institutions - 
to better understand the problematic history that is posed to us recurrently and at 
 
1372 http://camra-online.org/ (Retrieved 1.3.2019). 
1373 L’Expression 10.5.2018. Ils maintiennent la protestation: Les médecins résidents campent sur leur 
positions. 
1374 El Watan 9.1.2017. « L’émeute ne menace pas le système, elle lui sert de fortifiant ». Hacen Ouali. 
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each historical stage. For example, let's look at the most recent one, that of the 1990s, 
how the political regime favored negotiation with the “military block” of the FIS and 
not with its policies. It is in this context that one can understand the thesis of René 
Gallissot, which explains the weakness of the protesting social movements as 
generative of the alternative elites, which the Algerian society badly needs1375. 
It is also important to keep in mind that autonomous trade union movement is 
heterogeneous and it would be incorrect to bunch all the unions, and especially 
individual opinions, to same category generalizing that all of them share similar 
critical views and opinions regarding the state authorities. For example, Nouar Larbi, 
the President of CNAPEST spoke in a different tone about President Bouteflika: 
I think he has done lot of things for Algeria. In addition, Algeria was very rich during 
his period. However, there is an absence of good governance. Even though he tried. 
Because there are projects that have cost two, three or even four times more then 
they should that have to be paid, such as highway east-west and so forth. However, 
he did a lot for Algeria. Especially regarding the construction and housing. There are 
many cities that have been implemented or built. Hundreds of thousands of houses 
have been provided during the reign of Bouteflika. However, we are not satisfied. 
Why? Because the amount of money that have been used could have brought much 
more then this. Therefore, what we miss is good governance1376. 
Concerning the picture of former general Khaled Nezzar, Larbi said that they saved 
the country, though they may have been guilt for some atrocities as well. Meanwhile, 
another secretary general, Mohamed Salem Sadali, from the educational autonomous 
trade union SATEF, did not hide his dislike of President Bouteflika: 
When I see the picture of this president, I think he has been really miserable for this 
country, because never before Algeria has experienced the conditions of the life we 
have today due to the presidency of this man. Since 1999, even though there was the 
increase of the prices of oil more than 100 dollars of barrel, if during these last 15 
years the money would have been used to develop our economy and the country, I 
believe we could be within one of those emergent countries. Never before this kind 
of opportunity was presented1377. 
Energy prices fell in 2014, sparking a critical debate about how Algeria is capable to 
maintain its economy and avoid consequences that followed when oil prices went 
down in the mid-1980s. State authorities have been able to contain the formation of 
larger and vaster oppositional front. Opposition, whether political, organizational or 
 
1375 El Watan 9.1.2017. « L’émeute ne menace pas le système, elle lui sert de fortifiant ». Hacen Ouali. 
1376 Nouar Larbi. Interviewed in January 2015 in Algiers. 
1377 Mohamed Salem Sadali. Interviewed in January 2015 in Algiers. 
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associative, is dispersed and lack credibility among the Algerians. There have been 
sit-ins and strikes in various sectors, but the larger oppositional movement does not 
exist. State authorities are able to use various tactics such as negotiations, when 
necessary to search solution for social challenges. In the context of autonomous 
trade unions, In 2014, Minister of Education Nouria Benghabrit initiated concerted 
negotiations with numerous autonomous trade unions. One of the participants in 
the dialogue, Nouar Larbi from CNAPEST, described the process: 
KM: How would you describe the latest negotiation with the Minister [Benghabrit]? 
NL: We have a system administrative and bureaucratic. It is like the colonial system 
of the France. To have this you need a document … it is too much. One can say that 
our actual Minister is more interested in the pedagogy. She is not so much interested 
in the conditions of the good pedagogy, the salaries of the teachers or the expectations 
of the students. It is often said that we have only 42 students in a class. Meanwhile 
we have suburbs, where are more than 50 students in a class, especially in the new 
urban zones. They are really constructed randomly. Because when tens of thousands 
of houses are built, it is done without anticipation of public institutions, such as 
commerce centers, schools or high schools and so forth. In the end, we find ourselves 
in the unacceptable situation. While for them, it is already great when there are one 
teacher and class. We want that the conditions of the workers and teachers would be 
better. Especially when there are financial means. It is not like in Mauritania or Mali. 
Unfortunately, there are lack of good governance. That is the problem. It is not 
intentional to have bad schooling system, no. It is bad management. 
KM: And the meetings [with the Minister]. How they are organized? 
There are those meetings when everybody, every trade union, is invited. There they 
spread information about what they have done etc. However, when we conduct real 
negotiation, everyone is invited separately. Why we are eleven trade unions in the 
education sector?1378 
It is revealing that only the educational sector is divided to eleven different trade 
unions. When meetings are organized individually, it creates even more distrust 
among the unions when competing to represent the workers and show the 
effectiveness of attaining their objectives. Finally, eight unions signed the common 
Charter of ethics1379. While the media praised the success, all the unions that signed 
were those characterized by autonomous trade union activists as clones: SNAPEST, 
SNAPAP-Felfoul, SNAPEP1380, SATEF-bis, Le Syndicat des corps commun, lsa 
Fédération UGTA des travailleurs de l’éducation and UNPEF-bis. CLA and 
 
1378 Nouar Larbi. Interviewed in January 2015 in Algiers. 
1379 Liberté 30.11.2015. Éducation : 8 syndicats signent la Charte d’éthique et de stabilité. Djazia Safta. 
1380 Syndicat National Autonome des Professeurs de l’Enseignement Primaire. 
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CNAPEST who participated to the process refused to sign the charter in the end 
and Nouar Larbi resigned. In 2015, I interviewed Sadali of the SATEF related to 
negotiations between Minister and unions: 
MSS: They call it never negotiation, they call it dialogue (haiwar). Not even dialogue. 
KM: How do you meet, one after one or… and what do you think about of this whole 
process in general? 
MSS: The framework of negotiation is not a framework. Because the Minister herself 
do not consider the trade unions as partners. In front of you there should be a partner 
that is autonomous and is not dependent of you. Because, if something happens, hop, 
we will take away your detachment. We will take away you headquarter. All the power 
is in the hand of Minister. Firstly, the role of the partner does not exist in the first 
place. Trade unions are suppressed. Secondly, the so-called negotiations or dialogue 
take place with non-representative unions. You won’t find the real SNAPAP or 
SATEF in the negotiations. No, never. We have never been invited. They only invite 
the doubles to discuss with them.  
KM: Ok, so it is not you SATEF that takes part of the negotiations? 
MSS: No, not SNAPAP either1381. 
Once again, I found myself being confused which SATEF had participated in the 
negotiations. I asked then about CNAPEST, which can be considered as a serious 
oppositional autonomous trade union movement. Personal, or strategic 
disagreements came out: 
KM: But CNAPEST takes part and CNAPEST is not a clone? 
MSS: Yes, but I know people in CNAPEST. There are the base of the CNAPEST 
and the direction of the CNAPEST. It is the base that is protesting, but those people 
in the high level who organize things accept to play certain game. For example, when 
we organized CNCD, they refused though they were with us in the public function. 
They come but next morning they leave meaning that they don’t engage. They never 
touch the real problems. Regarding the technical issues such as salaries and so forth, 
they are not right. Therefore, the negotiations are not real negotiations and most of 
the actors are not real actors. The negotiations are contested. Even though sometimes 
we get around to the same table […] there are negotiations with everybody [with 
different autonomous trade unions] and in the end we find the trade unions against 
each other. Through inside, through people they decrease the power [of the unions]. 
The other thing is that the decisions, regarding the reforms of the educational system, 
are never consulted. […] However, when the reform goes further and there is a 
 
1381 Mohamed Salem Sadali. Interviewed in January 2015 in Algiers. 
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problem and the students go out to the streets for example, then we invite the trade 
unions to find solutions as if everybody are part of the decision making1382.  
Sadali criticized CNAPEST and especially its leadership while pointing out — in the 
context of their own experience of the negotiations — that due to asymmetric power 
relations, autonomous trade unions cannot conduct real negotiations. Unions are 
dispersed and it is easy for the government to play them off against each other so as 
to have a better position in negotiations. Kaddour Chouicha, who is today active in 
the autonomous trade union (Syndicat Enseignants du Supérieur, SESS), was terse, 
when I asked his opinion on negotiations with Minister of Education: 
There is no dialogue. They know me. They would probably say that take Chouicha 
out and you get your authorization1383. 
Another way to weaken the autonomous trade union movement is to prevent its 
access to the economic sector. According to Farid Cherbal, autonomous unions have 
been unsuccessful in this regard1384. Whenever the autonomous trade unions have 
managed to reach the economic sector, the state authorities are able to block their 
attempts. The latest example was in 2017, when the SNATEG, a union affiliated to 
CGATA consisting of workers of the Sonelgaz, was targeted by detaining its 
president Raouf Mellal and general secretary Abdelkader Koufi1385. In early 2018, 
CNAPEST organized strikes and drifted in direct confrontation with the 
government. Minister Benghabrit threatened to fire all the teachers that joined to 
manifestation. In 2019, the signed autonomous trade unions within the educational 
sector argued that their promises with Minister Benghabrit have not been kept and 
they will continue strikes regardless of negotiation attempts by Minister of 
Education. In the health sector doctors and care staff organized large marches in 
Oran and even in Algiers.  
In March 2018, the Ministry of Employment published an official list, which 
contained 66 officially recognized trade unions in Algeria. In the communication, it 
was stated clearly that the “pseudo-confederation CGATA” and SNATEG were not 
considered as official unions. In addition, the communication stressed that the 
recognized SNAPAP, which is the first officially authorized independent trade union 
in Algeria, meant the SNAPAP-Felfoul. This means that SNAPAP-Malaoui is not 
 
1382 Mohamed Salem Sadali. Interviewed in January 2015 in Algiers. 
1383 Kaddour Chouicha. Interviewed in Oran in January 2015. 
1384 Farid Cherbal. Interviewed in Algiers in October 2019. 
1385 Industriall-union 20.12.2017. Support Algerian union under government attack. 
http://www.industriall-union.org/support-algerian-union-under-government-attack  
 324 
an officially recognized autonomous trade union. In addition, a new attempt to 
establish another autonomous trade union confederation La Confédération des 
syndicat algérien (CSA)1386, collided with a negative decision from the Ministry of 
Work, Employment and Social Security in February 20191387. This attempt was the 
latest push from the autonomous trade unions bringing together 13 different unions, 
the most important of them being CNAPEST, UNPEF, SNPSP and SNPSSP.  
Before the large popular citizenship protests in February 2019, the situation 
seemed extremely difficult for the autonomous trade unions movement. They were 
dispersed and were not able to mobilize significant masses of workers to struggle 
with them against the state authorities. However, the movement continued to protest 
and operating, and by internationalizing the struggle they were able to gain some 
important victories. Nevertheless, the popular protests of February seemed to be a 
spontaneous reaction by Algerians, who were against the fifth mandate of President 
Bouteflika rather then as a result of efficient oppositional sensitization. The 
oppositional movement may had some influence on Algerian citizens, but so far it 
seems that none of the oppositional movements, whether political party, 
autonomous trade unions or other civic association, are able to lead the popular 
uprising opposing the political regime in its entirety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1386 CSA was consisted of 13 autonomous trade unions. 
1387 La Liberté 7.2.2019. Le ministère du Travail dit non : Création de la Confédération des syndicats 
autonomes. Amar Rafa. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
What are the autonomous trade unions in Algeria? They are individual societal actors, 
or social movements that form a heterogeneous political body through a manifold 
organizational network consisting of other autonomous trade unions, human rights 
groups, civil society associations and political parties. While there are dozens of 
autonomous trade unions that work mainly in opposition vis-à-vis the state 
authorities, there are also dozens of autonomous unions that function alongside 
UGTA in accordance with the state policies. Therefore, autonomous trade unions 
cannot be generalized and grouped into a single actor. I have included in this thesis 
the most conspicuous oppositional autonomous trade union actors, while I cannot 
argue that this work represents the vast autonomous trade union movement in its 
entirety. Oppositional autonomous trade unions form an important ensemble within 
the scattered oppositional movement in Algeria and have played an important role 
in the state policies last 30 years.  
The objective of this research is firstly to map and analyze the trade union 
movement, its networks and development in Algeria and to problematize its 
functioning and contribution to social change through normatively expressed 
democracy building. Secondly, to contemplate how the state authorities manage 
peaceful societal development and the challenge presented by these oppositional 
unions. Thirdly, to explore how the citizenship demanded by these autonomous 
union activists is negotiated through nonviolent acts of citizenship in the public 
space? I have analyzed the acts of citizenship of the trade union activists, 
mobilization in general, membership and media coverage as well as the attempts of 
state authorities to control the functioning of these unions. I have conducted the 
main body of the research material through ethnographic oriented fieldwork and 
used discourse analysis as a research tool to analyze the construction of discourses 
through participant observation, interviews and other existing research material such 
as media articles and other available literature.    
The autonomous trade unions are significant political actors. Their organization 
and devoted membership may transform them into a stronger political force than 
scattered oppositional political parties. There are sectorial contestations among these 
unions, while a convergence of the movements has lacked latitude when aiming for 
 326 
larger political change. None of the single oppositional groups, whether autonomous 
trade unions, oppositional political parties or various civil society actors, such as 
human rights groups, have succeeded in creating a credible, cohesive and unified 
alternative force for the state authorities to challenge the power elite in the country. 
Therefore, it is possible to argue that the oppositional forces remain dispersed.  
It is difficult to identify a single reason for this failure. The causes are rather 
combinations of manifold factors: socio-economic development, retaliatory actions 
by state authorities, mutual dispersion due to inter-competition and personal 
relations and other regional or international occurrences that have led to absence of 
compact oppositional set. The international economy that impacts on energy prices, 
the international political situation in general, and regional processes has various 
intricate affects on internal developments in Algeria. Simultaneously, interior 
proceedings and maintained order in the country integrate multitudinous evolutions 
on social and political actors, whether within the societal or on an individual level.  
Because political parties, unions and associations that play a crucial role within 
the formation of political life were not able to function properly or efficiently 
enough, discontent burst out through segments of people in February 2019. It is 
illuminating to observe how challenging it is for the masses in the streets to organize 
themselves and form rapidly a common way to organize and create political 
structures (organizations, associations, parties, unions) that could efficiently 
concretize the people’s will into demands  to proceed towards wished social change. 
It is difficult to know whether the lack of political oppositional organization is failure 
of the social movements or success of state officials’ divide-and-rule policies. At this 
point, it is hard to estimate which political forces or social segments are able to 
transform 2019 uprisings to their political advantage.  
8.1 Evolution of the fragmented autonomous trade union 
movement 
During the 1988-1992 democratic phase, an anomaly within North Africa at the time, 
led to early Islamist gains, as occurred within the post-2011 regional uprisings in 
various countries, maybe most clearly in Egypt and Tunisia. However, it has been 
paradoxical how even the most democratically oriented parties and movements 
supported military intervention at the expense of strain on the democratic process 
itself to save democracy and reform. This was spectacular in Algeria at the beginning 
of the 1990s, when various personalities and movements supported halting the 
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elections to freeze the gains of the Islamist movement FIS. Autonomous trade 
unions have continued to demand the realization of the reforms from the 1988-1992 
period. Therefore, the question I pose is: 
1. What are the contributions of independent trade unionism to social 
change in Algeria and how do they reflect democracy building in the 
country?  
To answer to my first research question, it is necessary to problematize what was the 
role of the autonomous trade unions regarding 1988-1992 aftermath, because before 
1988 they were, officially, non-existent. Nevertheless, strikes and other trade union 
activities took place already before the October uprisings and political contestation 
in Rouiba reflected wider discontent in the country offering an important allusion, 
what was about to follow.  
The violent events of 1988 that led to significant social change and democracy 
building were interrupted due to, first, political stalemate between the Islamist 
movement led by FIS and state authorities, and secondly, civil war. Regardless of 
atrocities committed during the “dark decade”, the most radical and oppositional 
autonomous trade unions, such as CNES and SATEF, were in the forefront 
demanding reforms and promoting democratic social change organizing multiple 
actions in the public space to gain popularity and support for their claims. Members 
of autonomous trade unions were active in various other social movements, such as 
students movements, already before the 1988 October uprisings. However, their 
membership increased, after the laws 90-14 and 90-02 were enacted in February 
1989. The next year dozens of autonomous unions started to appear through various 
sectors challenging the predominance of the UGTA. However, some of the unions 
functioned already before the 1989 constitutional change. Autonomous trade unions 
continue to protest for democratic reforms, which they consider necessary in 
protecting the workers’ rights. 
This study concentrates on the 30 years of time-period between the years 1988-
2018. Autonomous trade unions have been important social and political actors since 
their gradual official creation in 1990. Currently, there exist officially 66 trade unions 
in Algeria. Their mobilization suffered during the civil war in the 1990s and especially 
since 2011 regional uprisings, when they failed to form coherent and unified 
oppositional movement with other civil society actors and political parties. 
Meanwhile, the period after the beginning of the 2000s can be arguably be stated as 
the fiercest phase of contestation and struggle between the oppositional autonomous 
trade union movement and the state authorities. Especially, the hunger strike of 2002 
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and internal attempt to divide SNAPAP in 2004 were visible events in the Algerian 
media and produced popularity for autonomous unions through media attention 
within various newspapers and other media broadcasts. The civil war had prevented 
the possibility to develop trade unionism due to weakened socio-political societal 
situation, but after the peace process came into force, autonomous unions demanded 
the rights guaranteed within 1989 constitutional reform.  
Is it possible to estimate whether the autonomous unions were able to reach their 
objectives during the contestation that has lasted past 30 years? This is how the 
activists themselves feel about their success. Again, their answers show diverse 
positions. The President of CNAPEST, Nouar Larbi, was more optimistic with his 
estimation whether autonomous trade union movement has been able to promote 
democratic development: 
Yes, because if it would not have been successful in promoting the democracy and 
disturb the public power, it would have not been treated by the political parties or 
public power as if it would want destabilize or that it is inscribed to the international 
agenda. I consider myself as a reference of wisdom that is learning the democracy. I 
do not believe that there exists the democracy in the world. I am doubtful but I am 
human being and I believe that human being has rights. I am supposed to defend the 
principles of the humanization. The animals have also right to live1388.  
Mohamed Salem Sadali, Secretary General of SATEF was subtly more pessimist 
regarding past achievements and reflected possibilities to strengthen the activities: 
The only way to solve things is through presence within the field. If the problems are 
only resolved in the high level, they are not the real problems. The presence is the 
only way to solve things. However, even there are intrusions and it [autonomous trade 
union movement] is now dispersed and the autonomous trade unions suffer. There 
is fatigue. There are members that we are not able to defend and so forth. [… ] So, 
now in SATEF we only try to use our energy in the places where it is worth to 
consume, meaning in the real combats related to real questions … but playing with 
small details we will only confuse our members as if we give an impression that 
SATEF exists even though we cannot have any influence on decision making. The 
only way is that trade unions find again their cohesion to form a block so that we can 
struggle together and make things change1389.  
A member of SNAPAP, LADDH and CGATA, Selim Mecheri, told me in March 
2019 that at the end of 2018 they had almost lost all hope for aspired social change. 
The 2019 uprisings surprised even the experienced political actors. However, a few 
 
1388  Nouar Larbi. Interviewed in Algiers in January 2015 in Algiers. 
1389  Mohamed Salem Sadali. Interviewed in January 2015 in Algiers. 
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years earlier, in 2014, he believed that there were some important gains achieved 
showing more optimistic visions than for example Sadali, while he did not shared 
the optimism of Nouar Larbi either. He considered being important that 
autonomous trade unions had been able to permanently implant their existence 
within societal level as one actor among many within the oppositional forces:  
I think that the autonomous trade unions have been able to restore within the spirit 
of the Algerian worker the fact that autonomous trade unions are reality. It 
[autonomous trade union movement] has been able to defy the Algerian system, to 
change the mentality of the system. Because one has to recognize that we have been 
able to gain many achievements, such as increase of the salaries. We have imposed 
the right to exercise trade unionism […] The system play recognition of the trade 
union pluralism in Algeria, which is really important. Before it was a taboo that there 
were this pluralism and we were sure that the system refused the autonomous 
reflection. It always controlled and commanded these trade union organizations 
rejecting the autonomous reflection. It did not want to recognize that there were 
autonomous trade unions. It was able to monopolize or neutralize the political parties. 
I consider them as the pseudo [organizations] … It was able to neutralize the 
autonomous trade unions organizations, all those that refused to align with the power 
[pouvoir] 1390.  
Therefore, while it is not easy to estimate how successful the autonomous trade 
unions have been in promoting the social democracy and democratic reforms in the 
country or how the democracy has developed in Algeria in the first place, it is 
possible to state that autonomous trade union movement has successfully continued 
being an important societal actor in the political level. They have continued the 
democratic spirit of exerting the rights guaranteed in the 1989 constitutional reform. 
I argue that autonomous trade unions have formed an important element into 
oppositional movements especially since 1988 October uprisings and some of the 
most critical unions that function currently within non-authorized confederations 
CGATA and CSA can be considered as significant actors among other social 
movements in Algeria.  
8.2 “Successful” management of the state authorities 
As with the 1988 October uprisings, which were politicized later on by various 
actors, so too trade unionism has also become a political phenomena where social 
and political struggle takes place. While autonomous trade unions have been 
 
1390  Selim Mecheri. Interviewed in Oran in December 2014. 
 330 
powerless to maintain a traditional role within trade unionism due to governmental 
restrictions, they have instead transformed into a protest movement that has 
included various demands on their programs outside from traditional working 
related challenges. Due to the restriction of their action, their contestation has 
transformed into political struggle on civic and associative liberties and for 
application of democratic configurations guaranteed in the 1989 constitutional 
reform. Therefore, many autonomous trade unions are considered to represent one 
of the oppositional actors among many, not as traditional trade unions, though these 
unions politicize various work-related issues: salaries, working conditions, 
appointments, housing distributions and management in general.   
The state authorities maintain various methods of impacting on the oppositional 
trade union movement. Therefore, it is necessary to ask in relation to the state:  
2. How do the Algerian ruling authorities manage the non-violent acts of 
citizenship  conducted by the autonomous trade unions?  
Especially since the beginning of 2000s after the atrocities involving the radical 
Islamist armed forces started to abate, state officials hardened, alongside the 
radicalization of the unions, their stance on civic liberties using the political violence, 
caused by terrorism, as an explanation for restrictions within the public space, where 
autonomous unions were organizing their activities. The state authorities have 
equally aimed at restricting the functioning of the autonomous unions. Preventing 
manifestations, arrests, allegedly created doubles and denying authorization of the 
new movements have been efficient tools to weaken and disperse the autonomous 
trade unions. 
In addition, with the power displays, the state authorities have conducted 
negotiations with the autonomous trade unions since 1990s. However, at least from 
the unions’ point of view, the results have been modest. While these negotiations 
may have not yielded concrete results, they have strengthened and confirmed the 
reckoned position of the autonomous unions vis-à-vis state authorities as credible 
social actors. At the same time, asymmetric negotiations between the state and 
scattered unions have enabled for the state authorities to gain time and disperse the 
oppositional unions even further. 
It seems that the state authorities have been successful in breaking the unity of 
the unified autonomous trade union movement, though it seems that all the 
discrepancies among the key figure activists are not result of successful intervention 
by the state. Sometimes personal conflicts have equally created split among actors 
preventing unification of the oppositional movement. After the Civil War, 
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autonomous trade unions tried to hang on 1988-1992 democratic reforms. While 
their efforts gained little success, they continue to exist and demand the actualization 
of the past constitutional reform.  
At the same time, neither autonomous trade unions nor oppositional political 
parties pose a serious menace for the regime, though through the successful 
internationalization of the conflict unions and human rights groups have managed 
to cause losses for the international image of the government. Autonomous trade 
unions have managed to mediatize and internationalize the internal conflict 
cooperating with multiple international human rights organizations and trade unions. 
For example, approval of CGATA within ITUC as the second Algerian 
representative, while being unauthorized in Algeria, can be considered as an 
important victory within international level for the autonomous trade union 
movement. 
In general, trade unions are more significant when they have the power to 
organize strikes and actions that have an economic impact. The state authorities have 
been successful in Algeria in preventing any oppositional autonomous trade unions 
to reach economic sector and blocking their ability to exercise economic pressure. If 
the strikes are organized only in the public sector, they cannot cause serious 
economic damage and do not have significant international impact regarding energy 
exportations. The latest highly mediatized incident took place in 2017, when 
SNATEG, affiliated with CGATA, consisted workers of the Sonelgaz was targeted 
by the state authorities ending to arrest of the leaders of SNATEG. Sonelgaz, an 
important state-owned utility responsible of distributing and selling the natural gas 
in the country, was too significant to risk for the potential economic pressure.  
Finally, due to economic growth in the 2000s and investments on social 
development, probably inadequate, have slowed down the mobilization of the 
autonomous unions, which have not succeeded to attract the masses of population 
to their ranks. Autonomous unions have constantly lacked members while the youth 
have been mostly passive to join manifest political activity, trade unions or other civil 
society associations. To investigate further the individual aspect related to trade 
union activism, I integrated the theory of acts of citizenship to approach single 
human perspectives instead of abiding solely within the societal level.  
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8.3 Activist citizens 
Before the 2019 uprisings, Algerians were sometimes considered as passive 
bystanders. As I showed above, various quantitative inquiries demonstrated the wide 
and deep manifest political disengagement in the country, especially among the 
youth. In 2011, Algerian people did not follow the mass demonstrations organized 
by the CNCD. Many suggested that he aftermath of the October 1988 uprisings and 
the civil war during 1990s that followed were the most prominent factors leading 
youth to lose hope regarding their abilities to impact on political system. Therefore, 
I was interested in the construction of individual discourses related to activism, 
whether among younger or older members. My third research question sought to 
find out: 
3. How the citizenship demanded by independent trade union activists is 
negotiated through nonviolent acts in the public space? 
The imaginaries related to political passivity in Algeria changed in February 2019, 
when hundreds of thousands started to spontaneously gather to manifest against the 
fifth term of the President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and the whole political system. It is 
inaccessible for this study to estimate whether the masses of the streets were totally 
disconnect from oppositional movements, or if there were any connection at all. 
After the masses started to gather, political parties, autonomous trade unions and 
other associations wished to turn the events according to the best suitable narrative 
for themselves and participated to these peaceful demonstrations. However, it is also 
relatively easy to notice that 2019 manifestations integrate many similar dichotomies 
and statements presented by oppositional autonomous trade unions during the last 
decades, among other oppositional movements, whether related to demands, 
discourses or habits that these demonstrations integrate and resemble. Before these 
massive peaceful uprisings, political activism was relatively marginal phenomenon 
among majority of the Algerians. Demonstrations usually brought together a few 
dozens participants, regardless of the sporadic nature of the events. These protests 
were mainly organized by oppositional political groups but also by various 
inhabitants from local housing districts. But in this thesis I draw a distinction 
between a spontaneous act of demonstration and activism within the theoretical 
framework of acts of citizenship.  
The motivation for the activism springs from the surrounding social conditions, 
important familial figures and friendship including the progressive courses of life. In 
many ways, activism was long process of ruptures from the habitus from personal 
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aspect, while simultaneously acts were not passively given. These individuals 
endeavored more than being merely just institutionalized citizens that exercise rights 
and fulfill obligations. Initially they perceived deficits within the socio-political 
system and then acted to change them. Because oppositional political parties were 
weak, these individuals found autonomous trade unions through internet, via 
personal contacts or by accident as their platform for engagement. The 
transformation continued during the activism within the trade union movement. 
I have shown how trade union activists and state authorities view the societal 
environment from dissenting perspectives, in some contexts even from the opposite 
slant. Both, autonomous trade union activists and state authorities blamed each other 
for destabilization, political maneuvers and unpatriotic performances. Meanwhile 
they both represented themselves as the nationalist protector of Algerian 
independence and freedom. The acts of citizenship had meaning: struggling for a 
better society. Activists argue that their action aimed at increase of freedom and 
democracy. They consider themselves as the representatives of those authentic 
independence fighters that fought for the independence of the country. They are 
against foreign capital owners and corrupted elite who enable stealing of Algerian 
national wealth. They view the state authorities as puppets of foreign interests whose 
rapacious lust for power led to the impoverishment of Algeria and Algerians. 
Activists performed manifestations within the public space through nonviolent 
protests, rallies, sit-ins, demonstrations, hunger strikes, petitions and media coverage 
aiming at transforming their social imaginaries related to state authorities into wider 
collective action. By showing their own example and sharing their views with other 
Algerians they aspired to instigate interest of their fellow citizens to join for the 
common struggle for the better Algeria. Meanwhile, state authorities tried to block 
their access for these spaces viewing these actions as destabilization of the country 
for the benefit of their viewed external enemies of Algeria.  
These disagreements were negotiated through various aforementioned discourses 
that actually led the debate into issues of patriotism and stability instead of 
concentrating on poverty, development of the society and the rights and 
responsibilities of all the Algerian actors. Therefore, the negotiation took place 
elsewhere, though occasionally union activists confronted the police forces during 
the protests. The debates concerned history, values and various other more abstract 
concepts in general. In many ways, discussions for example on the level of salaries 
or regularization of labor seemed to play marginal role. As if there did not exist 
genuine platforms or spaces to conduct those debates. 
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Algeria is currently in the process of the transformation of its second republic. 
The so-called “hirak” movement, or popular protest movement, that gathers 
hundreds of thousands Algerians have shown determination among Algerians to 
achieve profound socio-political reform. This movement, regardless of its loose 
structures, is capable of integrating all the segments of Algerian society. In addition, 
it is explicitly supported by various oppositional parties, human rights groups, civil 
society associations and autonomous trade union movement. These spontaneous 
and vast manifestations around the country surprised academics, political activists 
and Algerian citizens themselves. As if overnight, the whole nation would have 
transformed from active citizens into activists citizens.  
Since February 2019, on every Monday and Friday hundreds of thousands 
individuals have gathered on the streets around the country. The joy and 
determination resembled a therapeutic performance. As if the occupation of the 
public space enabled not only its reappropriation, but enabling personal freedom, 
confiscated by the various authorities and rulers in the past, for citizens themselves 
as well. These gatherings generated public discussion, led to the reappropriation of 
the dignity and formation of new political subjectivity. The foundation of the 
citizenship instigated need to reassure its existence every week, month after month.  
The functioning of Algerian autonomous trade union movement reflects well the 
political and societal “realities” and operational modes of the contemporary actors. 
Large non-violent manifestations follow the pattern of avoiding confrontation with 
state’s security forces and surprisingly peaceful demonstrations have been able to 
generate the necessary power leading to resignation of the President Bouteflika, the 
government and various other key personalities from government administration. It 
is important to follow the contributions of autonomous trade unions for the social 
change in general and for the development of Algerian society in particular in the 
near future. The future will show whether Algerians manage to construct the 
Algerian republic 2.0 peacefully.   
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